Iraq’s plan for national reconciliation

As the Iraqi government launches its effort to recover Fallujah from the Islamic State (ISIS), it behooves us to ask about the broader political context in which this liberation will occur. Is the Iraqi state prepared to reintegrate the more than half of ISIS-occupied territory that has already been recovered? Can the overwhelmingly Sunni occupants of these areas be reintegrated? How will Islamic State fighters be held accountable? What is being done to reconcile Sunni and Shia Iraqis so that violence does not re-ignite? How can Iraqi politics and society recover from the devastation that the ISIS insurgency has wreaked?

There is a plan, which a helpful visitor shared with me (in Arabic and English) and some others last week here in Washington. The plan is based on a united, non-sectarian and democratic Iraq. No reconciliation is foreseen with Al Qaeda, ISIS or other terrorist groups. The Ba’ath party is forbidden in the constitution, but the government is willing to talk with its members as individual citizens seeking economic and social rights.

The government envisages Sunni insurgents renouncing violence in exchange for reforms that create a more inclusive polity. It also envisages providing help to displaced people as well as support for liberated populations and those who want to return to liberated areas. It will try to mobilize civil society, women, tribes and youth in favor of reconciliation.

Revenge killings are expected to be a serious problem. The government wants a “code of honor” to prevent them, one that would pledge subscribers to use the courts against those who have wronged them.

The current snag in all of this concerns who should be at the negotiating table. It is not easy to identify who really represents those insurgents not associated with Al Qaeda or ISIS. It may even be an illusion that they still exist. The government, in cooperation with the UN mission in Iraq, is looking for acceptable, legitimate parties that are prepared to negotiate and reach a political settlement.

What are the odds for success of this still nascent effort? I don’t really know. Violence makes negotiated outcomes far more difficult. But it is looking as if ISIS’s hold on large parts of Iraq is ending. The government is certainly correct to try to reach viable political arrangements with Sunnis who did not support ISIS, even if they didn’t fight it. My own inclination is to think that local governing structures that can “represent” the populations of liberated areas would be a good thing, but I really have no idea at this point how they could be created. We are nowhere near elections in liberated areas, which will likely be “governed” after the defeat of ISIS by some combination of warlords, imams, tribal chieftains, and former Ba’athists for some time to come.

Baghdad’s inclination will be to think local capacities to plan and execute reconstruction are limited so the national ministries will have to take charge. I suppose the premise is valid, but I’m not so sure the conclusion is. People who have been abused are not much interested in being ruled by people far from their local context.

If I had to bet on a single factor that will determine the outcome of liberation in Iraq, it would be just this: can the government find legitimate representatives of indigenous forces and negotiate with them decent and respectful solutions to how power and resources will be distributed in liberated areas. The odds on that are not good, but I certainly wish those who are trying the best in their pursuit.