Day: February 22, 2016
A cessation of hostilities unlikely to last
It took a week or two, but the US and Russia have finally come up with a joint statement whose Annex specifies the terms for the cessation of hostilities in Syria.
Basically it says to the government and opposition fighters (other than those belonging to the Islamic State, Jabhat al Nusra and other terrorist groups) that they need to accept the terms by noon Thursday or risk attack from midnight Friday onwards. The terms include a commitment to participate in the UN-facilitated political process convened under Security Council resolution 2254, to cease attacks, to allow humanitarian access, to refrain from acquiring territory and to proportionate use of force in response to violations.
The US and Russia are to delineate territories the adherents control and provide the capacity to prevent attacks against those who adhere to the agreement, including a working group and communications facilities to investigate noncompliance. No neutral observers are to be deployed. The UN’s special envoy (Stefano De Mistura) is to provide the secretariat for the effort.
The Syrian regime responded quickly. It announced parliamentary elections for April 13, in an obvious effort to short-circuit the UN political process and present the international community with a fait accompli in the form of yet another fraudulent election outcome. No serious opposition will be prepared to participate in an election occurring that quickly under the disastrous conditions existing in Syria today.
I imagine many of the opposition fighting forces will accept the cessation of hostilities. They are on the ropes after weeks of ferocious and indiscriminate Russian bombing. The civilians in areas they control are desperate. The Americans will do their best to twist arms and deliver their friends, including by threatening to cut off support.
The Russians swear up and down they will do everything necessary to deliver the Syrian government. That is hard to believe after their mendacious behavior of the last few months, when they used the cover of international negotiations to mount their offensive. More likely, the Russians as well as the Iranians will use any lull in the fighting to reinforce the Syrian army, Hizbollah and Shia militia fighters from Iraq for the resumption of the war.
Unless someone comes up with a way of getting Bashar al Assad to commit to give up power on a date certain, I expect any cessation of hostilities to be a hiatus, possibly a very short one, not the beginning of a serious political process. Assad’s calling of elections is a clear signal of his disdain for the Geneva 1, Vienna 2 and other internationally negotiated agreements intended to end the war with a political transition.
The Russians aren’t going to force him out after doubling down on their bet last fall and winning back strategically important territory from the opposition. From Moscow’s perspective, this cessation of hostilities is an opportunity for its allies on the ground to consolidate control and get ready for the next round.
There is no indication that Washington is prepared to do likewise for the opposition, who not only lost important territory to the Russian-backed offensive but also find themselves without the anti-aircraft and other weapons they require if they are to perform any better next time around.
Russia is winning a war in Syria the United States refuses to fight, or let others fight. But in doing so, Moscow has alienated most of the Syrian population and guaranteed it will lose the peace.
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Russia loses
I spoke this morning at a session on the Middle East of the SAIS conference on Russian Foreign Policy: New Spheres of Influence? Here are my speaking notes.
1. As a conflict management person, I look to distinguish between stated positions and underlying interests. That distinction is fundamental to understanding and resolving conflict.
2. Russia’s stated position on Syria, if you listened to NPR this morning, is clear: Moscow says it is not wedded to Bashar al Assad and is fighting terrorism in Syria.
3. While I am ready to be convinced that Moscow was at one time not wedded to Bashar al Assad, it is hard to argue that since September, when Putin doubled down on Russia’s support for him by initiating its air campaign.
4. Russia’s underlying interests are discernible from what it is doing, not what it is saying: Russia’s main bombing targets are Bashar al Assad’s strongest opponents, which include relative moderates as well as extremists. It is doing little to attack the Islamic State.
5. A well-informed Russian told me in December that the targets are in fact selected mainly by the Syrian army, so the targeting is not a surprise.
6. It is now hard to picture any successor to Assad, except a member of his family or inner circle, who would be as friendly to Russia’s interests in Syria as Assad.
7. Rather than gaining a sphere of influence in Syria, Moscow has lost any hope preserving its influence there in the longer run.
8. A transition to a democratically elected leadership, as foreseen in both the Geneva 1 and Vienna 2 statements, will likely end Moscow’s port access and other privileges in Syria, or raise significantly the price Russia pays for them.
9. It is foolish of the Americans to convince themselves that Russia in the current situation, which is militarily advantageous to Assad, will sign on seriously to any plan that ends the Assad regime.
10. In the meanwhile, Russia is causing massive destruction in Syria
11. Moscow’s strategy is essentially a Chechnya strategy—destroy and conquer—without the possibility of post-war reconstruction under a hand-picked autocrat that has worked reasonably well in Grozny.
12. While the US has contributed upwards of $4 billion to international relief efforts distributed both regime-controlled, and when possible, opposition-controlled areas, Russia has done virtually nothing to feed, shelter or care for upwards of 4 million refugees and 7 million displaced people.
