Managing South China Sea conflicts

I enjoyed some time with some smart colleagues yesterday discussing the South China Sea conflicts, unfortunately under Chatham House rules. Below are my own notes for the occasion. 

Two points stand out in my memory of what others said: 

1. Oil and gas resources in the South China Sea are not promising and fish stocks are declining; 
2. The Chinese might well challenge the next president, or undisciplined pilots or naval captains might do so. 

There were lots of other excellent points made, but I’ll have to hope that one of the students present might offer up their notes. I find it difficult to take notes while participating on a panel. 

1. I’m truly honored to sit on a panel with distinguished colleagues. My advice to the students in the room is to listen carefully to them, as they know a lot about the South China Sea disputes and the legal background.
2. I don’t, but I was asked to talk about the conflict management implications of the recent arbitration and the outlook for resolving future maritime disputes in the region, including alternative methods of dispute settlement that China Studies and Conflict Management students will be exploring this fall and during a study trip to Beijing in January.
3. Let me begin with the bad news: if in order to ensure peace we need to settle the various claims of sovereignty in the South China Sea, I think there is very little chance of success.
4. Sovereignty claims are all too often resolved by force.
5. China has the advantage there. For the foreseeable future Beijing will be able to deploy force superior to any of the other individual claimants. Without US assistance, none of the South China Sea claimants would win a naval clash with China.
6. With US assistance, they might win, but only after causing incalculable damage to world order, the world’s economy, and international relations throughout the Pacific.
7. War would be a really bad way to resolve any of the South China Sea disputes.
8. Fortunately, other means are available. Arbitration is one.
9. But arbitration is a method that decides who is right and who is wrong. If it goes in favor of the less powerful state, the more powerful state is unlikely to accept the outcome. That is pretty much what we’ve seen in response to last summer’s arbitration decision.
10. But we’ve also seen another classic conflict management response: China is trying to buy off the Philippines, with at least initial indications of some success.
11. Billions are unlikely to make Manila cede completely, but it may render the arbitration decision ineffective, postponing rather than resolving the issue.
12. There are ample precedents for simply letting sovereignty claims slide. There are still more than five outstanding maritime boundary disputes between the US and Canada. They are mostly ignored in practice, even if neither country is willing to concede legally.
13. There are also ample precedents for cooperative regimes that do not necessarily decide the sovereignty question, or decide it without prejudicing economic interests, thus enabling disputants to gain at least some of the benefits that they think are rightfully theirs.
14. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia share production from a once-disputed oil field; Iran and Qatar share production from a disputed gas field.
15. Such cooperative arrangements are relatively easy where resources are concerned but particularly difficult where security issues are involved, since security is often regarded as a zero sum game.
16. China’s militarization of various non-islands in the South China Sea is perceived in Washington as a threat to US freedom of navigation there. So we send ships and aircraft to traverse locations that we believe are permitted, even if the Chinese think not.
17. In particular, the Chinese think military vessels and planes conducting espionage are not entitled to passage even in its Exclusive Economic Zone, so they may respond by declaring an Air Defense Identification Zone, or by challenging US naval ships or military aircraft.
18. China is building up its military capabilities in the South China Sea, not least by fortifying coral reefs. The US sees this as a challenge to its credibility both as a global superpower and as an ally or friend to other claimants.
19. That is a dangerous sequence. It could set off—maybe it already has—a security dilemma, in which each side can only feel safer by making its adversary feel less safe.
20. Escaping a security dilemma of this sort requires negotiation of rules of the road, so that each side can feel confident that restraint will not disadvantage it in a confrontation. Some rules already exist for avoiding collisions. More are likely needed.
21. Rules of the road can be difficult to negotiate, not only because of your adversary’s belligerence but also because of your own internal politics.
22. In the US, contestation with China in the South China Sea is not yet a major issue in domestic politics. To my knowledge, it has not come up at all in the present presidential campaign. Bilateral trade issues have a much higher profile with the American public.
23. But of course that could change: a Chinese effort to capture or divert a US vessel in the South China Sea could generate a lot of flag-waving passion, as the collision of a US spy plane with a Chinese fighter did in 2001.
24. In China, nationalist passions about the South China Sea are significantly higher profile than in the US, at least at times. The government there has far more ability to tune the domestic response, but it might also find itself trapped into a belligerent stance, or encouraging one to distract attention from economic failures or social unrest.
25. Avoiding unproductive political responses will require that the leaderships in both countries keep South China Sea issues in proper perspective and minimize their own rhetoric and claims.
26. That will be a lot easier if the US and China can improve their overall relations, so that both countries recognize how much they have to lose if things go south.
27. The 1783 Treaty of Paris that ended the American revolution was one that established the borders of a new sovereign state, but it also granted fishing rights to American fishermen in Canadian waters off Newfoundland still controlled by the British Crown, much to the dismay of the Newfoundlanders.
28. Disputes over those fishing rights remained a source of friction for a long time thereafter, but little was heard of that or other outstanding US/Canadian disputes since the two countries dramatically improved their relations in the 1890s.
29. The Newfoundland disputes were in fact settled in 1910, when the two countries were far friendlier and fish far less important.
30. It shouldn’t take that long in the 21st century. The South China Sea disputes put at risk the long peace Asia has enjoyed for more than 40 years. Force is clearly not a good way to resolve them.
31. It is with that thought in mind that the China Studies program and the Conflict Management program are jointly organizing a study trip to China in January.
32. We are organized in five issue groups: security, law, politics, economics and international relations. We’ll be hearing mainly American views on these issues during the fall and focusing in January during the trip to Nanjing and Beijing on Chinese views.
33. We’ll return to write chapters of a volume to be published in early April analyzing the issues and proposing ways in which they might be resolved.
34. You’ll have to tune in then for much more wisdom than I can offer today on how the conflicts in the South China Sea can be managed effectively.