Month: July 2016
The problems of victory
I missed this July 15 Middle East Institute/Johns Hopkins SAIS event “After Fallujah: Security, Governance, and the Next Battle Against ISIS,” due to unanticipated travel. I was supposed to moderate. Paul Salem did a great job at that.
I enjoyed watching it just today. Jessica Lewis McFate worries about what happens in the aftermath of victory against ISIL, especially in Mosul, as it may open the way for a return of Al Qaeda. Doug Ollivant argues that real politics have begun in Iraq, with important dimensions of intra-sectarian and intra-ethnic competition/conflict. This is a good sign, one that might allow the emergence of cross-sectarian alliances and even lead to serious reform. Charles Lister is concerned about ISIS tactics as it retreats from control of territory and the Turkish/Syrian border, embeds in urban communities as well as in Lebanon, and confronts possible future US/Russian joint intervention. He also suggests we should not rush to defeat ISIS, because of the need for preparation for the “day after.” Robert Ford focuses on three R’s connected with undercutting extremist recruiting: screening of refugee returnees as well as jobs for them, the lack of resources for reconstruction of infrastructure and housing, and “ruling” (i.e. local governance, which is highly fragmented in the Sunni communities being recovered from ISIS).
My compliments to all the panelists for a truly enlightening event!
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Hold your breath
About half the readers of www.peacefare.net are non-American, so I feel some obligation to try to explain what is going on in the US presidential campaign to a foreign audience. Americans can tune out if they like, though some may want to verify whether what I have to say tracks with their own understanding.
We’ve long had only two dominant parties at the national level in the US: Republicans on the center right and Democrats on the center left. The Republicans have traditionally been for limited national government, strong emphasis on defense, law and order, and in favor of free trade and low taxes, especially on investors and wealthy individuals. They have generally opposed abortion and gay marriage, making them in American parlance “conservative” on social issues. The Democrats in recent years have advocated national government intervention to protect civil rights and reduce income inequality, somewhat less emphasis on defense and crime, free but fair trade, and somewhat higher taxes, especially on the well-heeled. They have been more open to abortion and gay marriage, making them “liberal” on social issues.
So far, this may all sound familiar, as it resembles the political spectra in many other countries. But there is a lot more to the story, especially this time around.
Race is the first factor upsetting the normal division between Democrats and Republicans. After more than seven years of a black president, relatively uneducated whites, once a Democratic constituency, are in rebellion. Anyplace but America, they would be called “working class,” but here we refer to them as (lower) middle class in order to avoid class struggle implications. They have good reason to be unhappy: their incomes have stagnated for more than 40 years while the gap with upper income people has widened dramatically. International trade and a more competitive domestic economy have forced many to change jobs, often garnering lower wages.
They blame this on the black president, black people in general, trade and immigrants, many of whom are Hispanic, even though immigration from Mexico is down and Obama has done little for free trade. Donald Trump has embraced this meme and promoted it, contrary to what the Republicans had intended in this election cycle. Their plan was to reach out to Hispanic and black voters, many of whom are conservative on social and economic issues. Trump has gone in the other direction, in particular by criticizing and opposing immigration. He has also reversed traditional Republican support of free trade, while continuing to be hawkish on defense and anti-tax, especially when it comes to the wealthy.
This is clearly not in the interest of Trump’s lower middle class white supporters, who stand to lose services and gain little from tax cuts for the rich, but they want what they call their country back, meaning back from black people and Hispanics. Trump has learned how to appeal to these white racist voters. His supporters think he will end the foreign trade as well as domestic labor market competition they find unwelcome. Blacks were fewer than 1% of the delegates at the Republican convention (they are more than 12% of the US population). Hispanics were around 5% (people with Hispanic roots of one sort or another make up more than 15% of the population). It is simply impossible to understand white lower middle class support for Trump without taking race and ethnicity into consideration.
Gender is another important factor, easier to fathom. Hillary Clinton will this week become the first woman in American history to be nominated for president by a major political party. She has an advantage among women, according to the polls. Trump appeals especially to men, including many who are not only racist and anti-immigrant but also misogynist. He has made no secret of his disdain for women in general and working women in particular. He deploys his (third) wife (two of them immigrants) and daughter as show girls who all but dance and sing his praises.
