Success without victory
In October of 2001, the United States invaded Afghanistan with a goal of rooting out the Taliban government in Kabul and establishing a peaceful democratic state in its place. Sixteen years later the war continues with no sign of resolution, as the Taliban continue to launch attacks on U.S. forces and Afghan civilians. For policymakers in Washington, what is the best approach to end the conflict? Does the US have a strategy to declare victory in Afghanistan?
February 16 the Middle East Institute’s Director of Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies, Marvin G. Weinbaum, moderated a discussion featuring Vanda Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow and researcher on drug trafficking at Brookings; Christopher Kolenda, adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and former senior advisor on Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Department of Defense; Ahmad Khalid Majidyar, director of MEI’s IranObserved Project; and Ronald Neumann, former US ambassador to Afghanistan and currently President of the American Academy of Diplomacy. Here is the full video of the event:
Weinbaum opened the panel with a question: Given the U.S. administration’s signaling their intention of “winning” in Afghanistan, what does “winning” look like?
The panel agreed on the operating goal for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan: ensuring no terrorist attacks on the United States based out of Afghanistan. Neumann commented that the White House’s strategy appears sensible, despite the failure to explain it in depth. Since the enemy in Afghanistan is a non-state group with a capacity to regenerate, a realistic concept of victory must be limited: “far less than surrender on the deck of the Missouri.” Felbab-Brown noted that this limited goal of reducing the potential for terrorist attacks has been America’s core strategic objective since 2001, but there has been little reckoning with what that looks like in real terms. Can that goal be accomplished by military force alone? How much will it need support from the Afghan government? Does success require completely defeating the Taliban, or negotiating their existence under a democratic system?
Majidyar added that the US has a second vital interest in Afghanistan: with a porous Afghanistan-Pakistan border, a renewed Afghan conflict can easily destabilize its nuclear-armed neighbor. Thus, American success also requires enabling the Afghan government to control its territory and police its borders with minimal foreign assistance. Majidyar suggested that this goal, and the goal of leaving an Afghan government capable of enforcing nternal security and engaging cooperatively with its neighbors, will remain a challenge.
The panelists disagreed, however, on the necessity of a fixed timetable for withdrawal.
Neumann opposed setting a hard deadline, noting that American objectives require leaving a competent partner on the ground in the Afghan government, which still after 16 years remains incapable of good governance. He criticized the Obama administration’s emphasis on fixed timetables, which the Taliban exploited to lay low and gather forces. A conditions-based plan of withdrawal hinges on political will, with an expectation that the operation to build up the Afghan military will continue into 2019 or 2020.
Felbab-Brown echoed Neumann’s criticism of the Afghan government, but advised that setting deadlines can produce reforms by pressuring Kabul into action. Majidyar argued that the Obama administration intended to produce changes in the Afghan government with their timetable, but it had the unintended effect of producing more corruption in Kabul, as America’s local and international allies limited their involvement in anticipation of a US pull out.
As a final answer to Weinbaum’s question, Kolenda summarized the three general possibilities for a military victory: a decisive victory over the enemy, a transition of responsibility to the host-nation government (which was the goal under Obama), or a negotiated settlement that satisfies US interests. Kolenda implied that this third possibility has the most realistic chance of success.
Following up on that point, Weinbaum turned the discussion to the possibility of negotiation: If there can be a solution through negotiations, how prepared are both sides to come to an agreement?
The panelists were pessimistic on the chances for a negotiated settlement with the Taliban in the near future. Majidyar pointed out that while Washington and Kabul have given concessions to the Taliban as inducements to talk (such as releasing Taliban prisoners and allowing them quasi-diplomatic privileges in foreign countries), the Taliban have made no positive moves in return. While the American position is that any talks must involve both the Taliban and the Afghan government, the Taliban refuse to recognize the government in Kabul. Felbab-Brown agreed that the Taliban had no incentive to negotiate before next year’s presidential elections, and added that an electoral crisis (which she predicted is likely) would strengthen their cause. It is possible that the Taliban are signaling their willingness to negotiate only as a stalling tactic, while gathering power to unleash after US withdrawal.
The panelists agreed that negotiations must be thought out, with a clear understanding of what would be an acceptable result that satisfies American and Afghan interests. Kolenda was firm in stating that the US will not leave Afghanistan without guaranteeing the country’s stability, while arguing that the Taliban have already agreed to much of American objectives for the country. Success is within sight. He agreed with Neumann, though, that the specifics of negotiations – how they will verify and enforce the results – have not been sufficiently thought out. Majidyar and Felbab-Brown warned that the Afghan government (with or without participation from the Taliban) must engage in a process of building national consensus and reconciliation, or else risk a reignited civil war potentially worse than that of the 1990s.
The panel concluded with a contradiction: the best way forward in Afghanistan is a negotiated outcome, but it is unclear whether there is a willing negotiating partner. Does Washington have an exit strategy in Afghanistan if US interests remain unmet? What responsibility does America have if civil war breaks out after we leave? While we refuse to countenance failure, the route to success without a clear military victory remains unclear.
RSS - Posts
