Mosul yes, Raqqa not yet

As the Iraqi offensive on Mosul progresses and Kurdish forces encroach on ISIS territory in Syria there is an eagerness to finalize the destruction of the ISIS caliphate. An Atlantic Council panel yesterday examined the complex realities on the ground in an attempt to clarify the “day after” issues.

Hassan Hassan of the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy considers the Mosul offensive to be an important moment for the Iraqi army and its coalition of forces: it offers a historic opportunity to resolve deep Iraqi wounds. But Mosul poses greater challenges than cities already liberated from ISIS due to the complex political environment and number of stakeholders in the coalition. We are likely to see ISIS attempt to prolong the Mosul fight rather than fleeing immediately for Raqqa, hoping that rising tensions among coalition members will lead to dysfunction.

These concerns were echoed by Jessica Lewis McFate of the Institute for the Study of war, who agrees that the longer the battle rages the more fragile the coalition will become. We can also expect ISIS to accelerate attacks in other areas of Iraq where they have already established a presence, such as Kirkuk and Baghdad, in order to undermine the Iraqi army’s progress and distract from the Mosul battle. Unaddressed Sunni grievances will make it difficult for the Iraqi government to reassert authority in troubled regions. As ISIS is chased out, we are likely to see Al Qaeda pick up the cause of Sunni disenfranchisement. Its affiliates are reportedly already active in Anbar province. The Iraqi government must therefore address the grievances, a move the US should support. 

Turning towards ISIS in Syria, Howard Shatz from RAND Corporation noted that the Iraqi coalition in Mosul is stable for now, but a coalition in Syria with Kurdish forces in the lead is a dicey proposition, making the impatient calls for a simultaneous attack on Raqqa risky. Hassan agrees that Washington generally underestimates the fear and suspicion of Syria’s Kurds among the Arabs, who perceive Kurdish ambitions of establishing dominance and depopulating areas to allow the settlement of Kurdish families. This is not an accurate reflection of Kurdish aims, since no one believes they intend to stay in Raqqa, but the fear will be exploited by Jabhat al Nusra and other Islamist groups. McFate agrees that the Arab-Kurd dynamic must be considered in the fight against ISIS, and noted that following Kurdish liberation of Shaddadi in 2015 much of the population fled to territory still held by ISIS.

This leads to what McFate identifies as a fundamental gap in American policy. Due to the current composition of Syrian opposition forces, the defeat of ISIS empowers Al Qaeda affiliates such as Jabhat al Nusra. If alongside the Turkish-backed coalition, which includes Al Qaeda affiliated groups, Kurdish forces liberate Raqqa and then retreat to Kurdish areas, this will leave Al Qaeda in a dominant position to reassert influence over Raqqa. Indeed it was Jabhat al Nusra and affiliated groups who held the Raqqa area prior to the ISIS blitz. Hassan agrees, arguing that unless an appropriate coalition has been built the expulsion of ISIS forces will only open new conflict. The US has been hesitant in supporting appropriate forces, but this must be the priority if we do not want to open another conflict within the Syrian civil war.

All panel members agreed that defeating ISIS in Iraq is more a political and governance issue than a military issue. They were reasonably optimistic about the opportunity for Iraq to rebuild, but the international community must remain engaged in Baghdad to encourage governance improvements. However they would urge patience in confronting ISIS in Syria if we do not want to see renewed violence and even greater Al Qaeda empowerment.