Month: June 2016
No end in sight
How can Daesh (that’s the Islamic State, ISIS or ISIL to the uninitiated) be defeated and what will happen thereafter? If you want the more upbeat official story, read Brett McGurk’s testimony. Here are some thoughts that have crossed my screen lately.
Everyone should expect a generational fight. Though Daesh is losing territory rapidly in Iraq (47% of its maximum) and Syria (20%), it is good at what it does, resilient and adaptable. It has recruited at least 40,000 foreign fighters from 120 other countries. It has overt affiliates in more than half a dozen countries as well as a covert worldwide network devoted to smuggling, finance and terror, as illustrated all too clearly in this week’s Istanbul airport bombing. Even after it has lost all its territory, Daesh will go to ground and continue terrorist attacks of that sort.
The Coalition arrayed against Daesh is large (nominally 66 countries) and organized but still clumsy and far from fully integrated. It will hold a July 20 “summit” in Washington focused on its five “lines of effort”: political/military coordination, blocking foreign fighters, Daesh finance, stabilization of areas retaken from Daesh and counter-messaging. This is in addition to the nine US “lines of effort.”
There are contrasting narratives that avowed opponents of Daesh espouse, leading them to opposing conclusions.
The Russians view Daesh as the product of destabilization of Syrian government institutions, whose maintenance is vital to stem the extremist tide. In order to ensure the survival of state institutions, they support Assad and want reconciliation between him and at least some portion of the opposition. They also think their military intervention has gone pretty well, delivering some Western respect and easing Western pressure on Ukraine. But they are concerned, based on the Chechen precedent, about the enormous cost and difficulties of an Assad victory in Syria. They have flatly refused to pay for any reconstruction when approached by a government-linked expert.
The Saudis have an almost diametrically opposed narrative. They believe Daesh is the product of Iranian-sponsored sectarianism in both Iraq and Syria. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki helped the Islamic State to revive in Iraq after the American withdrawal by governing in a blatantly sectarian way dictated by Iran. ISIS’s ability to gain ground in Syria is attributable to the regime, which released extremist prisoners, has bought oil from Daesh, and focused its military attacks against moderates, all with backing by Iran. The Saudis take the threat of Daesh seriously and believe the fate of Iran’s effort to establish itself as the Middle East hegemon will be determined in Syria. The Kingdom recognizes that its own Wahhabi ideology has contributed to Daesh‘s appeal and is committed to reforms that will change that in the decades to come.
Iraqis are fighting and dying to take turf from Daesh, but the aftermath of victory is a big and unsolved problem. Inclusive governance is what the country needs but seldom gets, in particular in Baghdad. Shia militias were too active in Tikrit in the wake of victory there over Daesh, rendering the town unsafe for Sunni returnees initially. Only once local leaders and reconciliation mechanisms were put in place was the stabilization effort more successful. At Ramadi, the governor has been doing well but there is much more damage and a lot of demining to be done. At Fallujah, there is less destruction but a serious humanitarian crisis, with 85,000 civilians fleeing from the city and living in unacceptable conditions in the desert. UNDP resources are grossly inadequate to the stabilization effort it has been tasked with.
Little planning has been done for stabilization in Syria. What is needed there is a political settlement. Sunni alienation and grievance are the the problem, enormously aggravated by the presence of Hezbollah. Ignoring it gives the impression that the West will support “ABS”: anyone but Sunnis. Post-Daesh, governance needs to be far more inclusive.
The Kurds in both Iraq and Syria are getting a lot of Western support because they are willing to fight Daesh. The support should be more conditional. The US should insist that Iraqi Kurdistan reach a pact with Baghdad and that the Syrian Kurds help with peace talks between Turkey and the PKK, which is closely tied to the Syrian Kurds.
