Month: February 2018
Kosovo’s travail
I’ve already expressed my enthusiasm for the EU’s re-opening of the window for enlargement in the Western Balkans. I don’t take any of it back. But my friends in Kosovo are upset: the final text of the plan apparently erases explicit references to Kosovo, due to Spain’s concern that it represents a model for Catalonia.
I wish that hadn’t happened, but it is far from incurable. It is still clear that the EU is opening the window and that Serbia will have to settle its issues with Kosovo completely–“normalizing relations” is the euphemism–before acceding. The Union is not willing to bring in any new members that have problems with their neighbors. That means recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations between Pristina and Belgrade. I am assured on good authority that Madrid has made it clear that once Kosovo and Serbia settle their issues Spain will go along.
What Spain has done is nevertheless a diplomatic auto-goal. By implicitly accepting the analogy between Catalonia and Kosovo, Madrid makes itself analogous to Milosevic’s Belgrade. Objectively, that is not the case. I may think some of what Madrid is doing to fight the Catalan independence movement is unwise and counterproductive, but it is nowhere near the criminal abuse that Milosevic indulged in. Spain has not chased hundreds of thousands of Catalans from their homes, and the international community has not had to intervene to stop war crimes and crimes against humanity. Nor has Catalonia been governed for the better part of a decade by an international administration entrusted by the UN Security Council with developing self-governing institutions with a view to an eventual decision on final status. Worrying about Kosovo as if it is Catalonia in disguise is foolish.
Kosovars are also partly responsible for their own fate. They have spent years now refusing to ratify a border agreement with Montenegro and months threatening to undo their agreement to a special, internationally staffed tribunal to try accusations of war-time and post-war crimes. Small countries need lots of friends. The border issue is not worth 15 minutes of high quality diplomatic time, never mind years. The special tribunal was tough for Kosovo’s politicians to swallow, but regurgitating it would be no less painful. Had Pristina proceeded with the border demarcation and avoided a new debate over the special tribunal, it would no doubt have had more time, energy, and international credit to ensure better treatment in the EU strategy.
The opening of a Balkan window for enlargement by 2025 is an extraordinary thing for Brussels to do. There is no telling when the window will close again. The only productive response is to get ready as quickly as possible by meeting the entry requirements. For Kosovo, that means border demarcation (not only with Montenegro but also with Serbia) as well as complying with whatever the special tribunal decides. The alternative is decades in purgatory, where friends are few. Kosovo’s citizens would do well to avoid that.
Operation Olive Branch
I did an episode of “Heat” for China’s CGTN America yesterday on the Turkish offensive (Operation Olive Branch) in Kurdish-controlled Afrin, in northwestern Syria, along with
- Guney Yildiz, visiting fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations
- Giran Ozcan, representative of the Peoples’ Democratic Party to the United States, a Kurdish pro-minority party
- Metin Gurcan, a security analyst and columnist for Al-Monitor’s Turkey Pulse.
That was excellent company, so here is their wisdom:
So far, so good
The European Commission today announced its new strategy for the Western Balkans: “A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement.”
That’s good news. The non-EU members of the Western Balkans are floundering. Autocratic impulses, Russian trouble-making, and Chinese cash are loosening the region’s attachment to liberal democratic values and commitment to joining the European Union, which has become far more difficult after a long recession, the migrant crisis, Greece’s financial debacle, and rising rule of law requirements. Anything that increases the credibility of the enlargement perspective should be welcomed, both in the region and in Washington.
Does the EU announcement portend real improvements or substantial acceleration in the enlargement process? The proof will be in the pudding, but the answer for the moment has to be yes. Brussels now says it will be able to admit its first new members by 2025, which means they would have to qualify fully by 2023 in order to allow two years for ratification in national parliaments.
Montenegro and Serbia are leading the regatta at the moment, based on the number of chapters of the acquis communautaire already under negotiation. Kosovo is in the rear, not yet having achieved candidacy status. But the announcement makes it clear each country will in principle qualify on its own without any pre-ordained order. It also underlines the importance of settling issues with neighbors, which means Serbia will have to come to terms with Kosovo sooner rather than later in order to take advantage of its leading position in the regatta.