13. Those who know the relief business know how useless the recent airdrops of food are.
14. So long as the Assad regime stays in power, I see no way the United States or even the Europeans would pay for reconstruction, the price tag for which is in the hundreds of billions.
15. Syria may become for a while a Russian satellite, but the longer-term future is one in which Russia loses influence not only in Syria but throughout the Sunni world.
16. What can Washington do to hasten that day?
17. The most immediate priority is to save the relatively moderate opposition in northern Syria from obliteration.
18. John Kerry is trying to do that by negotiating a cessation of hostilities.
19. I admire the determination, but he is unlikely to succeed without a clearer American commitment to protecting a specific area in northern Syria from Russian, Iranian and Syrian attacks.
20. That would require a military commitment that President Obama, fearful of the slippery slope, is unwilling to make in a country where he perceives no vital American national security interest.
21. Bottom line: the horror is likely to continue, with the very real possibility that the winners will be extremists and the losers will be Russians.
22. It will be up to a future American president to determine how Washington feels about that.
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DRC election
SAIS student Qifan Huang reports:
Last Wednesday, the SAIS African Studies Program hosted an event discussing the upcoming election in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) with Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, former President of the African Studies Association (ASA).
The DRC faces extreme difficulty in conducting an orderly and peaceful transition between regimes. Nzongola-Ntalaja attributed this difficulty to the weakness of political institutions, including the parliament and civil society. The fragile governance structure in Africa, coupled with its history of invasion, occupation, colonialism, are the root causes of the prevalence of money politics and political crimes, including crimes of war in Sudan, crimes against humanity in Chad, and a number of genocides. The DRC’s present failures must also be observed through these lenses, in both the national and international contexts since 1960.
On the national level, Nzongola-Ntalaja argued that an illegitimate, corrupt and weak regime is the primary reason for DRC’s current situation. The nation is not fundamentally different from Mobutu’s Zaire, with the same failed governance structure. Figures from the Mobutu regime can be found in all branches of the government. Their primary interest is not to serve the people, but themselves.
The progress Congo has made since the fall of Mobutu has not been reflected in the livelihood of ordinary Congolese citizens. Criminals were not punished. Assassinations of journalists and human rights activists with the collusion of the police are prevalent. Political office is seen as an avenue to personal enrichment.
As a result, the Kabila regime has no legitimacy, which is particularly reflected in the 2011 elections when the government manipulated the parliament to change the constitution and directed the security forces to unleash terror and violence against the President’s major opponent. Kabila has also taken desperate measures to win the 2016 election, including attempts to change the electoral law so that national census, which may take up to four years, must be conducted before any election. That attempt was only curbed after the Senate rejected the proposal due to widespread demonstrations by young students. Kabila claims that logistical barriers are the main reasons for him postponing the election, but Nzongola-Ntalaja pointed out that the obstacles are largely political, not technical: they can be solved if the government is committed. Kabila is just using them as excuses.
From the international perspective, Nzongola-Ntalaja pointed to the interference in internal DRC politics by Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, as well as the acquiesce of the international actors, as reasons for Congo’s bad governance. He argued that Kabila is a “puppet,” a warlord without the vision, capability and organization to rule Congo. The country’s eastern provinces are in the hands of Rwanda: James Kabarebe, Kabila’s first Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, is now the Minister of Defense of Rwanda.
Because the 1996 “civil war” was, in essence, a war of aggression against the DRC by Rwanda, Uganda and other regional states supported by Western powers, Kabila was never recognized as someone representing the interest of the general Congolese public. In the years following the conclusion of the civil war, international attempts to ameliorate the situation in DRC, including the 11 plus 4 mechanism and the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, failed, adding to the instability of the Kabila regime. Support for Kabila by the EU, the UN, among other international actors, including their recognition, at least partially, of the 2011 election, contributed to Kabila’s desire to stay in power.
Only the Congolese people can save themselves from Kabila, Nzongola-Ntalaja argued, praising the recent protests in Kinshasa and other regions of the country and wishing for a fair election in the second half of 2016.
In the Q&A session, Nzongola-Ntalaja discussed further the indulgence of the international community towards Rwandan President Kagame, due to the fear of Rwanda no longer engaging in peacekeeping and fighting terrorism. The strength of civil society in Eastern Congo, peacekeeping offensives against M23 and other rebel groups, and the role of Angola were also discussed.
To conclude, Nzongola-Ntalaja pointed to the dire need for the protesters to find good leadership who can mobilize the population and fight the regime, as well as mobilize regional and international backers, to curb Kabila’s ambitions. He has full confidence in the power of the people to elect a truly democratic president in the near future.
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