Month: November 2016
Peace picks, November 21-25
- The American Moment in the Middle East from Eisenhower to Trump |Monday, November 21 | 11:45am – 1:30pm | Hudson Institute | Click HERE to RegisterWith the election of a new president and significant foreign policy decisions on the line, one of the best ways to understand the stakes involved is to revisit the past. With the Middle East, there is no better place to start than with Dwight Eisenhower, the incisive leader who helped win World War II and formulated America’s Cold War policy. But according to Hudson Senior Fellow Michael Doran in his critically acclaimed new book, Ike’s Gamble, Eisenhower stumbled repeatedly in the Middle East before he got it right.
Eisenhower, in Doran’s account, initially made the same kinds of mistakes that President Barack Obama has made. Both believed America had tilted too closely to Israel and sought to readjust the balance—Obama by realigning with Iran, and Eisenhower by allying with Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. The difference, argues Doran, is that Eisenhower came to realize he was wrong to turn against America’s traditional Middle East allies and he eventually restored the status quo. Obama, however, leaves the White House with America’s position in the Middle East still unsettled. Will Donald Trump be able to repair Middle Eastern relations, or will he indulge isolationist tendencies and further cede America’s status in the region? Given the extent of Eisenhower’s engagement in the region, what other lessons can the next administration draw from his experience?
Join us at Hudson Institute on November 21 as panelists Michael Doran, Hudson Distinguished Fellow Walter Russell Mead, and Council on Foreign Relations Fellow Ray Takeyh discuss Eisenhower’s strategy and the incoming administration’s policy options in the Middle East. This lunchtime panel will be moderated by Hudson Senior Fellow Lee Smith. - Real Security: Governance and Stability in the Arab World | Monday, November 21 | 3:00pm – 4:30pm | Brookings Institution | Click HERE to RegisterThe breakdown of regional order in the Middle East was driven by domestic crises in the relationship between Arab citizens and their governments, but the resulting disorder has unleashed civil violence, sectarian and ethnic conflict, and fierce geopolitical competition. What is the relationship between the region’s power politics and the breakdown in the Arab social contract? What does the collapse of Arab governance tell us about the requisites for lasting stability in the Middle East? And what role can outside powers, especially the United States, play in helping the region move toward more sustainable governance?
On November 21, the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council and the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will launch a report on this topic written by Tamara Cofman Wittes: “Real Security: The Interdependence of Governance and Stability in the Arab World.” The report was commissioned by the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Strategy Task Force (MEST), co-chaired by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley. To discuss the report, they will be joined by Amr Hamzawy, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. - Ambassador Series: Ambassador of Finland, H.E. Kristi Kauppi | Tuesday, November 22 | 6:00pm – 8:00pm | World Affairs Institute at the Ronald Reagan Building | Email to RegisterPlease join the World Affairs Council-Washington, DC as we host Her Excellency Kirsti Kauppi, Ambassador of Finland to the United States. She will address the US – Finland bi-lateral relationship, the country’s approaching centennial, Finland’s climate change research in the Arctic, and its relationship with Russia.
Ambassador Kauppi took up her post in Washington in September 2015. She has over 30 years of experience in foreign policy. She previously served as advisor to the Finnish State Secretary and head of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy coordination in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Helsinki. Her previous diplomatic postings include Permanent Representative to the UN-related international organizations located in Vienna, where she served for three years as the Finnish Governor in the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors.
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What the fuck have you done?
Egyptian physician and comedian Bassem Yousseff MC-ed the Middle East Institute’s annual conference dinner Tuesday evening. He asked two things about the election that have stuck with me:
- America: what the fuck have you done?
- How come your campaigns cost a lot of money? In the Middle East, assholes are free.
