Month: January 2018

Promising

Meeting today for the first time in Davos, Greek Prime Minister Tsipras and Macedonian Prime Minister Zaev exchanged friendly words and gestures. Tsipras said in part:

We must find a solution to all our pending issues, so that as our neighbor country wishes its European accession process and its membership to NATO can move ahead so in particular I made clear that we must find a mutually agreed solution, erga omnes, and in this framework we agreed to intensify the negotiation process that is taking place under the UN in order to reach a solution on the name.

He also announced unblocking of his “neighboring country’s” hopes in connection with the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (can I confess I don’t know what that is?) and further progress in EU accession.

Zaev said in part:

The final solution has to be acceptable to both sides, we need to take care of the interest of one another, the solution has to take care of the national dignity and identity of our peoples to show practically that we are stronger committed to finding a solution, I announce that our government will change the names of the airport and highway, the highway will be called Friendship. Our actions show our good faith, this testifies to the fact that we have no irredentist aspirations towards our neighbor.

For the uninitiated: the airport and highway were both named for Alexander the Great, whom the Greeks claim exclusively as their own, along with the name “Macedonia.”

This exchange sounds pretty good to me. There is willingness on both sides to try to move things forward, in the context of the more than two-decade-old UN mediation. Particularly promising is Tsipras recognition that EU and NATO accession for his neighbor are important, implying that Greece should bend to make them happen.

The devil is of course in the details, especially those two Latin words: erga omnes. What the Greeks want is a name for the country the United States has been calling the Republic of Macedonia for more than a decade that will be used for all applications (“towards all”). This means not only in its relations with Greece, but also with other countries and even internally, requiring a change in the country’s constitution.

That’s difficult for the Macedonians, who have been calling their republic Macedonia and themselves Macedonians at least since 1944. Of course the Greek claim is far more ancient, but it is hard for many of us to see how a place called the Republic of Macedonia can be confused with Alexander’s Macedonia, any more than the Estados Unidos Mexicanos can be confused with the United States, or New Mexico with Mexico. Nor is there any more irredentist claim associated with the the use of the name Macedonia than in these other cases, where no such claim exists.

What’s at issue here is not really the name but rather identity. Many Greeks believe themselves, their language and their culture to be descended from the ancient Greeks and admit no other claim. The language of the Republic of Macedonia is Slavic, not Greek, in origin and most of its citizens make no claim to descent from the ancients, though some part of ancient Macedonia is inside the Republic (most of which was Paeonia I am told).

So what’s the problem? Most citizens of Macedonia are happy for their republic to be called Macedonia. Though they have been glad to repeatedly and definitively reject any implication of a claim to Greek territory, they don’t want to change their identity or their republic’s to suit a neighbor. Greece has wanted to deny them this privilege, seeing it as an assault on Greek identity and feeling the need to defend themselves.

Nothing announced today even comes close to resolving this deeper identity conflict. But confidence building is a good thing. Today’s mutual announcements are a promising new start in the right direction. Ethnic nationalist politicians in both countries will now try to slam the door shut to any further progress. Tsipras and Zaev will need determination and luck to keep things moving in the right direction.

 

 

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Resist to exist in dignity

I’m in Jerusalem, where Vice President Pence declared to the Knesset today:

We stand with Israel because we believe in right over wrong, good over evil and liberty over tyranny.

That confirms what President Trump had already made clear with his decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem, without even mentioning the Palestinian hope of a capital there: that Washington will no longer even pretend to be neutral in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.

I’ve spent the last four days or so on a SAIS study trip talking mainly with Palestinians, having spent the previous several talking with Israelis. Here I’ll focus on the Palestinians, since their views will be less reported and are far less known. I’ve also spoken to quite a few Jewish Israelis who would agree at least in part with their Palestinian colleagues, though the majority is thrilled with Trump’s move and Pence’s audacity.

The mood among the Palestinians I’ve talked with is annoyance, sadness, frustration, and exasperation. They are profoundly disappointed that the United States, which they have seen as the standard bearer of human rights and international law, has abandoned that vocation for an America First policy that guarantees declining American influence and strengthens Israeli determination to maintain its settlers in occupied Palestinian territory.  The rumor that the Americans intend to relabel their East Jerusalem consulate as the embassy, in order to make the move more quickly, rubs salt in Palestinian wounds, since it means that the Americans will not accept a Palestinian capital in that traditionally Arab part of a city.