The European Commission announcement includes an indication of priority areas for 2018-20:
rule of law, security and migration, socio-economic development, transport and energy connectivity, digital agenda, reconciliation and good neighbourly relations.
This too is good, as it tells gives the Western Balkan countries a pretty clear idea of what they need to work on. There are really no surprises here: rule of law has been at the top of Brussels’ concerns since what is now regarded as the premature admission of Bulgaria and Romania, the migrant crisis has preoccupied many EU members for several years, connecting the Balkans to the rest of the EU with transport and energy infrastructure is a real and pressing need, and the “digital agenda” presumably includes cyberdefense as well as improving internet performance in the region.
Reconciliation and good neighborly relations are still big challenges in the Western Balkans, the former inside Bosnia and Herzegovina and the latter between Kosovo and Serbia. The Spanish are said to have drawn a red line at Kosovo’s entry into the EU as a sovereign state, apparently due to Madrid’s own concerns about Catalonian independence. That is terrible, since Belgrade has already accepted in principle that it and Pristina will qualify separately for EU membership, which is available only to sovereign states. Madrid’s position will encourage Belgrade’s intransigence.
But I am also told that Spain has indicated it will accept whatever solution Pristina and Belgrade come up with. I hope to see them do that sooner rather than later. If Belgrade waits until just before EU accession, it can be forced to accept whatever the most Pristina-friendly government in the EU decides. If Pristina waits, it runs the risk of seeing Belgrade accede to the EU without a satisfactory resolution of the issue.
That’s all for now. The EU does not seem to have posted yet the full strategy paper. I look forward to reading it and commenting in more detail in the future. But so far, so good.
PS: This is the full enlargement strategy paper, in what appears to be a near-final draft. Has anyone seen the final yet?
Peace picks, February 5-11
- Stabilizing Raqqa: Connecting Current Operations to U.S. Policy Objectives | Monday, February 5 | 9:30am – 11:00am | CSIS | Register here |
CSIS invites you to join a panel discussion on local Syrian and Coalition stabilization efforts in Raqqa. Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Coalition forces drove ISIS from its self-proclaimed caliphate capital in Raqqa in 2017. Enduring security in ISIS-cleared areas now depends on local governance and restoration of services. Following a recent visit to Raqqa, Syria by Ambassador Mark Green, Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and General Joseph Votel, Commander of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), panel speakers will discuss the importance of stabilization efforts in Raqqa and the challenges of connecting current operations with U.S. policy objectives. Featuring Karen Decker (U.S. Department of State), Maria Longi (USAID), Mark Swayne (U.S. Department of Defense), Robert Jenkins (USAID), Melissa Dalton (CSIS), and Erol Yayboke (CSIS).
_____________________________________________________
- Taking Stock of Mexico’s Security Landscape | Monday, February 5 | 8:30am – 1:00pm | Wilson Center | Register here |
The Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute invites you to attend its fifth annual Mexican security review. The forum will provide a careful examination of security challenges in Mexico. Of particular interest will be a review of 2017 and a discussion of trends in 2018, including establishing new bonds in U.S.-Mexico military-to-military relations and strengthening the rule of law in Mexico. We will also be launching a new book The Missing Reform: Strengthening the Rule of Law in Mexico, which analyzes the concrete obstacles that Mexico faces to implement the rule of law. Featuring presentations from leading policy analysts, including Iñigo Guevara Moyano (Director at Jane’s Aerospace, Defense and Security), David Shirk (University of San Diego), Viridiana Rios (David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard University), Matthew Ingram (University of Albany, SUNY), and others.