There are a lot of other things going on: criticism of Clinton’s tenure as Secretary of State (especially with regard to Libya, despite a Congressional report clearing her of culpability) and abuse of her private email server, Russian support for Trump, his criticism of American allies and alliances, visceral reactions to terrorist attacks as well as anti-Muslim rhetoric and behavior. The Republican convention (and Trump’s acceptance speech) painted a grim picture of a deteriorating world and country under ferocious attack by Muslim militants and weakened by international trade. The Democratic convention will be far more upbeat, pointing to a growing economy, reduced unemployment, success in protecting the US from terror attacks mounted abroad and against the Islamic State in Syria and especially Iraq.
But the underlying issues are race and gender. Trump needs all the white male voters he can get, especially in the “rust belt” states of the Midwest. Clinton needs to slow their move in his direction while retaining her commanding leads with minorities and women. She certainly has my white male vote, but I’m a university professor and a resident of the District of Columbia, where Clinton will win upwards of 80 or perhaps 90% of the vote. The District is not the country, where Republican efforts to suppress minority turnout and Democratic efforts to promote it may be critical in deciding the outcome in several “swing” states.
America runs real elections, this time with a real choice. Hold your breath until it’s over.
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The day before ISIS
Iraq’s problems were not born in 2003.
In a roundtable discussion hosted by the Middle East Institute on last Tuesday, Dr. Luay al-Khatteeb, founder and director of Iraq Energy Institute, made clear that current discussions in Washington about Iraq are lacking. The focus in DC think tanks on “the day after ISIS” neglects a century of mistreatment, mismanagement, and disregard.
Taking a longer vie, al-Khatteeb focused on the origins of Iraq’s present problems. Sectarianism has been a virulent force in Iraq since before the Ottomans; it didn’t suddenly appear in 2003. Al-Khatteeb points to the 12 successful coup d’états in Iraq’s recent history as a major source of instability in Iraqi politics. If Turkey’s week is any indicator, coups shake the foundation of a society to its core, and their reverberations continue to affect societies long after their conclusions.
The strong centralism that dominated Iraq for most of the 20th century didn’t prepare Iraq’s political class or citizenry for federalism. According to al-Khatteeb, the Kurds had an 11-year head start; enjoying self-government for a decade before the fall of Saddam gave them a huge advantage going into the post-2003 political process.
Miscommunication about federalism in the establishment of the new Iraqi state is one of the major factors contributing to Iraq’s current governance failures. Many political participants came to the negotiating table talking about federalism, but were still grounded in the centralism of previous decades. Kurds adopted the language of federalism, but had independence in the back of their minds throughout the negotiations.
Because of this lack of meaningful consensus, Iraq never established functioning governing institutions. How then, did Iraq survive for 10 years ? Al-Khatteeb says sheer luck. Oil prices were high enough that the Iraqi government could muddle along without thinking of the future. People in government looked at oil money as a supermarket—taking as they pleased to finance any number of special projects. Currently there are 7 million Iraqis on government payroll. Those constantly expanding public salaries drained surpluses during high oil prices and are now dragging Iraq down into deeper deficits. In 2013, Iraqi foreign reserves were at 80 billion. Total is down to 40 billion today.
On the Kurdish question, al-Khatteeb predicts that the now dominant KDP would lose to the PUK and Goran alliances if an election was held today. They are clearly winning at the constituent level, and are negotiating with Baghdad to ask what’s in it for them to remain in the Iraqi state.
Right now, the answer is quite a bit. The KRG gets $100 billion per year from Baghdad. It also gets to keep somewhere around $40 billion in its own production, although exactly how much oil is produced and exported from Kurdish regions is not publicized. However, Kurdish production is dependent on Kirkuk, and Kurdish hold there is tenuous at best given the competing claims for the territory. Even still, oil production in the Kurdish area has fallen from 800,000 barrels to 550,000.
Everything comes back to government mismanagement. There are 1.4 million people on government payroll in Kurdish areas. The Iraqi federal government was encouraging governorates to hire as many people as possible, and threatened to withhold funds if hiring demands weren’t met. The salaries of government officials are criminally high, in al-Khatteeb’s mind. MPs make $20,000 monthly, each of their dozens of advisers each make $10,000, on top of the president and PM making $50,000 each month. If Iraq is going to overcome its centuries of neglect, they need to start paying some attention where it matters.