The Palestinians are planning a general strike and demonstrations tomorrow in response to Trump/Pence. That of course may boil over into violence, not least because in the Palestinian view the Israeli security forces seem to prefer it that way: they can more easily disperse a crowd with tear gas and rubber bullets if given even a slight excuse to do so. But at least those Palestinians we’ve been talking with are hopeful that violence will be avoided. The successful nonviolent confrontation in July, when massive crowds of praying Palestinians forced the Israelis to remove security devices from the entrances to the Al Aqsa compound in Jerusalem, is the paradigm many hope will prevail. There is of course no guarantee it will.

Conditions for Palestinians vary from catastrophic in Gaza and the refugee camps of the West Bank to maddening in the more or less middle class neighborhoods of Ramallah, Beit Jalla, and Nablus. The Israeli occupation is evident to Palestinians every day:

  • Checkpoints not only coming into the West Bank but between the major Palestinian towns
  • Settlements that loom like recently arrived space ships over the West Bank
  • Prohibited roads used only by settlers, who hope to number 1 million within the next few years
  • Settler violence, rarely punished, against Palestinians, including murder
  • Destruction of olive trees and other factors of production
  • Jerusalem Palestinians “exiled” to the West Bank without permission to return to the city and the vast majority of Gaza residents who can never leave their densely populated strip
  • Gates that close off particular towns without any apparent or announced security justification
  • House and other building demolitions, ostensibly due to lack of permits, which are almost never granted to Palestinians while Jewish illegal outposts are not only tolerated but often legalized
  • Israeli security raids into areas that are supposed to be under exclusive Palestinian control

Some Jewish Israelis would claim these measures are justified, but that reminds me of a story one told: he found one of his two children crying uncontrollably and when asked what happened she responded “It all started when she hit me back.”

The Palestinian leadership is aging. No one knows who will succeed Mahmoud Abbas as President, or many other figures now reaching into their late 70s and 80s. Seventy per cent of their population is under 30 years old. Many young people are looking not to Fatah and Hamas for leadership but rather to “popular struggle”: resist to exist in dignity is their motto. They trust no one, one elder statesman advised, follow no one, and want to define their own future. Let’s hope they do so nonviolently, and with more wisdom and restraint than the President and Vice President of the United States.

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Peace picks, January 22-26

  1. Ending Civil Wars | Monday, January 22 | 2:30pm – 4:00pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |

The cause of civil wars and effective policy responses have been debated extensively for decades, and the United States has often stressed counterinsurgency doctrine and state-building to restore political and societal stability. However, 21st century rebel movements, shifting geopolitics, and the high costs of intervention bring the “standard treatment regime” for resolving civil wars into question. Join us as experts discuss their findings and recommendations on how the United States can better respond to intrastate conflict and promote both development and stability to create lasting peace. Featuring former Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry (Stanford University), Nancy Lindborg (President, U.S. Institute of Peace), Steve Krasner (Stanford University), Stephen Biddle (George Washington University), Susanna Campbell (American University), Clare Lockhart (Director and Co-Founder, Institute for State Effectiveness), and Paul Wise (Stanford University).

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  1. Turkey, the Kurds, and the Struggle for Order in the Middle East | Tuesday, January 23 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |

The American-led campaign against the Islamic State (ISIS) has empowered Syria’s Kurds and, as a result, alienated Turkey. Meanwhile, Russia and Iran have expanded their presence in Syria. Washington, Moscow, and Tehran now find themselves in a complicated diplomatic contest over the orientation of Turkey and various Kurdish polities and factions. How should the U.S. manage its role in this contest? Hudson Senior Fellows Eric Brown and Michael Doran will discuss the current state of affairs in the region and offer recommendations for future U.S. policies. Hudson Fellow Peter Rough will moderate the conversation.

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  1. What Does 2018 Have in Store for Turkey? | Wednesday, January 24 | 12:00pm – 1:00pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |

Turkey began 2018 embroiled in domestic dissent and diplomatic friction. Last April’s constitutional referendum was met with widespread criticism as an attempt by President Erdogan to consolidate power. Activists and journalists face increasing restrictions on their rights, the government continues its crackdown on the opposition, and debates swirl over the future of Turkey’s economy, the Kurdish question, and relations with the United States and European Union. These various issues are coming to a head in advance of 2019’s presidential election. The Middle East Institute (MEI) will convene a panel of experts to examine these key issues and more, featuring Soner Captagay (Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy), Howard Eissenstat (St. Lawrence University), and Max Hoffman (Center for American Progress). MEI’s Director for Turkish Studies Gönül Tol will moderate the discussion.

