Month: July 2016
Iraqi Kurdistan’s future
Some colleagues asked me to offer my view of the future of Iraqi Kurdistan. Here is what I told them:
- A Martian could be forgiven if he arrived today on earth and concluded that Iraqi Kurdistan will be independent by November.
- President Barzani has promised a referendum by then and even the Martians know that Iraqi Kurds would vote overwhelmingly for independence if given free choice and opportunity.
- The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) case for independence is strong: Iraqi Kurds have been brutally treated by their own government, chased from their country and even attacked with chemical weapons; they have governed themselves sort of democratically for decades and treated minorities well by regional standards; they have fought the Islamic State courageously and welcomed people of all ethnicities displaced by the fighting.
- One of my pro-independence friends argues that Iraq is like former Yugoslavia: a failed state that has disappointed all its inhabitants and needs to dissolve into its constituent parts.
- Another friend asks why Washington would not welcome another stalwart and more or less democratic friend in the turbulent Middle East.
- So why do I think independence won’t happen?
- To make a long story short: the KRG lacks well-established borders, the means to defend itself, the needed internal political cohesion, the required economic resources, the good relations with its neighbors and the required support of the world’s great powers to become a sovereign state.
- Before explaining in depth, let me make an important distinction: political independence is something you declare. It is an expression of political will, sometimes unilateral.
- Sovereignty is something you acquire, largely through recognition by other states, which sometimes requires the defense or conquest of territory. The KRG already has a large measure of independence. What it lacks is sovereignty.
- President Barzani’s proposal is a classic process for achieving independence: a referendum followed by a unilateral declaration.
- It would do little or nothing to establish sovereignty.
- For that, the KRG would need to have in the first place well-established borders that none of its neighbors would contest.
- That is simply not the case. Baghdad has not and will not accept the KRG’s right to all the disputed territories the peshmerga seized in the confusion of 2014, when the Iraqi Army collapsed in Mosul and other parts of the north under Islamic State attack.
- The Iraqi Army today is in no condition to contest KRG control of Kirkuk, parts of Diyala and parts of Ninewa province, but Baghdad won’t accept the fait accompli either. A declaration of independence now would leave a giant unresolved border problem that sooner or later would likely be resolved by force.
- I don’t really see how the KRG will ever be able to defend itself from the rest of Iraq if Baghdad gets its act together, which to some degree it seems to be doing. In fact, there might be nothing so likely to unite Shia and Sunni Arabs in the rest of Iraq than a KRG declaration of independence.
- How does a KRG with a population of 5.2 million defend itself from an Arab Iraq of perhaps 28 million? Only by reaching an agreement that would likely involve the surrender or compromise of Kirkuk and other disputed territories.
- The KRG lacks the internal political cohesion for a deal of that sort and many other requirements of sovereignty and independence. Just last month a Sulamaniya delegation was in Baghdad forswearing any intentions to go for independence.
- The PUK and Gorran have no intention of letting President Barzani be the George Washington of the KRG, or even allow him an unconstitutional third term. He has locked the opposition Speaker out of parliament, which is unable to meet even to decide how the referendum will be organized.
- Kirkuk’s governor wants his province to become a region, separate at least initially from the KRG. Some in Sinjar are resisting incorporation into the KRG. One observer even sees signs of Balkanization of Kurdistan.
- Resources are also a problem. At oil prices of $100/barrel or above, KRG officials thought production of 500,000 bpd might enable them to replace all the money Baghdad was supposed to be sending. At $50/barrel, the production required is presumably close to 1 million bpd. Current exports are a bit more than 500,000 bpd.
- The KRG is an oil rentier state. Even with recent tax increases and reductions in subsidies, it has precious little revenue other than from oil.
- The consequences for the KRG economy are dramatic. Civil servants are going unpaid, the economy is in crisis and the enormous influx of people displaced by the Islamic State has increased the stress. The 1.4 million people on the government payroll, including those fighting the Islamic State, are being paid erratically.
