Month: April 2016
Tin cupping
A friend dropped this piece in my in box:
Iraqi Kurdistan is in trouble. Last week its Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani visited Washington, along with a Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) delegation of officials, including Interior Minister Kareem Sinjari and head of foreign relations Falah Mustafa Bakir, to convince the US Administration to release more funds. The delegation pitched a stark message to policy makers: Kurdistan is the most effective force fighting ISIS, but it faces a greater existential threat–the economy. That economy has come unstuck as oil and gas prices have tanked, and the Iraqi government has refused to release Kurdistan’s share of the federal budget.
Meanwhile Kurdistan’s peshmerga fighters have been spearheading the war on ISIS, even as the Iraqi-Kurdistan region plays host to 1.8 million refugees. The KRG cannot keep up with these pressures.
But the KRG’s woes are, at least in part, of its own making. The budgetary dispute with Baghdad came after repeated failures to uphold the KRG’s side of an oil production agreement. In a provocative move, the KRG signed an oil supply deal with Turkey in an attempt to further bypass Iraq, and at the end of 2015 seized deposits at two branches of the Iraqi central bank. The money went mainly to pay a vast public sector. Once Baghdad pulled the plug, the KRG was forced to make up the deficit by selling off oil. When the price of oil dropped the government fell four months in arrears for civil service salaries and three months in arrears for peshmerga soldiers. Salaries have been cut to enable payments.
Now Qubad says the KRG is running a $100 million deficit per month, down from a high of $400 million thanks to pay cuts and austerity measures. Even so, Kurdish officials know this is a huge hole to plug. The recent delegation ominously warned policy makers that if the KRG continues at this rate it will fall behind on payments again, including to its peshmerga fighting ISIS.
This is why the Kurdish delegation was in Washington. It needs money, badly. The public sector employs over 1-in-5 in Kurdistan, so the failure to pay salaries is felt broadly. The KRG has justified pay cuts to its employees as a necessary measure to allow those reduced salaries to be paid on time. If the government falls behind again, workers may reach new levels of unrest.
Given the problems the region is beset with, one might expect the KRG to shelve its long-held ambitions for independence. The US is unlikely to support an independence bid at this time: US policy has long supported a united Iraq, and that position is unlikely to change while the Kurdish economy remains a mess and ISIS remains at large.
It is surprising then, that last month President Barzani reaffirmed his support for an independence referendum, setting the timeline for “before October.” Officials and experts have suggested that Barzani is creating a distraction, trying to draw attention away from his refusal to stand down after his term expired last year. But Qubad appeared to support President Barzani when speaking at the Wilson Center in DC last Thursday. While stopping short of naming a date, he unequivocally denied that the referendum issue was a distraction.
Talabani is a member of the opposition Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Former Kurdish officials and those who know him describe him as pragmatic on the independence issue. He understands that Kurdistan cannot expect to transition to independence while all of its prospective neighbors remain skeptical, if not outright hostile to the prospect of a Kurdish nation. It certainly cannot expect a smooth transition while its economy is already on its knees, and it is fighting a war with a frontline less than 50 miles from its capital at Erbil. His decision not to play down independence suggests Kurds may be hoping to use it as threat, if attempts to secure aid are met with uncertainty, if not outright rejection.
US aid, if it comes, will almost certainly require the KRG to drop its independence bid for now. If Kurdish officials are digging in on the issue, it bodes ill for the prospects of a swift resolution. It is possible Talabani’s decision to talk up the issue is evidence of failed negotiations with the administration and with Congress. That means there may be worse to come for Kurdistan, and US-Kurdish relations.