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Peace picks July 25 – 29
- Ten days after Quelling the Coup: Where is Turkey Headed? | Tuesday, July 26th | 11:30 AM | The Atlantic Council | Click HERE to RSVP | Last week’s failed coup attempt in Turkey has raised serious questions about Turkey’s domestic political and security situation. The immediate aftermath of last weekend’s events will have significant implications for a range of Western interests, from the fight against ISIS to EU membership to Turkey’s role in the Middle East. To what extent did the attempted coup indicate an irreparable rift in the Turkish armed forces? How will the United States manage the fragile Turkish relationship in light of accusations of an American role in the plot and demands for extraditing Fethullah Gulen? How far will President Erdogan go to purge government institutions and how will this impact the country’s political and economic future? A conversation with: Elmira Bayrasli, Visiting Fellow at the New America Foundation, and Steven A. Cook, Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. The discussion will be moderated by Aaron Stein, Senior Resident Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council, and an introduction by Ambassador Frederic C. Hof, Director of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council.
- Israel and Hezbollah: The Prospect of Renewed Hostilities Ten Years after War | Tuesday, July 26th | 11:45 AM – 1:30 PM |Hudson Institute | Click HERE to RSVP | On July 12, 2006, the Iranian-backed Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah ambushed an Israel Defense Force patrol near the Lebanese border. Three IDF soldiers were killed on the spot and another two were taken hostage. Israel retaliated by bombing the Beirut airport and other key targets. Thus began what Israel refers to as the Second Lebanon War, a conflict that lasted 34 days and set the stage for much of what has happened in the Levant over the last ten years. Israel quietly secured the Israel-Lebanon border, and Hezbollah pivoted to fight in Syria. Ten years later, both sides face circumstances similar to those that led to war a decade ago. In recent years, Iran has dramatically increased Hezbollah’s weaponry capabilities by supplying Russian-made “Kornet” missiles, surface-to-air missile defense systems, and surface-to-ship cruise missiles. Israel’s concerns are compounded by Tehran’s increasingly assertive regional posture and ballistic missile tests conducted since signing the nuclear agreement. Hezbollah is still Iran’s most impressive export, but it is hemorrhaging fighters in Syria to a sectarian war in which it is outnumbered eight to one. Many throughout the Middle East and in the West believe that regional tensions and hot spots will necessarily drive Israel and Hezbollah to resume hostilities. On July 26, Hudson Institute will host a timely panel on the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War and the prospect of resumed conflict. Panelists include Deputy Head of Mission at the Embassy of Israel Reuven Azar, Hudson Senior Fellow Michael Doran, and Foundation for Defense of Democracies Research Fellow Tony Badran. Hudson Senior Fellow Lee Smith will moderate the conversation.
- Will North America become the next Saudi Arabia? | Tuesday, July 26th | 12:00 PM – 1:15 PM | New America Foundation | Click HERE to RSVP | Not long ago Washington policymakers spent a great deal of time bemoaning our ever increasing dependence on foreign (especially, alas, Middle Eastern) oil. Rarely has such pessimistic groupthink proven so misguided. North America is blessed with a number of comparative advantages when it comes to producing energy at a low cost, and Canada’s increased oil production, innovation in alternative energy research, Mexico’s historic energy reforms, and the shale revolution across the region have only accentuated North America’s potential to become the world’s dominant energy superpower. On the heels of the North American Leaders Summit, Future Tense and the Wilson Center’s Canada Institute invite you to join them for a conversation on what it will take for North America to fulfill its energy potential. People tend to obsess over the monthly gyrations of oil prices and the latest regulatory battle over shale or pipeline-building, but we want to look forward to 2050. With the new North American Climate, Energy, and Environment Partnership what concerted steps should Canada, Mexico, and the United States be taking to ensure that North America will become the world’s leading energy power for generations? And how can this region lead the world not only in output and economic growth, but also in setting new standards of environmental responsibility and sustainability? Panelists include: Hector Moreira, Director of Energy Model for Mexico Initiative at Arizona State University and Commissioner, Mexican National Commission of Hydrocarbons, and Former Under Secretary of Energy of Mexico; Laura Dawson, Director of the Canada Institute at the Wilson Center and Former Senior Advisor on economic affairs at the United States Embassy in Ottawa; and Sharon Burke, Senior Advisor for International Security and Resource Security at New America and Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy.