- Kurdistan’s difficult neighborhood is an additional problem. All the KRG’s oil is exported to Turkey, which has greatly improved its relations with the Iraqi Kurds. But Ankara under current conditions is still unlikely in my opinion to welcome a KRG declaration of independence, for fear of incentivizing the Syrian Kurds or its own to head in the same direction.
- Iran is even harder over against KRG independence, for fear of what it would mean for its own province of Eastern Kurdistan, where the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps is chasing Kurdish guerrillas and occasionally shelling across the border into the KRG.
- Syria no longer counts for much in regional politics, but KRG independence would not be a welcome move there either. The KRG could expect none of its neighbors to offer it diplomatic recognition and exchange of ambassadors.
- Most of the great powers will be even more resistant than the KRG’s immediate neighbors. The United States will fear that a referendum and independent Kurdistan would strengthen Russia’s case for the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as well as the annexation of Crimea and eventual annexation of Ukraine’s Luhansk and Donetsk provinces, not to mention Bosnia’s Republika Srpska.
- Europe, in particular Germany, is hard over against independence.
- China would agree: it wants no precedents that Tibet might want to follow. Russia might be more amenable, though Moscow would be wise to contemplate the issue, since an independent Kurdistan is likely to be strongly pro-Western (and its own constituent republics might be getting ideas).
- To summarize: if you can’t expect recognition by any of your neighbors or your best friends, if you don’t have the money to pay the bills, if your internal politics are divisive and you will not be able to defend the borders you claim, my best advice is don’t try it.
- The Kurds would be wise to wait for a more auspicious moment. It may well come, possibly within the next five years. They will know the time is right when they have Washington and Baghdad’s concurrence, recognition by Iran and Turkey, revenue to cover their expenses, a functioning parliament and a leader who attracts support from Sulamaniyah as well as Erbil. Stranger things have happened.
What, my colleagues asked, if the KRG went ahead despite the circumstances. What would happen?
I answered maybe nothing, since without recognition of sovereignty declarations of independence evaporate pretty quickly. Kosovo’s in 1991 didn’t work, nor did the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad declared in 1946, another colleague noted. But it is also possible a Kurdish declaration of independence would spark a wider war in the Middle East, involving Iran and Turkey even more directly than the current conflict. That would not be good news.
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The road to Tripoli goes through Cairo
There is multi-dimensional irony in Libya’s recent progress. The militias that have plagued security for years are delivering success against the Islamic State forces in Sirte, at high cost. A country that notoriously resists international intervention has begun to accept a UN-imposed Presidential Council as its highest governing authority. A state notorious for lacking substantial institutions has somehow preserved through years of chaos a precious few vital to delivering future services to its population: the national bank, oil company and investment authority. Some of their divided bureaucracies still need reunification, but they have not been obliterated.
The biggest roadblock in Libya today is General Khalifa Haftar, who has refused to pledge loyalty to the Presidential Council, blocked such a move by the expiring Tobruk-based House of Representatives, and still gets support from Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and perhaps Western governments. Even that has its ironic side: Haftar has been less effective against the Islamic State than his archenemies the Misrata militia. His resistance won’t last long if his sponsors can be convinced to turn him in the right direction. Western support for Haftar, if it exists, is aimed at defeating the Islamic State and likely won’t outlast that objective.
Egypt’s support for Haftar aims to defeat Islamists in its western neighbor, much as President Sisi has sought to do inside Egypt as well. The Egyptians do not make much distinction among Islamists. It views all of them as threats to the President’s hold on power and therefore terrorists. Russia, which has been flirting with Haftar, has a similar attitude. Haftar reflects this absolutism: he wants to obliterate the Islamists physically, not just marginalize or defeat them politically.