______________________________________________________
- Russia’s Influence in the Balkans: Methods and Results | Tuesday, February 6 | 12:30pm – 2:00pm | Johns Hopkins University SAIS | Register here |
Moscow is increasingly active politically, militarily and economically in the Balkans. What are its goals and methods? What has it achieved thus far? What will it do in the future? The Center for Transatlantic Relations and the Conflict Management Program at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) will convene a panel of experts to examine these key questions, featuring Reuf Bajrovic (Former Minister of Energy of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina), Metodija A. Koloski (President, United Macedonian Diaspora), Jelena Milic (Director and Chair of the Board, Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies, Belgrade), Steve Rukavina (President, National Federation of Croatian Americans Cultural Foundation), Sinisa Vukovic (Assistant Professor, Johns Hopkins University SAIS). SAIS Director of Conflict Management Daniel Serwer will moderate the conversation.
______________________________________________________
- UNRWA’s Role in Promoting Israeli-Palestinian Stability | Wednesday, February 7 | 2:00pm – 3:15pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |
In the wake of his announcement to relocate the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, President Trump has also vowed to cut funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) by 83 percent, in a stated effort to bring the Palestinian Authority to the negotiating table. International governments and NGOs swiftly condemned these funding cuts by the United States, citing the critical role UNRWA plays in promoting security and stability in the region through health, education, and assistance programs for Palestinian refugees. The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host UNRWA’s West Bank Director, U.S. Army Maj. (ret.) Scott Anderson, and the director of UNRWA’s Representative Office in Washington, Elizabeth Campbell, who will discuss the regional impact of this decision and UNRWA’s global funding push to support its critical work. MEI’s Director for Gulf Studies and Government Relations, Amb. (ret.) Gerald Feierstein, will moderate the discussion.
______________________________________________________
- Threats to Democracy in the Trump Era | Wednesday, February 7 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Brookings Institution | Register here |
From Russia to South Africa, from Turkey to the Philippines, from Venezuela to Hungary, authoritarian leaders have smashed restraints on their power. The freedom of the media and the judiciary have eroded. The right to vote may remain, but the right to have one’s vote counted does not. Until the U.S. presidential election of 2016, the global decline of democracy seemed a concern for other peoples in other lands. However, some see the political rise of Donald Trump as the end to that optimism here at home. In his new book, “Trumpocracy: The Corruption of the American Republic,” David Frum outlines how Trump could push America toward illiberalism, what the consequences could be for America and the world, and what we can do to prevent it. On Wednesday, February 7, Frum will join a panel of experts at Brookings to discuss the burgeoning threats to democratic institutions in the Trump era.
______________________________________________________
- How to Interpret Nuclear Crises: From Kargil to North Korea | Wednesday, February 7 | 12:15pm – 2:00pm | Stimson Center | Register here |
With tensions mounting between the United States and North Korea, what has been clear is the wide disagreement among scholars about what constitutes a nuclear crisis, how dangerous it is, and what dynamics dictate how it plays out. The Stimson Center is pleased to host Mark Bell, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, to discuss his co-authored paper on the subject in which he and Julia MacDonald, Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Denver, argue that nuclear crisis dynamics depend on incentives to use nuclear weapons first and the extent to which escalation can be controlled by leaders involved. Rebecca Hersman, Director of the Project on Nuclear Issues at CSIS, and Austin Long, senior political scientist at RAND, will offer comments. Sameer Lalwani, Co-Director of Stimson’s South Asia Program, will moderate the discussion.
______________________________________________________
- Cyber Mercenaries: States and Hackers | Thursday, February 8 | 4:30pm – 5:30pm | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register here |
As cyberspace has emerged as a new frontier for geopolitics, states have become entrepreneurial in their sponsorship, deployment, and exploitation of hackers as proxies to project power. Such modern-day mercenaries and privateers can impose significant harm undermining global security, stability, and human rights. In a new book, Cyber Mercenaries: The State, Hackers, and Power, Tim Maurer examines these state-hacker relationships and the important questions they raise about the control, authority, and use of offensive cyber capabilities. Drawing on case studies in the United States, Iran, Syria, Russia, and China, the book establishes a framework to better understand and manage the impact and risks of cyber proxies on global politics. Maurer will be joined in conversation by Eric Rosenbach (Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School), and Ellen Nakashima (Washington Post) will moderate.