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Peace Picks April 18-22
- A Conversation on Jerusalem and the Future of the Peace Process with Daniel Seidemann | Monday, April 18th | 12:15-1:30 | Middle East Institute and Johns Hopkins SAIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Middle East Institute (MEI) and the Conflict Management Program of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) are pleased to host internationally renowned Jerusalem expert and activist Daniel Seidemann in a discussion with Al Arabiya TV’s Muna Shikaki about ongoing settlement activities in Jerusalem and challenges to an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. Seidemann has observed that Jerusalem is becoming “the central arena for Israeli-Palestinian skirmishing of such intensity that developments there jeopardize the very possibility of a two-state solution and threaten to undermine both local and regional stability.” In the absence of a political dialogue, Israel is extending physical barriers and discussing ideas to more thoroughly separate the communities, particularly in Jerusalem. In this period of growing crisis, what steps can advocates of a two-state solution – in the region and in the U.S. and Europe – take to preserve the prospect? Daniel Serwer (SAIS and MEI) will introduce the program.
- Beyond Migration: The Refugee Crisis in Europe and the Challenges of Immigrant Integration | Monday, April 18th | 3:30-5:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Despite decades of immigration, even the most multicultural countries in Europe are struggling with the scale of the current refugee crisis, and the challenge of integrating the newcomers. This crisis, one of Europe’s biggest of the past century, has the potential to alter the political fabric of the continent and undermine the foundation of post-WWII transnational institutions. The political and humanitarian consequences of the EU’s deal with Turkey have drawn much attention. But what about those refugees who have already made the trip and are now settling in Europe, if only temporarily? Looking back, what lessons can European governments learn from successes and failures in integrating earlier generations of immigrants? Join us for a discussion of the dilemmas of immigration control in Europe, as well as the longer-term issues of immigrant integration, identity, and belonging. Speakers include Henri J. Barkey, Director of the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center, James Hollifield, Public Policy Fellow at the Wilson Center, and Riva Kastoryano, Senior Research Fellow, Center for International Research, SciencesPo, Paris.
- High Stakes at the Gulf Summit: What President Obama Should Get from the GCC Meeting | Tuesday, April 19th | 2:00-3:30 | Center for Transatlantic Relations and Human Rights First | REGISTER TO ATTEND | On April 21 President Obama will attend the Gulf Co-operation Council Summit in Saudi Arabia, with a series of crises confronting the Gulf monarchies. Syria, Yemen and Iran will be key components of the discussions, as well how to prevent violent extremism. Join us for a panel discussion featuring regional specialists on what Obama should achieve in the GCC meeting, and why it matters so much. Introductory remarks will be made by Ambassador Andras Simonyi, Managing Director, CTR. Speakers include Hala Aldosari, Visiting Scholar, the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, Brian Dooley, Director, Human Rights Defenders, Human Rights First, and Matar Ebrahim Matar, former member of the Bahraini Parliament. Mihai Patru, Senior Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations, will moderate.
- The Idea of Culture and Civilization in Contemporary Turkish Politics: Public Debate, Policy and Foreign Relations | Wednesday, April 20th | 9:30-2:30 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Join us for a conference that explores new ideas among Islamist and secular intellectuals in contemporary Turkey and inquire whether novel understandings exist about the relationship between Islam and modernity, East and West, and the position of Turkey itself within them. The conference will also investigate the impact of these understandings on public debate domestically in Turkey and on its foreign policy, specifically its relations with the United States and Europe, Russia, and the Middle East. This event consists of three panels. Speakers and panels may be found here.
- The Value of Values: Reconsidering the Role of Human Rights in U.S.-China Relations | Wednesday, April 20th | 2:30-4:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Issues of ideology, values, and human rights are again moving to the top of the United States’ China agenda and underlie many frictions in U.S.-China relations. The competing virtue narratives and disparate systems of the United States and China fuel suspicions in the military, economic, and global governance spheres. Please join us for an examination of values, rights, and ideals in the U.S.-China relationship and in the evolution of regional and world orders. Speakers include J. Stapleton Roy, Founding Director and Distinguished Scholar at the Wilson Center, Sharon Hom, Executive Director, Human Rights in China, Zheng Wang, Global Fellow, and Robert Daly, Director, Kissinger Institute on China and the United States.
