Month: June 2016
In
Of course I prefer that the UK stay in the European Union. The economic arguments are compelling, both for Brits and for Americans. Britain is clearly much better off today than it was when it joined the EU in 1973. Its economic future outside the EU is highly uncertain, causing stock markets worldwide to tremble until yesterday. Then they strengthened in response to indications the “remain” camp might win. A lot of US companies are established in Great Britain. Leaving would reduce trans-Atlantic trade and investment, hinder London’s role as a financial hub, reduce British and American access to European markets and hurt the fragile European recovery now just barely beginning.
But none of that has mattered much. Instead the “leave” campaign has gained momentum as a largely a populist rebellion against immigration, European bureaucrats and British (principally English) identity. Many Brits want out despite the economic arguments. The parallels to Donald Trump’s successful campaign for the Republican presidential nomination are all to obvious.
I hope the parallel does not end there. Trump’s effort so far is clearly a minority one. Assuming the polls are correct, the US election if held today would end in a landslide victory for Hillary Clinton, despite all the heavy baggage she carries. Great Britain will do the world, and the American election campaign, a great deal of good if it rejects “leave,” which has run a campaign only slightly less objectionable than Trump’s. The murder of “remain” parliamentarian Jo Cox cannot be pinned on the campaign itself, but it betrays the level of division and violence associated with this referendum. By the same token, if “leave” wins, it will put wind in Trump’s sails.
Both “leave” and Trump are drawing on a reservoir of resentment from globalization’s losers. They are protesting, loudly, and all too often with good reason: many have not seen an increase in wages for 20 years. Some blame that on trade agreements, immigration or people whose skin is not “white.” The real reasons are often tax policies that favor wealthy real estate investors like Donald Trump, lack of appropriate education to take on the new jobs globalization has created, the union-breaking Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher initiated, and a dearth of retraining opportunities or desire to exploit those that exist.
Ironically, a “leave” win will likely lead to at least one other “leave” vote. Most Scots are far more comfortable with Brussels Eurocrats than the English are. The First Minister has already indicated that Scotland will conduct another referendum on leaving Great Britain if Great Britain votes to leave the EU. Northern Ireland can’t be expected to follow suit, but what about Wales?
And what about other EU countries? We can expect several of them to want to follow Britain’s lead, which will mean a very hard line against concessions in the two years of departure negotiations that would follow the referendum. Germany and France in particular will be hard over not to make departure easy for Britain, in hopes of discouraging other members from following suit. Not to mention Spain, which faces a possible secession of Catalonia.
Nothing could please Vladimir Putin more than to watch the Europe that has united with the US in imposing sanctions in response to Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine, in particular on the basis of a referendum, since that is the meretricious device he used in Crimea. Never mind the possibility that parts of the Russian Federation might want to follow the precedent. Putin knows well how to deal with that, as he demonstrated in putting down the Chechnya rebellion.
So “out” is bad for the US and bad for the rest of Europe. It is good for Trump and Putin. That is enough reason for me to want the United Kingdom to remain “in.”
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Peace picks June 20-24
- Decision Point For The Citizens Of Europe: Brexit Referendum And Spanish Parliamentary Elections | Monday, June 20th | 12:00-1pm | Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) | 1717 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036, USA | Register HERE |On June 23, citizens of the United Kingdom will participate in the European Union membership referendum. Only three days later, on June 26, a general election will be held in Spain after six months of political deadlock and the failure to form a government. Both events will have significant implications for the future of the European Union, a union already under duress due to the Greek debt crisis and mass migration. In addition, populist and nationalist parties have been surging in a number of EU member countries – from Germany to Austria, Hungary to Poland, and France to the United Kingdom. Will Europeans seek unity or chose division? The US-Italy Global Affairs Forum would like to invite you to a panel discussion discussing such issues. Speakers will include Renzo Cianfanelli of the US-Italy Global Affairs Forum; Donald Jensen, Senior Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations; John Gizzi, White House Correspondent for Newsmax,; and Juncal Fernández-Garayzábal of the Institute for the Study of International Migrations (ISIM) at Georgetown University.