This objective is unachievable. A large portion of the opposition to Qaddafi was Islamist. Islamists won a significant minority of seats in Libya’s first free and relatively well-run elections in July 2012. They continue to have the support of many Libyans as well as armed groups. Even the kind of restored autocracy that Sisi has achieved in Egypt would not eliminate the Islamists in Libya. It would only drive them underground and create the conditions for the kind of terrorist insurgency that Egypt already faces.
The UAE’s position is less absolute than Egypt’s. The Emirates face little or no Islamist threat at home. They want Libya to separate mosque and state in the fashion of secular societies. Western influence is likely strong on the UAE, which would not continue to support Haftar if Egypt stops.
So the Libyan quandary increasingly depends on ending Egyptian support for Haftar and preventing Russia from stepping in to replace it. The Western powers will also need to convince the Misrata and other militias to accept some role for Haftar in a more unified Libyan security force. These are diplomatic and political issues, not military ones. The Americans, who have lost clout in Egypt with the autocratic restoration, have been shy of asking for more than the essentials: military access through and over Egyptian territory as well as maintenance of the peace with Israel. Washington has largely abandoned pressure on human rights issues.
But if Libya is to continue progress in the right direction, the Americans need to do more to block or coopt Haftar and solidify the authority and legitimacy of the Presidential Council and the Government of National Accord it appoints. The road to Tripoli goes through Cairo.
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Softly softly
The Middle East Institute is publishing this short piece of mine today, on why the Chilcot Inquiry has landed so softly in the US:
The report of the British government’s Chilcot “Inquiry” on the Iraq war is reverberating less in the United States than one might expect, given its indictment of former Prime Minister Tony Blair for blindly following former President George W. Bush’s path to war. But the main thrusts of the report are already well-accepted in the United States. It has been clear for years that the war was not a last resort and the intelligence it was based on was wrong. Blair wasn’t the only one fooled. But unlike him, few in the United States still think the invasion of Iraq was a good idea or had good results.
The United States is also preoccupied with other matters: its presidential electoral campaign; the fight against the Islamic State; and now the controversy over police killings. If the Chilcot report has any impact in Washington, it will be in directions readers already prefer. The Obama administration may see it as added justification for not intervening in Syria. Some hawkish Republicans, possibly including Donald Trump, will see it as justification for bombing the Islamic State and other extremists with fewer restrictions. It could also incite him to another outburst of praise for Saddam Hussein. Hillary Clinton will stay mum, as she voted for the Iraq war and doesn’t need any more attention drawn to what she now regards as a mistake.
The main ingredients of decision-making on Syria lie in directions other than the Chilcot report. President Barack Obama is focused on degrading and destroying the Islamic State without attacking the Syrian government or worrying much about how Syria will be governed in the aftermath. Clinton would like to clear safe areas for opposition governance and refugee returns, but it is unclear how she would get the Russians to buy in. Trump, who has repeatedly expressed admiration for President Vladimir Putin, would likely seek more cooperation from Russia, even if it meant keeping dictator Bashar al-Assad in power indefinitely.
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Countering Daesh in cyberspace
In his speech following the deadliest shooting in American history and the nation’s worst terror attack since 9/11, President Obama asserted that the gunman had been radicalized over the internet. Many Daesh (aka ISIS) fighters, sympathizers, or “lone-wolf” attackers are like Omar Mateen. They have been radicalized online or have been exposed to violent extremism via social media, such as Twitter, YouTube, or other platforms. Radicalization is not new, but the internet has made it easier and faster. Social media platforms have become central for disseminating terrorist propaganda, allowing recruiters to reach a far larger and more global audience.
What the US government in partnership with NGOs and the private sector can do to successfully counter violent extremist narratives online, and what they are already doing, were the main topics at the “Fighting ISIS in the Information Space: Government and Civil Society Perspectives” panel, hosted by New America on last Thursday. The panel consisted of Meagen LaGraffe, Chief of Staff at the Global Engagement Center (GEC), and Tara Maller, Spokesperson and Senior Policy Advisor for the Counter Extremism Project. It was moderated by Peter Bergen, Director of New America’s International Security program and CNN’s national security analyst.
