Month: November 2016
Managing South China Sea conflicts
I enjoyed some time with some smart colleagues yesterday discussing the South China Sea conflicts, unfortunately under Chatham House rules. Below are my own notes for the occasion.
Two points stand out in my memory of what others said:
- Oil and gas resources in the South China Sea are not promising and fish stocks are declining;
- The Chinese might well challenge the next president, or undisciplined pilots or naval captains might do so.
There were lots of other excellent points made, but I’ll have to hope that one of the students present might offer up their notes. I find it difficult to take notes while participating on a panel.
1. I’m truly honored to sit on a panel with distinguished colleagues. My advice to the students in the room is to listen carefully to them, as they know a lot about the South China Sea disputes and the legal background.
2. I don’t, but I was asked to talk about the conflict management implications of the recent arbitration and the outlook for resolving future maritime disputes in the region, including alternative methods of dispute settlement that China Studies and Conflict Management students will be exploring this fall and during a study trip to Beijing in January.
3. Let me begin with the bad news: if in order to ensure peace we need to settle the various claims of sovereignty in the South China Sea, I think there is very little chance of success.
4. Sovereignty claims are all too often resolved by force.
5. China has the advantage there. For the foreseeable future Beijing will be able to deploy force superior to any of the other individual claimants. Without US assistance, none of the South China Sea claimants would win a naval clash with China.
6. With US assistance, they might win, but only after causing incalculable damage to world order, the world’s economy, and international relations throughout the Pacific.
7. War would be a really bad way to resolve any of the South China Sea disputes.
8. Fortunately, other means are available. Arbitration is one.
9. But arbitration is a method that decides who is right and who is wrong. If it goes in favor of the less powerful state, the more powerful state is unlikely to accept the outcome. That is pretty much what we’ve seen in response to last summer’s arbitration decision.
10. But we’ve also seen another classic conflict management response: China is trying to buy off the Philippines, with at least initial indications of some success.
11. Billions are unlikely to make Manila cede completely, but it may render the arbitration decision ineffective, postponing rather than resolving the issue.
12. There are ample precedents for simply letting sovereignty claims slide. There are still more than five outstanding maritime boundary disputes between the US and Canada. They are mostly ignored in practice, even if neither country is willing to concede legally.
13. There are also ample precedents for cooperative regimes that do not necessarily decide the sovereignty question, or decide it without prejudicing economic interests, thus enabling disputants to gain at least some of the benefits that they think are rightfully theirs.
14. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia share production from a once-disputed oil field; Iran and Qatar share production from a disputed gas field.
15. Such cooperative arrangements are relatively easy where resources are concerned but particularly difficult where security issues are involved, since security is often regarded as a zero sum game.
16. China’s militarization of various non-islands in the South China Sea is perceived in Washington as a threat to US freedom of navigation there. So we send ships and aircraft to traverse locations that we believe are permitted, even if the Chinese think not.
17. In particular, the Chinese think military vessels and planes conducting espionage are not entitled to passage even in its Exclusive Economic Zone, so they may respond by declaring an Air Defense Identification Zone, or by challenging US naval ships or military aircraft. Read more
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Nukes in the next administration
Yesterday, the Brookings Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative held an event discussing how the next presidential administration should approach nuclear arms control and deterrence. Brookings scholar Michael O’Hanlon interviewed fellow Brookings scholar Steven Pifer on his recent report about this topic.
Although there are many nuclear states that we need to keep an eye on, Pifer explained,the primary concern for the next administration should be Russia due to their large arsenal and our quickly deteriorating relationship. Russia has also expressed a desire to modernize their arsenal, and the US needs to keep a close eye on that. Given that Russia and the United States have more warheads than any other country, if the two great nuclear powers reach a strong reduction agreement, it will serve as an example for the rest of the world. Additionally, the New START treaty will expire in 2021—the next administration needs to take a long, hard look at the existing treaty and decide whether they want to renew it or renegotiate the terms.
In many respects, conventional weapons have become almost as deadly as traditional nuclear warheads; perhaps conventional arms reduction should be considered as well. Pifer recommended that while the US should maintain the existing defense triad of submarine launched domestic missiles, ICBMs and bombers, the next president should consider reducing their numbers. Maintaining all these warheads is very expensive. The US doesn’t really need 700 deployed missiles—they could get by on 550 and save. In fact, nuclear parity with Russia is not a strategic concern but rather a political one. Having as many or more warheads than Russia reassures US allies that the United States is capable of defending them and gives the US a better position at the negotiating table.
The US has pledged to use its warheads if the homeland or one of its allies is attacked with nuclear weapons, but foreign allies are nervous that Washington will only use its nuclear capabilities if attacked at home. Indeed, Pifer said, no president would be willing to risk Chicago for a small city in South Korea. Current US policy also gives room for US enemies to attack the homeland with conventional weapons without fear of nuclear reciprocation. Pifer believes that despite these issues, the policy contributes to nuclear deterrence and can be strengthened by improving communication with allies that depend on the US for nuclear security.
Pifer advises that the US should push hard for other nuclear states to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty. The US has no need for further testing at the moment, since it conducted so many nuclear tests in the second half of the 20th century. In fact, the US conducted more tests than the rest of the world combined. As a result of these extensive tests, US knowledge about nuclear weapons far surpasses the rest of the world. Therefore, by encouraging others to sign the treaty, the US keeps the knowledge it gained from its own nuclear tests while ensuring that the rest of the world never catches up.
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