Month: May 2016
Iraq’s plan for national reconciliation
As the Iraqi government launches its effort to recover Fallujah from the Islamic State (ISIS), it behooves us to ask about the broader political context in which this liberation will occur. Is the Iraqi state prepared to reintegrate the more than half of ISIS-occupied territory that has already been recovered? Can the overwhelmingly Sunni occupants of these areas be reintegrated? How will Islamic State fighters be held accountable? What is being done to reconcile Sunni and Shia Iraqis so that violence does not re-ignite? How can Iraqi politics and society recover from the devastation that the ISIS insurgency has wreaked?
There is a plan, which a helpful visitor shared with me (in Arabic and English) and some others last week here in Washington. The plan is based on a united, non-sectarian and democratic Iraq. No reconciliation is foreseen with Al Qaeda, ISIS or other terrorist groups. The Ba’ath party is forbidden in the constitution, but the government is willing to talk with its members as individual citizens seeking economic and social rights.
The government envisages Sunni insurgents renouncing violence in exchange for reforms that create a more inclusive polity. It also envisages providing help to displaced people as well as support for liberated populations and those who want to return to liberated areas. It will try to mobilize civil society, women, tribes and youth in favor of reconciliation.
Revenge killings are expected to be a serious problem. The government wants a “code of honor” to prevent them, one that would pledge subscribers to use the courts against those who have wronged them.
The current snag in all of this concerns who should be at the negotiating table. It is not easy to identify who really represents those insurgents not associated with Al Qaeda or ISIS. It may even be an illusion that they still exist. The government, in cooperation with the UN mission in Iraq, is looking for acceptable, legitimate parties that are prepared to negotiate and reach a political settlement.
What are the odds for success of this still nascent effort? I don’t really know. Violence makes negotiated outcomes far more difficult. But it is looking as if ISIS’s hold on large parts of Iraq is ending. The government is certainly correct to try to reach viable political arrangements with Sunnis who did not support ISIS, even if they didn’t fight it. My own inclination is to think that local governing structures that can “represent” the populations of liberated areas would be a good thing, but I really have no idea at this point how they could be created. We are nowhere near elections in liberated areas, which will likely be “governed” after the defeat of ISIS by some combination of warlords, imams, tribal chieftains, and former Ba’athists for some time to come.
Baghdad’s inclination will be to think local capacities to plan and execute reconstruction are limited so the national ministries will have to take charge. I suppose the premise is valid, but I’m not so sure the conclusion is. People who have been abused are not much interested in being ruled by people far from their local context.
If I had to bet on a single factor that will determine the outcome of liberation in Iraq, it would be just this: can the government find legitimate representatives of indigenous forces and negotiate with them decent and respectful solutions to how power and resources will be distributed in liberated areas. The odds on that are not good, but I certainly wish those who are trying the best in their pursuit.
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One thing not to worry about
Yesterday’s front-page New York Times piece on radicalization in Kosovo is every diplomat’s nightmare: a well-written, prominent story with solid facts that contradict what his or her government wants the Americans to believe. But there is another two-thirds of the story that got short shrift:
- the Kosovo government has already reacted vigorously and effectively to the inroads Islamic extremists have made, and
- Kosovo Albanians as well as their government remain overwhelmingly and enthusiastically pro-American and pro-European.
The article would have been a clarion call to action three or four years ago. But today it is largely old news. The story of relatively high levels of extremist recruitment and Saudi funding Carlotta Gall tells has already been amply documented. In fact, radicalization according to Adrian Shtuni is not uniform across Kosovo but focused in four municipalities:
The Kosovars themselves have spilled a lot of electrons on the subject, in particular the Saudi connection that is one of Gall’s main, and well-told, points. They figure:
In terms of the number of foreign fighters per capita amongst their Muslim population, Kosovo is in the bottom half of the list of countries, ranked 14th among 22 countries with the highest number of foreign fighters per capita of their respective Muslim populations.
The Kosovo government is claiming there have been no known Kosovar recruits to the Islamic State (ISIS) in the past year or so. To my knowledge, no one is denying that claim.