______________________________________________________
- War Powers and Military Force | Thursday, February 8 | 4:00pm – 5:15pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
In an age of unprecedented disruption and escalating inter- and intrastate conflict, we have seen a surge in the need for nations to resort to military force. As one of the most consequential decisions for a nation to undertake—with enormous consequences to a country’s security, prosperity, and global standing—the gravity of such decisions cannot be understated. Please join Nuchhi Currier (former President of Woman’s National Democratic Club), Bruce Fein (former Associate Deputy Attorney General), and John Yoo (University of California, Berkeley), three of the world’s most renowned experts on the issue of war powers, as they dissect this topic of immense geopolitical importance.
______________________________________________________
- Securing a Place for Taiwan in International Organizations | Thursday, February 8 | 10:00am– 11:00am | Heritage Foundation | Register here |
Taiwan increasingly finds its efforts to obtain meaningful participation in international bodies such as the WHO, INTERPOL, and ICAO checked by external forces. Setting aside political issues, there are valid reasons of health, safety, and livelihood for Taiwan to be included, even if only as an observer, in these organizations. Join us as our panel of experts discusses how to increase Taiwan’s role in international organizations and expand its international operating space, while addressing the swift and strong reaction from China that invariably results from such efforts. Featuring Jacques deLisle (Professor of Law & Political Science, Director, Center for East Asian Studies, UPENN), Valérie Niquet (Director, Asia Program, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS), Paris), and Theodore R. Bromund (Senior Research Fellow in Anglo-American Relations), hosted by Walter Lohman (Director, Asian Studies Center, Heritage Foundation).
Peace is still far off
As 2018 opens, the Syrian Civil War, as a battle of two opposing visions of Syria’s future, has ended. Today, the conflict continues on a more complex level: with multiple layers of conflict, international intervention, and growing power for non-state armed militias. What does 2018 bode for Syria, and what strategies are there to help bring the conflict to an end?
On January 25, the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, a think tank focused on the Syrian conflict, debuted its operation in Washington. The Omran Center, which has been operating in Turkey since 2013 as an arm of the broader Syrian Forum, opens its doors in America as a source of independent research and objective analysis of the murky state of affairs in Syria today. Yaser Tabbara introduced Thursday’s event, featuring analysts from the Omran Center discussing the current situation on the ground in Syria and trajectories for the near future.
Sinan Hatahet reported on the background as Syria moves into 2018. Describing the goals of the strongest power players on the ground (U.S., Turkey, Russia, Iran, along with the Syrian government and opposition), he noted that all are in favor of stabilization, with one exception: the forces of the Syrian opposition. Thus, building a lasting solution to the conflict requires a response to fundamental political issues that sparked the uprising in 2011. Hatahet went on to explain that, on the international level, the peace process is tilted toward the Russian approach to hold new elections and update the constitution, while preserving Bashar al-Assad as president. Despite this, the weakness of the Syrian military makes it difficult for the regime to regain control of the whole country without the assent of opposition groups.
Ammar Kahf spoke on developing trends on governance across Syria. Kahf described the complex phenomenon of decentralization that is taking place, both officially under the Assad government’s reforms and unofficially with local councils in areas outside of government control. The situation of local councils varies across the country, but their growing ability to provide for their constituents hints at a path toward stabilization that could bring in all Syrians. Kahf displayed the Omran Center’s proposal for a reorganization of the flow of government from Damascus to individual provinces and towns, in order to grant more local control over security.
Mona Alami warned about other risks for Syria in the absence of a peace deal. Alami predicted greater influence of Iranian-linked paramilitary groups, which have grown to rival the power of the Syrian army. With greater ability to call airstrikes, hold and control territory, and deploy rapidly from one area to another, these militias have become an unpredictable factor in building a solution for Syria. On a similar note, Sinan Hatahet warned that continuing conflict could spark the appearance of new rogue non-state actors, potentially more destructive than the Islamic State.
What the panelists did not predict for 2018, notably, is peace. There may be prospects for stabilization in Syria, but it is likely that the conflict is far from true resolution.