Month: March 2018
Russia should be job 1
Far be it from me to in any way align myself with John Bolton, but there are things he could get the Administration to do consistent with at least some of his stated positions that would be preferable to the hodge-podge of contradictory signals Washington is currently sending on foreign policy.
For the moment, President Trump has prioritized the Iran nuclear deal. He is trying to use his threat to withdraw as leverage to get the Europeans to agree to amend the deal in order to gain access to Iranian military sites, restrain Tehran’s missile program, and end the “sunset” (expiration) clauses. His self-imposed deadline is May 12, when Congress requires him to certify once again that the deal is in the US interest. He didn’t do that last time around and said he would withdraw if the agreement wasn’t fixed by the next deadline.
Withdrawing from the deal is patently not in the US national interest. Either Iran will also withdraw and re-initiate its nuclear program, giving it the potential for nuclear weapons within a year or so. Or Tehran and Brussels will decide to proceed without the US, splitting the Western alliance on a vital issue. US withdrawal would also spell the end of any distant hope (but see below) for a deal with North Korea, as Pyongyang would be correct to conclude that the US can’t be trusted to hold up its end, and strain relations further with China and Russia (who helped negotiate the agreement with Iran and continue to support it). There are simply no gains from withdrawal, only losses, unless you want to provide yourself with an excuse to go to war. That means risking the Sixth Fleet as well as numerous US bases and troops in the Gulf and Iraq, as well as attacks elsewhere in the Middle East and even inside the US.
Another apparent priority is North Korea. It already has nuclear weapons and credible if not certain means to deliver them, at least against US forces and allies in South Korea, Japan, and Guam. The odds of successfully negotiating “denuclearization” with Pyongyang are risible. There simply is no better protection for North Korea against an American attempt at regime change than Kim Jung-un’s nukes. Once again, the only real option to “denuclearize” is war. The consequences would be worse than catastrophic: at the very least a massive artillery barrage by the North against Seoul, killing tens of thousands, if not a nuclear exchange.
A third priority for Trump has been trade, in particular the North American Free Trade Agreement, (that is, Canada and Mexico) as well as China’s intellectual property expropriation and excess capacity in steel and aluminum. There is little hope of anything good coming of Trump’s unilateral measures (tariffs on steel and aluminum as well as on Chinese products), beyond the agreement already reached with South Korea (which has lots of reasons to be nice to the US these days). Tariffs are a blunt tool that has nothing to do with intellectual property theft, and the US doesn’t import much steel or aluminum from China. It does from Canada and Mexico, which have already been exempted from the tariffs, whose main impact will be to raise prices to American consumers (not only for steel and aluminum but for all the products in which they are used).
The remaining priority is Russia, which has distinguished itself in recent years by defying the norms of the liberal international order: murdering its opponents abroad and at home (including with nerve gas in a public place!), refusing to leave parts of other countries (Moldova and Abkhazia), annexing Crimea, invading Ukraine, threatening the Baltics as well as Sweden and Finland, meddling in democratic elections while making its own non-competitive, and intervening to slaughter the relatively moderate opposition as well as thousands of civilians in Syria while launching a mercenary attack on US troops and allies there. Moscow is the capital of a state that has gone rogue.
Bolton is no friend of Russia. He recognizes and has denounced most if not all of the offenses listed here. The problem is the President. While the Administration rightly boasts that it has done more against Russia (in expulsion of diplomats and sanctions) than Obama did (partly because Russia has done more against the US than in Obama’s time), President Trump has still not uttered a word of criticism against Vladimir Putin. Such consistency is not his normal habit and raises the question worldwide whether the US really speaks with one voice. That incoherence limits the impact of the modest moves made so far to counter Russia’s troublemaking.
It seems to me the right order of priorities is this:
- Russia: pushback worldwide, with a view to reaching a new, more balanced, modus vivendi
- Iran: no withdrawal from the nuclear deal but instead get it and its proxies out of Syria, where they pose a threat to Israel
- Trade: by using the WTO and other well-established multilateral mechanisms, not unilateral tariffs and exceptions that will shift imports but do little to limit them
- North Korea: deterrence is really the only option
More in a future post on how to accomplish at least 1 and 2.
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A more coherent approach
Turkey’s relations with the United States and the European Union are under strain. In light of continuous US support for the Kurdish YPG, Washington and Ankara are split over the way forward in Syria. Due to President Erdogan’s hostile rhetoric and increasingly authoritarian governing style, policy makers in Europe have advocated a suspension or even end of Turkey’s accession process to the EU.
