No answers

The big question that looms over Syria policy now that the US has attacked the air base there from which the Syrian regime launched its chemical weapons attack last week is “what next?” as my SAIS colleague Eliot Cohen suggests. Sam Heller argued before the US bombing that American goals should remain focused on blocking the use of chemical weapons, nothing more. Tony Blinken, while warning against expanding the goal to regime change, still hopes the US intervention will lead to a successful ceasefire and negotiation of a political settlement and transition.

It is difficult to limit the goal as Heller suggests. It was Bashar al Assad who launched the chemical weapons attack. The American response is not likely to deter him for long. He may go back to using chlorine rather than far more deadly sarin for a while, but he will want to test American tolerance repeatedly, looking for what he can do without going over the threshold. Even if he doesn’t use chemicals, he will continue bombarding hospitals and schools, in an effort to make civilian life intolerable in opposition-controlled areas. The chemical attack he launched last week killed no more people than he might kill on a typical day using more conventional weapons.

It is also unlikely that Blinken’s hopes will be realized. Russia and Iran are backing Assad to the hilt, denying that he used chemical weapons and denouncing the US for aggression against a sovereign state. The Russians, who were present at the base from which the most recent chemical attack was launched, surely knew what the Syrian air force was up to. Tehran is normally a fierce opponent of chemical weapons because Saddam Hussein used them during the Iran/Iraq war, so denial is its only logical course. So long as Moscow and Tehran back Assad, there is little hope of negotiating a transition, since neither can hope any future leader will be friendly to their interests.

The US is ill-equipped at the moment for the broader diplomatic effort that Blinken recommends. The Trump Administration has not nominated a single sub-cabinet official in the State Department, where professional foreign service officers are acting without in most cases any clear direction. This is fine when it comes to continuing current policies, but any new diplomatic initiative on Syria, which Secretary of State Tillerson has suggested will be undertaken, requires more personnel in tune with the still relatively new administration. There is no way to get them into place quickly, as all will require extensive vetting and Senate confirmation.

Nor is there any serious indication that the Trump Administration would be interested in pursuing long-term commitment to reconstruction and democratic transition in Syria. The Trump budget proposal guts the State Department and US Agency for International Development, the essential tools for a civilian effort of that sort. Trump has wanted to kill the Islamic State there and get out. That’s what President Bush wanted to do in Afghanistan, which is now the longest war in American history. A quick exit from Syria is just as unlikely: it would virtually guarantee the return of extremists. Who is going to govern Raqqa after the Islamic State is defeated there? Are we going to turn it over to Assad?

There no clear or even tentative answers to the question of what next. That’s not good.