Assad reaps the whirlwind

Syria’s almost six-year struggle with itself is coming to an ignominious end for an important contingent of its motley revolutionaries, who are facing defeat and even obliteration in eastern Aleppo. Idlib, where the opposition has generated an elaborate set of governing structures, will presumably be the next target of the Iranian/Russian/Syrian offensive. Provided that coalition continues its support, President Assad will soon control all of Syria’s major western population centers though still face Turkish-backed resistance in the north as well as CIA-backed resistance in the south. The Kurdish cantons along the Turkish border can’t be counted as revolutionary, but they aren’t likely to give up their autonomy any time soon.

The smart money is betting that the regime victory in Aleppo will tilt the playing field in Assad’s direction, lead at least some of the revolution’s external supporters to abandon their surrogates, and cause them to seek a modus vivendi with the Assad coalition. This will mean local surrenders and population transfers, which have become common. There will indeed be a political solution, but not of the kind Washington has sought. Assad will not need to agree to a political transition but instead claim to direct a “transition” himself, perhaps even including trappings like another Potemkin election.

The war against the Islamic State, especially the US-supported offensive investing Raqqa, will presumably continue, though a big question mark hangs over who lead the fight and govern in Raqqa (Kurds? Arabs? backed by Turkey? the US?) once ISIS is removed. The Assad regime has better prospects in Deir Azzour, where it has managed to maintain a presence.

Driven from control of cities, the Islamic State will presumably do in Syria what it has done in Iraq: head for the hinterland, go underground and revert to terrorist attacks on regime-controlled areas. This will help the regime to justify its repression, which relies on a bewildering half dozen security agencies as well as “anti-terrorism” courts that have jailed something like 100,000 Syrians.

Reconstruction faces insurmountable obstacles: Assad’s Russian and Iranian friends have told him they won’t pay. Iran might ante up a bit for resettling Alawites and Shia (Syrian or not) into strategically important areas around Damascus and on the road north, but they can afford little else. The Americans, the Gulf states, and the international financial institutions will refuse all but humanitarian assistance so long as Assad remains in power, unless the Trump Administration surprises all of us and decides to make him America’s latest Great White Hope. Alissa Rubin in today’s New York Times suggests Assad may be able to use the threat of increased refugee flows to blackmail the Europeans into footing some of the bill, but they aren’t likely to write checks in the hundreds of billions of euros required.

Fighting will likely continue even after the fall of Aleppo, Raqqa and Idlib, though likely at far lower levels than for the past year. The Russians and Iranians will be able to remove at least some of their troops and reduce some of their aid to Assad, though the country’s economic catastrophe will render him their ward for a long time to come. Syrian society, which in the leadup to the war was nowhere near as sectarian as Iraq’s, will not revert quickly (or likely ever) to its prior state. Alawites and Shiites, most of whom remained loyal, are going to expect rewards. Sunnis will be sharply divided between those who stuck with the regime and those who joined the revolution, but the latter aren’t likely to forget what Assad, the Russians and Iranians have done.

This is a war whose only winner is Assad, but what he has won is in many places reduced to rubble and unsustainable.