Six questions about Iran’s protests

News often catches us off guard.  Once we recover from our initial astonishment, we typically spot reasons why developments were predictable all along.  The collapse of the Soviet Union is one example.  The Arab Spring (and subsequent Winter) is another.

Iran’s incipient wave of sometimes violent protests demand better explanation than those on offer.  Here’s why:

Yes, Iranians appear to be fed up with longstanding economic deprivation.  But typically it isn’t the absolute economic standing of a country that drives protest — particularly violent protest — but rather the trend lines.  With the lifting of sanctions, the opening of Iran to foreign trade and investment, and the infusion of frozen assets, how is it possible that the economic trend lines in Iran are worse than when Rouhani entered the scene or when the nuclear deal was signed in the summer of 2015?  Yes, corruption has no doubt siphoned off some or much of the anticipated benefit, but all of it — to the point that the public discerns virtually no improvement?  That’s not straightforward at all; it would take hard work and skill to mismanage an economy to that degree.  Is that what’s going on Iran?

Again, a seemingly straightforward expectation that defies common sense.  Sure, when he was running for re-election, it is likely that Rouhani — like politicians anywhere — inflated expectations.  But that election took place last May.  Why would any political leader continue to inflate expectations that he knew — and Rouhani surely knew this — were unlikely to be met?  To the contrary, the Iranian President has had seven months to dial back public expectations.  Why wouldn’t he do that?  How would that earn him the ire of his hard-line opponents, which is widely seen as his greatest constraint?

This is a more plausible explanation.  Even as astute a politician as Margaret Thatcher got whacked for introducing an unpopular tax.  The baffling thing here is why Rouhani — whose hold on power, we are told, is tenuous due to those hard-line opponents — would make deficit-cutting and structural reforms a near-term priority.  Why not wait for the public to realize some of those ballyhooed benefits before taking away the punch bowl?  Surely, Rouhani and his advisers knew that there would be risk of public push-back; Iranians are not quiescent.  Iranians defied even the hardliners with massive protests in 2009 and have shown their mettle at times since.  What on earth was Rouhani thinking with these austerity measures?  Why didn’t he look to the infusion of long-frozen Iranian assets — up to $50 billion worth according to former US Treasury Secretary Lew — to address deficits?  If the answer is that the funds haven’t arrived, or that Khamenei or the IRGC siphoned them off, or Rouhani thought he could get away with only austerity and no progress, then that all needs to be explained.

In addition to these inadequate, question-provoking ‘explanations’, there are several other head-scratching puzzlers:

4.  Why haven’t Rouhani, Khamenei and the IRGC been able to distract public attention from economic problems given the perfect foil they have in Donald Trump?

It’s the go-to move for any beleaguered leader: distract the public by pointing to a foreign enemy.  And Donald Trump is a central casting, made-to-order foil:

— he spews anti-Iranian invective at a rate and intensity that would offend the national pride of even moderate Iranians.

— he refused to certify Iran’s compliance with the nuclear deal, putting the Iranian economy in jeopardy.

— he has slavishly embraced Iran’s arch-rivals, the Saudis.

— he recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, implicating an issue on which Iran (with its aptly named Al-Quds force) has utilized to expand its influence.

It would be different if Trump were somehow ‘winning’ on these issues, but they have left Washington — not Tehran — isolated.

We know that Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif routinely tweet about Trump.  Indeed, Iran’s Foreign Minister has already chided Trump for his expression of Schadenfreude on Twitter.  It’s stunning that Tehran cannot better exploit this walking, talking caricature of the overbearing American foe to engage the public’s passions.  This would be true in any country; it’s particularly puzzling given that Iranians have been exposed to nearly four decades of enmity with/from the US.

5.  Why can’t Rouhani deflect criticism?

In Venezuela (which is only to be compared because of its restive, much more seriously deprived population and its oil economy), the public has only one target: the regime of President Nicolas Maduro.  But in Iran, President Rouhani is not ‘the Supreme Leader.’  That makes the protests — which seemingly are aimed at both — all the more baffling.  Why can’t Rouhani effectively portray himself as ‘the good guy trying to do his best against an implacable, overly conservative foe’?  Yes, if he goes too far in that vein, he risks arousing Khamenei or IRGC ire; but surely Rouhani is deft enough to get away with distancing himself and doing a bit of scapegoating of his rivals.

6.  Where are all those French and German businessmen?

We are told that Trump’s non-certification puts US trade and investment with Iran at risk, i.e. gives the advantage to Airbus over Boeing and the like.  One of the reasons the Europeans look the other way on Iranian malfeasance in the Middle East is due to their economic interest in the country.

If that’s the case, then where are all those French, German and other European investors?  If they are present in the numbers suggested, then why on earth hasn’t Rouhani trotted out the images — photo-ops and ribbon-cuttings and the like that are the staple of politicians everywhere, even in much poorer, less sophisticated countries? If they are not present in such numbers, then why is that?  What is going on with investment and trade with Iran?