peacefare.net

Syria’s future

It would be foolish to have much hope well into the sixth year of the Syria’s wars that Saturday’s meeting of the US, Russian, Iranian, Saudi, Turkish and Qatari foreign ministers will lead to a way out of the current impasse. But it is reasonable to ask what would make the meeting more than just one more boon to Lausanne’s luxury hotels.

The current situation is not propitious. Syria’s government is feeling confident as it rides a ferocious wave of mostly Russian and Iranian attacks on the opposition-held neighborhoods of eastern Aleppo, which it is “cleaning.” It figures the fall of Aleppo will be a tipping point leading to government victory in much of more populated Syria. The government has already negotiated an end to sieges of several areas near Damascus, transporting their populations in an effort to adjust their demography. President Assad has no intention of welcoming back the more than 7 million Syrians who have fled the country. He wants, and thinks he can get, a Syria over which he can restore his autocratic rule by violent means.

At this point, the only thing that would increase the likelihood of a negotiated diplomatic solution is a change in the military balance that threatens Assad. There are ways that might be accomplished without directly engaging Russian forces, which the Americans don’t want to do: stand-off attacks on the Syrian air force or on Hizbollah ground forces or giving more and better weapons to non-extremist opposition forces, to cite two examples. The Americans are hesitant to move in that direction for fear of hitting commingled Russians or enabling an extremist takeover. They have spent the last week or two pondering options.

Washington isn’t likely to do anything before Saturday, but if Secretary of State Kerry can go to the Lausanne meeting with an option to re-balance the military equation in his pocket he might be able to make some diplomatic progress. He needs a credible threat, one Moscow and Tehran feel they need to forestall, to get a serious cessation of hostilities. The beginning of serious talks on transition is likely a bridge too far. Iran and Russia have doubled and quadrupled down on their bets favoring Assad. They are unlikely to risk losing him, since any successor regime that is even remotely democratic would throw them out.

What happens if/when Aleppo falls? Assad will force the opposition adherents out, either leaving eastern Aleppo destroyed and deserted or repopulating it with loyalists. Will the government and its allies then turn its attention to Idlib, where there really are extremists (and infighting among them)? Or will they try to drive farther north to the Turkish border, risking clashes with Turkish and Turkish-backed groups advancing there?

Or will they be content to rest on their laurels? That seems unlikely. Many of us, including me, have underestimated Assad’s sticking power and his determination to retake territory. Now that he is on a roll, he won’t want to stop. Nor will the extremist and non-extremist forces leave him alone. I’m afraid more war rather than less is still in Syria’s future.