We are now in a position to begin to answer the first question. President-elect Trump’s initial nominations, with the exception of Republican National Committee Chair and now Chief of Staff Reince Priebus, all come from the racist, Muslim-bashing fringe of America First politics:
- Chief Strategist Steve Bannon is the editor of the alt_right scandal website turned Trump cheerleader Breitbart News;
- National Security Adviser Michael Flynn is an anti-Muslim ideologue who says Barack Obama invented the Islamic State;
- Attorney General nominee Jeff Sessions has expressed disregard for the NAACP as “un-American,” opposes same-sex marriage, abortion and Obamacare, and supports unfettered gun rights.
- CIA Director nominee Michael Pompeo thinks Muslims have to denounce terrorist acts, or else and held Hillary Clinton culpable in the Benghazi incident that killed the American Ambassador, even though the Republican-controlled committee reached the opposite conclusion.
So far, what America has done is to bring to power fringe right-wingers with little regard for civil rights or constitutional protection, except when it comes to carrying a loaded gun. There are rumors Trump might choose Mitt Romney as Secretary of State and David Petraeus as Secretary of Defense, neither of whom belong to this racist fringe, but we’ll have to wait and see about that. It might no make much difference with these initial appointments in place.
Assholes aren’t free in the US, but they apparently cost far less than Hillary Clinton:
That’s arguably worse than embarrassing. How do you spend that much more than Trump and still lose Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania?
The short answer is that you fail to turn out minorities and you lose white working class votes, including women. You pile up almost as many votes as Barack Obama did and win over Trump by well over 1.4 million, but they came mainly in the northeast and on the West Coast. That causes you to fail in the electoral college, where smaller and more rural states have added weight.
What are the implications for foreign policy?
Some of the sharp edges will get smoothed down. The United States isn’t ditching NATO or tearing up the Iran nuclear deal, since even an asshole would recognize we are better off with them than without them. If I am wrong about that, we are in not only for a rough ride but a potentially catastrophic one.
But other promises will need to be fulfilled. I expect the wall on the border with Mexico to be built, even though more Mexicans are leaving the US than arriving. I expect an end to accepting Syrian refugees, even though they are already undergoing “extreme vetting.” The proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership is dead, leaving the initiative on trade in Asia to the Chinese. Ditto the Paris climate change agreement, unless Trump reverts to his 2009 position in favor of vigorous action on greenhouse gases (not going to happen):
Trump will certainly attempt to reach an understanding with Russia on Syria and Ukraine, but he will only succeed if he is willing to offer Moscow more than Obama did. That will anger not only many Democrats but also many Republicans, most notably John McCain.
It will be much harder to get rid of refugees or undocumented immigrants who are already in the US, since they have rights to “due process” (even Melania Trump, who apparently worked illegally in the US). It will also be difficult to withdraw from the North American Free Trade Agreement, which has boosted US exports and created a mutual dependency that would be expensive and complicated to unravel.
In the end, I suspect the biggest international damage from appointing people like Bannon, Flynn, Sessions, and Pompeo is to America’s reputation abroad and to the liberal democratic model that has been so important for the last 70-odd years. It doesn’t really matter whether Trump himself is a racist or anti-Muslim. His appointments speak louder than anything he can say. The right response is this, from the cast of Hamilton last night:
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Overdue
Praveen Madhiraju, a pro bono advisor to the Bytyqi family, writes:
Recently, the credibility of Serbia’s many promises to resolve the state-sponsored murders of three American citizens and brothers took a sharp downward turn.
US Ambassador Kyle Scott summarized the problems in the Bytyqi case well:
This is obviously a burden for the Bytyqi family, but also a burden for our bilateral relationship[.] When three of our citizens were arrested by the Serbian police, handed over from one unit of the police to another, and then found out back with their hands tied, executed gangland style, someone is responsible and it defies logic that no one saw anything and no one knows anything.
I find it is very difficult to understand that nothing happened to any of the members of that group and that in fact, the leader of that unit [Goran “Guri” Radosavljevic] is now in a position on the Executive Board of the leading party in this country.
Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic’s response? To go to bat for the main suspect:
And now, I have been asked, why is he [Guri] a member of Vucic’s party…You should be ashamed of yourself, what do you think, that I will allow someone kicking me in the head and not reply with facts…. Never [would] the enemy of the USA and killer of the American people get [an] invitation to NATO.
Mr. Vucic then protested that no one did anything in 13 years to resolve the case and now he is to blame.
This is unprecedented. Many people (me included) have opined that Prime Minister Vucic still protects war criminals. Before 2008, he had a long history of doing so. But this is the first time he so overtly went to bat for the prime suspect in the murders of three American citizens.
Remember that Prime Minister Vucic has previously pledged to resolve the case by the end of Summer 2014 and March 2015. In June 2016, he pledged resolution, “very soon or much sooner than anybody might expect” to the American public, Vice President Biden, and others. Each time, he has done little to nothing. It seems like the only time Mr. Vucic authorizes Serbian prosecutors to work on the case (and yes, it seems like they require his authorization) is when he needs something from the United States.
The Associated Press, Tanjug, and Radio Slobodna Europa, all covered Fatose Bytyqi’s recent visit to Belgrade. A new independent investigative outlet called Insajder (Insider) produced a 30 minute mini-documentary on Serbia’s failures in the case. Yet Serbian officials seem content in their complacency.
Despite his many promises, Prime Minister Vucic just took a stand for war criminals. But he still has time to reassert the independence of the investigation and distance himself from the main suspect, Goran Radosavljevic. After all, it’s what he has promised to do many times.
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Rebuilding Syria
As the Syrian conflict continues both international institutions and Syrian civil society are building a vision for the future reconstruction of the country. At MEI’s 70th Anniversary Conference Wednesday a panel was convened to discuss these issues and highlight the economic and governance challenges facing reconstruction efforts.
As Deputy Executive Secretary of UNESCWA and former Syrian Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, Abdullah al Dardari has been tasked with developing a reconstruction plan for Syria. He first set out the daunting scale of reconstruction efforts required through the example of housing infrastructure. In order to meet Syria’s housing needs the country will need to build 300,000 new homes per year for ten years. Given that prior to 2011 they only managed 90,000 per year this will clearly stretch on resources. Housing reconstruction would also require 30 million tons of cement per year, but domestic production only reaches 5 million tons. Importing 25 million tons of cement is not possible given the current state of infrastructure and the current account. Mixing such a large amount of cement also requires huge volumes of water, which will be a challenge given Syria’s water crisis.
Dardari assured the audience that while the engineering and financing problems of reconstruction are troubling, of most concern are the governance challenges that must be addressed first. An inclusive, representative, accountable, and capable governance structure must be developed that enables the Syrian people to negotiate freely the difficult choices to be made early in the development process, such as to which regions limited resources are to be directed first.
Also of vital importance will be balance between decentralization and a unified Syria. Dardari emphatically rejected any proposals for the division of Syria as this would only lead to further fragmentation and dysfunction. Division proposals denythe complexity of Syria’s ethnic and sectarian makeup, as no area is dominated by a single group. Even the Alawite ‘heartlands’ of Lattakia and Tartous are 50 per cent Sunni. Furthermore, the Syrian model post-Ottoman is a centralized national project, which should not be reversed. Practically speaking, reconstruction requires a centralized process as networked systems such as electricity and transport must come from a single authority.
The other Syrian on the panel, Karam Foundation founder Lina Sergie Attar, firmly agreed that Syria must remain unified. However the conflict has led to a degree of decentralization that will be irreversible. Convincing places such as Raqqa and Idlib, which are currently far removed from the central government’s authority to return to the fold, will require representative and inclusive institutions able to rebuild trust.