Looking ahead, there is a real risk that with Russian and Iranian support the Syrian regime will manage to capture Aleppo as well as Raqqa, form some sort of “national unity” government with elements of the loyal opposition and rewrite parts of the constitution. The US might then declare victory and abandon the field entirely, leaving reconstruction inadequately resourced. This would not really solve anything and would allow grievances to worsen, ungoverned spaces to grow and the conflict to spread, possibly to Lebanon and Jordan.
There is a glimmer of hope for Iraq, but even that is limited. Splits in both the Sunni and Shia communities are opening the possibility of cross-sectarian mobilization in Baghdad. The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) are often viewed as under Tehran’s control, but some of them are not and might join with Sunnis who have also fought against Daesh. The Kurdish issue would still be unresolved, however, which will create problems for the liberation of Mosul. Kurdistan Regional Government President Barzani is entirely dedicated to consolidating his own power, both vis-a-vis other Kurdish political forces and vis-a-vis Baghdad. Without clearer definition of the political end-state, defeat of Daesh could lead to a follow-on civil war pitting Kurds against Arabs.
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Good ideas
State-building, the function American presidents love to hate, is the unavoidable foreign policy burden of our times. Without it, the war against the Islamic State and other extremists will last forever. Only when Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Egypt are better governed will they be immune to the extremist infection that has roiled the Middle East.
Fortunately, I’ve got colleagues around DC who not only agree with this proposition but also are thinking hard what to do about it. I prefer not to spend my time and whatever intellectual energies I’ve got left thinking about reforming the US government, which has resisted most such efforts for well over 200 years. But I’m glad others are willing to engage.
Max Boot and Mike Mikclaucic want to reconfigure the US Agency for International Development into a state building agency, giving up most of its programs to international governmental and nongovernmental organizations better suited to the tasks and often better funded. They would toss out “poverty alleviation, global health, biodiversity, women’s empowerment, education, sanitation, and economic and agriculture development.” They want the US agency to focus on ungoverned or inadequately governed spaces, seeking to provide them with security forces, courts, professional civil services, and accountable financial mechanisms. In other words: the essential functions of sovereignty.
They also want AID–or maybe it would be called the US Agency for State Building–to focus on fewer countries, mainly but not exclusively in what some of us think of as the Greater Middle East (Morocco to Pakistan, more or less), plus countries at risk from Russian and Chinese expansionism, with a few Latin American countries thrown in for counternarcotics purposes. The point is to choose them based on their strategic importance to US national security.
John Norris, arguing that our current practices favor rewarding failed states with lots of money and attention, takes what he terms a”better” approach to fragile states. He proposes that willing and able fragile states–not the utterly failed ones–be invited to enter into repeatable 5-year, USAID-administered Inclusion, Growth and Peace compacts, with the aim of developing effective and legitimate institutions over a decade and more. While not proposing a definitive list, he suggests:
Niger, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Lebanon, Uganda, Myanmar, Cameroon, Egypt, Mali, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, Nepal, and Rwanda all stand out as countries where a mixture of host country commitment, effective diplomacy, positive leverage, and sound assistance strategies could help move them more permanently out of the fragility category.
Adding Tunisia and Mali for good measure, Norris says the pay-off from focusing more attention on these not-yet-basket cases could be particularly high.
This approach is analogous to one the Millennium Challenge Corporation uses, usually for more consolidated states. Greater flexibility would be required for fragile states, and the money would be focused on improving legitimacy, which is something the host country naturally wants. But it would have to make specific, transparent and accountable commitments in exchange.
Implicitly, the array of current AID objectives that Miclaucic and Boot cite would be at least partly dropped in Norris’ approach as well, though of course improvement in state effectiveness would likely result in some of those objectives being met. Norris proposes specific indicators for his compacts, geared toward the problems of fragile states like return of refugees and internally displaced people, reduction of grievances and increased government effectiveness, among others. He also proposes getting rid of the parallel budgets funded as Overseas Contingency Operations, but only if equivalent amounts are re-inserted into regular appropriations of State, AID and Defense.
