Day: April 19, 2016

Macedonia agonistes

Posted in Daniel Serwer - April 19, 2016 - 1 Comment

My inbox continues to produce interesting material. Today it was this opposition perspective from Hristijan Gjorgievski, commenting on the situation in Macedonia (but read also President Ivanov’s government perspective, at the link below):

I am writing to send you a short brief on the ongoing political crisis in Macedonia, which last week reached a new high. This is an issue that has been very close to my heart, and on which I have been working intensely together with other colleagues in Macedonia, with the end goal of putting an end to a corrupt regime and putting the country back on its Euro-Atlantic track.
In February of last year, Zoran Zaev, the leader of the largest opposition party the Social-Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) revealed an unprecedented scandal where a small cabal around Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski illegally wire-tapped 20,000 citizens over a period of many years, starting at least in 2011. This number amounts to one percent of Macedonia’s population and includes opposition and government politicians, academics, civil society, foreign diplomats, journalists, church officials and others. The wire-taps revealed unprecedented government corruption, electoral fraud, political acts of revenge, a murder cover-up and much more that has taken place during 10-year reign of VMRO-DPMNE.
In July 2015, the ensuing fall-out culminated with an agreement between the leaders of the four main parties, under the auspices of the United States and the European Union, referred to as the Przhino agreement. The main pillar of the agreement was the establishment of a special prosecutor to investigate all cases resulting from the wire-tapping, as well as the formation of a technical government that would prepare the ground for free and fair elections. The prosecutor began its work in December, Prime Minister Gruevski resigned in January 2016, and control of the ministries for police and social policy was ceded to the opposition SDSM.
However, as the prosecution began opening investigations and requesting detentions for high ranking members of the ruling party VMRO-DPMNE, the agreement began falling apart. On top of stalling on all issues outlined in the agreement, the ruling party took a number of steps to delay reforms in the police and media, revisions of the voters’ list, as well as wider reaching reforms to detach the party from state institutions, which it had so completely captured.
The high drama escalated last week on April 12, when the President of Macedonia Gjorge Ivanov announced a wide-ranging pardon/abolition of 56 individuals charged (or yet to be charged) in the most serious cases of wiretapping, electoral fraud, murder cover up and corruption. Among this group were former premier Gruevski (pardoned on 5 counts), his cousin and former secret police director Sasho Mijalkov (6 pardons), as well as the former minister of police and transport Gordana Jankulovska (13 pardons) and Mile Janakievski (16 pardons). It is widely acknowledged that the president’s decision was pushed by Gruevski and his team, and the president was obliged to sign it under some duress. The matter is further complicated by the fact that the president had no legal basis for the pardons, pardoned people who were not yet charged (presumably illegally acquiring confidential information available only to the prosecution) and failed the follow the proper procedure for pardoning.
The president’s decision sparked citizen outrage in Skopje. Protesters demolished the president’s constituency office in the center of the city and sparked off mass daily protest. These citizen protests are now entering their second week and have expanded to eight different cities.  The United States and the EU have come out uncharacteristically strongly against the president’s decisions and urged him in no uncertain terms to revisit his decision. The state department and EU Commission indicated that criminal impunity endangers the country’s Euro-Atlantic future, makes elections on June 5 impossible and that results from an “undemocratic” elections would not be recognized by them.
Complicating matters further, the decision has sparked a confrontation between the US and the EU on one side and Russia on the other. At the onset of the crisis a year ago, the Russian embassy issued a statement on Macedonian internal politics for the first time in 24 years. Coupled with statements by minister Lavrov in the Duma about scenarios to destabilize and divide Macedonia and plunge the Balkans into chaos, the crisis has developed a wider geo-strategic component in the post-Ukraine/South Stream context.
Two days after the president’s pardons, the Russian embassy in Skopje issued a statement accusing the opposition of being used “as an external tool” to stir internal division and warned the US and EU against pushing for a “Ukrainian scenario in Macedonia.” This was immediately followed up by similar stories in media outlets such as Russia Today (link included below), and corresponded with some of the insinuations and accusations put forward by president Ivanov. Contacts between high ranking VMRO officials with Russian contacts in Skopje and abroad have been well documented this past year.
Subsequently, VMRO has pushed ahead for elections to be held on June 5 without meeting any of the agreed upon conditions. Parliament has been officially dissolved, though the legal basis for the dissolution remains unclear. The opposition consisting of over 11 parties, led by SDSM, have firmly stated that they will “neither participate, nor allow” for another criminal election to take place. The citizen protests have expanded across Macedonia. In response, VMRO is planning big counter-protests against the opposition for this week, setting the stage for yet another escalation; this time amongst the citizens themselves. In an attempt to revive the agreement, the EU supported, rather firmly, by the US is trying to gather the party leaders for renewed talks in Vienna planned for Friday, April 22.
A number of citizens, including myself, are working daily to get the message out to friends and allies, and persons interested in the Balkans and democracy in southeast Europe. We hope to garner support for free and democratic Macedonia and initiate wider political debate with and action by allies of Macedonia, especially in the US. If you feel so inclined, please circulate this note to whoever you think may be interested.
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The ISIS war and Iraq’s politics