Still, Ankara and its Western partner need each other. Turkey depends on the EU as a market, and cannot adequately address the Syrian refugee crisis as well as conflict at its southern border without Western support. Washington and European policy makers rely on Turkey as a pivotal member of NATO to provide stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. Where is the relationship headed?
On March 26, the Brookings Institutions convened a panel of experts to discuss how the West should handle its important but challenging ally. Eric Edelman, former US ambassador to Turkey and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Kemal Kirişci, director of the Turkey Project at Brookings, Amanda Sloat, Robert Bosch Senior Fellow at Brookings, and Stephen F. Szabo, senior fellow at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, offered their perspectives on the future of relations between Turkey and the West. Lisel Hintz, assistant professor at Johns Hopkins University School of International Studies, moderated the discussion. A recording of the event is available online.
Domestic politics in Turkey drive the country’s relations with its Western partners. Eric Edelman highlights that Erdogan’s domestic agenda of establishing a presidential system has determined Ankara’s stance towards Washington and Brussels. The Turkish president utilizes sentiments against the West to rally support for his political project. In particular, Erdogan has stirred up anti-Americanism to mobilize voters and will likely draw again on nationalistic rhetoric ahead of the parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for 2019.
Edelman proposes that the United States should adopt a more transactional approach towards Ankara. Washington has so far remained silent about Erdogan’s political game and expected that “if Turkey is treated like an ally, it will behave like an ally.” This perception has proven false. Thus, the United States must increase pressure on Ankara. For instance, Washington could close one of Turkey’s consulates. This would both send a clear message to Erdogan and provide the United States with leverage.
Sloat counters that pressure alone cannot work. She stresses that a purely transactional approach has limitations as it could undermine the West’s efforts to promote the rule of law and good governance. Likewise, abandoning Turkey by either forcing it to leave NATO or ending the EU accession process is not a good option, as it would diminish US and EU leverage over Ankara. Rather, they should pursue a policy of constructive engagement. Washington has to address relations with Turkey from a broader perspective, which goes beyond security-related issues. Moreover, policy makers in both the United States and Europe should acknowledge the utility of engaging with a broad section of Turkish society and increase their outreach to civil society.
Kemal Kirişci highlights that the EU already has considerable leverage over Turkey. The EU is by far the biggest market for Turkish goods, absorbing almost 50% of the country’s exports. Likewise, there are significant Turkish communities in the EU that affect politics in Turkey. Erdogan, who relies on a good performance of the Turkish economy to maintain domestic supremacy, recognizes this dependency relationship.
Szabo hence argues that Western states should follow the example of Germany. Berlin has consistently emphasized the importance of the rule of law when dealing with Ankara. At the same time, the economic powerhouse of Europe has pursued a transactional approach, using its role as a major market for Turkish goods to press Erdogan for concessions. Moreover, Berlin has adopted a long-term view towards Turkey. Instead of simply formulating a rather reactive and shortsighted Erdogan strategy, Germany follows a comprehensive Turkey strategy that looks beyond the president’s time in power.
The West’s biggest challenge in handling Turkey is internal division and confusion. Szabo stresses that growing anti-Turkish sentiments among Germany’s population compromise Berlin’s foresighted approach. Kirişci points out that the erosion of the rule of law and liberalism within the EU has helped Erdogan to push his authoritarian agenda. Likewise, discrepancies in US policies have damaged Washington’s credibility among Turkish policy makers. Edelmann adds that any approach towards Turkey will fail as long as the US government does not sing from the same song sheet. Turkish consternation about conflicting statements concerning Washington’s support for the Kurdish YPG in Syria exemplifies this shortcoming, Sloat says.
Turkey under President Erdogan is certainly a difficult partner. Inconsistent policies in the West have aggravated this challenge. The United States and EU are advised to pursue a more coherent approach towards Ankara. This will ameliorate current strains and potentially bring about positive change within Turkey. The West should not waste this opportunity.
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Only a beginning
I greatly appreciated yesterday’s March for Our Lives here in DC. The speakers, mostly kids, were eloquently inspiring and the enormous crowd supportive, peaceful and determined. I half imagined they would trash the Trump hotel on leaving, as it stood towards the far end of the “march” (more a “stand”: the group didn’t have a permit to move from Pennsylvania Avenue). But no one seemed to be in a mood to cause trouble, so the police stood around as virtual participants. I imagine they’d be very happy to see fewer guns on the street, as they are among the more vulnerable of our fellow citizens.