Shanta Devarajan, Chief Economist of the World Bank for the Middle East and North Africa region, gave insight into its preparations for rebuilding post-conflict Syria. The World Bank is laying the foundation of a private sector to be transplanted to Syria through the establishment of Special Enterprise Zones (SEZs) in Jordan. In these zones both Jordanians and Syrians are permitted to work, with Jordan agreeing to grant 300,000 work permits to Syrians. The goods produced will enter the EU at reduced concessionary rates. Many of the investors in the SEZs have been Syrians who would have otherwise directed their capital towards the Gulf. This suggests that capital mobilization from the Syrian community will be possible, and must be a central component of the estimated US$200 billion required to return Syrian GDP to 2010 levels.
The World Bank is also prioritizing education and health care in their redevelopment plans as these sectors have been disproportionately targeted in the conflict with troubling consequences for Syria’s human development indicators. Attar confirmed that education projects are also a focus for the Karam Foundation, which is calling for flexible and innovative solutions for a generation of children that has missed up to five years of essential schooling.
Attar was granted the last word on the rebuilding of Syria and argued that reconstruction without justice will never be lead to an enduring peace. In her view, many Syrians would not have rejected Assad and his regime remaining if it meant the violence would stop, however this is no longer possible as all trust has been eroded. While Dardari argued that economic reconstruction is part of the reconciliation process itself, including developing industries and sectors that cross lines to addressing the exploitative war economy, Attar believes the removal of Assad and his regime must be the first step to reconciliation and a priority in the peace process.
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The day after Mosul
It is almost certain that ISIS’s Iraqi capital, Mosul, will fall to Iraqi and Kurdish forces within the next year. However, the question remains as to how the city will rebuild itself. For that, we can look to the experience of Kirkuk, another major Iraqi city that was secured by Kurdish forces in 2014.
On Monday, the Kirkuki governor Najmaldin Karim spoke at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He was interviewed by Michael Knights, a Lafer fellow at the Washington Institute.
Karim explained that despite the Kurdish control of the city, Kirkuk is in a precarious position. Since the Mosul operation began last month, ISIS militants have begun attacking Kirkuk, leading to 13 deaths and 200 injuries. It is difficult for Kirkuki officials to detect ISIS militants because they disguise themselves as civilians and internally displace people (IDPs). Additionally, some of the suburbs around Kirkuk are still controlled by ISIS. These represent a major threat to Kirkuk. The governor expressed disappointment that the Iraqi military and the Peshmerga decided to address the problem in Mosul before the problems around Kirkuk.
The problems that created Al Qaeda in Iraq—ISIS’s predecessor—still exist. The discord between Iraqi Sunnis and Shias as well as Kurds and Arabs still causes problems in Iraq. If these divisions are not addressed, ISIS or another radical group will take root in Iraq even after the Mosul operation ends. Karim noted that Mosul is especially tricky due to its internal ethnic divisions and the large number of ISIS supporters in the city. It will also be very difficult to return IDPs to the city, since much of it will be destroyed in the fighting.
Karim focused on how Kirkuk has been handling its population of IDPs. The majority are Sunnis from Mosul. Some are from towns that have already been liberated from ISIS, but due to destruction they have not been able to return. The city has received no financial assistance from Baghdad to help care for and resettle the IDPs. In fact, the city is fully supported by the KRG, which has not been able to give Kirkuk what it should. Karim sees the issue of IDPs as central to the rebuilding of Iraq. If the IDPs cannot return home and lead happy, productive lives, Iraq will remain in chaos, even after ISIS has left the country.
Karim was asked if he were the governor of Mosul, what would be his priorities for the day after liberation? He answered that he would be vigilant not to prioritize certain areas over others. If the governor of Mosul chooses to rebuild Shia areas before Sunni areas, the Sunni population of Mosul would rise up in protest and cause instability. Rebuilding should be prioritized based on the number of people.
The KRG representative to the United States, Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman asked Karim if perhaps Kirkuk is subtly trying to pursue an agenda of Arabization by accepting a large number of Sunni Arab IDPs. Karim admitted that from an outsider’s perspective it might look as though this is Kirkuk’s agenda, especially given Arabization efforts in Kirkuk in the past. However, he said, Kirkuk is desperately trying to return the IDPs to their homes. They are stuck in Kirkuk for the time being, for better or for worse.
