Day: October 4, 2016
Plan B options
The Administration is considering plan B for Syria. In order to be effective, it has to somehow rebalance the military situation to enable the non-extremist Syrian opposition to resist effectively the Russian/Iranian/Syrian government/Shia militia onslaught and to fight the Islamic State.
I take as a given two limits: 1) Washington does not want to directly engage Russian forces and 2) it does not want to put significant numbers of troops on the ground in Syria. Nor do I think it will be possible for the President to gain Congressional approval for an expanded Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF).
Here is a summary of options, all of which I think I have previously discussed on peacefare.net:
1. Encourage Congress to pass and sign the pending sanctions bill. This would have broad political significance, but mainly affect helicopter and airplane parts, if we are prepared to enforce third party prohibitions (i.e. threaten suspension of business with US companies if foreign companies ship parts to Syria).
2. End the impunity of the Syrian air force by destroying helicopters that drop barrel bombs on civilian targets. This can be done with stand-off weapons and does not require US aircraft over Syrian territory. It would likely have to be done as covert action in order to get around the AUMF, which covers only Al Qaeda (and via a stretch Al Qaeda-descended organizations like the Islamic State).
3. Tell the Russians and Iranians we are no longer going to turn a blind eye to Hizbollah engagement in Syria. If they don’t leave, we would need to target them (again as covert action with standoff weapons).
4. Create safe areas inside Syria we are prepared to protect from the air. The opposition, or Turkey, would have to provide ground forces in order to govern there without fear of regime and Islamic State violence. This option would also entail financial and technical assistance to the civilian opposition on a scale not yet attempted.
5. Provide (or allow others to provide) anti-aircraft and other more advanced weapons to vetted opposition groups. Possible use of these weapons against civilian aircraft either in Syria or in the region is the obvious downside. Remember Malaysia Air flight 17.
None of these ideas is a slam dunk. All could generate unintended consequences, in particular Russian and Iranian escalation. It is not clear that Washington would be willing to meet and exceed their responses. Nor is it guaranteed that the non-extremist opposition would be able to take advantage of the opportunities Washington generates.
But without something that changes the military equation, Aleppo is lost and the Syrian/Russian/Iranian alliance will continue its depredations against civilians in Idlib and other opposition strongholds. This would strengthen extremist recruitment and postpone the prospect of any political settlement.
I don’t envy this president, or the next one, in facing the choice among these options, or doing nothing.
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The toughest nut in the Middle East
The Middle East Institute held their 7th annual conference on Turkey last week, gathering regional experts to discuss Turkey’s turbulent domestic politics and regional role. This post focuses on the regional issues discussed.
Haim Malka of the Center for Strategic and International Studies focused on Turkey-Israel relations. The reconciliation agreement following Israel’s 2010 raid on a Turkish flotilla headed to Gaza is being implemented. This is a mutually-beneficial, low-cost measure. Strategic cooperation is likely to remain limited.
Syria will test the renewed relationship as it is an arena where both Turkey and Israel’s interests intersect. Israel’s policy on Syria has to date been confused and vague, perhaps intentionally so, but ultimately the Israelis want to see a Syria with minimal Iranian influence. The fall of Iran’s ally Assad may be assumed beneficial to Israel, but the Israelis seem to have followed a ‘better the devil you know’ approach so far and do not appear to be supporting alternative political actors in Syria.
Bill Park of King’s College, London discussed Turkey’s relations with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq, which saw marked improvement in 2009 and 2010 due to trade and energy connections, shared mistrust of Maliki’s Baghdad government, and President Barzani’s role as a potential partner in the peace process with Turkey’s own Kurds (the PKK). While these foundations for positive relations remain, Turkey’s refusal to support Syrian Kurds in the fight against IS, Turkey’s re-establishing a relationship with Baghdad following the replacement of Maliki by Abadi, and a change in perception of Barzani’s leadership record have undermined the rapprochement.
Senior Associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Karim Sadjadpour discussed Turkey-Iran relations. There are notable commonalities between the two states as they suffer both a superiority and inferiority complex – both do not see their current status in world affairs as reflecting their histories as great empires. There is also a strong shared cultural history. The Iran-Turkey border has proven stable in an otherwise turbulent region for centuries. Also important is their economic partnership, with shared gas projects and common concern with Kurdish independence.
Having suffered from terrorist attacks, Turkey is disappointed in Iran following Assad’s lead, especially in ignoring the radical Islamist threat in Syria. Upcoming events could exacerbate frictions between Turkey and Iran. These include the upcoming US presidential election, the May 2017 presidential elections in Iran, and whether the nuclear deal lasts ten years.
Presenting the complex relationship of Turkey, the US and Kurds was Amberin Zaman, Public Policy Fellow with the Wilson Center. She believes the US has an opportunity to use its leverage with the Syrian Kurds (the PYD) and Turkey to revive the Turkey-Kurdish peace process. This will require the US to abandon the fiction that the PYD and PKK are separate groups. The PYD is not seeking an independent state but rather a subnational federal unit within Syria, which the Kurds term “Rojava.”
While Turkey is unable to determine a military outcome, Ankara holds considerable soft power, especially in assisting the moderate opposition.
It was agreed among all the panelists that the US must articulate its policy for the region, and Syria in particular, as Turkey and its neighbors are looking for US leadership and unwilling to pursue their own policies without clarification from Washington. That is proving the toughest nut to crack in the Middle East.
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