The March goals were relatively modest:
- Passing a law to ban the sale of assault-style weapons
- Prohibiting the sale of high-capacity magazines
- Closing the loophole in our background check law
None of these would change the current situation: there would still be several million assault-style weapons in the US and a comparable number of high-capacity magazines. Requiring background checks of those who buy guns online or at gun shows would only affect future purchasers, not the armed potential perpetrators already out there.
Nor are school killings of the type that motivated the March our biggest numerical problem, even if the mass murder of children merits heightened moral denunciation. Most gun deaths in the US are suicides: almost twice as many as homicides. And most homicides are committed with handguns, not assault-style weapons. The gun-related murder rate in the US is more than an order of magnitude greater than that in other developed countries, but not because of school shootings, assault-style weapons or high-capacity magazines.
Achieving the March’s goals would thus not do much to improve the situation, but there is little risk the current Congress will do anything like what the students want. The gun lobby owns the Republican members of Congress, who have the majority in both Houses. President Trump is not going to buck the National Rifle Association, which raised a lot of money for his campaign, some of it now under investigation because it may have come from Russia. The Administration has probably reached the limit of what it is prepared to do with its proposed prohibition on the sale of “bump stocks” (which enable a non-automatic weapon to fire like an automatic one) and a requirement that Federal agencies report more data on people ineligible to purchase guns. Those amount to a nothingburger compared even to the March’s modest goals.
The sad fact is that no solution to the gun problem is possible without getting a significant percentage of the nation’s more than 300 million guns out of the hands of their owners, especially those who possess them illegally. I’ll happily join those demanding less when they turn out the kind of crowds they did on Saturday, because their efforts may contribute to electing a different Congressional majority in November. But at best the March was the beginning of something big, not the end.
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Fragile states pose security threats
State fragility is on the rise. In recent years, civil wars have proliferated throughout the world. In 2015, the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) reported 49 active intrastate conflicts, the highest number since 1991; likewise, casualties have increased consistently during the past 25 years. These developments are worrying. In contrast to most interstate conflict, civil wars are extremely difficult to resolve. Studies on intrastate conflicts since 1945 have shown that civil wars tend to last an average of about seven to twelve years, making their repercussions tremendous. As the brutal civil war in Syria exemplifies, the fallout includes humanitarian crises, the rise of extremist organizations, and regional political instability. Policy makers in the West must thus adopt more effective policies to stabilize fragile and failed states.
On March 19, the United States Institute of Peace hosted a high-profile panel discussing how the United States and the international community can address better the national security challenges stemming from state fragility. Nancy Lindborg, President of the US Institute of Peace, was joined by Ilan Goldenberg, Director of the Middle East Security Program at Center for a New American Security, and Kimberly Kagan, founder and President of the Institute for the Study of War. Joshua Johnson, host of NPR’s program 1A, moderated the discussion.
State fragility poses critical security threats. According to Nancy Lindborg, fragile states are characterized by the inability to provide basic public goods such as security and lack political legitimacy as governments typically exclude parts of their citizenry from participating in politics, the country’s social life, and the economy. As a result, fragile states suffer from weak institutions and are less able to manage shocks like disasters and conflict. In this respect, Ilan Goldenberg emphasizes that fragile states often require merely a spark to disintegrate. Collapsing states create serious security vacuums. As outside actors are concerned about losing political influence, they are incentivized to intervene. This generally exacerbates and perpetuates the conflicts already unfolding within failed states.
Syria is a prime example for this vicious dynamic. Goldenberg argues that the 2011 Arab Spring caused the disintegration of the Syrian state and ignited a domestic conflict, which has developed into a regional and international fight over influence in the Levant. Today, Syria is divided into five different zones of influence: a Jordanian-supported rebel pocket in southwestern Syria, the Iran-backed Assad regime in the center of the country, an al-Qaeda safe haven in the province of Idlib, a Turkish-controlled territory in the north, and a Kurdish canton that enjoys US support. Conflict erupts at the intersections of these “tectonic plates.” To pacify Syria, all involved parties must first agree on long-term political arrangements concerning these hotspots before a national reconciliation project can be launched. Goldenberg is however not hopeful that positive change will occur soon. Kimberly Kagan affirms this observation and stresses that the diverging interests of the foreign actors involved in Syria impede any peace progress.