Posted in Daniel Serwer - April 19, 2016 - 0 Comment

The Turkish Anadolou news agency asked me some questions about the war against the Islamic State in Iraq. Then the International Business Times asked questions about the political situation in Iraq. I answered:

Anadolou agency on the war against ISIS

Q: The Pentagon has recently announced that it has built up a fire base where American Special Operation Forces operates artillery against Daesh and a few weeks later the Department said that it may establish more fire bases ahead of Mosul offensive and just yesterday we heard that the Pentagon is also authorizing deployment of 200 additional troops alongside combat helicopters to the help the operation.

First of all what does this tell us about Obama administration’s policy in Iraq?

A: Obama wants to do what he can to destroy the Islamic State before leaving office. Recent progress in getting ISIS to give up territory is making the Americans want to accelerate the process. They are prepared to take some additional risk in order to do so.

That said, I think one of the important decisions recently has been increased funding for the Kurdish peshmerga, who have proven among the most effective troops fighting IS.

Q: Is the US involving more and more in the swamp in Iraq?

A: Yes, though I’m not sure it is really a swamp. IS lacks the popular support that made Vietnam a quagmire.

Q: Do you think that Obama’s no boots on ground policy is over?

A: It is clearly over. The American troops on the ground will certainly be defending themselves as the need arises.

Q: Without the US isn’t it possible for Iraqi forces to retake Mosul?

A: I don’t know that it is possible with the US. Mosul will be a big and difficult operation. I imagine the Americans and Iraqis are hoping that it will fall without a major battle.

Q: Why does the administration feel compelled to involve itself in the Mosul operation in a combat role?

A: The Americans want to accelerate the process and have important means–like the Apaches–that the Iraqis lack.

Q: How is this troop build-up in Iraq tied into the election process? And what does it tell us about post-election term or next president?

A: I doubt it is tied to the election process itself, because ISIS has really not been a big issue, yet. But it is certainly tied to the approaching end of the Administration.

The next president will be under the same pressures Obama is. Cruz, Trump, Kasich or Clinton might be inclined to respond by doing more. There is lots of pressure from the American public to finish with the Islamic State as soon as possible and to get American troops out of harm’s way. Sanders would want to do less.

International Business Times on the political situation in Iraq

Q: Abadi said his goal is to fill his cabinet with technocrats. What does that mean in reality and why have so many people refused their appointments?

A: What it should mean is the appointment of people based more on their technical competence than on party or sectarian affiliation. You have to ask the people who refused appointments why they did so, but clearly any new minister would like to be sure that he or she will have the kind of political support required to get the job done. That will be especially true for more “technical” types, who can’t by definition assume political support.

Q: Who pressured Abadi into reshuffling his cabinet? Shiite clerics or the US? How much do you think the Americans were involved in this decision?

A: I think the Americans are supportive of Abadi in general and his decision to reshuffle the cabinet with more competent people in particular. You’ll have to ask the Shiite clerics about their views, though one of them–Muqtada al Sadr–clearly played a key role in the demand for a “technical” government. It seems to me Shiites in Iraq in general are demanding more competent and accountable governance. That is not a bad thing.

Q: How does what is happening now in Baghdad compare to what happened under Maliki? Seems like the US keeps repeating its mistakes when it comes to advising Baghdad.

