Heresies

The Middle East Institute today published my heresies concerning America’s future in the region. Essentially I agree with President Obama that American interests in the region are declining and shifting: the nuclear deal with Iran has postponed the proliferation threat and American dependence on Middle East oil is declining. Other interests like the fight against terrorism and maintaining relations with our allies require less military presence in the region and more attention to civilian functions like state-building, diplomacy to create a regional security architecture, and continuation of democracy support to those who desire it. Military assistance to allies in no way justifies the current massive US military presence in the Middle East, which attracts more problems than it solves.

This is not as different from Ken Pollack’s recent Fight or flight: America’s choice in the Middle East as might be imagined. Ken also emphasizes the important civilian dimensions of stabilizing the region, especially once the civil wars are brought to an end. But he uses the oil issue as his trump card in arguing for continued US engagement and even re-commitment to the region, as he fears breakdown of Saudi Arabia.

I am perfectly willing to concede that is a possibility, but it is one the Saudis have every incentive to prevent. How redoubling American military commitment to the Middle East would contribute is not clear to me. I am confident that any future regime in the Kingdom will want to protect itself and its oil exports. A disruption of Saudi exports, should it occur, can be met more readily by drawdown of the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve, coordinated with other countries through the International Energy Agency as well as with China and India. Getting those two major importers of Middle Eastern oil to hold at least 90 days of strategic stocks would do much more for stability of the oil market than the Fifth Fleet, which is ill-suited to respond in any substantial way to internal disorder in Saudi Arabia.

Should an oil supply disruption last a long time, the consequent increase in prices will bring back a lot of “non-conventional” oil and gas. The technology for producing it is spreading around the world, so it is unlikely we’ll see a rise much above $70 per barrel during the next decade or more.

The Saudis could also do some things to improve the security of their oil exports. Existing pipelines that circumnavigate the strait of Hormuz are not used to full capacity. New pipelines could be built. The Kingdom would be wise to improve treatment of its Shia minority, many of whom live in oil-producing areas.

Some think Syria demonstrates that it would be better to fight wars in the Middle East than reduce our commitments there. I’d be quick to admit that President Obama’s inattention to Syria during the peaceful phase of its revolution was a serious mistake. He should have ensured that saying Bashar al Assad needed to step down was translated into action. It was clear from early on that his staying would lead to violence, that violence would lead to sectarian polarization, and that polarization would lead to radicalization.

But I disagree with those who claim the best way of ensuring that Assad left would have been to attack his chemical weapons facilities. That option did not arise until August 2013, which was well after the rebellion turned violent. Two years earlier would have been the best time to act, most likely through diplomatic and political means rather than military ones.

The failure to do so has created an enormous mess in Syria, but it is one that does not actually affect oil production and exports much. Even the humanitarian catastrophe should concern the Europeans more than the US, because of their vulnerability to migrants.

The big challenge in the Middle East today is creation of some kind of security architecture to channel competition into peaceful arenas. While American military capacity has a role to play in shaping the environment in which that is achieved, the task is essentially a diplomatic one requiring Iran and Saudi Arabia to come to terms and seek to reduce the threats that each perceives, stemming in part from the other. That should not be impossible. We did at least that well with the Soviet Union during a period of much greater threat to the US than any today. Detente is not a four letter word.

The Middle East today needs more diplomacy, state-building and democracy. It could do with a lot less saber-rattling and killing.