To avoid more Syria-like scenarios, the United States must invest more effort in stabilizing fragile states and pacifying failed states. Given U.S. economic strength, Lindborg argues that Washington has a moral obligation to help fragile states. Support must thereby exceed simple humanitarian assistance and rather address the sources of fragility. Kagan highlights that moral obligations often align with political and security interests such as counteracting breeding grounds of terrorism. She thus advocates more US engagement in form of a balanced hard and soft power approach to help fragile states recover themselves and create situations whereby governance can return. Goldenberg adds that the United States also acts as a role model in addressing state fragility. If the US demonstrates leadership, other states follow suit.
However, Washington is currently unwilling to meets is obligation of providing stability around the world. Lindborg points out that US policies are too reactive. Although consecutive administrations have identified state fragility as a key security threat, they have only responded to crises after they had become far too problematic. The United States is in a state of “hunkering down” whereby Americans are “tired of playing world police.”
It is clear, however, that the United States and European states must tackle state fragility more proactively. While conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, or South and Central America often appear to be localized problems at first glance, they have critical repercussions on the political, societal, and economic situation in the developed world. The international refugee crises and its impact on European and US politics is evidence enough for this circumstance.
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Peace picks, March 26 – April 1
- Will the Russians Meddle in Latin American Elections? | Monday, March 26 | 9:30am – 11:00am | Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) | Register here |
2018 will see presidential elections in several countries across Latin America, notably in Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, and Venezuela. This event will discuss Russia’s strategic interests in Latin America, including how the region should prepare for potential Russian meddling in upcoming presidential elections. Featuring Javier Lesaca (Visiting Scholar, School of Media and Public Affairs, GWU) and David Salvo (Resident Fellow, Alliance for Securing Democracy, GMF).
This event will be webcast live.
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- The New Geopolitics of Turkey and the West | Monday, March 26 | 10:30am – 12:00pm | Brookings Institution | Register here |
Turkey’s relations with the United States and the European Union are under significant strain, and they are likely to remain difficult ahead of Turkey’s parliamentary and presidential elections, scheduled for 2019. Ankara and Washington remain at loggerheads over the way forward in Syria; several EU member states have been calling for an end to the accession process; and Turkey’s domestic politics are raising further questions about Turkey’s place in the trans-Atlantic alliance. Yet, there is much at stake: Turkey is facing threats from terrorism, struggling to manage 3.5 million Syrian refugees, and dealing with the aftermath of a failed coup. Europe and the United States have shared interests in addressing regional challenges with Turkey, especially as Russia seeks to expand its influence in the region. So how should the West handle this important but challenging ally? Featuring Eric Edelman (Roger Hertog Distinguished Practitioner-in-Residence, SAIS), Kemal Kirişci (Director, The Turkey Project, Brookings), Amanda Sloat (Robert Bosch Senior Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe), and Stephen F. Szabo (Senior Fellow, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies). Lisel Hintz (Assistant Professor of International Relations and European Studies, SAIS) will moderate the discussion.
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- US in a Post-ISIS Iraq and Syria: Realigning Allies and Constraining Adversaries | Monday, March 26 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |
In the Post-ISIS Middle East, Iran, Bashar al-Assad, and Russia continue to pose challenges for the U.S. as the Trump Administration develops its policy for Iraq and Syria. Turkey’s expansion of its Syria operations has the U.S. and NATO allies concerned that Turkish actions in the region run counter to NATO goals. Additionally, cooperation between Russia and Iran continues to disrupt the balance of power in the region. Hudson Institute will host a panel to explore U.S. options to realign our allies with traditional NATO and U.S. positions, hold adversaries responsible for atrocities, and prevent security backsliding in the region. Featuring Hillel Fradkin (Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute), Michael Pregent (Adjunct Fellow, Hudson Institute), Jennifer Cafarella (Senior Intelligence Planner, Institute for the Study of War), and Dr. Nahro Zagros (Vice President, Soran University).
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- Addressing the Ongoing Humanitarian Crisis in Nigeria | Monday, March 26 | 2:00pm – 3:30pm | Brookings Institution | Register here |
Widespread violence has plagued Nigeria over the years, with an epicenter of activity in northeast parts of the country. Much of this violence is related to the Boko Haram insurgency, although other battles between ethnic groups have also intensified, largely over land and partly due to a growing drought. Despite some success by Nigerian security forces in tamping down violence, lives continue to be lost and communities displaced. All of this is ongoing as the country prepares to hold elections next year. Featuring Alexandra Lamarche (Advocate, Refugees International), Mark Yarnell (UN Liaison and Senior Advocate, Refugees International), and Vanda Felbab-Brown (Senior Fellow, Brookings). Michael O’Hanlon (Senior Fellow, Brookings) will moderate the conversation, while adding his own perspectives.
