Month: September 2017
Kim is winning because Trump
Permanent Representative Haley is pushing hard this week for a new UN Security Council resolution on North Korea, one that brings maximum economic pressure to bear, even as President Trump continues to mumble about military options rather than negotiations. Kim Jong-un appears to be paying neither any mind. Why not?
The short answer is BATNA: best alternative to a negotiated agreement. His is better than ours:
- He can ignore our military bluster because he now has both a conventional deterrent–a massive artillery attack on Seoul–and a nuclear one. There can be no more doubting Pyongyang’s capability of hitting at least US allies (and the US forces stationed in them) with a nuclear weapon.
- He can ignore the sanctions threat at least until he sees what emerges from the UNSC and whether China is inclined to comply with it fully. Barring North Korea’s trade without China is meaningless.
Our options are limited: we can threaten military action and tightened sanctions, but we can’t really do either unilaterally. Military action should at least require concurrence from South Korea, which is most exposed to the North’s artillery and understandably loathe to go in the military direction. Trade and financial sanctions require China’s cooperation. Threatening not to do business with any country or company that does business with North Korea may sound great, but our reliance on trade with China and Chinese companies precludes actually doing it.
Haley’s most striking rhetoric was her claim that Kim Jong-un is “begging for war.” That is simply untrue. He is deterring the US from a military strike, so far successfully, by demonstrating the North’s own military capabilities. It is far truer that President Trump in his tweets is begging for war, but the adults in the National Security Council and the Defense Department are likely showing him military options and consequences that are unappetizing at best, catastrophic at worst.
President Trump is not entirely to blame for this situation. The history of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs is strewn with poor choices, both by American presidents and Pyongyang. The Americans have wanted to kick the can down the road. The North Koreans have preferred isolation to integration with the rest of the world. Neither the Americans nor the North Koreans have been willing to make decisions based on the real, but in the 1990s and 2000s long-term, threat of nuclear holocaust.
We are now approaching that long-term future. Haley has ruled out a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, in exchange for a freeze on what the North quite reasonably views as hostile US and South Korean military preparations for a pre-emptive strike. The smart money is betting that is the best we are going to get, but Trump’s bluster precludes it. That said, he often backs down, after an effort at distraction. Bluster, distract, cave is his preferred style of (very poor) negotiation. He’d have done a lot better with an upfront assessment of his BATNA, which is what every first-year conflict management student learns at SAIS.
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Tweeter-in-chief meets defiance
Locked and loaded for fire and fury, President Trump now confronts a defiant Kim Jong-un, who has conducted a big (whether thermonuclear is not yet clear) nuclear test, following quickly on a successful missile launch over Japan. Trump had promised none of this would happen. Now that it has, what are his options?
- A conventional military attack, presumably targeting North Korea’s missile and nuclear facilities. It won’t destroy them all (they are increasingly mobile and hard to find), but it could do some serious damage. The trouble is Pyongyang is likely to respond with a devastating conventional military attack on Seoul. That could escalate quickly to a land war or nuclear exchange. That’s not where we should want to go.
- Tightening sanctions. Trump has talked of preventing all trade with North Korea. He hasn’t got anything like the Chinese, Russian and other backing required for that. Unilateral sanctions tightening is near the limit of what can be achieved.
- Cyber attacks. I’d be surprised if we haven’t already exhausted their potential. The North Koreans, adept at the cyber game, will retaliate. We’d better be sure we are not more vulnerable than they are. Escalation dominance is vital if you are going to escalate.
- More bluster, including UN Security Council denunciation. Trump settled for this last time around. He likely will again. It obviously makes little difference to the North Koreans, who argue they are within their rights, since they have withdrawn from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to develop nuclear weapons as well as missiles of any range they think necessary to defend themselves. The UNSC has no means to enforce its decisions to the contrary.
- Negotiation. Trump once upon a time suggested he would want to negotiate with Kim Jong-un, presumably offering a formal end to the Korean War (until now there has just been an armistice) and diplomatic relations as well as other guarantees that we would not seek an end the North Korean regime, in exchange for some sort of nuclear and missile restraint on Pyongyang’s part. But it is hard to see why Pyongyang would sign on to that rather than just continue its so far successful nuclear and missile programs until they can credibly threaten the US?
Where does that leave us? Nowhere good.
It essentially means we are going to need to learn to live with North Korea as a nuclear-armed power, one bent on decoupling the US from its allies in Northeast Asia by threatening nuclear attack on the American homeland. The North Korean long-range, potentially nuclear, missiles raise the difficult question of whether the US will risk Los Angeles to save Tokyo or Seoul.
It will be vital in that scenario to maintain as close an alliance as possible with South Korea and Japan, which need to be confident of US support if they are to continue to refrain from developing nuclear weapons of their own. Certainly Trump’s tweeted threat to withdraw from the US/South Korea free trade agreement is the worst possible kind of thing to contemplate, as it would undermine South Korean (and Japanese) confidence in the US as a reliable ally and give them real reasons to think about arming themselves with nuclear weapons.
Trump during his campaign suggested he would be all right with that. He should by now understand how damaging to US interests a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia could be. He should also be having second thoughts about tearing up the Iran nuclear deal, which has so far prevented a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.
But second thoughts, or even first thoughts, are not his strong point. His bluster has already contributed to Kim Jong-un’s successful defiance. How many more stupid tweets before Trump precipitates a crisis that irreversibly damages US interests?
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