Declining, but not disappearing
Yesterday’s discussion of Russia: A Test for Transatlantic Unity at the German Marshall Fund’s Transatlantic Academy made for a grim morning. The European and American Russia scholars were pleased that the West has maintained a coherent and unified response on Donbas, including greater support for front line allies, unity on sanctions and support for Kiev. But they worry that sanctions will fray or even collapse in 2017 and that Ukraine is not making the reform progress it urgently requires.
Nor do they see any sign that Russia is prepared to deliver anything serious in Ukraine. Russian officials view the US as malevolently and incompetently denying Russia its rightful role in the world by limiting its natural sphere of influence. They believe the West is decadent and unwilling or unable to exert itself on behalf of Ukraine, while denying that Russia is directly involved there. Putin in particular is banking on the West weakening.
The only positive sign anyone reported was a palpable desire by Moscow officials to “engage” with Americans, which is difficult as they refuse even to discuss the war in Donbas. If Moscow wants progress, the Americans think it needs to deliver something on the Minsk II agreement.
On Syria, Moscow has gained some of what it sought. It is now engaged with the US in daily deconfliction of military operations as well as higher level political discussions. But we continue to disagree on Bashar al Assad and on who is a terrorist.
More generally, Russia is a declining power in key dimensions: its economy is in a tailspin, its population is imploding, its energy resources are no longer as irreplaceable as once they were. Most of Ukraine is lost, mainly because the West has proven more unified than Putin anticipated. His effort to reassert Russia’s great power status has largely failed except for Syria, where the reformed and refinanced Russian military has proven to have serious but limited capabilities. The Russian regime is self-deceiving, unable to correct its mistakes or face its own responsibility. It instead blames its problems on the rest of the world.
Even if the Ukraine sanctions were lifted, the Russian economy would not recover quickly. Nor would prospects for political change, which depend on an upper middle class that is shrinking because of emigration and economic difficulties. The regime has successfully repressed the political opposition and left it without significant representation.
Putin has become decreasingly pragmatic and increasingly ideological towards the West since 2012. He can still be pragmatic (e.g. with China) but less and less so with the West. He is openly preparing for more war as he challenges the West in Ukraine and the Middle East. His ruling circle is shrinking, becoming less predictable and disengaging from the West. He is unrealistic. The beat of the war drums coming from Moscow’s tightly controlled propaganda machine is loud. The risks are high.
The West is also subject to risk. EU unity on the sanctions may not last. Ukraine could fail to deliver on its part of Minsk II. Conditionality has worked with Ukraine on economic issues, far less so on political ones like electoral and administrative reform. The US election also raises questions, as even Hillary Clinton may not give priority to Ukraine and could try to reach out to Putin. Donald Trump is unpredictable, but he has said he is looking for a deal. That could mean divvying up Europe again, as we did at Yalta.
Washington in particular hasn’t made up its mind on the threat from Russia. Some believe Russia is a declining power that wants to deal with the US and poses relatively little threat. Neither its propaganda machine nor its military has proven very successful. In Ukraine and Syria, there is an imbalance of interests: they are far more important to Russia than to the West. Others think Russia is a serious and growing threat, evidenced by its burgeoning military strength. Still others think there is a need to reassess relations with Russia and in particular to anticipate an end to sanctions, striking as good a deal as the West can get before they collapse.
These uncertainties could become all too apparent this summer, as Moscow will want to react to the July NATO Summit. There is a real possibility of an August surprise in Ukraine or Syria, or perhaps in the form of a Turkey/Russia conflict, which would put NATO on the spot. Russia may be declining, but it is not going away.
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