Recognizing that Daesh, and violent extremism in general, cannot be defeated solely by military force, in March 2016 President Obama signed Executive Order 13721, establishing the GEC as an interagency entity based at the Department of State. LaGraffe explained that the GEC plays a critical role in the Obama Administration’s revamped strategy to undermine Daesh’s media messaging and erode its appeal.
The Executive Order states that the Center “shall lead the coordination, integration, and synchronization” of US counterterrorism messaging to foreign audiences. According to LaGraffe, observers had rightly criticized prior government efforts focused on producing video or other materials in English. Even though the government has a good message to tell, it is not the best messenger to to its target audiences. The Center therefore refrains from messages with a government stamp on them.
The new strategy is defined by identifying local partners and more credible messengers on the ground, and working with them to produce more localized anti-terrorism messages. For LaGraffe, “it takes a network to defeat a network.” Among other parties, this network includes ISIS defectors and foreign fighters’ family members, whose messages seem to be particularly effective for counter-radicalization and counter-recruitment.
In addition to fostering and empowering a global network of local messengers, the fight against Daesh also requires cooperation with nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and especially social media companies. Maller applauded Twitter shutting down 125,000 Daesh-linked accounts, but asserted that a lot more can be done. She explained that every picture and video has a unique DNA. Companies don’t have to review manually extremist content, but instead can use technology like Microsoft’s PhotoDNA to detect ISIS photos or videos as they’re being uploaded. This allows for immediate removal of the content and of the user’s account. The same image matching technology is already used to stop the online spread of child sexual abuse content.
Daesh does not rely on its own media platforms, but primarily uses platforms owned by private companies in America, which have the power to shut its messages down. Maller observed that like the US government, NGOs and the private sector still haven’t caught up with the significant change in terrorist radicalization techniques and recruitment strategy. Countering violent extremist narratives and defeating Daesh requires that they all step up their game.
As acknowledged by LaGraffe, the GEC is solely concerned with changing behavior, and not necessarily with changing beliefs and perceptions. While an entity that does this work is undeniably necessary, a successful long-term approach to countering terrorism requires deeper contemplation about the root causes of terrorism and commitment to address them. The internet accelerates, but it rarely if ever creates.
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Peace picks July 11 – July 15
1) HEARING: Human rights under siege worldwide | Tuesday, July 12th | 10:00 AM | 2172 Rayburn House Office Building | Chairman Royce on the hearing: “Human rights violations are on the rise around the world. In Iran, the courts carry out public amputations and floggings. In Putin’s Russia, journalists are jailed for exposing government corruption and reporting the facts. In failed states like Syria, we’ve seen abhorrent treatment of civilians, including genocide. We’ve even seen backsliding in respect for human rights among established democracies. These are disturbing trends, and this hearing will seek answers on how the U.S. should respond.” Witnesses include: The Honorable Mark P. Lagon, President of Freedom House. Thomas Farr, Ph.D., President of the Religious Freedom Institute. Ms. Amanda Schnetzer, Director of the Human Freedom Initiativeat the George W. Bush Institute. Mr. Mark Bromley, Chair at the Council for Global Equality
2) Economic and Labor Reform in Bahrain | Wednesday, July 13th | 12:00 PM | Brookings | Click HERE to register | No country in the Gulf region and perhaps in the broader Arab world has thought about and experimented with reform more than the Kingdom of Bahrain. Indeed, Manama was setting up economic visions of the future long before the trend became popular. However, the country’s reform process faces various challenges, posed by an ongoing political crisis at home and an increasingly turbulent regional environment. Ausamah Abdulla Al Absi, Chief Executive Officer of the Kingdom of Bahrain’s Labour Market Regulatory Authority (LMRA), will join the Atlantic Council to discuss Bahrain’s reform accomplishments and shortcomings and lay out the country’s path toward sustainable development. In his capacity as head of the LMRA, Mr. Al Absi is responsible for realizing Bahrain’s economic reform plan. Since its inception in 2006, the LMRA has played a crucial role in HRH Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa’s economic reform program. Additionally, the large and vastly important institution oversees the implementation of Bahrain Vision 2030. Speakers include:
Ausamah Abdulla Al Absi, CEO of the Labour Market Regulatory Authority, Kingdom of Bahrain Introduced by: Barry Pavel, Vice President, Arnold Kanter Chair, and Director of the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council. Moderated by: Bilal Y. Saab, Director, Middle East Peace and Security Initiative, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security Atlantic Council.
