Day: September 12, 2016
Ain’t happening
Bill Burns, Michele Flournoy, and Nancy Lindborg unveiled this morning a report on U.S. Leadership and the Challenge of State Fragility. It says all the right things: we should be strategic in choosing where we engage, systemic and selective in our engagement, and sustain the the effort for however long it takes. Its all about partnerships (within the US government, between the US government and fragile states, and within fragile states). The aim is inclusive, legitimate, accountable states. What’s to complain about?
My main complaint is that isn’t happening. Asked about the considerable capacity the US built up in Iraq and Afghanistan in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), Bill replied that yes, we need to make sure that the experience acquired in the last 15 years is preserved. I don’t think the State Department could name even its own officers who had PRT jobs, never mind the many contractors and Defense Department people involved. Asked about how to deal with a country like Turkey that is turning towards autocracy, no one had much to say. Never mind Egypt. Audience members, not panelists, were quick to point out that President Obama’s budget requests have not emphasized fragile states or the programs aimed at repairing them.
The sad fact is that the Obama Administration has dismantled many of the capacities in the US government to deal with fragile states and reduced use of diplomatic leverage (sanctions, conditionality, etc.) to counter human rights violations and other international abuses associated with them. Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel are all enjoying to one extent or another immunity. All these states fail to provide full inclusion to portions of their populations, but at least in public Washington has pulled its punches in order to achieve high priority security objectives. We are seeing in South Sudan the results of immunity. When will we seem them in Rwanda? What do you do when local authorities simply aren’t willing to acknowledge or act on the problems we see all to clearly?
The two positive examples the study provides are instructive: Colombia and Myanmar. Plan Colombia was extraordinarily expensive and sustained over a long period, but the study group rightly emphasizes the importance of local political and financial commitment. The October 2 referendum on the peace agreement is still pending, but we can hope things will turn out all right. Myanmar has been far less expensive, but the outcome is still in doubt. It will be at least another 5-10 years before we can really say whether it has been able to overcome its internal conflicts and make the transition to a democratic state and society.
How do we get to the point of being able to make such long-term commitments?
The Study Group wants a strategic foresight cell at the National Security Council, consultation with Congress to identify priority fragile states and provide necessary resources, and personnel policies intended to enhance interagency cooperation. It also wants to expand the partnership model based on the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, build local capacity in fragile states, and increase US government capabilities in a grab bag of areas: security sector reform, conflict mediation, anti-corruption, assistance to support peaceful elections, civil society support, public-private partnerships, sanctions implementation, international education and exchanges, as well as the de rigeur learning and evaluation.
I’m fine with all of this, even if I’d have included things this report skips. I’d certainly want to think about whether our current institutions–State, Defense and AID–are suitable to the tasks defined. I doubt it. I would also want a much clearer definition of the end states we should seek in fragile states–that among other things is what makes the New Deal compelling. “Inclusive, legitimate, accountable” are nice, but how would we recognize them? What is required to achieve them? What indicators are most appropriate, or are they entirely context dependent?
But my main concern is just that it ain’t happening.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Success in an unlikely place
Three years ago, peacefare.net published Patricia Powers Thomson’s A call to action from South Sudan, which advocated founding of a School of Public Service in South Sudan. Despite all the difficulties since, the aspiration has been fulfilled. Here is her account of how:
Q: It has been three years since you called for a School of Public Service in South Sudan. What has been accomplished?
A: The major accomplishment is that the School has been established and is now in its second year. We recently prepared a Status Report comparing our progress to the path laid out in our Strategic Plan, and it goes into a lot more detail about our efforts.
In a nutshell, after releasing A Call to Action: Establishing the South Sudan School of Public Service in October 2013, I recruited a Board of Advisors through the good auspices of the Ebony Center and their Development Policy Forum. This Board was instrumental in establishing the School. After a competition, the Board decided to house the School at the University of Juba –the country’s flagship university. We spent about a year developing our programs and courses. By late 2014, the University’s Dean’s Board and Senate had approved the School. The University Council officially established it on June 13, 2015. So in less than 2 years we were up-and-running.
Q: What programs does the School offer?
A: Our first program is a 2-year MPP. Our pioneer class of 41 finished their first year in May. In September they were joined by a second class of about 50 students. I really believe our students represent the best of South Sudan – smart, committed public servants. They come from all its regions, and work with government, nongovernmental organizations, and international organizations.
Q: These three years have been difficult ones, marred in particular by the power struggle between South Sudan’s President and Vice President, including widespread violence. How has that affected your project?
A: The last three years have been heartbreaking. Everyone in the country has been touched by the recent conflicts. Actually, let me correct myself. The conflicts are not “recent.” They have been simmering for a very long time, but ignited into violence in December 2013. Amazingly, SPS continued to operate without disruption during and after the 2013 fighting, as well as the fighting this past July. The credit for this really belongs to my outstanding team and to the University’s leadership, particularly Dr. John Akec who has been one of our strongest advocates since the beginning.