ISIS recruitment worldwide is down overall, due to its loss of territory and fighters over the past year. But in addition Pristina has been conducting a legal crackdown, described by the Police Director earlier this month in Brussels. It includes 110 arrests, 67 indictments and 26 convictions so far. This is not an easy thing to do for a young country still not a member of Interpol with lots of other problems. But it is getting done. The government has also prepared a 2015/20 strategy for countering violent extremism covering early identification, prevention, intervention and de-radicalization and reintegration.
The overall political environment is favorable to blocking ISIS recruitment: Kosovars are remarkably pro-NATO and pro-Europe, with over 90% supporting membership in the Alliance and the European Union. Despite divisive domestic politics that have led to street demonstrations focused on the wisdom of continuing Pristina’s dialogue with Belgrade, dissenters from the Euroatlantic path Kosovo has chosen are few and far between.
Americans are quick these days to see threats, in particular from Muslim populations. Kosovo however is a constitutionally secular state whose mostly Muslim population is as friendly to the West as any on earth. The Alliance saved Kosovo Albanians from Serbia’s effort to expel them in 1999, has protected the country ever since and is now in the process of helping it to build up its security forces. The European Union has been generous and helpful, providing most of the NATO troops deployed there and much of the international aid. It is not surprising that most Kosovars view Washington and Brussels as friends and protectors, not enemies.
Of course there are some individuals who feel differently. Unprovoked, a Kosovar killed two US airmen five years ago in Frankfurt. Other incidents may happen. What we need to do to ensure they are few and far between is to continue to help ensure the success of Kosovo’s democracy and economy, as well as its application of the rule of law. Despite the Times’ front-page article, Kosovo is one of the last things Americans should have to worry about.
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Peace Picks May 23-27
- Economic Sanctions on Russia | Monday, May 23rd | 9:30-11:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | With the proliferation of new hybrid threats in the global economy, the United States and its transatlantic partners have increasingly used economic sanctions to make broad geopolitical and state-sponsored threats not financially viable. The design and approval of sanctions against globally recognized threats is in the hands of governments that must coordinate on the objective and scope of sanctions, while their implementation relies on the compliance of the private sector that must bear the burden of reduced trade. After a keynote speech on where the United States stand on economic sanctions on Russia, Ambassador Fried will take part in a high-level panel discussion on “US Sanctions Obligations.” Please join the Atlantic Council and Baker & McKenzie for an offsite conversation on Economic Sanctions on Russia, featuring the US State Department’s Coordinator for Sanctions Policy, Daniel Fried. Nicholas F. Coward, Baker & McKenzie Partner, and Caroline Vicini, Deputy Head of Delegation, Delegation of the European Union to the United States, will join the discussion. Anders Aslund, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, will introduce and moderate.
- Belarus in Transition | Monday, May 23rd | 2:00-3:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | With revolutionary changes in Ukraine, great power ambitions in Russia, and falling oil prices paired with sanctions, there are serious challenges to Belarus’ paternalistic model of governance. These challenges, however, may present an opportunity for Belarus to move towards a more modern political ideology and economy. Dr. Larissa G. Titarenko, Professor at Belarus State University, and Dr. Valery Yevarouski, Fulbright Research Scholar at the Kennan Institute, will discuss the current socio-economic situation in Belarus and potential models of transition.
- Challenges Facing Europe: A Conversation with British Ambassador Sir Kim Darroch | Wednesday, May 25th | 10:00-11:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Less than a month before the British referendum on EU membership, and as anti-refugee and anti-establishment narratives fuel forces of disintegration and nationalism across Europe, Sir Kim Darroch, British Ambassador to the United States, will address the geopolitical and economic issues facing Europe and explore a strategic transatlantic response. An experienced and innovative diplomat, Sir Kim became the British Ambassador to the United States in January 2016. Prior to that, he served as National Security Advisor to Prime Minister of the United Kingdom David Cameron. In this capacity, he led the National Security Council in dealing with the rise of ISIS, nuclear threats from Iran, and Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Sir Kim, who also served as Britain’s Permanent Representative to the European Union, is particularly well-versed on the Brussels-centric debates surrounding enlargement, integration, and economic recovery. Frederick Kempe, Atlantic Council President and CEO, will join the discussion.