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  1. Bringing Armed Groups into the Peace Process in Afghanistan | Thursday, January 25 | 9:30am – 11:00am | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here | 

Peace negotiations to end the war in Afghanistan remain elusive, despite years of effort and a growing consensus that no side is likely able to defeat the other militarily.  The Afghan government, United States, and Taliban leadership all profess openness to a peace deal, but efforts have suffered from mistrust, conflicting objectives, and each party’s efforts to break the military stalemate.  Afghanistan in the meantime continues to face widespread violence, insurgent control of large swathes of the countryside, and major economic challenges. The Conflict Prevention and Resolution Forum at the U.S. Institute of Peace will host a panel of leading experts to discuss options for advancing peace talks, reaching an inclusive political settlement, and transitioning Taliban and other insurgents off the battlefield and into nonviolent politics. Featuring Johnny Walsh (U.S. Institute of Peace) as moderator, with speakers Alexander Ramsbotham (Conciliation Resources), Laurel E. Miller (RAND Corporation), and Javid Ahmad (Atlantic Council).

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  1. The Impact of Trump’s Jerusalem Move: A Conversation with PLO Ambassador Husam Zomlot | Thursday, January 25 | 12:00pm – 1:15pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |

President Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and to relocate the U.S. embassy there was met with Arab and international censure. The United Nations General Assembly voted 128 to 9, with 35 abstentions, for a resolution demanding that the United States rescind this declaration. Human rights groups decry the decision as a death knell for the two-state solution. The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a conversation with Ambassador Husam Zomlot, head of the PLO General Delegation to the United States. Ambassador Zomlot will address the implications of this announcement on Palestinians as well as their Arab neighbors, and how a future peace process might be revived. MEI’s Senior Vice President for Policy Research and Programs, Paul Salem, will moderate the discussion.

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  1. Current Challenges in US-Turkey Relations | Thursday, January 25 | 2:00pm – 3:00pm | SETA Foundation | Register here |

President Trump’s win in the November 2016 election was met with cautious optimism in Turkey, however, as the first year of his administration draws to a close, the bilateral relationship still faces a number of challenges. The National Security Strategy issued in December 2017 promises a “dramatic rethinking” of US foreign policy as National Security Advisor HR McMaster put it, but it is unclear what prospects it holds for US-Turkey relations. Moving forward into 2018, how will the divergent approaches between the US and Turkey in Syria affect the broader bilateral relationship? Please join the SETA Foundation at Washington DC for a discussion on the challenges facing the bilateral relationship between the US and Turkey. Featuring speakers Luke Coffey (The Heritage Center), James Jeffrey (Washington Institute for Near East Policy), Kilic B. Kanat (SETA Foundation), with moderator Kadir Ustun (SETA Foundation).

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  1. People Power Movements and International Human Rights: ICNC Monograph Launch | Thursday, January 25 | 4:00pm – 5:15pm | Atlantic Council| Register here |

From winning freedom for slaves to achieving recognition of women’s rights, the real source of many historical breakthroughs in international human rights has been the bottom-up resistance efforts of ordinary people to collectively and nonviolently fight injustice and lack of freedoms. The International Center on Nonviolent Conflict’s (ICNC) monograph author and legal scholar Elizabeth A. Wilson (Rutgers University) will explore a legal framework for understanding the relationship between civil resistance movements and international human rights. A moderated discussion will follow, featuring Maria Stephan (U.S. Institute of Peace) and Sean Murphy (The George Washington University Law School), moderated by Maciej Bartkowski (International Center on Nonviolent Conflict). Mathew Burrows (Atlantic Council) and Maciej Bartkowski will deliver welcoming remarks.
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  1. Islamist Politics in the Middle East and North Africa | Thursday, January 25 | 5:30pm– 7:00pm| Project on Middle East Democracy (Elliott School of International Affairs) | Register here |

The past decade has witnessed major changes as Islamist parties and movements across the Middle East and North Africa were democratically elected, ousted from power, formed coalitions, splintered internally, faced increasing repression, and governed. This panel of top scholars will discuss innovative new political science research on Islamist movements and parties, examining who votes for these organizations, their internal dynamics, and how our study of them continues to evolve. Featuring panelists Lindsay Benstead (Portland State University), Steven Brooke (University of Louisville), Quinn Mecham (Brigham Young University), Jillian Schwedler, (Hunter College, CUNY), and Joas Wagemakers (Utrecht University), moderated by Marc Lynch (George Washington University).