Q: You say the conflict has been simmering for a very long time. What do you see as the drivers of this conflict?
A: I have lived in South Sudan for 5 years, and the situation here is one of the most complicated I’ve encountered. I see at least four related drivers. Many people in the international community have come to believe kleptocracy is behind much of the country’s instability. I agree. Minimizing kleptocracy is fundamental to creating a stable state, but even more fundamental is building capacity. You can’t fight kleptocracy without capacity. Quite frankly, there isn’t a critical mass of competent people working in the public sector. People with the mindsets, as well as skillsets they need to succeed, including management and leadership skills.
Let me be more specific, most of the provisions of the current peace agreement require skilled South Sudanese working within government and civil society. And when peace comes, when we succeed in making “war more costly than peace,” South Sudan will still be faced with the challenges of building effective institutions and engaging in long-term development. Again, both require a cadre of capable public servants.
So yes, greed and the quest for power are a big part of the problem, but so, too, is lack of capacity. There are many smart, motivated, and honest people in South Sudan who are unable to impact the mammoth problems their country faces because they do not have the necessary skillsets and mindsets.
Q: You mentioned four things driving the conflict, including lack of skills and kleptocracy. What are the other two?
A: There is definitely an element of tribal competition, age-old animosities between tribes. This is driven by fear, as well as pride; when people are insecure they tend to coalesce along familiar ethnic, tribal, and familial groups. And lastly, there has been a lack of consistent political will to make peace. This lack of will is fed by the first three drivers, as well as trauma and exhaustion. Read more
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Faute de mieux
I’ve been hesitating to comment on the Russian/American agreement on Syria. So far as I know no text is available publicly. As the devil is in the details, it is important to read the whole thing. It is also important to see how implementation goes. But herein a few preliminary remarks.
The basic outline is clear enough from press reports and the leak of an earlier draft. Humanitarian corridors are to opened to besieged areas like Aleppo. Starting this evening, which happens to mark the beginning of Eid al Adha, the Russians and Americans will try to restore the cessation of hostilities, after a weekend of ferocious attacks on opposition forces. Provided humanitarian deliveries go well, seven days later Moscow and Washington will begin jointly to target Fateh al Sham, the successor organization to Al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al Nusra, which has been largely embedded until now with non-extremist fighters. The idea is to give the non-extremists time and incentive to separate and to prevent the Russian/Syrian government/Iranian coalition from targeting the non-extremists. The war against the Islamic State, which keeps itself separate from the opposition, will also continue.
Secretary of State Kerry describes the agreement as a step in the direction of a political transition. I don’t hear Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov saying that. This agreement in no way threatens the regime, which gets a respite from the fighting during which it will no doubt try to resupply and consolidate its fragmented forces. It is unclear what, if any, restraints on its air and ground attacks are included in the agreement, though it is presumably expected to participate in the ceasefire by not attacking opposition forces that observe it. If there is to be a political transition in accordance with the June 2012 UN communique, it won’t start until the military balance changes significantly from its current tilt in favor of the Syrian government.
The Syrian opposition people I’ve talked to welcome the agreement, more out of resignation than enthusiasm. They doubt the regime will abide by it and know that Fateh al Sham makes important contributions to the resistance to Bashar al Assad. But they also know that the non-extremist opposition is exhausted and needs a break, even if only a temporary one, from a year of indiscriminate but successful Russian/Syrian government/Iranian assault. The US and its Gulf allies could turn off the opposition’s spigot of money and supplies. Better, the opposition figures, to go along with a pause in the fighting and make the best of it. Maybe something like a relatively stable patchwork of opposition-controlled safe areas will emerge.
But the cessation of hostilities isn’t likely to last. Without third party observers, the same frictions that wrecked the last cessation of hostilities are likely to wreck this one as well. The Americans of course know that but hope to do enough damage to Fateh al Sham in the meanwhile to prevent it from being able to launch attacks against Americans, which the Administration is convinced is the extremists’ intention. They do not believe the formal separation of Fateh al Sham from Al Qaeda has made the jihadis any less dangerous to Americans.
Whatever they say about not being wedded to him, the Russians and Iranians have demonstrated unequivocally that they care more to keep Bashar al Assad in power than the Americans care to see him removed. I hope Secretary Kerry at least told them that success in that endeavor means they are responsible for rebuilding Syria, the bill for which will be several hundred billion dollars.
From my point of view, the agreement is a second best and likely temporary solution. President Obama is simply not willing to do more to help the Syrian opposition prevail in forcing a political transition. Secretary Kerry was left with no Plan B. He had no alternative to a negotiated agreement, which means he was over a barrel. The non-extremist opposition is in the same unfortunate state. Faute de mieux, they will go along to get along, hoping that it leads to where they would like to go.
RSS - Posts