- Western Defense Reassurances to Gulf Arab After the Iran Deal: Are We on the Same Page? | Thursday, April 21st | 10:00-11:30 | International Institute for Strategic Studies | REGISTER TO ATTEND | You are invited to an IISS discussion meeting on Thursday, April 21st, on Western defense reassurances to Gulf Arabs after the Iran deal. Panelists include Ellen Laipson, Distinguished Fellow and President Emeritus of the Stimson Center, Michael Eisenstadt, director of The Washington Institute’s Military and Security Studies Program, Caroline Hurndall, Head of the Middle East Team at the British Embassy, and Bilal Saab, Resident Senior Fellow for Middle East Security at the Atlantic Council. The panel will discuss whether post-Iran deal arms sales to Gulf Cooperation Council countries meet the goal of reassurance, whether arms sales from different NATO counties are complementary or competitive, and how the sales are affecting the geopolitics of the region. Following the hour-long panel discussion, there will be a 30-minute Q&A session with the audience. The full event will be on the record and webcast live on the IISS website.
- Protecting Religious Minorities | Thursday, April 21st | 1:30-3:00 | United States Institute for Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Propelled by the atrocities against religious minorities in several Muslim-majority countries in recent years, particularly at the hands of the Islamic State group, senior religious leaders meeting in Morocco in January issued the Marrakesh Declaration to prevent such violence in the future. Join the U.S. Institute of Peace and its co-hosts on April 21 as renowned Islamic legal scholar Sheikh Abdullah bin Bayyah, who designed the legal framework for the declaration and convened the Morocco meeting, discusses the next steps in ensuring the terms of this call to action can be implemented. The violence wrought by violent extremists creates an imperative for people in the Muslim world across sectarian, ethnic, and national lines to affirm positive teachings within the tradition, address historical points of disagreement and transform the underlying causes of violent extremism into peaceful change.The Marrakesh Declaration courageously acknowledges the oppression and violence against religious minorities within some predominantly Muslim countries. Inspired by the Charter of Medina, which was established in the time of the Prophet Muhammad to guarantee religious freedoms, the declaration presents a way to apply a religious legal and theological framework to uphold human rights. But much of the success of the Marrakesh Declaration will depend on how it is implemented. In this discussion co-hosted by the Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers and Sheikh bin Bayyah’s Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies, he will address the urgency of the Marrakesh Declaration in light of current events. He also will outline plans to work with individuals and organizations to use the declaration as a source of authority and accountability to advance the goals of this call to action.
- A Stronger UN for a Peaceful World—Conversation with Ambassador Natalia Gherman | Thursday, April 21st | 4:00-5:00 | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Women in Public Service Projectand the Kennan Instituteinvite you to a discussion with Ambassador Natalia Gherman, candidate for United Nation Secretary General. Amb. Gherman will outline her unique perspective and goals for new UN leadership, before taking audience questions. Ambassador Natalia Gherman has previously served as acting Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, and Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova. As a Chief Negotiator, she led Moldova towards the Association Agreement, Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, and visa liberalization regime with the EU. She served as Ambassador to Austria and Permanent Representative to the UN Agencies in Vienna and the OSCE, and Ambassador to Sweden, Finland, and Norway.
- The Changing Role of Egypt’s Private Sector | Friday, April 22nd | 9:00-10:30 | Middle East Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a discussion about the evolving role of Egypt’s private sector and the emergence of new business models to meet the demands of sustainable development. Egyptian business leaders Mohamed El-Kalla (Cairo for Investment and Development), Dina Sherif (The Center for Entrepreneurship, AUC) and Tarek Tawfik (Federation of Egyptian Industries) will be joined by American attorney and investment adviser Samar Ali (Bone McAllester Norton PLLC) for an examination of the changing nature of private enterprise in Egypt. Egypt’s new generation of entrepreneurs and corporate leaders are increasingly prioritizing sustainable development, accountability, and responsible business practices as key tools for economic growth. The panel will discuss the drivers of change, the challenges that private business faces from the state, and how the U.S. government and business community can encourage the new trend. Randa Fahmy will moderate the discussion.