- Making Sense of Pakistan’s Sectarian Landscape | Wednesday, May 25th | 10:30-12:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Pakistan’s diverse Islamic landscape features Sunni sects, such as the Deobandis, Barelvis, and Ahl-e-Hadith, as well as Shia ones that include Twelvers, Ismailis, and Khojas. While sectarian tensions in Pakistan are commonly seen through a Sunni/Shia lens, significant divides within the Sunni groups tend to receive less attention. Competition between Deobandis, Barelvis, and Ahl-e-Hadith is intense, and understanding this intra-Sunni competition is essential in order to comprehend not just Pakistan’s sectarian dynamics, but also the roots of extremism in Pakistan and how to counter it. This event will examine intra-Sunni divides in Pakistan, and it will more broadly consider how best to understand the current state of the Sunni/Shia divide. It will also discuss how Pakistan’s contemporary sectarian climate is affected by the Saudi-Iranian rivalry and other developments in global geopolitics. Speakers include Farhat Haq, Wilson Center Fellow, and Marvin Weinbaum, Director, Center for Pakistan Studies, Middle East Institute.
- Turkey’s Defense-Industrial Policy | Thursday, May 26th | 10:30-12:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join us for the latest event in the Atlantic Council’s Defense-Industrial Policy Series, featuring a discussion on Turkey’s defense-industrial policy with Dr. Ismail Demir, Turkish undersecretary for defense industries. The Defense-Industrial Policy Series is a platform for senior government executives in defense and aerospace to address the public policies that shape these industries’ markets. By engaging the perspective of government leaders about issues at the interface of defense ministries and industries, the series aims to cultivate a constituency for practical solutions to these problems.
- A Conversation on the Middle East with Congressman Adam Kinzinger | Thursday, May 26th | 11:45-1:00 | Hudson Institute and The Foreign Policy Initiative | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Join Hudson Institute and the Foreign Policy Initiative as we host Congressman Adam Kinzinger of Illinois for a discussion with journalist Josh Rogin of Bloomberg View. The focus of the discussion will be the ongoing turmoil in the Middle East, including ISIS and the resulting refugee crisis, the U.S. exit strategy for Afghanistan, terrorist safe havens in North Africa, the Iran nuclear deal, and a way forward in Syria. As a veteran of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and a congressional leader on national security and foreign policy, Congressman Kinzinger will share his perspective on these challenging issues and how America can lead in ensuring greater global stability and prosperity.
- China’s Role in a Changing Middle East | Thursday, May 26th | 12:00-1:00 | Middle East Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | China is engaged in active, high-profile diplomacy in the Middle East, ranging from presidential visits to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran to a mediation effort in the Syrian civil war earlier this year. Beijing’s One Belt, One Road initiative to connect major Eurasian economies through infrastructure, trade, and investment relies in part on stability across the oil-supplying states of the Middle East. The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host Dr. Pan Guang (Chinese Association of Middle East Studies) for a discussion of the drivers and impacts of China’s increasingly complex role in the Middle East, the objectives Beijing and regional capitals are pursuing in their relations, and the implications for the United States. Paul Salem, MEI Vice President for Policy and Research, will moderate.
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Still works in progress
Home from the Balkans for a couple of days, I’ve had time to reflect a bit on my almost two weeks in Podgorica, Belgrade and Sarajevo. I was in Podgorica and Sarajevo for academically-sponsored conferences. I inserted the stop in Belgrade during the week between them. In all three places, I organized my own visit, with the cooperation of friends and colleagues. The US embassies were not involved, except that in Sarajevo it was one of the sponsors of the meeting.
All three capitals are wrestling with internal political issues with profound implications: Montenegrin Prime Minister Djukanovic has taken some opposition figures into his cabinet to try to ensure wide acceptance of the October elections as well as NATO accession, Serbian Prime Minister Vucic is rejiggering his coalition in an effort to accelerate progress towards the EU, and the many levels of governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina are trying to convince the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to release $800 million to support implementation of the EU-imposed Reform Agenda.