Karim said that he hopes President-elect Trump will focus more on stabilizing Iraq rather than defeating ISIS. Kurds are worried that once ISIS is defeated they will lose US support and will not be able to pursue their goal of independence. However, Karim remains hopeful that KRG president Barzani will be able to negotiate greater Kurdish autonomy with Iraqi president Al-Abadi in the aftermath of the Mosul operation.
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What to expect in the Balkans
Not much, in the first instance. It has now been a long time since a president of the United States regarded the Balkans as a priority. A region that in the 1990s was the object of two US military interventions (in Bosnia and Kosovo) and NATO deployments has dribbled its way down the list of priorities and now rests no higher on most days than a deputy assistant secretary in the State Department. That’s not a bad thing: democracy and statebuilding in the Western Balkans has been relatively successful, with Slovenia, Croatia and Albania now NATO members and Montenegro in the accession process. Slovenia and Croatia are also EU members and all the other countries of the region are pointed in that direction, each at its own pace.
But the Westernization process in the Western Balkans is still not complete, has slowed recently, and could be curtailed or even reversed during the Trump administration. Bosnia is suffering attacks on its constitutional legitimacy, rooted in the Dayton peace accords of 1995, from the President of the relatively autonomous 49% of the country known as Republika Srpska. Macedonia is stalled due to internal strife and Greece’s refusal to accept is name. Kosovo started its existence as a sovereign state well behind the others and likewise suffers internal strife and continuing problems due to Serbia’s non-recognition. All the Balkan countries are suffering a Russian soft power assault on their media and institutions.
If the new president is inclined to accept a Russian sphere of influence in the Balkans, the consequences for the region’s relatively new democracies could be dramatic. Montenegro’s NATO accession depends on ratification in the US Senate. Progress in Bosnia will require the EU and the US to act in tandem to promote political and economic reforms. Improved relations between Kosovo and Serbia likewise depend on concerted action Brussels and Washington, as will resolution of Macedonia’s internal and external problems. Just easing up on these ongoing efforts could doom them to failure.
But worse could be in store. Trump wants to improve American relations with Russia and may be tempted to concede items of value to get them. If, for example, he were to accept Russian annexation of Crimea, that alone could set off a series of ethnically based partitions not only in Ukraine but also elsewhere: in Georgia, Moldova, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia. It would be truly miraculous if such a chain of partitions were to occur peacefully. It is far more likely that it would entail instability, ethnic cleansing, redrawing of borders, and war. White nationalists like Steve Bannon, Trump’s chief long-term strategist, will no doubt be telling the new president that ethnic partition is natural or inevitable and not such a bad thing after all.
What this amounts to in the Balkans is an assault on the post-war order established in the late 1990s as the most recent Balkan wars came to an end. It wasn’t an entirely liberal democratic order, as ethnic identity and group rights have remained an important dimension of organized political life virtually everywhere in the region. But it was an order based on aspirations to EU and for some NATO membership that involved establishing independent judiciaries, relatively free media, representative legislative bodies, and peaceful resolution of disputes. Upsetting this order in favor of ethnic separation and illiberal autocracies with territorial pretensions would be perilous: this is a part of the world involved in two world wars, in addition to its own post-Cold War conflicts arising from the breakup of former Yugoslavia.
I don’t expect Steve Bannon or John Bolton to worry about that, but I do hope that more pragmatic Republicans like Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Corker or outgoing New Hampshire Senator Ayotte, both of whom are rumored for cabinet positions, to understand that the Balkan wars of the 1990s and the subsequent peace were a bipartisan effort, with support led as much by Republican Senator Dole as anyone else. Preserving that bipartisan legacy of peace and increasing prosperity is important, even if the region no longer attracts high level attention.
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