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The difference between Jews
I spent an hour today with two really smart guys: Dov Waxman of Northeastern University and Ilan Peleg of Lafayette College. The occasion was a Middle East Institute event we hosted at SAIS on Dov’s newly published book, Trouble in the Tribe: The American Jewish Conflict over Israel. I can’t review it, because I haven’t read it yet, but the two professors certainly gave me a good deal to think about.
I confess I was uncomfortable with the book’s title. I don’t regard myself as a member of a tribe but rather as an individual who has chosen to be what my parents were: Jews and Americans. Many years ago a co-worker referred to the Jewish owner of the factory we worked in as my Landsmann. That grates to this day. Of course I share with at least some Jews many things: history, culture, beliefs, norms, and support for the state of Israel. But I also share those things with many non-Jews. And I differ from many Jews on some of those things. I am not indifferent to the religious connection, just not willing to prioritize it over everything else and assume a familial tie to someone I had never met.
This turned out to be one of Dov’s main points: many American Jews, especially the millennial generation (of which I am definitively not a member), feel the way I do. We prioritize liberal values rather than ethnic connections. In so doing, we are increasingly at odds with an Israel that has returned to its 19th century roots as a Jewish national movement, especially but not only under Benyamin Netanyahu’s leadership. We want to see Palestinians treated in accordance with liberal values as equals endowed with inalienable rights. Bernie Sanders expressed this view last night in the debate with Hillary Clinton.
So why, I asked, do so many American politicians, like Clinton, support Israel so unconditionally? Even Barack Obama has been assiduous, more so than his predecessors, in protecting Israel from undesired UN Security Council resolutions. Part of the answer is that they get vital support and money from doing so. I’m not going to be able to match Sheldon Adelson as a political donor, but in addition I wouldn’t prioritize Israel as my top issue. He will. Passion counts and most of it is on the side of those who want unconditional support for Israel as the Jewish state. They don’t much care about how Palestinians are treated.
They even deny that they exist, saying they are really just Jordanians. If anyone argues that with you, tell them to talk with a Jordanian and ask what Jews who lived in the Holy Land were called before Israeli independence in the 1948. The answer will shock: they were called Palestinians, albeit Jewish rather than Arab ones. The term “Arab Jew” then applied to the many Jews whose native language was Arabic. Today many use the Hebrew term: Mizrahi Jews, which includes Jews from other than Arab countries.
More important is that Christians, in particular evangelicals, have lined up solidly in more or less unconditional support of Israel. Bernie of course doesn’t have to worry about them, because they will never support him. He is much more interested in that millennial generation, including the young New York Jews he wants to vote for him on Tuesday. So he grabbed the third rail of American politics with both hands and seems to have survived the immediate shock, though I won’t be surprised if Clinton beats him in New York on Tuesday.
Apart from the domestic political issues arising from the palpable split in the American Jewish community, there are potentially serious foreign policy issues. Ilan pointed to the split between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu over the Iranian nuclear deal and Dov mentioned Israeli opposition to the American role in the fall of Egyptian President Mubarak in 2011. On the Iranian nuclear deal, it seems to me the split is already partly healed: Netanyahu has become a cheerleader for strict implementation, since that is manifestly in Israel’s interest.
But the healing is only partial, because the President is inclined to allow at least a partial return of Iran to something more like its traditional role in the region (in exchange for postponement of its nuclear ambitions) while Netanyahu is increasingly aligned with the Sunni Arab states in actively resisting that. He has also begun to imitate some of their less liberal practices in cracking down on Israeli civil society and making life hard for those who speak out against excessive use of force against Palestinians. That really offends my liberal sensibilities.