That’s about as much budgetese as I am capable and willing to speak. The main point for all three authors is just this: our current foreign assistance is not producing the best results because it is focused on the wrong objectives and countries and because it is spent on the wrong efforts. The stove pipes that rule the foreign assistance world are separating things that belong together, especially where fragile states are concerned. We could do much better if we re-thought the whole package strategically, from ultimate objectives to programs.
As I explained in the book advertised to your upper right, I doubt that can be done with existing institutions, which have proven irremediable. But Norris, Boot and Miclaucic have put forward good ideas worthy of attention.
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Peace Picks June 27-30
- Restoring NATO’s Power And Purpose| Monday, June 27th | 1:30 | Atlantic Council | 1030 15th St NW, Washington, DC 20005, USA| Register HERE | After Britain’s historic vote to leave the European Union, the NATO Alliance has become more important than ever as a platform for European cooperation and security. What the Alliance achieves at its upcoming Warsaw Summit will be integral in defining NATO’s role in the new Euro-Atlantic security environment and strengthening international peace and stability in a turbulent world. Framing a critical conversation about the Alliance’s strategic priorities, this event will present the final conclusions of an Atlantic Council-chartered study on the future of NATO co-chaired by Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns and General James L. Jones. The study is premised on the belief that the Alliance is facing its greatest set of internal and external challenges since the Cold War. The report calls for renewed leadership by the United States and key European allies to restore NATO’s power and purpose in the face of an entirely different security landscape. Featuring a panel discussion with Nicholas Burns, Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and Former US Ambassador to NATO; and General James L. Jones, Chairman and Board Director, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council; the event will convene key transatlantic officials and leaders to discuss what the US, UK, and crucial European Allies must do to bolster NATO’s strength and solidarity in a post-Brexit Europe.
- Challenges And Opportunities For The U.S. Government To Improve The Protection Of Civilians In Armed Conflict| Monday, June 27th | 3:30-5:00 | Stimson Center | 8th floor, 1211 Connecticut Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register HERE | To mark the Washington, D.C. launch of Protection of Civilians, a comprehensive volume published by Oxford University Press, the Stimson Center will host a discussion examining how the U.S. government can advance the protection of civilians agenda. Panelists from inside and outside the U.S. government will explore how the government has engaged through bilateral diplomatic channels and multilateral institutions to prevent and respond to violence against civilians in conflict zones. The panel discussion will be followed by a reception with drinks and hors d’oeuvres. This event will be held under the Chatham House Rule. Speakers include: Victoria K. Holt, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State; Bruno Stagno Ugarte, Deputy Executive Director at Human Rights Watch, Lise Grande, Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, Tamara Guttman, Director General, Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START).
- Is China’s Door Closing? | Tuesday, June 28th | 2:30-4:00 | Woodrow Wilson Center | 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20004 | Register HERE | Ever since Deng Xiaoping launched his reforms in 1978, “openness” (对外开放) has been a central tenet of Chinese policy. While the actual degree of China’s openness has varied from time to time and sector to sector over the past 38 years, the trend toward greater liberalization of society, institutions, and the economy has been clear. Until recently. The passage of China’s foreign NGO law raises doubts about Xi Jinping’s commitment to further opening and reform. The law, which places foreign NGO’s under the supervision of the Ministry of Public Security, is the latest in a series of regulations meant to control “hostile foreign forces.” Surveys indicate that foreign companies are concerned about tightening business regulations in China and wonder whether they are as welcome as they were in recent decades. International journalists and publishers, too, are finding it difficult to obtain visas and to reach Chinese audiences. Is China’s door closing to foreigners? Why are conditions changing for international actors in China? How should the United States respond? Please join us for a discussion of the future of American NGO’s, corporations, and media in Xi’s China. Speakers: Erin Ennis, Senior Vice President, US-China Business Council Isaac Stone Fish, Asia Editor, Foreign Policy Shawn Shieh, Deputy Director, China Labour Bulletin.
