Russian/American cooperation in Syria

My recent travels caused me to miss publication of the draft US/Russian agreement on Syria. You can skip the “Terms of Reference for the Joint Implementation Group.” It contains the nitty gritty details of how Moscow and Washington will choose ISIS and especially Jabhat al Nusra targets while constraining the Syrian air force.

The more interesting part starts on p. 6 in the section on “Practical Approach for Russian-American Cooperation Against Daesh [ISIS] and [Al Qaeda affiliate] Jabhat al Nusra and Strengthening the Cessation of Hostilities.” Even that begins with more Joint Implementation Group stuff, but then goes on to conclude with this:

b) translation of the CoH into a durable, nationwide ceasefire, phased with steps on the political transition, inclusive of provisions on the disposition and separation of forces, control of heavy weapons, regulation of the flow of weapons into Syria , independent monitoring and verification, and enforcement; and
c) a framework on political transition in Syria consistent with UNSCR 2254, to include provisions on how and when a transitional government with full executive authority formed on the basis of mutual consent will be established, security and intelligence institutions will be reformed, and constitutional and electoral processes will be conducted.

The Europeans are said to be circulating a paper with more substance on this last point. The failure of the US to put the issues of ceasefire and political transition up front, and to leave them in this rudimentary afterthought, reflects the Administration’s priorities. It wants to focus on killing extremists, not on stabilizing Syria or ending the war.

Steve Heydemann has already blasted this approach, which has no hope of achieving its counter-terrorism objectives without focusing also on displacing Bashar al Assad, whose efforts to maintain himself in power feed extremism in Syria and ensure the war will continue. But President Obama has made himself eminently clear: he has no intention of displacing Assad, fearing what might come next.

That’s where the Syrian opposition needs to focus: on convincing the US that it can offer a viable governing alternative, at least in those areas where ISIS and Jabhat al Nusra are not present and the cessation of hostilities can be made to hold. The US is providing resources to police, schools, civil defense, local councils and nongovernmental organizations in these areas, but everything is done piecemeal, without any central direction or oversight.

Kurdish “cantons” along Syria’s northern border with Turkey have already achieved a large measure of what is required. They have chased extremists out and established fairly effective governing bodies. But they also collaborate with Assad, thus avoiding attacks, and have ethnically cleansed Arabs from some areas, in order to establish Kurdish dominance. The Kurds may merit the US support they are getting to fight ISIS, but only if they stop the ethnic cleansing and end their collaboration with the Assad regime.

The non-extremist Arab opposition has been far less successful in ensuring security in the areas it controls, due to continued regime and Russian bombing and shelling. If an agreement with the Russians can stop those attacks and allow humanitarian relief to flow, there will be some hope that opposition authorities can begin to govern more effectively.

But the fragmented approach the US has taken so far seems guaranteed to be ineffective in helping the opposition to establish legitimacy with the populations in areas it more or less controls. Washington has already abandoned several efforts at building a unified Syrian opposition: the Syrian National Council, the Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (Etilaf) and the Syrian Interim Government. The landscape is littered with other piecemeal efforts: the Assistance Coordination Unit, the Local Administrative Councils Unit and the Syrian Recovery Trust Fund, to name a few.

Washington needs to get serious about constructing a viable governing alternative to the Assad regime. This should be thought of as the nucleus of a transitional governing body, one capable of implementing the cessation of hostilities, reforming the security and intelligence services, and organizing the constitutional and electoral processes (see b and c above).  The High Negotiations Committee, which has represented the opposition in recent UN meetings, would be my current candidate to take charge of these preparations. But to be effective it will need more structure and organizational integrity than it has today. Washington should try to ensure it gets what it needs.