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Anyone but Jeremic
I am getting a lot of questions about Vuk Jeremic’s candidacy for UN Secretary General, which the Serbian government is supporting. Here is what I have to say:
I think Vuk Jeremic is ill-regarded in Washington, both from his time as Foreign Minister and his time as President of the General Assembly. His support lies in Moscow, not the US. I am frankly surprised that a government aiming at EU membership would put him forward.
Jeremic’s most important contribution to peace in the Balkans was his mistake in asking the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of independence. The ICJ concluded unequivocally that the declaration breached no international law. That defeat of Belgrade’s claim led to the dialogue with Pristina and the ongoing process of reintegration of the north with the rest of Kosovo, whose constitutional legitimacy on its whole territory Belgrade has accepted.
I suppose Belgrade, where he is not in particularly good odor with the current government, puts him forward partly to assuage the Russians and partly to get him off their backs. Neither of those is a good reason for Washington to support him.
People will tell you Jeremic is hardworking and knows the UN well. Both are true. And for the US they are two additional reasons not to want him as Secretary General. He would work hard and possibly have significant success in making America’s goals unachievable, not only in the Balkans but elsewhere as well. He didn’t keep commitments to the US while he was foreign minister. He certainly wouldn’t do so as UN Secretary General.
From the American perspective, there are lots of good candidates this time around. Any one of them would be better than Jeremic.
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Syria frays, Libya wobbles, Yemen improves
The Middle East and North Africa have become difficult to follow without a scorecard. Here is a quick update:
In Syria, the ceasefire appears to be unraveling. The rebel group Jabhat al-Nusra made gains this week in ceasefire territory. This opposition group extended their territorial holds in Aleppo, Hama, and Latakia provinces. This new offensive, though limited in extent, takes back some of the territory the Syrian regime grabbed during the Russian airstrike campaign in early 2016. Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda affiliated group, was not a part of the ceasefire agreement, but other rebel groups, such as Jaish al-Islam, have collaborated with them. This poses a threat to the ceasefire holding and the next round of peace talks, planned for April 13.
Even though the opposition has taken back some territory, the regime still holds the upper hand at the negotiating table. The Russian-backed offensive and support allows Assad to keep his seat as the head of the regime. Russia does appear to want a peaceful solution to the crisis and proved so with the partial withdrawal of troops in Syria. The opposition says it wants a compromise, but they are not willing to compromise with their demand that Assad should be removed from power. The regime has spoken of a more inclusive government, but only with Assad as the leader. How successful this next round of peace talks will be is questionable. Neither side wants to compromise Assad’s position. His position is integral to both sides’ approach in achieving a peaceful solution.
The situation in Libya seemed to improve last week and the beginning of this week as the new unity government arrived in Tripoli. The UN-backed government faced competition from rivals in Tripoli and Tobruk. It seemed that the government in Tripoli was prepared to step down until Prime Minister Khalifa Ghweil declared otherwise. The eastern Tobruk government has not voted to formally recognize the unity government. This recognition is essential in order to “establish legitimacy.”
The new unity government will have to face the challenge of garnering support from the militias that backed the rival Tripoli government in the past. Though unity government Prime Minister Fayez Sarraj does not want to suggest that he needs this militia support, in fact it is imperative to gain the backing of these groups in order to implement real change and lessen the violence in Libya.
In Yemen, Saudi-led airstrikes on civilians continued in March. The Mastaba market incident left 120 dead on March 15. Peace talks on Yemen have been agreed upon, though, and this will hopefully lessen the impact of violence against civilians. The Houthis and President Hadi’s delegation will meet in Kuwait on April 18.
Recently President Hadi fired and appointed a new vice president, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, and prime minister, Ahmed Obeid bin Daghr, to his government. The new vice president is a key army general. The Hadi camp thinks this move will strengthen it at the peace talks. Defrocked Vice President Khaled Bahah thinks the move will be detrimental and detract from Hadi’s legitimacy.