- Ukraine’s Humanitarian Crisis | Tuesday, June 21st | 10:30-3:00 | Atlantic Council | 1030 15th St NW, Washington, DC 20005, USA| Register HERE | Since 2014, the war in Ukraine’s East has claimed over ten thousand lives and displaced over 1.6 million people—the largest internally displaced persons crisis in Europe. Nationwide, more than 3.1 million Ukrainians are in need of humanitarian assistance. As daily ceasefire violations continue in the Donbas, the ability of the Minsk Agreements to deliver a sustainable peace comes under question. The situation in the occupied territories of the so-called Luhansk People’s Republic and Donetsk People’s Republic is dire: An absence of the rule of law, violations of human rights by the self-imposed authorities, and shortages of basic necessities have left the most vulnerable populations at risk. In addition, aid groups face difficulties delivering supplies and services to where they are most needed. The conference will focus on the current state of Ukraine’s humanitarian crisis and how to strategize on a way forward. Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur, co-chair of the Congressional Ukrainian Caucus at the US House of Representatives, will deliver keynote remarks. We hope you can join us for this important and timely discussion. A light lunch will be served.
- The National Security Implications Of Climate Change And Food Security | Tuesday, June 21st | 10:30-12:00 | Center for American Progress | 1333 H Street NW, 10th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20005| Register HERE | U.S. policy communities are increasingly identifying climate change, environmental deterioration, water management, and food security as key concerns for national security and global governance. The interplay between these trends was visible during the upheavals across the Middle East, as food riots and water disputes illuminated the region’s extreme food insecurity. In the five years before the uprising in Syria, for example, the country experienced one of the worst droughts on record—decimating wheat production and wiping out livestock. There is little question that the effects of climate change will cause more extreme weather events and crop insecurities in the decades to come, and it is reasonable to expect that the secondary and tertiary effects will be magnified with time. Join the Center for American Progress on June 21, 2016, to discuss potential U.S. policy responses that address these pressing issues. Introductory remarks will be from Former Sen. Tom Daschle (D-SD) and Jon White, retired Rear Admiral, Navy, Coast Guard; President and CEO, Consortium for Ocean Leadership. Panelist will be Nancy Stetson, U.S. Special Representative for Global Food Security, U.S. Department of State; Richard Leach, President and CEO, World Food Program USA; Sharon Burke, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy, U.S. Department of Defense; Senior Advisor, New America.
- What Comes After? Strategy For Stabilization And Reconstruction In Syria | Tuesday, June 21st | 12:00-1:30 | American Security Project | 1100 New York Ave NW #710W, Washington, DC 20005| Register HERE | As the conflict in Syria enters its 5th year, questions of stabilization, peace, and reconstruction seem far away. However, building a sustainable peace will require clear planning now. Join American Security Project on June 21st for the launch of its latest White Paper on Syrian stabilization and reconstruction to discuss building a coherent strategy for building a durable peace. Hani Masri, Member of the ASP Board of Directors and Founder of Tomorrow’s Youth Foundation, will speak. Lunch refreshments will be served from 12:00pm – 12:30pm.
- Responding To The Migrant Crisis In The Middle East | Tuesday, June 21st | 1:00 | Council on Foreign Relations | 1777 F St NW #100, Washington, DC 20006, USA| Experts discuss efforts to assist refugees displaced from the migrant crisis in the Middle East. Speakers will include: Lisa Anderson, Former President of the American University in Cairo; US Ambassador to Germany, Peter Wittig; and David Miliband, President and CEO of the International Rescue Committee.
