peacefare.net

No end in sight

How can Daesh (that’s the Islamic State, ISIS or ISIL to the uninitiated) be defeated and what will happen thereafter? If you want the more upbeat official story, read Brett McGurk’s testimony. Here are some thoughts that have crossed my screen lately.

Everyone should expect a generational fight. Though Daesh is losing territory rapidly in Iraq (47% of its maximum) and Syria (20%), it is good at what it does, resilient and adaptable. It has recruited at least 40,000 foreign fighters from 120 other countries. It has overt affiliates in more than half a dozen countries as well as a covert worldwide network devoted to smuggling, finance and terror, as illustrated all too clearly in this week’s Istanbul airport bombing. Even after it has lost all its territory, Daesh will go to ground and continue terrorist attacks of that sort.

The Coalition arrayed against Daesh is large (nominally 66 countries) and organized but still clumsy and far from fully integrated. It will hold a July 20 “summit” in Washington focused on its five “lines of effort”: political/military coordination, blocking foreign fighters, Daesh finance, stabilization of areas retaken from Daesh and counter-messaging. This is in addition to the nine US “lines of effort.”

There are contrasting narratives that avowed opponents of Daesh espouse, leading them to opposing conclusions.

The Russians view Daesh as the product of destabilization of Syrian government institutions, whose maintenance is vital to stem the extremist tide. In order to ensure the survival of state institutions, they support Assad and want reconciliation between him and at least some portion of the opposition. They also think their military intervention has gone pretty well, delivering some Western respect and easing Western pressure on Ukraine. But they are concerned, based on the Chechen precedent, about the enormous cost and difficulties of an Assad victory in Syria. They have flatly refused to pay for any reconstruction when approached by a government-linked expert.

The Saudis have an almost diametrically opposed narrative. They believe Daesh is the product of Iranian-sponsored sectarianism in both Iraq and Syria. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki helped the Islamic State to revive in Iraq after the American withdrawal by governing in a blatantly sectarian way dictated by Iran. ISIS’s ability to gain ground in Syria is attributable to the regime, which released extremist prisoners, has bought oil from Daesh, and focused its military attacks against moderates, all with backing by Iran. The Saudis take the threat of Daesh seriously and believe the fate of Iran’s effort to establish itself as the Middle East hegemon will be determined in Syria. The Kingdom recognizes that its own Wahhabi ideology has contributed to Daesh‘s appeal and is committed to reforms that will change that in the decades to come.

Iraqis are fighting and dying to take turf from Daesh, but the aftermath of victory is a big and unsolved problem. Inclusive governance is what the country needs but seldom gets, in particular in Baghdad. Shia militias were too active in Tikrit in the wake of victory there over Daesh, rendering the town unsafe for Sunni returnees initially. Only once local leaders and reconciliation mechanisms were put in place was the stabilization effort more successful. At Ramadi, the governor has been doing well but there is much more damage and a lot of demining to be done. At Fallujah, there is less destruction but a serious humanitarian crisis, with 85,000 civilians fleeing from the city and living in unacceptable conditions in the desert. UNDP resources are grossly inadequate to the stabilization effort it has been tasked with.

Little planning has been done for stabilization in Syria. What is needed there is a political settlement. Sunni alienation and grievance are the the problem, enormously aggravated by the presence of Hezbollah. Ignoring it gives the impression that the West will support “ABS”: anyone but Sunnis. Post-Daesh, governance needs to be far more inclusive.

The Kurds in both Iraq and Syria are getting a lot of Western support because they are willing to fight Daesh. The support should be more conditional. The US should insist that Iraqi Kurdistan reach a pact with Baghdad and that the Syrian Kurds help with peace talks between Turkey and the PKK, which is closely tied to the Syrian Kurds.

Looking ahead, there is a real risk that with Russian and Iranian support the Syrian regime will manage to capture Aleppo as well as Raqqa, form some sort of “national unity” government with elements of the loyal opposition and rewrite parts of the constitution. The US might then declare victory and abandon the field entirely, leaving reconstruction inadequately resourced. This would not really solve anything and would allow grievances to worsen, ungoverned spaces to grow and the conflict to spread, possibly to Lebanon and Jordan. 

There is a glimmer of hope for Iraq, but even that is limited. Splits in both the Sunni and Shia communities are opening the possibility of cross-sectarian mobilization in Baghdad. The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) are often viewed as under Tehran’s control, but some of them are not and might join with Sunnis who have also fought against Daesh. The Kurdish issue would still be unresolved, however, which will create problems for the liberation of Mosul. Kurdistan Regional Government President Barzani is entirely dedicated to consolidating his own power, both vis-a-vis other Kurdish political forces and vis-a-vis Baghdad. Without clearer definition of the political end-state, defeat of Daesh could lead to a follow-on civil war pitting Kurds against Arabs.