Montenegro, despite some recent Russian-promoted disorder in Podgorica’s streets and even in parliament, has the best chances of success. NATO issued its formal invitation yesterday. The Russians objected, demonstrating how false its avowals of feeling threatened by NATO expansion really are. Montenegro’s 2000-person army is not even a threat to its immediate neighbors, much less to Moscow. The 28 members of the Alliance still have to ratify the accession. Podgorica is nervous mainly about US ratification, because of the Trump factor, and would like to see it done during the lame duck Senate session following the November election, in particular if he becomes president.
The real significance of NATO accession for Montenegro is that it keeps up the momentum in the Balkans, where Macedonia and Kosovo are already committed to joining the Alliance. That leaves only Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has asked for a Membership Action Plan, and Serbia, which has not made a decision on joining and flirts with Russia incessantly. Montenegro’s entry into NATO doesn’t threaten Russia, but the continued attraction of the Alliance to Balkans countries could end Russia’s troublemaking in the region.
Belgrade’s infatuation with Moscow was one of the disappointments of my trip to the Balkans. Normally proud and self-reliant Serbs tell me they need Russia’s warm embrace and cultural affinity. The pan-Slavic sentiment I get. We all like to chum with those who speak our language, or something close to it, listen to similar music and worship in ways we recognize.
The warm embrace is harder to comprehend. Russia is a declining regional power that allowed its currency to appreciate unrealistically during the period of high oil and gas prices, making its other industries uncompetitive in world markets. With prices now less than half of what they once were, Moscow is unable to balance its budget and lacks the industrial infrastructure needed to diversify its economy and finance the solution of its many serious social problems. It is also stuck in wars in Syria and Ukraine, not to mention smaller and less arduous military interventions in Georgia and Moldova.
Prime Minister Vucic recognizes the sterility of Russophilia and ran a markedly pro-Europe re-election campaign in April. But getting to Europe is not done in one big leap. Even while I was in Belgrade, masked thugs destroyed allegedly illegal construction on the waterfront, in order apparently to avoid a drawn-out court procedure. Many think the government was involved, or at least turned a blind eye, at the behest of someone well-connected. Calls to the police for help went unanswered. That’s not how things are handled in European states with consolidated judicial systems.
Many more liberal democratic Serbs and others in the Balkans think Europe and the US are turning a blind eye too. Washington and Brussels appreciate the progress Vucic has made reaching agreements with the authorities in Kosovo. He has accepted the validity of the Kosovo constitution on its whole territory, including the Serb-majority north, and has acknowledged that Serbia and Kosovo will enter the EU as separate states, each at its own pace. This is not far from formal recognition of Kosovo’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. But are Washington and Brussels rewarding this progress on Kosovo by ignoring Serbian government control of the media and courts as well as failure to reform its security services?
This is a good question. I hope the answer is no, but I also hope that we will be patient as well as exigent. There are lots of things that can be done to assist Serbia’s progress towards Europe: improved road connections to the Mediterranean through Montenegro and Kosovo, for example, as well as gas supplies that do not come from Russia. There are also next steps with Kosovo: the Serbian and Kosovar chiefs of staff, who have apparently never met, should be talking with each other regularly, and the boundary/border between the two should be agreed and demarcated.
When it comes to Bosnia and Herzegovina, I confess to being flummoxed. I’m not at all sure that the rather slow and rudimentary steps so far in the European Reform Agenda are worth $800 million, especially if some portion of that amount ends up feeding the corruption beast. The IMF and World Bank will tell you they can account for their funds, but part of the money will be displacing Bosnian funding that will then be diverted to less transparent purposes. Money is fungible. Some authorities in Bosnia are past masters at enriching themselves whenever it passes through their hands. That helps them to consolidate power and maintain their stranglehold on a country that deserves better.
Or it may help them defy the international community and make promises about independence for Republika Srpska, the Serb-dominated half of the country. That isn’t going to happen, because the international community won’t accept it. But those who support that goal are succeeding at making Bosnia and Herzegovina exceedingly difficult to govern effectively. A coffee at an outdoor cafe in Sniper Alley and a walk with an old friend to buy a Sarajevo football club tee shirt for my grandson are great pleasures, but I’d trade them happily for a Bosnia in which ordinary people could enjoy European standards of living and freedom from bombastic nationalism.