- The Gulf, Iran, And Future Oil Geopolitics | Wednesday, June 22nd | 3:00-4:30 | Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars | 1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington, DC 20004 | Register HERE | The oil markets remain in constant turmoil. Oil prices have yet to recover as OPEC countries have repeatedly failed to agree on production cuts. Following the nuclear deal, Iran has been aggressively looking to increase its oil exports despite secondary non-nuclear sanctions. Iraq is also focusing on increasing its oil exports while mired in a dispute with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) over revenue sharing. By contrast, the world’s largest producer, Saudi Arabia, is in the midst of a major restructuring of its decision-making apparatus as it also attempts to diversify from its dependence on oil. This panel will explore the geopolitics of oil and discuss the current state of play in the Gulf region. Panelists include: Douglas Hengel, Senior Resident Fellow, German Marshall Fund; David Goldwyn, President, Goldwyn Global Strategies; Elizabeth Rosenberg, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy, Economics, and Security Program, Center for a New American Security; Jean Francois Seznec, Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center; Jan Kalicki, Global Fellow, Woodrow Wilson Center, and Senior Fellow, Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University, will moderate.
- Russia’s Military: Assessment, Strategy, And Threat | Thursday, June 23rd | 1:00-2:30 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | 1779 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register HERE | Russia’s actions in Crimea, eastern Ukraine, and Syria have demonstrated the reemergence of the Russian military as one of the Kremlin’s most effective foreign policy tools. The success of these campaigns comes as a result of major military reform and modernization efforts that began in 2008. What changes led to today’s revamped Russian military? How will the Kremlin use its modernized force as a geopolitical tool? And does Russia’s new military pose a threat to the West? Ahead of the NATO Warsaw summit in July, the Center on Global Interests is pleased to invite you to a discussion with Michael Kofman, a leading expert on Russia’s military, and Michael Purcell, Director of Operations at CGI and former Marine officer, on the details of Russian military capabilities and how the West should respond. The event will mark the release of a new CGI report – a net assessment of Russia’s military – co-authored by Michael Kofman and Russian military analyst Alexander Golts. A Q&A will follow. Light refreshments will be served.
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Don’t forget Hezbollah
Here is the draft of the State Department dissent message on Syria, on which the New York Times based its coverage yesterday. So far as I can tell the final version is not publicly available, but this draft is polished. The argument is basically that the US has sufficient moral and strategic reason to attack Syrian government forces with stand-off weapons with the goal of getting President Asad to abide by the internationally mandated cessation of hostilities and initiate serious negotiations on a political transition, as required by the Geneva I communique and numerous subsequent international decisions. The dissent memo admits some downsides: a deterioration of relations with Russia and possible “second order” effects.
Those downsides require more consideration. There is no international mandate to attack Syrian government forces. Intervention in this case would in that sense have even less multilateral sanction than the NATO attack on Qaddafi’s forces in Libya, where there was a UN Security Council mandate, albeit one that authorized “all necessary means” to save civilians rather than to change the regime. Asad has not directly attacked the US, even if his reaction to Syria’s internal rebellion has created conditions that are inimical to US interests by attracting extremists and undermining stability in neighboring countries.
The Russia angle is also daunting. Moscow may well react by intensifying its attacks on the opposition forces the US supports, who are already targeted by Russian warplanes. Unilateral US intervention against Syrian government forces would also help Moscow to argue it is doing no worse in Ukraine, where it supports opposition forces behind a thin veil of denials that its forces are directly involved. The US is not ready to respond in kind to Russian escalation in Ukraine, if only because the European allies would not want it. Kiev might be the unintended victim of US escalation in Syria.
Second order effects could also include loss of European, Turkish and Jordanian support, because of an increased refugee flow out of Syria, as well as increased Iranian support for the Houthi rebellion in Yemen, destabilization of Bahrain and Shia militias in Iraq. Greater chaos in Syria could also help ISIS to revive its flagging fortunes and al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra to pursue its fight against the Syrian government.