- Changing Tides: The Road To Reconciliation And The Future Of Turkish – Israeli Relations | Tuesday, June 28th | 4:00-6:00 | Turkish Heritage Organization | Carnegie Endowment Conference Center | 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW | In light of these recent developments and the possibility that a deal between Turkey and Israel is imminent, the Turkish Heritage Organization is hosting a roundtable discussion on Tuesday, June 28th from 4-6pm at the Carnegie Endowment Conference Center to explore and discuss the prospects for reconciliation between Turkey and Israel, the final stages of a deal and what the future might look like for both countries. Spakers include: Dr. Brenda Shaffer, Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council; Dan Arbell, Nonresident senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings and Former Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of Israel in Washington, DC; and Moran Stern, Georgetown University, Center for Jewish Civilization. The moderator will be Dr. Mark Meirowitz, Assistant Professor at SUNY Maritime College.
- Media Activism Amid Civil War: The Role of Syrian Women Journalists | Wednesday, June 29th | 12:30-1:45 | Middle East Institute | 1761 N Street NW Washington, DC 20036 | Register HERE | Syrian citizen-journalists, bloggers, and media activists have played a critical role covering one of the world’s most dangerous conflicts. They do so in the face of significant challenges – from fear for their safety, to overcoming international indifference to the story of an unending conflict. Women journalists face even greater challenges and yet many continue to work in the field. Non-profit initiatives like the Syrian Female Journalists’ Network are providing training and support while promoting a better understanding of the important role of women in the Syrian uprising. The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host the founders of the Syrian Female Journalists Network, Rula Asad and Milia Eidmouni, and radio journalist Caroline Ayoub for a discussion of their work in promoting the roles of Syrian women in journalism and civil society. Kate Seelye will moderate the discussion with the activists, who are visiting Washington as part of an Asfari Foundation-backed program to highlight the ongoing role of Syrian civil society.
- Kurdistan Rising? Considerations For Kurds, Their Neighbors, And The Region | Wednesday, June 29th | 3:00-4:30 | American Enterprise Institute |1150 Seventeenth Street, NW Washington, DC 20036| Register HERE | Two decades ago, many US officials would have been hard-pressed to place Kurdistan on a map, let alone consider the Kurds as allies. Today, Kurds loom large on the Middle Eastern stage, highlighting their renewed push for independence amid the chaos in Iraq. In his new monograph, “Kurdistan Rising? Considerations for Kurds, Their Neighbors, and the Region,” AEI’s Michael Rubin examines the effects of Kurdish independence and unresolved questions that would follow an independent Kurdistan, including citizenship, political structures, defense, economic systems, and renegotiation of treaties to include the Kurds. Lukman Faily, Iraqi ambassador to the United States; James F. Jeffrey, former US ambassador to Iraq and Turkey; and Michael Rubin, resident scholar at AEI, will speak.
- Congo Crisis: Getting to Good Elections in a Bad Neighborhood | Wednesday, June 29th | 4:00pm | Institute of World Politics | 1521 16th Street NW Washington, DC | Register HERE | Charles Snyder, Former Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Professor of African Affairs, IWP, will speak about prospects for Congo.
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Brexit’s impact in the Middle East
The Middle East Institute, where I am affiliated as a Scholar, published my short assessment of Brexit’s impact in the region this morning, along with briefs by Paul Scham on Israeli reaction and Alex Vatanka on reshuffling of Syria portfolios in Tehran:
The Middle East seems far from Great Britain, but the reverberations of Brexit will still be felt there. The immediate impact on British and European stock and real estate markets, where Gulf oil sovereign wealth funds and individuals have a lot of money at risk, will be a dramatic fall. The E.U. economy, the world’s largest, was just beginning to pick up. It will likely now return to recession, due as much to uncertainty and lack of confidence as to any real economic impact of Brexit, which will take at least two years to implement.
Seasoned investors will hold on for the ride, but the impact on global economic prospects will be negative and persistent. Oil prices, which had gradually managed to climb back above $50/barrel, will slide again, due to reduced energy demand, a rising U.S. dollar as investors seek a safe haven, and the declining pound and euro. Iran, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies will feel the renewed pinch brought on by Brexit.
