Iranian power projection

Throughout the past couple of years, Iran has obtained a significant strategic advantage in the Middle East. In Syria, the Islamic Republic was able to keep the Assad regime alive and has gained the upper hand in the country’s civil war. In Iraq, Tehran utilizes local political allies and Shi’a militias to wield substantial influence over domestic politics. In Lebanon, the Iranian proxy Hezbollah constitutes the country’s dominant political and military force. It appears that the Islamic Republic today controls a strategic corridor stretching from Tehran in the East to the Lebanese capital Beirut in the West.

On February 2, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy addressed the question of Tehran’s apparent rise in a policy forum titled “Rolling Back Iran’s Foreign Legions.” Hanin Ghaddar, a veteran Lebanese journalist who currently serves as the Friedman Visiting Fellow at the Washington Institute, presented the findings of her latest report “Iran’s Foreign Legion: The Impact of Shia Militias on U.S. Foreign Policy.” Phillip Smyth, who is the author of the blog “Hizballah Cavalcade” and a Soref Fellow at the Washington Institute, joined the discussion via Skype. (A full recording of the event is available online).

Ghaddar argues that Iran has taken over power in Lebanon. Political balance in the country has ceased to exist. Hezbollah is not only the strongest military force but has also infiltrated the political system. The Iranian proxy controls public institutions and uses the state as vehicle to dominate Lebanon. Hezbollah is no longer a state within the Lebanese state as commonly believed. Rather, as Ghaddar emphasizes, “the Lebanese state has become part of the Hezbollah state.”

She stresses that Iran will emulate the Hezbollah model in both Syria and Iraq. In both countries, Tehran – through the Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) – commands a remarkable number of Shi’a militias which have so far mostly acted as the backbone of Iranian military endeavors. The Islamic Republic is eager to transform these irregular fighting forces into political actors which will take hold of state institutions. The participation of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) in the upcoming elections in Iraq is a clear sign of this approach. According to Ghaddar, the Hezbollah model will provide Tehran with substantial influence over Lebanese, Iraqi, and Syrian politics and hence enshrine Iran’s preponderance in the Middle East.

Ghaddar highlights that this potency manifests itself in the establishment of a strategic corridor between Tehran and Beirut. This land bridge constitutes a critical supply route that enables the cheap and steady transportation of arms. Moreover, the land bridge is of pivotal ideological importance. Located at the heart of the Shi’a crescent, it enables a transnational Shi’a identity. The consequence is a decline of national identities among Shiites and the erosion of the current state system, which will be replaced by an Iranian-dominated order.

Phillip Smyth expects that this new system will increase polarization in the region. For many Iranian proxies, the religious principles of the Islamic Republic have become subordinated to the mere struggle against the other, i.e. Sunni Muslims. Iran’s non-inclusive ideological project is therefore likely to cause a backlash among Sunnis. They will react in increasingly radical ways if they become convinced that all Shia are agents of Iran.

Ghaddar draws a bleak picture of the future of the Middle East. Iran’s creation of a Shi’a foreign legion that seeks military and political hegemony will escalate sectarian clashes. In the absence of an outside power preventing these conflicts, perpetual war is on the horizon.

Whether this Hobbesian doomsday scenario proves true remains to be seen, however. Indeed, Tehran’s perceived strength often does not reflect the situation on the ground. Headed by Ayatollah Sistani, Iraqi Shiites remain independent. In the Syrian theater, Iran depends greatly on Russian support. The upcoming parliamentary elections in Lebanon will show whether Hezbollah really controls the country. The actual strategic importance of the land bridge between Tehran and Beirut is debatable. Likewise, it is questionable whether the Islamic Republic could sustain a strategic corridor, considering military and economic overstretch. Domestic change within Iran could quickly alter the country’s positioning in the wider Middle East.

The United States should nevertheless be vigilant. Iran is seeking to increase its regional influence on many fronts, and Washington must be prepared to support local forces that stand up to Tehran’s ambition of creating a hegemonic order.