These downsides are all too real, but so is the current situation: Russia, the Syrian government, Iran and Hezbollah are making mincemeat of the US-supported Syrian opposition while more extremist forces are gaining momentum. President Obama is reluctant to attack sovereign states that have not attacked the US directly without an international mandate of some sort. That is understandable. But doing nothing military to respond to a deteriorating situation is a decision too, one with real and unfortunately burgeoning negative consequences for US interests.
Hezbollah is the way out of this quandary. It is not a state. It is a designated terrorist group that has killed hundreds of Americans, and many others as well. The Americans say they are fighting terrorist groups in Syria. Why not Hezbollah? Its ground forces there have become increasingly important to the Syrian government’s cause. Getting Hezbollah out of the fight would arguably have as much impact on the military balance as strikes on the Syrian army, which is already a declining and demoralized force.
Washington need not start with military action. It could lead with diplomacy, telling Moscow and Tehran that we want Hezbollah to leave Syria tout de suite. If it fails to leave by a date certain, we could then strip it of its immunity and treat it like the other terrorist groups in Syria. Moscow might even welcome such a move, since Hezbollah efforts in Syria strengthen Iran’s hold, not Russia’s.
Tehran would be furious, claiming Hezbollah is in Syria at the request of its legitimate government. Hezbollah would likely try to strike US, Israeli or even Jewish targets in the region or beyond. It has managed in the past to murder Jews as far away as Argentina. Doing so would confirm the thesis that Hezbollah is a terrorist group and redouble the need to act decisively against it.
No suggestions for what to do or not do in Syria are simple. The situation has gotten so fraught that any proposition will have complicated and unpredictable consequences. But the State Department dissenters missed an opportunity to duck some of the President’s objections and strengthen their own argument by focusing on a terrorist group, rather than the regime’s own forces. Don’t forget Hezbollah.
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Turkey’s Kurdish anxieties
The Bipartisan Policy Center hosted Cascading Conflicts: U.S. Policy on Turkey, Syria, and the Kurds Tuesday morning. This was nominally a launch of its report on Authoritarianism and Escalation: Preparing for the Worst in Turkey’s Resurgent Kurdish Conflict but ranged rather far from that excellent account of how Turkey has repeatedly turned to war when its government has become more authoritarian.
Eric Edelman, Co-Chair of BPC’s Turkey Initiative and former ambassador to Turkey, discussed the mutual misreading of priorities and interests between Turkey and the US. Amberin Zaman, Public Policy Fellow at the Wilson Institute, recalled how the peace talks between the PKK and Turkish government in February 2015 raised hopes for reconciliation that were then dashed by President Erdoğan. Ceng Sagnic, Junior Researcher at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, considered how the Kurdish situation in Syria has thwarted Turkey’s foreign policy and prompted its interventionism. Aliza Marcus, Communications Consultant for the Strategic Impact Evaluation Fund at the World Bank, assessed the relationship between the YPG/PYD (the dominant Syrian Kurdish organizations) and the PKK (the dominant Turkish Kurdish organization) as well as Turkey’s position on the question. Ishaan Tharoor, a reporter for the Washington Post, moderated a lively discussion spanning Turkish domestic politics, the fight against the Islamic State (IS), and more.
Amberin Zaman elucidated how domestic and international factors have influenced Turkey’s position on Syria and the Kurdish question. She maintained that peace talks with the PKK faltered in part because of rising tensions with the YPG/PYD in Syria and also in response to Erdoğan’s presidential ambitions. Growing Kurdish autonomy in Northern Syria has emboldened Kurds everywhere. In the words of Aliza Marcus, no matter how hard the Turkish government hits the PKK domestically, now there will always be a powerful Kurdish presence across the border in Syria.
The conversation then turned to Turkey’s descent into authoritarianism. Ambassador Eric Edelman argued that the US has a vested interest in shaping Turkey’s domestic politics. Long-term US interests and Turkey’s status as a NATO ally—an alliance intended to be a union of liberal democracies— demand that US use its position to speak out publicly and privately on Turkey’s civil rights violations.