- Islamic Exceptionalism: How the Struggle Over Islam is Reshaping the World | Wednesday, July 27th | 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM | Middle East Institute at the Carnegie Endowment’s Choate Room | Click HERE to RSVP | The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host Shadi Hamid (Brookings Inst.), Nathan Brown (George Washington Univ.) and Hassan Mneimneh (MEI) for a discussion about how Islam shapes public life, law, and the state. The conversation will explore and challenge the thesis behind Hamid’s new book,Islamic Exceptionalism: How the Struggle Over Islam is Reshaping the World. In Islamic Exceptionalism, Hamid argues that Islam is distinctive among the world’s cultural systems in how it conceives religion and politics as intertwined. In this exceptionalism he sees an intrinsic resistance to secularization, with profound implications for how the West can interact with the Middle East. The panelists will address Hamid’s provocative thesis and offer their own analyses of Islam’s relationship with politics. Sumaiya Hamdani (George Mason Univ.) will moderate the discussion. Copies of the book will be available for purchase and signing.
- French Leadership in a Post-Brexit Europe | Thursday, July 28th | 10:00 AM | Atlantic Council | Click HERE to RSVP | Europe faces historic challenges from the east and the south, at the same time as internal forces of fragmentation call into question the unity and direction of the European Union (EU). In the wake of the Brexit referendum, horrific terrorist attacks, an unprecedented migration crisis, and a continually sluggish economy, the future of Europe is in play. As a nation that combines strategic outlook, political will, military capabilities, and economic wherewithal, France is poised to shape Europe’s future. Since the end of World War II, Paris has played a leading role in advancing the European project. Franco-German political cooperation set the terms for integration. Franco-British military cooperation ensured Europe remained a serious security actor. Today, France is the bridge between the EU’s northern and southern members. France has the history, geography, and demography to help Europe navigate the confluence of challenges buffeting the continent. However, next year’s elections in France will likely determine whether France helps Europe hold together or succumbs to the challenges of economic stagnation, political fragmentation, and populism. Panelists include: H.E. Gérard Araud, Ambassador of France to the United States; Ambassador John Herbst, Director of the Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center at the Atlantic Council; Ambassador Frederic Hof, Director of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council; Ms. Laure Mandeville, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Future Europe Initiative, Atlantic Council. With an introduction by Mr. Damon Wilson, Executive Vice President of Programs and Strategy at the Atlantic Council.
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Russian/American cooperation in Syria
My recent travels caused me to miss publication of the draft US/Russian agreement on Syria. You can skip the “Terms of Reference for the Joint Implementation Group.” It contains the nitty gritty details of how Moscow and Washington will choose ISIS and especially Jabhat al Nusra targets while constraining the Syrian air force.
The more interesting part starts on p. 6 in the section on “Practical Approach for Russian-American Cooperation Against Daesh [ISIS] and [Al Qaeda affiliate] Jabhat al Nusra and Strengthening the Cessation of Hostilities.” Even that begins with more Joint Implementation Group stuff, but then goes on to conclude with this:
b) translation of the CoH into a durable, nationwide ceasefire, phased with steps on the political transition, inclusive of provisions on the disposition and separation of forces, control of heavy weapons, regulation of the flow of weapons into Syria , independent monitoring and verification, and enforcement; and
c) a framework on political transition in Syria consistent with UNSCR 2254, to include provisions on how and when a transitional government with full executive authority formed on the basis of mutual consent will be established, security and intelligence institutions will be reformed, and constitutional and electoral processes will be conducted.
The Europeans are said to be circulating a paper with more substance on this last point. The failure of the US to put the issues of ceasefire and political transition up front, and to leave them in this rudimentary afterthought, reflects the Administration’s priorities. It wants to focus on killing extremists, not on stabilizing Syria or ending the war.
Steve Heydemann has already blasted this approach, which has no hope of achieving its counter-terrorism objectives without focusing also on displacing Bashar al Assad, whose efforts to maintain himself in power feed extremism in Syria and ensure the war will continue. But President Obama has made himself eminently clear: he has no intention of displacing Assad, fearing what might come next.
That’s where the Syrian opposition needs to focus: on convincing the US that it can offer a viable governing alternative, at least in those areas where ISIS and Jabhat al Nusra are not present and the cessation of hostilities can be made to hold. The US is providing resources to police, schools, civil defense, local councils and nongovernmental organizations in these areas, but everything is done piecemeal, without any central direction or oversight.
Kurdish “cantons” along Syria’s northern border with Turkey have already achieved a large measure of what is required. They have chased extremists out and established fairly effective governing bodies. But they also collaborate with Assad, thus avoiding attacks, and have ethnically cleansed Arabs from some areas, in order to establish Kurdish dominance. The Kurds may merit the US support they are getting to fight ISIS, but only if they stop the ethnic cleansing and end their collaboration with the Assad regime.