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Syria strategy

Secretary of State Tillerson today in a speech at the Hoover Institution outlined US goals in Syria. Tobias Schneider summarized them succinctly on Twitter:

  • Enduring defeat of ISIS & AQ in Syria
  • Political resolution to Syria conflict (w/o Assad)
  • Diminishing Iranian influence
  • Create conditions for safe refugee return
  • Syria free from WMD

Those sound in principle desirable to me, though they leave out an important one: preventing instability in Syria’s neighbors, including Iraq, Turkey, Lebanon, Israel and Jordan (all more or less US friends if not allies).

The problem lies one step further on in defining a strategy: the ways and means. Tobias and others on Twitter see this set of goals as a license for an unending US commitment to remain in Syria and to “stabilize” it. Hidden under that rock, which Tillerson was careful to say was not a synonym for nationbuilding, lies a commitment to guess what? Nationbuilding.

But let’s deal first with the the ways and means issue. As I see it, this is all we’ve got going for us in Syria:

  1. US military presence and capability, including control through proxies of major oil-producing wells and maybe a proxy presence along the borders with Israel and Jordan.
  2. A UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution (2254) that outlines a political process to prepare a constitution, hold elections, and begin a transition to a democratic system.
  3. The US veto in the UNSC over any successor resolution that approves and advances the political process.
  4. US aid to parts of Syria outside Assad’s control, US clout in the IMF and World Bank, and influence over European and Gulf aid.

Is this enough to deliver the five goals? I doubt it. Take just refugee return: it requires that people not be forced back but that they return of their own volition. The trickle (50,000 Tillerson said) who have returned in the last year are truly a drop in the bucket. Most refugees (upwards of 5.5 million if I remember correctly) won’t return until Assad and his security forces are gone, or at least blocked from acting in parts of Syria. Likewise the political resolution, diminishing Iranian influence, and getting rid of WMD also depend on getting rid of Assad, which is a necessary but not sufficient condition.

Even the enduring defeat of ISIS and Al Qaeda likely require Assad to be pushed aside, as he has consistently used his forces preferentially against the moderate opposition rather than the extremists, with whom his regime had an excellent cooperative relationship when US forces were in Iraq from 2003 to 2011. Assad will want to keep some of them around even now, as they help to justify his brutal repression of the Syrian population.

But getting rid of Assad means, let’s face it, rebuilding the Syrian state, which is unlikely to survive in a form able to deliver on the above goals once he is gone. He has made sure of that by waging war against his own population for six long years.

Remember too: he has Russian and Iranian backing to remain in power.

Without better means, it looks to me as if the US is in Syria for a long time and will ultimately fail. That’s not an attractive proposition. The question is whether it would be better to leave now, or soon. Do we have to stay to do nationbuilding? How can it be done best? How long will it take? How much will it cost? More on that in a future post.

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Trump’s threat to the nuclear deal

Pantelis Ikonomou, former IAEA nuclear inspector, offers this reflection on President Trump’s continuing threat to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal: 

Last Friday, the US president said he is extending the sanctions waver for Iran one last time, for another 120 days, so Europe and the US can fix the nuclear deal’s “terrible flaws”.

Should we be relieved? Rather disappointed for the continuation of an ambiguous policy with unclear scope and dangerous consequences.

What are the “terrible flaws” of the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA)?

Crown points of concern for the US president are the nuclear agreement’s “sunset clauses” and  “suspicious sites” in Iran, which are not monitored.

How can these be fixed in the upcoming 120 days?

The agreement’s deadlines regarding specified actions and defined sanctions have been thoroughly discussed and agreed upon by all signatories, including the United States.

As for “suspicious sites”, the IAEA has the agreed right and obligation to request access to any site it might consider necessary under the scope of the agreement. Such a request would be based on an IAEA assessment of credible open-source or other information provided by an IAEA member state, including the US.