Aliza Marcus explained how the YPG grew out of networks of support for the PKK in Syria. However, despite clear evidence of ties between the two, she said that it is unclear to what extent the PKK and the YPG/PYD are independent decision-makers. She added that, from Turkey’s perspective, the question is irrelevant. The two are one and the same, and nothing will diminish Turkish fears of Kurdish nationalism.
After hearing from audience member and representative of Rojava Cantons, Sinam Mohamed, on Kurdish governance and long-term strategy, Ceng Sagnic contended that Kurdish-controlled areas show more signs of functioning governance than the rest of Syria currently does. He also commented on current Syrian Democratic Force movements into Sunni-Arab areas in northern Syria. Marcus countered that Kurdish forces are not expanding for expansion’s sake, they are simply going where the Islamic State already is–namely Sunni areas.
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Hard questions, difficult answers
Murdered yesterday, Jo Cox gave this last speech in Parliament on Syria (via @ThomasPierret):
Would that we could all lead lives that guarantee we leave behind such eloquent, upstanding memorials!
I can’t match that, but my readers do ask hard questions about the war against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Here are a few, with answers:
Q: Why do the Russians back Assad?
A: Lots of people more knowledgeable than I am about Russia have tried to answer this one. Most take seriously Moscow’s frequent statements that they are not wedded to Assad personally but want an orderly and legitimate transition in Damascus, not abrupt regime change.
Certainly they don’t want regime change, but I’ve seen no evidence the rest of that summary is true. Now that they have doubled down on Assad by joining the fight last fall, the Russians have in fact welded, if not wedded, themselves to Assad or some proxy for him. There is no conceivable successor regime that would be even half as friendly to Russian interests.
Moscow’s tactical gains through its air attacks have guaranteed it eventual strategic defeat in Syria, where the overwhelming majority of the more than 60% of the pre-war population that was Sunni will be forever hostile to Russia.
Q: How about the Iranians?
A: Iran has been 100% committed to Assad from the get-go. They need Syria to maintain their pipeline of arms shipments to Hezbollah in Lebanon, who are Iran’s front-line troops in the confrontation with Israel. Tehran cannot rely on access to Beirut’s airport, and Syria provides strategic depth to Hezbollah.
Iranian strategic defeat is even more certain than the Russian loss of Syria. I would be the first to stand up against retaliation by Sunnis against Shia and Alawites, but the odds of its happening eventually are high.
Q: Why don’t we just go in there any finish off the Islamic State?
A: In some alternate universe where George W. Bush is still president, I suppose we might do that. But the risks of deploying US ground troops to the front lines to fight ISIS are significant. Are we prepared to see 100 American soldiers captured and shot in the back of the head or burned alive? How about 500? Or a thousand? ISIS is significantly more virulent and brutal than even its predecessor, the Islamic State in Iraq during the 2000s.
There is also the “day after” problem. The key question once ISIS is defeated is how the territory it once controlled will be stabilized and governed. Without a solution to that, we can expect ISIS (or something worse) to return. The US didn’t do well as an occupier in Iraq in 2003. How well would we do in Syria or Iraq in 2016? Are we prepared to deploy several hundred thousand troops for years to try to make sure things come out right? And pay perhaps another 500 billion or a trillion dollars for reconstruction?
Q: What’s the solution?
A: I don’t know. The last five years of war have made everything more difficult than it might have been in those first six months of peaceful demonstrations, but the clock can’t be turned back.
There are two propositions I find somewhat appealing now.
One is for the US to extend its war on terrorists in Syria, which in practice now targets only the Sunni variety, to Hezbollah, which is a Shia non-state actor. The first step would be telling the Iranians that Hezbollah must leave Syria. We’d have to be prepared to back that up with air strikes. Getting rid of Hezbollah would significantly affect the military balance in Syria, raise the risks to Russia and Iran, and increase the odds of a negotiated outcome.
