Russia loses

I spoke this morning at a session on the Middle East of the SAIS conference on Russian Foreign Policy: New Spheres of Influence? Here are my speaking notes.

1. As a conflict management person, I look to distinguish between stated positions and underlying interests. That distinction is fundamental to understanding and resolving conflict.
2. Russia’s stated position on Syria, if you listened to NPR this morning, is clear: Moscow says it is not wedded to Bashar al Assad and is fighting terrorism in Syria.
3. While I am ready to be convinced that Moscow was at one time not wedded to Bashar al Assad, it is hard to argue that since September, when Putin doubled down on Russia’s support for him by initiating its air campaign.
4. Russia’s underlying interests are discernible from what it is doing, not what it is saying: Russia’s main bombing targets are Bashar al Assad’s strongest opponents, which include relative moderates as well as extremists. It is doing little to attack the Islamic State.
5. A well-informed Russian told me in December that the targets are in fact selected mainly by the Syrian army, so the targeting is not a surprise.
6. It is now hard to picture any successor to Assad, except a member of his family or inner circle, who would be as friendly to Russia’s interests in Syria as Assad.
7. Rather than gaining a sphere of influence in Syria, Moscow has lost any hope preserving its influence there in the longer run.
8. A transition to a democratically elected leadership, as foreseen in both the Geneva 1 and Vienna 2 statements, will likely end Moscow’s port access and other privileges in Syria, or raise significantly the price Russia pays for them.
9. It is foolish of the Americans to convince themselves that Russia in the current situation, which is militarily advantageous to Assad, will sign on seriously to any plan that ends the Assad regime.
10. In the meanwhile, Russia is causing massive destruction in Syria
11. Moscow’s strategy is essentially a Chechnya strategy—destroy and conquer—without the possibility of post-war reconstruction under a hand-picked autocrat that has worked reasonably well in Grozny.
12. While the US has contributed upwards of $4 billion to international relief efforts distributed both regime-controlled, and when possible, opposition-controlled areas, Russia has done virtually nothing to feed, shelter or care for upwards of 4 million refugees and 7 million displaced people.
13. Those who know the relief business know how useless the recent airdrops of food are.
14. So long as the Assad regime stays in power, I see no way the United States or even the Europeans would pay for reconstruction, the price tag for which is in the hundreds of billions.
15. Syria may become for a while a Russian satellite, but the longer-term future is one in which Russia loses influence not only in Syria but throughout the Sunni world.
16. What can Washington do to hasten that day?
17. The most immediate priority is to save the relatively moderate opposition in northern Syria from obliteration.
18. John Kerry is trying to do that by negotiating a cessation of hostilities.
19. I admire the determination, but he is unlikely to succeed without a clearer American commitment to protecting a specific area in northern Syria from Russian, Iranian and Syrian attacks.
20. That would require a military commitment that President Obama, fearful of the slippery slope, is unwilling to make in a country where he perceives no vital American national security interest.
21. Bottom line: the horror is likely to continue, with the very real possibility that the winners will be extremists and the losers will be Russians.
22. It will be up to a future American president to determine how Washington feels about that.