3) Blasphemy Laws and Censorship by States and Non-State Actors: Examining Global Threats to Freedom of Expression | Thursday, July 14th | 2:00 PM | 2322 Rayburn House Office Building, click HERE for event details | The Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission | The Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission will hold a hearing that will examine blasphemy laws, state censorship, actions by non-state actors, and other threats to freedom of expression around the world. This hearing will examine these issues, while seeking to provide concrete recommendations for how U.S. policy makers can most effectively encourage the protection of freedom of expression around the globe. This hearing will be open to members of Congress, congressional staff, the interested public and the media. The event will be hosted by Joseph R. Pitts, M.C. and Co-Chairman, TLHRC. James P. McGovern, M.C. and Co-Chairman, TLHRC.
Panel I:
David N. Saperstein, Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom, U.S. Department of State
Panel II:
Rev. Thomas J. Reese, S.J., Chairman, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
Panel III:
Ms. Vanessa Tucker, Vice President for Analysis, Freedom House
Ms. Nina Shae, Director, Hudson Institute Center for Religious Freedom
Dr. Karin Karlekar, Director of Free Expression Programs, PEN America
Dr. Courtney C. Radsch, Advocacy Director, Committee to Protect Journalists
Mr. Wael Aleji, Spokesperson, Syrian Network for Human Rights
4) After Fallujah: Security, Governance, and the Next Battle Against ISIS | Friday, July 15th | 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM | Middle East Institute hosted at the Johns Hopkins Kennedy Auditorium | Click here to register | Iraqi forces have expelled the Islamic State (ISIS) from Fallujah, but difficult work lies ahead to retake the territory still under ISIS control, provide security, and rebuild. Restoring government and the rule of law, returning the displaced, and rebuilding homes and infrastructure will be crucial for sustaining the victory. Who will have the power and legitimacy to manage local resources and services? What will it take for civilians to return? Can the Popular Mobilization Forces that played an important role in the liberation of Fallujah be demobilized or absorbed into the army, or will they remain independent power centers? The Middle East Institute (MEI) and the Conflict Management Program at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) are pleased to host Robert S. Ford (MEI), Charles Lister (MEI), Jessica Lewis McFate (Institute for the Study of War), and Douglas Ollivant (New America) for a discussion of these and other questions regarding the aftermath of Fallujah, how ISIS may react in defeat, and the challenges ahead facing the liberation of Mosul.
5) How to Defeat Terrorism in Iraq | Wednesday, July 20th | 10:30-12:00| The Institute for World Politics | Click here to RSVP | Sheikh Jamal al-Dhari will share his vision for his country: a political re-crafting of the existing government structure away from sectarianism and towards a new constitution based on Iraqi national citizenship and inclusive of participation from all sectarian communities. HE Sheikh Jamal al-Dhari is the Chairman of the Iraq National Project and President of Peace Ambassadors for Iraq (PAFI). One of the leaders of the al-Zoba tribe in Iraq, he is the nephew of the late Islamic scholar and religious leader. Sheikh Harith al-Dhari Jamal was born in the Abu Ghraib district of Iraq on July 16, 1965. He grew up within the al-Zoba tribe and in the 1970s he attended the Hafsa School. In the 1980s, Jamal was conscripted into the Iraqi Army to fight in the Iran- Iraq War. During his time on the frontline, he fought alongside both Sunni and Shia officers and friends, in the Iraqi Republican Guard. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq by coalition forces, Jamal was a strong proponent of Iraqi nationalism and self-rule. In 2005, he and his family fought against al-Qaeda’s occupation of Iraqi territory and, as a consequence, Jamal lost 70 members of his family in the struggle. In 2014, Jamal helped to establish the nonprofit think tank Peace Ambassadors for Iraq, whose purpose is to advocate for a renewed system of government in Iraq, to determine the best policies to fully eliminate ISIS/Daesh and other terrorist forces from Iraq, and to build international support for an all-inclusive Iraq. Presently, Jamal is working for a renewal in Iraq by forging a non-sectarian and inclusive settlement for all Iraqis.