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The Syrian opposition narrative
I returned home from the Balkans yesterday and today is commencement at SAIS, which means I’ll be spending a good part of the working hours dressed up in Princeton’s imitation of medieval academic garb and unable to tweet or blog. So here is a video the Syrian Coalition (Etilaf) sent this morning, with its narrative of the conflict with Bashar al Assad. I do not agree with every word of this, and it certainly leaves out some relevant developments, but narratives are important and it merits attention.
I would be interested in learning if the Assad regime has put out a comparable narrative from its perspective.
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When and where America really was great
Wherever I go abroad–on this trip to Podgorica, Belgrade and Sarajevo–the topic people most want to discuss is–you guessed it–Donald Trump. Across political sympathies, religions, genders and ages, people are fascinated and mostly disgusted by his appeal to Americans. The exception is a few of the more nationalist leaders in the Balkans, who are Trumpites because they admire his autocratic style and remember that he was a vigorous opponent of the NATO war against Yugoslavia.
Here is what I tell my Balkans interlocutors: Trump reflects a real and important slice of the American electorate. His greatest strength is among white, working class males, many of whom have not seen a rise in income for decades. They incline towards blaming others, which makes some of them xenophobic, misogynist and racist. Europeans in particular should understand this, as many European countries are suffering analogous rises of comparable nationalist political forces. Trump has discovered how to tap into nationalist sentiment, much the way the UK Independence Party, Marine LePen in France, and Hungarian Prime Minister Orban have done.
Hillary Clinton is a much better known figure worldwide, but especially in Europe and the Balkans. If elected, I expect her to continue what has become traditional American policy in the region: support for democratization and European Union accession for the seven successor states to former Yugoslavia (two of which have already succeeded) plus Albania and openness to NATO accession for those who want it. As on many (but not all) other issues, Clinton is likely to serve the moral equivalent of Barack Obama’s third term. After all, Obama has delegated the Balkans mostly to Vice President Biden, who was a strong supporter of Bill Clinton’s 1990s interventions in the Balkans and a close associate of Clinton thereafter when both were in the Senate.
The odds are heavily in Clinton’s favor, but no one can reliably predict the outcome of American elections, especially six months out. A relatively strong economy, revulsion at Trump’s more extreme and erratic stands, and dissent from his candidacy within the Republican elite (and to some extent in its base) favor Clinton. The American electorate is increasingly Hispanic, female, gay and aging, all categories that will vote disproportionately for Clinton. Some establishment Republicans have made it clear they will support her, though many more are now flocking to Trump, despite his obvious lack of conservative credentials on social issues. Independents, who decide most American elections, are leaning towards Clinton.
That said, stuff happens. A mass casualty terrorist attack or a sudden economic downturn would tilt the table towards Trump. So too will Clinton’s “negatives”: many Americans regard her as untrustworthy and excessively tied to Wall Street. The North Atlantic and Pacific coasts seem pretty solid for Clinton right now, but there is a lot of political turf in between. Billionaire New Yorker Trump is not a natural fit with the heartland, but he has surprised all observers during the primaries and may continue to do so, as he adjusts his positions to garner more mainstream support. His shifting stances do not seem to weaken his core support.
Election of Trump would really do serious damage on the foreign policy front. Even if he is unable or unwilling to follow through on his promises to get Mexico to pay to build a wall on the border, block Muslims from entering the US, withdraw from NATO and allow South Korea and Japan to build nuclear weapons, it will take months or even years for the course corrections to become clear. In the meanwhile, a great deal of damage will be done.
In the Balkans, uncertainty about American policy will allow all sorts of crackpot proposals to emerge in the next six months. I’ve already heard from some who claim that Trump will unrecognize Kosovo. No doubt others will emerge suggesting ethnic partition of Kosovo, Bosnia and Macedonia. But Donald Trump, who is married to a Slovenian, is nevertheless unlikely to pay even passing attention to the Balkans, which are way down the list of American priorities. Apart from rallying a few Serb voters in Ohio with an offhand remark or two, he is likely to focus much more fury on the mess in the Middle East, on the Chinese challenge and on his much-vaunted promise to make America great again.
He will ignore the very real accomplishments Washington delivered in ending the war in Bosnia, saving Kosovo Albanians from expulsion, and rescuing Macedonia by diplomatic means. America really was great in the Balkans during the unipolar 1990s.
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