The proverbial fly on the wall
Here is what a fly on the wall heard yesterday in a well-informed, but not attributable, discussion of Iraq.
The defeat of Daesh at Ramadi has strengthened the Iraqi government politically and refocussed Baghdad attention to what will happen after Daesh is defeated, in particular to the (mostly Shia) Popular Mobilization Forces (PMUs). Once seen as not only national heroes but also a permanent fixture in Iraqi politics, some Shia as well as Sunni politicians are now hoping they can be neutralized as a political force.
How to do that is still under discussion. It is not clear that incorporation of the PMUs into National Guard forces organized at the provincial level, which is what the international community until now has advocated, is the best approach. That could result in making them permanent. It might be better to transfer them, either as units or individuals, to the regular security forces, both army and police.
Even as the Baghdad government has strengthened politically, it has weakened economically. It faces a massive economic and budgetary crisis, due to declining low oil prices. The situation is even worse in Kurdistan, which also faces a humanitarian crisis due to the influx of people displaced by the war against the Islamic State (ISIS).
There is however good news, especially in Tikrit. Sunnis are returning there and joining in the continuing fight against Daesh. The liberation of Mosul it is agreed will require cooperation between Sunni forces and the Kurdish peshmerga. Shia PMUs will be involved only peripherally. The preparations for the Mosul operation, which may not occur before the end of this year despite what the government is claiming, are having a positive political impact overall, though they are causing some competition among Sunni politicians.
The overall Sunni mood is not good. Returns to Sunni areas require local reconciliation as well as law and order. Both are too often lacking. Ramadi is still laced with improvised explosive devices, so returns are minimal. International community capability to support stabilization and reconstruction is limited. The government has few resources to devote to reconstruction in the liberated territories. National Sunni politicians are disconnected from the Sunni population and unrealistic in their expectations.
Serious long-term problems remain. The territories disputed between Erbil and Iraq are likely future battlefields. Tehran still controls some of the PMUs. Iraq’s unity is imperiled, but the Germans and others are making it clear to the Kurds that they oppose an independence referendum. The two traditional Kurdish parties–the PDK and the PUK–are in intensive political consultations on KRG reform and on the issue of President Barzani’s remaining in power. There is some hope for Kurdistan to postpone its ambitions for self-determination.
Everything in Iraq would be easier if Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia could come to an agreement on Syria.
Prime Minister Abadi is not in a strong position. But he maneuvers well and is muddling through. He is looking now to install a more technocratic cabinet that will pursue reform more aggressively. This will not be easy, but the effort merits international community support.
PS: Those interested in the Prime Minister’s own view of the situation can get it here.
RSS - Posts