The non-extremist Arab opposition has been far less successful in ensuring security in the areas it controls, due to continued regime and Russian bombing and shelling. If an agreement with the Russians can stop those attacks and allow humanitarian relief to flow, there will be some hope that opposition authorities can begin to govern more effectively.
But the fragmented approach the US has taken so far seems guaranteed to be ineffective in helping the opposition to establish legitimacy with the populations in areas it more or less controls. Washington has already abandoned several efforts at building a unified Syrian opposition: the Syrian National Council, the Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (Etilaf) and the Syrian Interim Government. The landscape is littered with other piecemeal efforts: the Assistance Coordination Unit, the Local Administrative Councils Unit and the Syrian Recovery Trust Fund, to name a few.
Washington needs to get serious about constructing a viable governing alternative to the Assad regime. This should be thought of as the nucleus of a transitional governing body, one capable of implementing the cessation of hostilities, reforming the security and intelligence services, and organizing the constitutional and electoral processes (see b and c above). The High Negotiations Committee, which has represented the opposition in recent UN meetings, would be my current candidate to take charge of these preparations. But to be effective it will need more structure and organizational integrity than it has today. Washington should try to ensure it gets what it needs.
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Stability rather than integration
I was a fly on the wall yesterday and overheard a discussion of Libya. Here are some of my takeaways:
- The UN-sponsored political process has gotten about as far as it can get under current circumstances. The Presidential Council is in Tripoli and the country’s two expired legislatures are more or less defunct.
- General Haftar, who leads the so-called Libyan National Army headquartered in Benghazi, will not be able to displace the Presidential Council, but he also isn’t prepared to accept the subordinate role (as foreseen for the military chief in Article 8 of the UN-sponsored Libyan Political Agreement).
- So the most likely outcome is divided governance for now, superimposed on an elaborate array of municipal and tribal arrangements that are far more important to most Libyans than those claiming national authority.
- Legitimacy in Libya does not stem from elections but rather from effective and inclusive governance. The international community has to do what it can to help Presidential Council Chair Sarraj deliver the goods.
- Over the long-term, subnational dialogue and structures will also be vital to stability in Libya, which should be the international community’s relatively modest goal.
- The next step at the national level should be a Libyan/Libyan dialogue on security issues, mainly between the Misratan militia and Haftar. This should aim to determine practical arrangements for security, in particular in Sirte once the Islamic State is defeated there as well as for the oil fields and pipelines.
- Power-sharing is not as good an idea as defining the territory on which different militias will hold sway.
- The Egyptians and United Arab Emirates have provided support to Haftar, but they can’t “deliver” him, partly because if they try he will turn to Moscow. The Russians would like an opportunity to gain a toehold in North Africa.
- Haftar could be more of a problem if his sponsors abandon him than if they maintain their support and try to influence him.
- The Turkish role in Libya is in doubt in the wake of the coup attempt. Erdogan, who had already begun to reconfigure Ankara’s relations with Russia and Israel, may also revise his position vis-a-vis Syria and Libya.
- So long as the international community gives priority to fighting ISIS, it will be difficult to gain attention to the more fundamental and long-term problem of how Libya is to be governed.
- Prospects for a major international intervention in Libya have dimmed, though the threat of mass migration persists: as many as 800,000 people in Libya are thought to be intending to cross the Mediterranean.
- Europe is increasingly turning its attention to preventing sub-Saharan migrants from reaching Libya by strengthening economies and governance in Mali, Niger and elsewhere.
- US and European special forces engagement on the ground in Libya, which aims principally at fighting ISIS, could also be useful in informing international efforts at promoting Libyan/Libyan dialogue and stabilizing the situation.
- The key to success is gaining an improved understanding of what motivates different actors: how can they be incented or disincented?
- While Libya’s revolutionary aspirations have largely been dashed and its polity badly divided, the society still has indigenous tribal and civil society capacities that could prove vital in stabilizing its three main regions (east, west and south) now and eventually re-knitting them into a single state.
International goals for Libya should be modest. Resources are limited. The “international community,” often divided, has lost a lot of clout and credibility in Libya, even if the UN plan has gone farther than some might have expected. Stability rather than democracy should be the immediate objection. Deconfliction rather than integration.
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