Antilogos to Trump’s stance:

The IAEA confirmed in a succession of reports that Iran is fully complying with the commitments made under the JCPOA, the world’s “most robust nuclear verification regime”.

The European High Representative Federica Mogherini, one day before Trump’s decision Friday, following a meeting in Brussels with the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, the UK and Iran, stated that “the continued successful implementation of JCPOA ensures that Iran’s nuclear programme remains exclusively peaceful.” Europe considers that the agreement “is crucial for its security (and)…is determined to preserve it.”

Neither Russia nor China are backing president Trump’s stance on the Iran agreement. To the contrary, they both defend JCPOA, which they have both shaped and signed. It is in fact a multilateral agreement endorsed by the UN Security Council.

Trump’s position on the deal keeps Iran in closer ties to Russia, its foremost geopolitical ally; it could also push Tehran closer to Beijing.

Moreover, hardliners in Iran might assume full control of power in Tehran, triggering this time a non-safeguarded nuclear program, thus “pushing” other candidates in the region to follow Iran’s nuclear breakout.

At a time of acute nuclear threat, in particular the open-ended North Korean crisis, jeopardizing the integrity of the non-proliferation architecture, along with breaking solid bridges with historical friends and steadfast allies, could create a paramount threat to global security.

 

Pantelis Ikonomou

Former IAEA nuclear inspector

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Peace picks, January 15-19

Peace picks is back, courtesy of newly arrived Middle East Institute intern Adam Friend:

  1. Pakistan, America, and Extremism: The Path Ahead | Tuesday, January 16 | 10:00 am – 12:00 pm | Brookings Institution | Register here | As the United States intensifies its pressure on Pakistan to take action against terrorist groups, the country is facing challenges from many sides. With elections set for the country in 2018, turbulence is likely to persist. The Global Economy and Development program and the Foreign Policy program at Brookings will convene a panel of experts to discuss extremism in Pakistan and its broader implications across the region and world. Panelists include: Madiha Afzal, nonresident fellow at Brookings and adjunct assistant professor of global policy at Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies, and author of the newly released “Pakistan Under Siege: Extremism, Society, and the State” (Brookings, 2018); Bruce Riedel, senior fellow at Brookings, and author of “Deadly Embrace” (Brookings, 2012); and Brookings Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon, who will moderate and add his perspective as well.

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  1. Iran Protests: Consequences for the Region and Opportunities for the Trump Administration | Tuesday, January 16 | 12:30 pm – 2:00 pm | Hudson Institute | Register here | Recent unrest in Iran has led to fierce confrontations between security personnel and protesters. Demonstrations have spread quickly across the country, further undermining the legitimacy of the Rouhani regime. Key upcoming policy decisions regarding U.S. sanctions and the certification of the Iran nuclear deal will set the tone for the Trump Administration’s policy towards Iran. Hudson Institute will host a discussion assessing the policy options available to contain and curtail Iran’s influence in the region and the potential consequences of inaction. The panel will consist of Brian Katulis, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress; Charles Lister, Senior Fellow and Director of Counter-Extremism & Counter-Terrorism at the Middle East Institute; Omri Ceren, Managing Director of Press and Strategy at The Israel Project; and Hudson Senior Fellow Michael Pregent. The discussion will be moderated by Joyce Karam, the Washington Bureau Chief of Al-Hayat newspaper. This event will also be live streamed onHudson’s homepage.

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  1. Religion and Countering Violent Extremism | Wednesday, January 17 | 9:00 am – 10:30 am |United States Institute of Peace | Register here | Both research and experience make clear that the spread of violent extremism is driven not by religion but by poor governance, injustices, and the radicalization of people who see no future for themselves. But extremists use religious ideas—whether from the traditions of Christianity, Islam, Buddhism or other faiths—as tools to encourage radicalization and violence. How can policymakers and practitioners working to counter violent extremism best ally with religions, their institutions and their people? This forum will offer recommendations from a recent USIP Special Reporton this question. With speakers Peter Mandaville (Professor of International Affairs at George Mason University), Robin Simcox (Margaret Thatcher Fellow at the Heritage Foundation), and Ann Wainscott (American Academy of Religion Senior Fellow at U.S. Institute of Peace), moderated by Melissa Nozell (Senior Program Specialist at U.S. Institute of Peace).