Nevertheless, the situation in Yemen looks more positive, as both sides have agreed on a ceasefire, implemented on April 10. The city of Taiz, home to 200,000 civilians, will be the key testing ground.
The Syrian ceasefire agreement is fraying, the new unity government in Libya is wobbling, and Yemen’s situation going into peace talks looks a bit better.
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Heresies
The Middle East Institute today published my heresies concerning America’s future in the region. Essentially I agree with President Obama that American interests in the region are declining and shifting: the nuclear deal with Iran has postponed the proliferation threat and American dependence on Middle East oil is declining. Other interests like the fight against terrorism and maintaining relations with our allies require less military presence in the region and more attention to civilian functions like state-building, diplomacy to create a regional security architecture, and continuation of democracy support to those who desire it. Military assistance to allies in no way justifies the current massive US military presence in the Middle East, which attracts more problems than it solves.
This is not as different from Ken Pollack’s recent Fight or flight: America’s choice in the Middle East as might be imagined. Ken also emphasizes the important civilian dimensions of stabilizing the region, especially once the civil wars are brought to an end. But he uses the oil issue as his trump card in arguing for continued US engagement and even re-commitment to the region, as he fears breakdown of Saudi Arabia.
I am perfectly willing to concede that is a possibility, but it is one the Saudis have every incentive to prevent. How redoubling American military commitment to the Middle East would contribute is not clear to me. I am confident that any future regime in the Kingdom will want to protect itself and its oil exports. A disruption of Saudi exports, should it occur, can be met more readily by drawdown of the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve, coordinated with other countries through the International Energy Agency as well as with China and India. Getting those two major importers of Middle Eastern oil to hold at least 90 days of strategic stocks would do much more for stability of the oil market than the Fifth Fleet, which is ill-suited to respond in any substantial way to internal disorder in Saudi Arabia.
Should an oil supply disruption last a long time, the consequent increase in prices will bring back a lot of “non-conventional” oil and gas. The technology for producing it is spreading around the world, so it is unlikely we’ll see a rise much above $70 per barrel during the next decade or more.
The Saudis could also do some things to improve the security of their oil exports. Existing pipelines that circumnavigate the strait of Hormuz are not used to full capacity. New pipelines could be built. The Kingdom would be wise to improve treatment of its Shia minority, many of whom live in oil-producing areas.
Some think Syria demonstrates that it would be better to fight wars in the Middle East than reduce our commitments there. I’d be quick to admit that President Obama’s inattention to Syria during the peaceful phase of its revolution was a serious mistake. He should have ensured that saying Bashar al Assad needed to step down was translated into action. It was clear from early on that his staying would lead to violence, that violence would lead to sectarian polarization, and that polarization would lead to radicalization.
But I disagree with those who claim the best way of ensuring that Assad left would have been to attack his chemical weapons facilities. That option did not arise until August 2013, which was well after the rebellion turned violent. Two years earlier would have been the best time to act, most likely through diplomatic and political means rather than military ones.
The failure to do so has created an enormous mess in Syria, but it is one that does not actually affect oil production and exports much. Even the humanitarian catastrophe should concern the Europeans more than the US, because of their vulnerability to migrants.
The big challenge in the Middle East today is creation of some kind of security architecture to channel competition into peaceful arenas. While American military capacity has a role to play in shaping the environment in which that is achieved, the task is essentially a diplomatic one requiring Iran and Saudi Arabia to come to terms and seek to reduce the threats that each perceives, stemming in part from the other. That should not be impossible. We did at least that well with the Soviet Union during a period of much greater threat to the US than any today. Detente is not a four letter word.
The Middle East today needs more diplomacy, state-building and democracy. It could do with a lot less saber-rattling and killing.
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