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Shape up, anything else is coddling
I disagree with much of what two of my dearest SAIS colleagues and their associate say in a recent Foreign Affairs article advocating greater EU and US backing for the Balkans. They argue that in the wake of Brexit,
European leaders, and perhaps those in Washington too, need to roll out a bold new plan for Europe. Enlarging the union by finally extending a hand to the Balkans would be a good place to start.
That’s wrong on two counts.
First, the Union has been extending a hand to the Balkans for more than twenty years, with some positive results: Slovenian and Croatian membership above all, as well as progress in Albania, Montenegro and Serbia. Even Macedonia, Kosovo and Bosnia, which are stymied by their own internal problems, have gained important access to EU markets and have begun adopting the acquis communautaire. None of the non-members will be ready before 2020, but some could hope for accession shortly after that.
Second, EU accession has in fact become more difficult due to Brexit, no matter what Chancellor Merkel (or my colleagues) say. The Brexit campaign unabashedly used immigration from the Balkans as one of its talking points. No one should imagine that ratification of an accession treaty with Albania, Montenegro or Serbia would be easier today than it was a couple of weeks ago. Brexit has consequences. The EU club has become harder to get into.
The only concrete advantage the Foreign Affairs article offers as an example of the advantages of additional Balkans membership in the EU is this:
For example, if the Balkans were incorporated into the EU, Brussels could help fund temporary shelters for Syrian refugees that land in the Balkans and facilitate better registration and processing.
But the EU could do what they suggest without adding any Balkan members, just as it has already done with Turkey. And the article suggests many good reasons why the EU should hesitate on accession: ethnic strife, corrosive politics, corruption, and organized crime.
The right lesson to be drawn from Brexit is not that the EU should open its arms wider. That isn’t going to happen, because EU members are all democracies that have to reckon with domestic political reactions. The right lesson is that non-EU Balkan countries need to shape up and meet the increasingly stringent requirements the EU has imposed since the arguably premature accession of Bulgaria and Romania.
The long pole in the EU membership tent throughout the Balkans is rule of law, which is weak and inconsistent. When a Serb can get a fair trial in a Kosovo court without international judges or prosecutors, when crooked politicians and their organized crime enablers are routinely prosecuted in Albania and Bosnia, when Serb politicians and generals answer for their 1990s war crimes in Serbian courts, then the Balkans will be ready for EU membership. If I were a citizen in one of the potential EU members, I would be doing everything I could to hasten the day, not pleading for special dispensation that is unlikely to come.
None of the non-EU Balkan countries is so big or problematic as Turkey. The largest is Serbia, at a bit over 7 million and declining (less than 10% of the population of Turkey). They will all be minor burdens on the EU budget and suppliers of needed cheap labor and taxpayers. Three are majority Muslim (Bosnia by a hair, Albania and Kosovo by more), but their Islam is fundamentally moderate. The Islamic State had a spurt of success recruiting in the Balkans, but that appears to have subsided in the wake of its military defeats and Balkan government crackdowns.
The best backing friends of the Balkans can give is to help them shape up for EU membership as soon as possible. Anything else is coddling.
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