Bill Burns, Michele Flournoy, and Nancy Lindborg unveiled this morning a report on U.S. Leadership and the Challenge of State Fragility. It says all the right things: we should be strategic in choosing where we engage, systemic and selective in our engagement, and sustain the the effort for however long it takes. Its all about partnerships (within the US government, between the US government and fragile states, and within fragile states). The aim is inclusive, legitimate, accountable states. What’s to complain about?
My main complaint is that isn’t happening. Asked about the considerable capacity the US built up in Iraq and Afghanistan in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), Bill replied that yes, we need to make sure that the experience acquired in the last 15 years is preserved. I don’t think the State Department could name even its own officers who had PRT jobs, never mind the many contractors and Defense Department people involved. Asked about how to deal with a country like Turkey that is turning towards autocracy, no one had much to say. Never mind Egypt. Audience members, not panelists, were quick to point out that President Obama’s budget requests have not emphasized fragile states or the programs aimed at repairing them.
The sad fact is that the Obama Administration has dismantled many of the capacities in the US government to deal with fragile states and reduced use of diplomatic leverage (sanctions, conditionality, etc.) to counter human rights violations and other international abuses associated with them. Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel are all enjoying to one extent or another immunity. All these states fail to provide full inclusion to portions of their populations, but at least in public Washington has pulled its punches in order to achieve high priority security objectives. We are seeing in South Sudan the results of immunity. When will we seem them in Rwanda? What do you do when local authorities simply aren’t willing to acknowledge or act on the problems we see all to clearly?
The two positive examples the study provides are instructive: Colombia and Myanmar. Plan Colombia was extraordinarily expensive and sustained over a long period, but the study group rightly emphasizes the importance of local political and financial commitment. The October 2 referendum on the peace agreement is still pending, but we can hope things will turn out all right. Myanmar has been far less expensive, but the outcome is still in doubt. It will be at least another 5-10 years before we can really say whether it has been able to overcome its internal conflicts and make the transition to a democratic state and society.
How do we get to the point of being able to make such long-term commitments?
The Study Group wants a strategic foresight cell at the National Security Council, consultation with Congress to identify priority fragile states and provide necessary resources, and personnel policies intended to enhance interagency cooperation. It also wants to expand the partnership model based on the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, build local capacity in fragile states, and increase US government capabilities in a grab bag of areas: security sector reform, conflict mediation, anti-corruption, assistance to support peaceful elections, civil society support, public-private partnerships, sanctions implementation, international education and exchanges, as well as the de rigeur learning and evaluation.
I’m fine with all of this, even if I’d have included things this report skips. I’d certainly want to think about whether our current institutions–State, Defense and AID–are suitable to the tasks defined. I doubt it. I would also want a much clearer definition of the end states we should seek in fragile states–that among other things is what makes the New Deal compelling. “Inclusive, legitimate, accountable” are nice, but how would we recognize them? What is required to achieve them? What indicators are most appropriate, or are they entirely context dependent?
But my main concern is just that it ain’t happening.
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