The U.K. and other European states have been important partners for the United States in the Middle East, in particular when intervening militarily in Iraq, Libya and Syria. Allied help will be harder to come by in the future, as the U.K. and the rest of Europe turn inwards and seek to block Middle Eastern immigrants even more vigorously than in the past. Turkey’s European perspective will evaporate. Nativist sentiments in Europe and America will increase, potentially accelerating radicalization, especially among Muslims in the U.K. who largely voted to remain. This will further distance Americans and Europeans from the Muslim world and make the Middle East easier prey for both Russia and extremists.
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Rare success
I’m no expert on Colombia, but you don’t have to be one to welcome the ceasefire negotiated with Cuban mediation between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (the FARC) after 52 years of rebellion. The Economist gives an excellent overview of the accomplishment and the problems that lie ahead.
I would just signal the capital importance of preventing FARC cadres from going the way of rebels in El Salvador and Guatemala. In the aftermath of their civil wars, which ended in the 1990s, criminality has remained a major problem and even grown dramatically in El Salvador. Colombia has had significant success against its once rampaging drug cartels, but demobilization of the guerrillas will increase the challenge. Thousands of unemployed youth with few talents other than avoiding the authorities and handling a gun constitute a serious problem. Nor will their commanders miss an opportunity to organize protection and smuggling rackets, especially if they don’t do well in the post-war political competition.
Colombia has a neighbor to the east, Venezuela, already in desperate straits. Its left-wing Chavistas have wrecked the country’s economy, despite sitting on what are arguably some of the world’s largest, albeit low quality, oil reserves. They have also made a hash of the government’s institutions, which include a parliament now controlled by the opposition. The power struggle there and its consequences may well boil over to Colombia as Venezuelans flee economic implosion, straining Bogotá’s capacities just as it embarks on the challenge of implementing a complicated and for some people not very palatable peace deal.
A slowdown in Colombia’s economic growth will likely worsen in the aftermath of Brexit as the world slips into recession. The government will have trouble anteing up all the resources needed to implement the peace deal, which includes commitments to rural development among other things. The US has spent about $8 billion on Plan Colombia, one of Washington’s more comprehensive efforts to strengthen a fragile state and help it block both drug cartels and leftist guerrillas from damaging US national security. While criticized on human rights grounds and for its efforts at drug eradication, the Plan appears to have contributed a good deal to Colombia’s current success.
Sustainment will not be automatic. A special tribunal and disarmament, as The Economist reports, will be particularly important to the Colombian public. Jobs and political inclusion will be important to the guerrillas. Colombia is the third most populous Latin American country, with 50 million people (only Brazil and Mexico are larger). It needs to make at least as much success of its post-war transition as it has already made of its internal wars. Success in negotiating the end of a rebellion is rare, but success in managing the post-war process is even rarer.
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Iznenadjenje!
Former Foreign Minister and Ambassador Mico Vlahovic, whose own reaction to Brexit is published here, has provided a translation into Montenegrin of mine for the Podgorica daily Pobjeda:
Da, glas da Britanija napusti EU me je iznenadio. Očekivao sam da ekonomska recionalnost i politička smirenost odnesu prevagu nad nezadovoljstvom zbog imigranata i nad onima koji mašu zastavama i viču “Engleska na prvom mjestu”. Politika identiteta je ponovo trijumfovala. Neka mi to bude lekcija.
Neposredne ekonomske implikacije su već poznate: oštar pad britanske funte, rasprodaja na berzama širom svijeta, još više uzdrmani euro i još izvjesnija obnovljena recesija u Evropi i jače [ekonomsko] usporavanje u ostatku svijeta. SAD bi mogle biti izuzetak za sada, jer će mnogi potražiti sigurno utočište u dolaru, ali će ga sve ovo poskupjeti, što će oslabiti izvoz i dodatno usporiti razvoj. Nesigurnost će opstati: Škotska će ići na drugi referendum, Vels može poći tim stopama, a i Katalonija će pokušati isto.