The second somewhat appealing idea is creation of safe areas for the non-extremist Syrian opposition to govern, one in the north and one in the south. This would give the mostly Arab opposition an opportunity to prove itself a serious competitor to the regime in dealing with the requirements of Syria’s citizens, as the Kurds have begun to do along the northern border with Turkey. Doing this would entail both protecting the safe areas from the air and providing the opposition with the means to protect themselves on the ground, as we already do with the Kurds.
Neither of these propositions is a slam dunk. The first would likely lead to Hezbollah retaliation against American or allies assets somewhere in the region. The second, safe areas, is an inherently difficult operation that provides the regime, the Russians and the Iranians with target-rich environments they would no doubt attack. Safe areas have more often failed (Bosnia) than succeeded (Iraqi Kurdistan).
Q: What do you think of the State Department dissent message urging air attacks on Syrian government forces?
A: I might agree with its overall thrust, as it appears based on the notion that the Russians won’t help and we have to do something to rebalance the military equation. But I’ll need to see a full text before commenting.
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Dear UN,
Riyad Hijab, who heads the High Negotiations Commission of the Revolution and Opposition Forces, writes:
UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION
Number: 256
Date: 16/6/2016
H.E. Mr. Ban Ki-moon
United Nations Secretary-General
New York
Excellency,
Al-Waer neighborhood in Homs has been under severe siege for over three and a half years. During that time, al-Waer’s residents have come under enormous pressure – because of dire humanitarian conditions, bombardment and starvation imposed by the Assad regime – to agree to a local truce. The United Nations Damascus office has helped the regime enforce the terms of this truce. In March 2016, the regime again targeted Al-Waer residents. As a result, the neighborhood is now on the brink of an epic humanitarian disaster. Food items have been denied entirely and medical, emergency, and surgical supplies have not been allowed to enter for over two and a half years.
Al-Waer neighborhood has been continually subjected to systematic bombardment. The regime’s siege exacerbates an already deteriorating humanitarian situation. Additionally, more than 700,000 residents have been displaced, none of whom have returned. Despite this, the UN team in Syria has asked the Al-Waer negotiations committee to meet in the hopes of continuing local negotiations.
We are deeply concerned by what has been relayed to us by the Free Homs Provincial Council and relevant entities in Al-Waer about the UN team there. The UN team has reportedly stressed to the residents through the Al-Waer negotiations committee that the political process in Geneva, per UN Security Council resolution 2254, will not lead to improved humanitarian aid delivery to Al-Waer, and that the only way to receive aid is to submit to the illegal siege tactics of the Assad regime.
We need clarification from the UN about what exactly was meant by the UN country team’s comments in its meeting with the Al-Waer negotiations committee on Saturday 12 June, in which the humanitarian situation in Al-Waer was discussed. The UN team stressed that the Security Council resolution cannot be implemented on the ground without the Al-Waer negotiations committee making major concessions. The UN team stated that the issue of airdrops to besieged areas was nothing more than words that could not be implemented. The best way to get aid to Al-Waer neighborhood was thus to succumb to the Assad regime and agree to its terms.
Unfortunately, this behavior is not limited to Al-Waer. We have seen it repeated by UN staff in several other areas. In addition, UN staff have permitted expired humanitarian aid items into some areas, leading to cases of serious poisoning and the death of some civilians.
Excellency,
We place this matter in your hands with full certainty that you will give it due attention, as we know you are keen for the United Nations to implement Security Council resolutions and to maintain the confidence of the people it serves. Syrians now desperately need the UN to play a strong role to ease the suffering and end the tragedy they have endured for their rejection of oppression and demand of freedom, justice, and the rule of law.
Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.
Dr. Riyad Hijab
General Coordinator of the High Negotiations Commission
of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces
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