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  1. Promoting Peace During Conflict in Ukraine and Myanmar: Women’s Roles and Strategies | Wednesday, January 17 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm | The Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace & Security and the Embassy of Sweden (hosted at Georgetown University) | Register here | Launching new research from the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace & Security: “Women’s Peacebuilding Strategies Amidst Conflict: Lessons from Myanmar and Ukraine.” Featuring remarks by Ambassador Karin Olofsdotter, Ambassador of Sweden, Ambassador Melanne Verveer, Director GIWPS, Ambassador William Taylor, U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine (2006-2009), and Ambassador Derek Mitchell, U.S. Ambassador to Myanmar (2012-2016). Refreshments provided.

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  1. Yemen: National Chaos, Local Order | Thursday, January 18 | 12:30 pm – 2:00 pm | The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington | Register here | In his latest paper, “Yemen: National Chaos, Local Order,” Peter Salisbury challenges much of the conventional wisdom regarding the Yemen civil war, including the focus of the U.N.-led mediation on two principal adversaries, namely the government of exiled President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi and the (now collapsed) alliance between the Houthis and deceased former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Instead, Salisbury offers a remapping of key local and regional stakeholders and examines the prospects for peace, offering a new long-term approach to ending the crisis and engaging in state building and economic reconstruction. AGSIW is pleased to host Peter Salisbury for a discussion of his paper and other issues impacting the continuing conflict in Yemen, with discussant Gerald M. Feierstein (Director of Gulf Affairs and Government Relations, Middle East Institute), moderated by Stephen A. Seche (Executive Vice President, AGSIW). A light lunch will be served.

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  1. Iranian Protests and US Policy on Iran | Thursday, January 18 | 12:30 pm – 2:00 pm | SETA Foundation at Washington DC | Register here | What kind of an impact can the US have on the unfolding events in Iran? How will the US-Iran relationship be defined in the Trump era given the president’s advocacy for more economic sanctions against Iran? How might regional dynamics be affected and how will regional actors adjust to the new Iran policy under President Trump? Please join the SETA Foundation at Washington DC for a discussion with a panel of distinguished experts on the regional implications of the Iranian protests, and the future of the Trump administration’s Iran policy. Featuring speakers Trita Parsi, President of the National Iranian American Council, Barbara Slavin, Director of the Atlantic Council’s Future of Iran Initiative, Alex Vatanka, Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute, and Kadir Ustun, Executive Director at the SETA Foundation at Washington DC, along with moderator Kilic B. Kanat, Research Director at the SETA Foundation at Washington DC.

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  1. Iran Looks East | Friday, January 19 | 9:00 am – 1:30 pm | Atlantic Council | Register here | The Future of Iran Initiativeand The Iran Project invite you to “Iran Looks East,” a major conference on Iran’s evolving economic and strategic relationships. As implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) marks its second anniversary, Iran is increasingly, if reluctantly, looking to Asia for trade and investment. At the same time, Iran also appears to be cementing a strategic partnership with Russia to stabilize Syria and to improve its leverage against threatened actions by Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States. Participants in the conference include William Luers of the Iran Project, Barbara Slavin of the Future of Iran Initiative, Sumitha Narayanan Kutty of Nanyang Technological University, Wu Bingbing of Peking University, Sachi Sakanashi of the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, Theodore Karasik of the Gulf State Analytics and the Lexington Institute, Eugene Rumer of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, and Maxim Suchkov of Al-Monitor, with panels moderated by Bharath Gopalaswamy of the Atlantic Council and Thomas Pickering, former Ambassador to Russia and former Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. The Hon. Stuart Eizenstat will deliver opening remarks.

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  1. The Syrian Opposition in 2018 | Friday, January 19 | 12:15 pm – 1:45 pm | New America | Register here | Ever since the Arab Spring protests broke out in Syria in 2011, the ensuing conflict between the government of Bashar al-Assad and Syrian opposition groups has gone through numerous shifts. With the fall of ISIS’ territorial holdings in the east of the country, advances by Syrian forces, and a new administration in the United States transforming the Syrian conflict, where does the Syrian opposition stand in 2018? New America is pleased to welcome Osama Abu Zayd, a spokesman and representative of the Free Syrian Army to discuss these issues, with the conversation moderated by Peter Bergen, Vice President of New America and Director of its International Security Program. Zayd has been a member of the Track 1 delegations at negotiations in Geneva and Astana, representing the Syrian opposition bilaterally and with transnational bodies such as the EU and UN.

 

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