A što je sa Balkanom i Srednjim Istokom, na koje je usmjerena moja pažnja?
Na Balkanu, kratkočni i dugoročni efekti su vrlo ozbiljni. Region je u velikom mjeri zavisan od evropske trgovine i investicija, koji će i sami biti odmah u teškoćama. Ali, politički efekat će biti značajniji. Balkanci su i do sada imali sumnje u svoju evropsku perspektivu, koja se sada čini daljom nego što je to bio slučaj prije pet godina. Sada bi oni bili budale ako ne posumnjaju u spremnost Evrope umanjene za Veliku Britaniju da im omogući članstvo.
Te sumnje će otvoriti vrata povećanom ruskom uticaju, ne samo na Balkanu, već i u Ukrajini. Niko od britanskog referenduma na političkom planu nije dobio više od Putina: rezultat slabi njegove protivnike u Ujedinjenom Kraljevstvu i u Evropskoj Uniji, čini njegovu aneksiju Krima i okupaciju jugoistočnog dijela Ukrajine prihvatljivijim i opravdava njegov etnički nacionalizam. Mora da ovih dana votka teče potocima u Moskvi. Stići će votka i do Balkana. Putin će, bez sumnje, pojačati napore u Srbiji, Republici Srpskoj i u Makedoniji kako bi odvratio Slovene od njihovih evropskih i NATO snova.
Srednji Istok je teži slučaj. Ima puno bogatih šeika iz Zaliva sa uloženim novcem i imovinom u Britaniji. Njima se neće svidjeti da vide kolaps funte. Neki od njih su već toliko izgubiki zbog niske cijene nafte da se mogu uspaničiti i napustiti Britaniju. Ali, ipak mislim da će mnogi ostati. Usporeni ekonomski rast na globalnom nivou će nastaviti da obara cijenu nafte, poslije njenog nedavnog povratka na nešto preko pedeset dolara. Zbog toga je sudbina zalivskog novca u Britaniji još i gora nego ranije.
Britanska uloga na Srednjem Istoku može biti izmijenjena. Britanija je bila najveći evropski kontributor ne samo u Iraku, već i u Libiji i Siriji. Britanija koja je više okrenuta sebi samoj i sa smanjenom ulogom vani neće imati iste resurse i neće biti u stanju da nastavi sa takvim angažmanom.
S druge strane, Britanija će, naravno, podići barijere imigrantima sa Srednjeg Istoka, mada ni do sada nije primila neki veći broj. Glavni fokus nezadovoljstva je bio usmjeren prema istočnim Evropljanima i prema prijetnji imigranata sa Balkana. Mladi Albanci, Srbi, Bosanci i Makedonci će izgubiti mogućnosti za školovanje i posao, koje su imali posljednjih godina.
Ironično, jedan od mnogih problema koji mora biti riješen u toku dvogodišnjih pregovora o primjeni Bregzita, će biti Britanci koji žive u ostatku Evrope, kojih ima oko milion i dvije stotine hiljada. Tri miliona ljudi iz zemalja Evropske Unije živi u Velikoj Britaniji. Ukoliko se ne postigne sporazum koji će omogućiti ovim ljudima da ostanu, mogli bi biti suočeni sa masovnim kretanjima stanovništva sa nepredvidljivim posljedicama. Čak i ako im bude dozvoljeno da ostanu, ovoj vrsti migracije je došao kraj. Sljedeća britanska vlada će biti primorana da učini sve što bude mogla da spriječi strance da se domognu njenih, uskoro – manje značajnih, obala.
Dakle: Bregzit je loša vijest za Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo, za EU, za SAD, Balkan i Srednji Istok. To je dobra vijest za Vladimira Putina. Ja i moji prijatelji nemamo što da slavimo.
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