A: Maliki became increasingly autocratic and sectarian. Quite the opposite is true of Abadi: it seems to me he is trying hard to move in a less sectarian and less autocratic direction. It isn’t easy.

Q: Parliament has always been dysfunctional. What makes this current political crisis different?

A: Different from what? In parliamentary systems, getting approval for a ministerial reshuffle when the governing party does not have a clear majority is often difficult. Iraq is not a consolidated democracy like the UK or Germany. Baghdad is also under enormous pressure from the war against IS, the fall in oil prices, Kurdistan’s growing appetite for independence and Sunni discontent.

Certainly the Americans would be happy to see a new government in place focusing its attention on defeating IS and governing effectively on the territory regained from it.

Q: What is at stake here? Are we seeing this trickle down to the local population? Have any affects on the economy?

The Iraqi economy is already on the ropes due to low oil prices. I don’t think the political situation comes near to that as a depressing influence.

A: How much of what is happening in Baghdad is a result of U.S. policy failures?

Q: I see it more as a result of US success in installing a parliamentary semi-democracy in Iraq. I don’t really regret the fall of Saddam Hussein, even if some Iraqis and Americans do. But not everything in Iraq is a consequence of what the US does. There is an Iraqi political dynamic over which Washington has little real influence.

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Macedonia needs to heal itself

Posted in Daniel Serwer - April 19, 2016 - 1 Comment

Boris Georgievski of Deutsche Welle asked some questions about Macedonia. I replied: 

Q: President Ivanov’s decision to pardon over 50 corrupt politicians and their aides caused a stir in Macedonia. What is your take on the current situation in the country?

A: Messy. This grossly inappropriate amnesty comes on top of a major wire tapping scandal that revealed widespread government malfeasance. It’s clearly time to clean up.

Q: How did Macedonia became a problem child again, after being fan-fared for years as a model of multiethnic democracy in the Balkans?

A: I wouldn’t minimize what Macedonia has achieved: economic reform has brought growth in the past decade that is relatively strong. The country has enjoyed a good deal of stability with a governing condominium of Macedonians and Albanians. But at least some of those in power have forgotten that they can be held accountable, judicially as well as electorally. That happens in democracies.

Q: The pardons have been condemned internationally, with the US and EU warning that they raised questions about rule of law in Macedonia and could undermine the country’s aim of joining the EU. Can we expect to see more direct actions by both Washington and Brussels?

A: You’ll have to ask official Washington and Brussels. But I doubt either one will roll out a red carpet these days for the president or prime minister of Macedonia, or any of those amnestied.

Q: An unnamed EU diplomat told the Wall Street Journal last week that the possibility of sanctions against individual politicians and the country might be on the horizon. What could be the next steps from the US especially since the country is in an election year?

A: Sanctions against individuals–travel bans, asset freezes–are possible, though I don’t expect them to have much immediate effect. And the governing parties still seem to be holding their own with public opinion.

Q: Many analysts, both in Macedonia and outside, suggest that the crisis in Macedonia was tolerated for too long by the international community. Is it an issue of the international community having no interest in the country and its democratic development?

A: I don’t think you should expect the international community to have more knowledge of, or interest in, corrupt practices than the citizens of Macedonia. Democracy is a system of self-government, not an imposition from abroad.

Q: Are the authoritarian regimes on the rise in Europe, especially in the Balkans? What is the reason for this phenomenon?

A: The pendulum swings. Incumbent politicians often use all the means at their disposal to remain in power. In democracies that are not fully consolidated, those means include influence over the press, illicit wire tapping, and pardons for corrupt officials. Macedonia, like other countries in the Balkans, needs an independent judiciary and vigorous electoral competition.

Q: Finally, is the EU choosing stability over democracy by tolerating hybrid authoritarian regimes like Gruevski’s in Macedonia. What’s the US role in the Balkans?

A: The US sees itself mainly in a supporting role today in the Balkans, following the EU lead. I’m pretty sure both Brussels and Washington will support a credible effort to clean up corrupt behavior and block authoritarianism in the Balkans. Both want Macedonia in NATO and the EU. But it is up to the citizens of Macedonia to ensure that their government does what is needed to qualify for membership.

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