Day: February 12, 2016
A view from inside the nuclear negotiations
On February 9, Wilson Center hosted ‘Inside the Iran Negotiations: A Conversation with Chief Negotiator Ambassador Wendy R. Sherman.’ Jane Harman, Director, President, and CEO of the Wilson Center, introduced Sherman, and Robert S. Litwak, Vice President for Scholars and Director of International Security Studies at the Wilson Center, prompted questions for Sherman to consider.
After nearly 20 months of negotiations, a nuclear deal with Iran was reached in 2015. The negotiations took place over a four-year period. The first two years of talks did not accomplish much, but Sherman was able to assess the Iranian mindset.
A major change occurred when President Hassan Rouhani assumed power. While Rouhani is a part of the revolutionary zeal and is a cleric, he is not a strict hardliner unwilling to compromise. He had to address the serious economic problems the regime faced, or else face dissent from dissatisfied constituents. After Rouhani came to power, Sherman took part in secret bilateral talks with Iran. Ultimately, the secret negotiations were brought to the formal table, as Iran proved it was serious about halting production of nuclear material.
The P5+1 formal negotiations proposed a comprehensive plan of action where Iran would no longer enrich uranium beyond a specified level and refrain from producing plutonium. Sherman claimed that this deal was written so Iran could never have a nuclear weapon. If Iran breaks its end of the bargain, the US will reimpose sanctions and military action will be considered.
She added that though sanctions never stopped Iran from producing nuclear material, they did bring Iran to the negotiating table. The nuclear deal is written as a long-term solution. It will remain durable because it is in everyone’s best interests to comply. The deal also guarantees access to Iranian facilities. Iranian production of nuclear material will be closely monitored. The only way for Iran to sidestep this deal would be to produce nuclear material covertly, which is nearly impossible.
Negotiations not only involved the US and Iran coming to an agreement, but also creating a solution the P5+1 could agree upon. Getting all actors to agree was a complex process. Sherman teased that she negotiated with the P5+1 countries the most, and only negotiated a fair amount with Iran. Outside actors affected the negotiation process, too. She dealt with Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu’s criticism of the deal, always remaining in contact with Israel throughout the negotiation period. The US also shared information about the process with Israeli experts and Gulf allies, and always looked for outside input.
Sherman said implementation will be a major challenge. The US received information that someone in Iran had injected gas into a more advanced centrifuge, which the Iranian negotiators seemed to know nothing about. Whether it was someone trying to sabotage the deal, or the restrictions were understood, is unclear.
If there is significant noncompliance in the future, a 30-day period is available to resolve the problem. Communication and transparency is key to this deal’s success. A channel of communication has been established, which has boosted US-Iranian relations, but it is unclear whether communication will generate trust. Grievances are deep on both sides.
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The Russians win this round
John Kerry went to Munich this week looking for a ceasefire and humanitarian access. He got a “cessation of hostilities,” which implies less legal status and less permanence, and a promise of immediate humanitarian access. This was entirely predictable and predicted: the cessation of hostilities freezes the recent Russian/Iranian/Syrian government gains in place on the ground around Aleppo. Humanitarian access will shift the burden of feeding and sheltering hundreds of thousands of besieged Syrians from their own government to the international community.
Just as predictable as this agreement is its breakdown. There is no neutral party to monitor implementation. Even if the moderate forces represented in the High Negotiation Commission, which gave a nod to the deal, restrain their cadres, there are lots of other fighters all over Syria, including extremists associated with the Islamic State and Al Qaeda who are uninterested in stopping the hostilities. The Russian-backed offensive never made any distinction between extremists and relative moderates, whom it slew with abandon. Some of the relative moderates will continue their efforts to flee northwards. Others who remain will swell the ranks of the extremists.
It would be surprising if an agreement built on such shifting sands were to last more than a couple of weeks. The Russians, Iranians, Hizbollah and Syrian forces will suffer many potshots and will at some point decide to take to opportunity to go at it again. The opposition will be trying to regain its footing, but that will be difficult as civilians flee and extremists recruit. The Americans have given no indication of any willingness to beef up arms to the opposition or to allow the Saudis and Gulf monarchies to deliver anti-aircraft and other higher quality weapons. The logistical advantage lies with the regime and its allies, who are not besieged and will more easily rearm and resupply.
So the next round, whenever it occurs, is likely to find the opposition at an even greater military disadvantage. Russia may want to help the Syrian Kurds take control of the entire northern border of Syria with Turkey, thereby boxing in the remaining opposition forces in the north. That could trigger a Turkish intervention, widening the war and weakening America’s best allies, the Kurds, in fighting the Islamic State. The Russians will also want to clear out the opposition forces near Damascus and in the south, where Russian air strikes had intensified in recent days. It is hard to say that the regime may “win” this war, because much of the country will be destroyed, but Assad could end up remaining in the presidential palace and presiding but not ruling over a fragmented and desperate country.
Without a political agreement that leads to his certain departure, it is hard for me to picture the Americans, Europeans and Gulf states supporting any significant reconstruction. Washington has already spent upwards of $5 billion on humanitarian aid and will presumably spend billions more. The Russians and Iranians, so far as I know, haven’t spent a dime on humanitarian aid yet. With oil prices around $30/barrel, both Moscow and Tehran will be hard strapped. Even at $80/barrel they wouldn’t have much to spare. They won’t be willing to spend any significant amount on reconstruction in Syria.
So an Assad “win” will make Syria a ward of poor step-parents with their own offspring to nurture. Some days I think the opposition should just stop fighting and allow the regime to confront the challenges of governing post-war Syria, with its ruined infrastructure, its decimated security forces, its limited oil production, its drought-ridden agriculture, and its dwindling water resources. How long would Assad last? Many Syrians have already been governing themselves through local councils for the better part of five years. It is going to be hard to take the legitimacy and authority they have built up back and stockpile it again in Damascus. Assad may win the military fight, but he has lost his country.
The Russians and Iranians are also likely losers in the long term. They have doubled down on supporting Assad. Their efforts will drive more Syrians to support extremists and guarantee that no successor regime will be friendly to their interests.
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