Out but not down

Kurdistan’s President Barzani is refusing to continue in the presidency after November 1. He is stepping aside in the wake of last month’s independence referendum that triggered the loss to Baghdad of a large part of the so-called “disputed territories,” including Kirkuk, as well as opposition from Turkey, Iran, the US, the European Union, and Russia. Barzani’s letter to the Speaker of Kurdistan’s parliament is ambiguous on next steps:

You should therefore meet at your earliest convenience to ensure there is no legal vacuum in the execution of the duties and powers of the president of the Region and resolve this subject.

Barzani, who has clung to power years after his mandate expired, is throwing in the towel, at least for now.

His ambiguity about what happens next stands in stark contrast to the relevant provisions of the Kurdistan Regional constitution:

Article 46:

i) In the case of the resignation, demise, or permanent disability of the President of the Kurdistan Region, a successor shall be elected in the same manner.
ii) When the position of the President of the Kurdistan Region becomes vacant, the President of the Kurdistan Regional Assembly shall assume responsibilities of the President until such time as a new President is elected.
iii) When the President of the Kurdistan Region is absent or on leave, the Regional Prime Minister shall assume the responsibilities of the President in an acting capacity.

My guess is he wants the Regional Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, his nephew, to assume the responsibilities, rather than the Speaker, who comes from an opposition party. I suppose the ambiguity might help Nechirvan to argue that the President is absent or on leave, rather than resigned.

In any event, Barzani is doing the right thing to take responsibility for the loss of territory and step aside. The question is what happens next?

Hopefully the ceasefire negotiated two days ago between the Kurdish peshmerga and the Iraqi security forces can be extended further. While Baghdad has not yet retaken all of the “disputed areas,” it has the critical ones, except for the border posts inside Iraqi Kurdistan.  It is negotiating with Erbil under US auspices for control of a key border post at Fish Khabur.

Once the situation has stabilized, with Iraqi security forces and peshmerga clear about their respective areas of control, it will be time for a serious dialogue on key issues: how the borders of Iraqi Kurdistan will be fixed and control over oil and oil revenues. Independence is off the table for now, but Kurdistan has a very large measure of autonomy within Iraq and will want to ensure that continues. Unambiguous borders and certainty about oil and money would be a big boost to Erbil’s ability to govern itself effectively.

Within Kurdistan, Barzani and his PDK party are still strong. Their main rivals in the Talabani-affiliated PUK have weakened significantly in recent years, with defections to smaller political groups that have failed to gain sufficient weight to challenge the PDK. The loss of Kirkuk and other territory will no doubt have repercussions in the PDK, but it is not yet clear what they might be. Though called political parties, these groups are in part based on family and tribe. Those affiliations don’t change easily, especially if the tribal chieftain is still active.

Barzani underlined in his letter to the Speaker that he would indeed remain an active peshmerga, which is presumably a way of saying he will continue to command his family’s significant forces in Kurdistan. The PDK is blaming the loss of Kirkuk on surrender by PUK peshmerga. Civil wars have been fought over less, including in Kurdistan. It happened before and could happen again.

Hard to tell what comes next, but the president who held on in office without a mandate is unlikely to buckle completely now. Barzani is out, but not down.