peacefare.net

What to do when peace talks stall

The Syria peace talks stalled even faster than I might have predicted, though I wasn’t sanguine about their success. The reason for the suspension is all too clear: the Syrian army is making headway in north Latakia, around Aleppo and elsewhere, with vigorous support from Russian air strikes as well as Hizbollah ground forces and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps “advisors” (more like commanders). President Assad and his allies see no reason to halt the offensive. The Syrian opposition, which had asked at the talks for an end to air strikes and opening up of humanitarian access, sees no reason to talk while its people are getting slaughtered. Those of us who said this conflict was not “ripe” for peace talks, which includes almost everyone knowledgeable about the situation, were right.

That is little comfort. Nor does it mean the UN was wrong to try.

It is the UN’s role in today’s world order to take on cases no one else wants touch. That’s how it ended up with Libya, Yemen and Syria. The Americans and Europeans left Libya to its own devices, which sufficed for a while but then proved unequal to the state-building challenge. Now there is an agreement of sorts, but no implementation. The Houthis and Saudis wrecked a four-year peace process in Yemen, based on a Gulf Cooperation Council agreement and UN mediation, with military action. A recent effort to reinitiate talks has been postponed until at least late this month. Syria has already seen two failed UN efforts to end the war–Geneva I and II they are called–to no avail. Geneva III looks likely to fail too. Let’s hope they don’t catch up with the Superbowl numbering.

These stalled peace processes are bad for Libyans, Yemenis and Syrians, but they don’t have much say in the matter. Civilians are today the most frequent victims of war, as the contestants are so often vying for power within a state rather than trying to defeat the regular military forces of another state. Moving civilians, or persuading them to accept your rule, is therefore the objective, not an unintended consequence. It is far less perilous to guys with guns (yes most of them are guys, though not always all) to go after unarmed civilians, or even armed insurgents, than to contest another state’s armed forces.

The only real beneficiaries of continued fighting in Libya, Yemen and Syria are likely to be the extremist forces affiliated with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. They thrive on disorder–areas that have witnessed chaos are more likely to accept their draconian rule–and the extremists often fill the vacuum as states concentrate their efforts against less extreme insurgents. The one thing we can be pretty sure of from the experience of fighting extremists since 9/11 is that attacking them from the air without establishing order on the ground thereafter ensures that we will have to roll Sisyphus’ rock up the hill once again. And with each iteration the extremists get bolder, smarter and more lethal.

We are all too clearly losing the war against violent extremism. We should be thinking hard about whether the means we are using are appropriate to the task. Washington’s purpose should be to eliminate safe havens for extremists who might strike Americans. Drones have dinstinct advantages. They keep their operators safe while killing bad guys, but they can’t reestablish governance on territory from which extremists have been driven. Only legitimate state authorities can do that. It is time to refocus our attention on where they are going to come from.

Stalled talks are an opportunity. The warring parties in Libya, Yemen and Syria as well as their international supporters should be thinking hard about how these countries will be governed once the killing has stopped. Both the fighting and the peacemaking are worthless without an answer to that question.