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- Russian Influence in Moldova | Monday, March 26 | 3:30pm – 5:00pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
Since emerging from the Soviet Union as an independent country, the Republic of Moldova has faced various challenges. Moldova, together with Ukraine and Georgia, were “captive nations” of the former Soviet Union; today, the three countries are still affected by Russian interference. For Moldova, the autonomous region of Transnistria raises questions regarding the state’s path forward with various international bodies, and the Kremlin still has clear influence in Moldovan politics. With Moldovan parliamentary elections approaching this year, the stakes are high for Moldova’s future as a free, whole, and secure European state. Featuring Ambassador John Herbst (Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council), Dr. William Hill (Global Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Professor, National Defense University), Dumitru Mînzărari (State Secretary for Defense Policy and International Cooperation, Ministry of Defense, Republic of Moldova), and Agnieszka Gmys-Wiktor (Program Officer, National Endowment for Democracy). Mark Simakovsky (Senior Fellow, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council and Vice President, Beacon Global Strategies) will moderate the discussion.
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- Elections in Tunisia and Hope for Democratic Reform | Thursday, March 29 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Middle East Institute | Register here |
Leading up to long-awaited municipal elections, Tunisia is at a crossroads. The beginning of 2018 saw widespread protests and social unrest in both cities and rural areas, as economic stagnation and unemployment continue to worsen. However, the vote currently set for May 6 signals an opportunity for Tunisian youth, women, and minorities to make their voices heard. How might the elections encourage confidence among Tunisians in a transparent democratic process? Could the results promote or undermine Tunisia’s fragile stability? How can the international community better support Tunisia and its government to address the rising social tensions? The Middle East Institute is pleased to host Ambassador Fayçal Gouia (Ambassador of Tunisia to the United States) and Elie Abouaoun (Director, Middle East and North Africa Programs, USIP) for a panel discussion to examine Tunisia’s political challenges—both local and national—ahead of the elections. Paul Salem (Senior Vice President for Policy Research and Programs, MEI) will moderate the discussion.
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- Securing Their Roles: Women in Constitution-Making | Thursday, March 29 | 10:00am – 11:30am | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
Women’s participation in drafting constitutions leads to more equitable legal frameworks and socially inclusive reforms, laying the groundwork for sustainable peace. Yet new research from Inclusive Security reveals that while 75 conflict-affected countries oversaw significant reform processes between 1995-2015, only one in five constitutional drafters in these environments have been women. As actors from Syria, Libya, and other countries marked by violence are taking steps towards building new constitutions, USIP and Inclusive Security are convening a panel to draw out lessons for policymakers by discussing women’s roles in constitution-making, gender equality in constitutional provisions – including in relation to constitutions developed with an Islamic identity—and their implications for long-term, inclusive peace and security. Featuring Palwasha Kakar (Senior Program Officer, Religion and Inclusive Societies, USIP), Marie O’Reilly (Director of Research & Analysis, Inclusive Security), Amira Yahyaoui (Founder, Al Bawsala), and Jason Gluck (Policy Specialist, Political Dialogues and Constitutional Processes, UNDP). Carla Koppell (Vice President, Applied Conflict Transformation, USIP) will moderate the discussion.
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- Ukraine’s Future Leaders on the Front-lines of Change | Thursday, March 29 | 4:00pm – 5:30pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
In the four years since the end of the Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine has not answered its most important question: how will the country ensure democratic values in its future development? Much of Ukraine’s hope lies in its young leaders who will drive the country forward in the coming years. Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) has been fortunate to provide a year-long residency to some of these future leaders as part of the inaugural year of the Center’s Ukrainian Emerging Leaders Program. This event will feature this year’s Ukrainian leaders Oleksandra Matviichuk (Chairwoman, Center for Civil Liberties), Dmytro Romanovych (Member, Reform Delivery Office of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine), and Olexandr Starodubtsev (Head, Public Procurement Regulation Department, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine). They will each discuss their own perspectives on opportunities and challenges to democracy and development in their home country, as well as objectives for strengthening public administration, civil society, and economic reforms upon their return to Ukraine With introductory remarks by Ambassador John Herbst (Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council) and a keynote address by Dr. Francis Fukuyama (Mosbacher Director, CDDRL, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University). Melinda Haring (Editor, UkraineAlert, Atlantic Council) will moderate the discussion.
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- After Syria: The United States, Russia, and the Future of Terrorism | Friday, March 29 | 10:00am -11:30am | Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) in partnership with EastWest Institute | Register here |
The collapse of Islamic State control in Syria has been hailed in both Russia and the United States as a victory over terrorism. Both credit their country’s military involvement with victory. But the war that continues in Syria also lays bare Moscow and Washington’s conflicting definitions and approaches when it comes to terrorism, insurgency, and combat operations. Moreover, even if a path to stabilization in that country is found, America and Russia will continue to face terrorism and terrorists at home and abroad. The ways in which these two crucial countries respond as the threat evolves will shape both their own polities and the world as a whole. Featuring Dr. Kim Cragin (Senior Research Fellow for Counterterrorism, National Defense University), Dr. Ekaterina Stepanova (Director of the Peace and Conflict Studies Unit, Institute of World Economy and International Relations), Dr. Irina Zvyagelskaya (chief research fellow, Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Oriental Studies), and Dr. Seth Jones (Harold Brown Chair; Director, Transnational Threats Project; and Senior Adviser, International Security Program, CSIS). Dr. Olga Oliker (Senior Adviser and Director, Russia and Eurasia Program, CSIS) will moderate the discussion.
This event will be webcast live.
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Hardliners
There isn’t much more to be said about President Trump’s recent appointments than that: future Director of the National Economic Council Alan Kudlow, National Security Advisor John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo are all harder line on trade, North Korea and Iran than their more “adult” predecessors. Ditto the new lawyers Trump is bringing in to the White House to protect himself from Special Counsel Mueller. Joe DiGenova is an attack dog, not serious legal practitioner. The only adult left is Secretary of Defense Mattis, whose days could be numbered, if only because Pompeo and Bolton will push him in directions he doesn’t want to go.
What can we, and the world, expect for the next year?
In a word: conflict. Even if Trump doesn’t follow Bolton’s advice to go to war against both Iran and Korea, the president is likely to pull the plug on the Iran nuclear deal and use his proposed meeting with Kim Jong-un to set up a casus belli. These moves will at the very least strain relations with US allies in Europe and Asia, reducing American influence on both continents and creating openings for Russia and China to fill vacuums there.
Trump has already precipitated sharp falls in the stock market with his announcement of aluminum and steel tariffs as well as his intention to impose tariffs on a broad range of Chinese goods. The tariffs, massive budget deficit, and tax cuts are all inflationary moves, on top of an economy that has been performing close to capacity pretty much since Barack Obama took office in 2009. The Fed will react by increasing interest rates to slow the economy and preempt inflation. The end of the long recovery from the 2008 financial crisis is in sight.
Tighten your seat belts one more notch. Trump is also likely to fire Special Counsel Mueller, who has clearly breached the President’s red line, drawn to protect himself from any inquiry into his finances. That’s where the crux of the Russia investigation lies: Trump’s real estate empire is highly dependent on hot Russian money, which Putin controls. That’s why Trump fears him. The legal team Trump is assembling is not one that could capably defend Trump in court or even prepare him for an interview with Mueller. The President thinks he is immune. His only defense will be offense.
On top of all this, three different women are going public with their stories of sexual encounters with Trump, Cambridge Analytica is facing accusations that it abused personal data and violated campaign finance laws (with some eyes wide shut from Facebook), and relations between the Trump campaign and the United Arab Emirates as well as the Russian intelligence service are coming into focus. Any one of these scandals would be headline news were it not for everything else going on. Distraction is one of Trump’s main tactics.
What does it all add up to? A sharp decline in American prestige and power has already begun: we are overspending on conventional military hardware in a period of cyber and other nonconventional threats, we are blowing up a thriving economy, we are risking two catastrophic wars, we are challenging trading and investment partners with a weak and ineffectual tariff attack, and Trump is embarrassing the country with salacious sexual, financial, and intelligence scandals.
Russian President Putin and Chinese President Xi are laughing at a president who inflicts more damage on America than they could ever imagine doing. American allies are panicking. Trump is making America small again. His hardliners will now make things worse.
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