Day: March 10, 2018
A race to save democracy in Venezuela
“If I’m honest to you, I don’t know if I’m going to be able to speak like this again in the near future. I don’t know if this afternoon or tomorrow they will seize some of us, silence the rest of us.” So spoke María Corina Machado, present via video conference at CSIS Headquarters. Machado, one of many Venezuelan opposition leaders threatened with prison since protests in 2014, said that the regime of Nicolás Maduro had closed off possibility of electoral route of restoring democracy in Venezuela. “Every day that Maduro stays in power cannot be counted anymore in hours, but in deaths,” she said, “Venezuelans that are killed with arms and hunger. But, at the same time, it is a growing threat for the whole region.”
Machado’s testimony underlined the urgency of developing a plan to save Venezuela, discussed in an event, “Restoring Venezuela’s Democracy and Halting the Humanitarian Disaster,” at CSIS on February 23. Joining her were Organization of American States Secretary General Luis Almagro and former Bolivian President Jorge Quiroga, along with CSIS experts Moises Rendon and Michael A. Matera, while CSIS President and CEO John J. Hamre delivered opening remarks. Watch full video of the event here:
Takeaways:
Venezuelan democracy, along with the sanctity of surrounding states, is under dire threat. The political crisis has become a humanitarian crisis, with potentially one million refugees already and hunger spreading – Venezuelan citizens having lost on average of nearly 20 pounds over the past year. Secretary General Luis Almagro confirmed the OAS’ opposition to the Maduro regime, calling on the international community to “support action to fashion a way to end the 21st-century narco-dictatorship that is Venezuela.” He welcomed Peru’s decision to disinvite Venezuela from April’s Summit of the Americas in Lima, describing the action as underscoring Maduro’s growing diplomatic isolation and furthering the fracturing of the regime. “Our mission is clear,” Almagro declared, “adopting at this hour increased pressure on the Maduro regime while simultaneously and concretely preparing for the day it falls.”
After Almagro, Jorge Quiroga emphasized the political importance of stemming the Venezuelan crisis. He described the rare confluence of political events in 2018: adding to the quadrennial convergence of elections in Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil (scheduled for May, July, and October, respectively), 2018 will see two historic changes in Cuba and Venezuela. Maduro’s regime, after replacing the opposition-controlled parliament last year, has now brought forward general elections that Quiroga stated would bring about “the second full-out, full-blown Cuba in Latin America in 2018, 58 days from now.” This move leaves the international community in a race against time to pressure the Venezuelan regime to change course from their “slow-motion coup” before peaceful resolution of the crisis becomes impossible.
Almagro and Quiroga proposed a plan of immediate action. Following Almagro’s declaration of the OAS’ commitment to action in Venezuela, Quiroga detailed a plan of immediate action to be taken before the regime is able to conduct its sham elections on April 22 (which have since been delayed until May 20). In this limited time, Quiroga called for “toda la carne el asador” – that is, putting everything on the table. His plan fits under eight points (which, as a means of branding, spell out the acronym CSISMODE):
- Charter – Invoking of Article 20 of the OAS Democratic Charter before April 22 to martial “necessary diplomatic initiatives” from OAS states “to foster the restoration of democracy”.
- Sanctions – Slapping individualized sanctions on Maduro, his government, and their relatives, as well as sectoral sanctions against revenue sources for the Venezuelan government.
- ICC – Referring Maduro regime figures to face charges in the International Criminal Court, following the recent announcement of the opening of an investigation involving Venezuela.
- Seizures – Closing regime figures’ bank accounts and seize their assets in foreign countries, to be returned to the Venezuelan people.
- Migration – Creating an international program and temporary protected status to manage refugees leaving Venezuela.
- Oil – Embargoing Venezuelan oil or placing Venezuelan oil funds in an escrow account to be disbursed by the Venezuelan National Assembly.
- Diplomatic relations – Cutting relations immediately with the Maduro regime based on their credible threats to democracy.
- Expulsions – Expelling Maduro associates and assets from foreign countries and suspending Venezuelan membership of UNASUR.
Maduro must be eased toward regime change. Maria Corina Machado emphasized that there exists a “short but real window of opportunity” to compel the Maduro regime due to the erosion of three of the regime’s five pillars of support. The regime’s cashflow is running dry, popular disapproval is at 90%, and international tolerance is at a breaking point. The Venezuelan government’s survival now rests on support from the drug cartel system and the weakened loyalty of the armed forces. Machado noted prominent defections from Maduro’s government and growing strife within the military as evidence that the regime’s control is shaking.
Machado pressed that allies of democracy can bring regime change by raising the cost of ruling cliques staying in power and lowering the cost of backing down. To Almagro and Quiroga’s plan Machado added that guarantees must be established for civilian and military officials willing to support democracy, and that foreign states supporting Maduro (Russia, China, some Caribbean nations) could be incentivized to side with Venezuelan democracy. She vowed that internal opponents of Maduro would build a civilian platform with the clear objective of a democratic transition, easing the way for regime change in the shortest time possible.
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Another botched move
Josh Marshall gets it right in this morning’s tweet:
The reality is already pretty clear, though it’ll take a few days for people to admit it. The President accepted a non invitation to a summit with Kim Jong un on an clueless impulse. White House now trying to make it unhappen.
Specifically, the National Security Council, where the adult in charge is General McMaster. He managed to get the White House spokesperson to say “”concrete and verifiable action” is required from Pyongyang before the meeting.
That condition has been nowhere evident in the President’s utterances. Nor is it clear that Pyongyang ever issued an invitation, though a meeting with the US president has been a priority goal for the North Koreans for decades. It is certainly reasonable to try to get them to pay something for it.
Unfortunately the clumsy way the non invitation has been accepted and conditions imposed only afterwards undermines US standing in the matter. Of course we can just fail to schedule the meeting if the North Koreans don’t comply with the conditions, but that will make the US look responsible for the failure. It might be better than the alternative: a meeting without substantive accomplishments that gives the North Koreans what they want and the US nothing but an ego-moment for Trump. But if I had to guess, Donald Trump will want to go ahead anyway, convinced that he can by force of personality bring Kim Jong-un around.
The odds of North Korea abandoning its nuclear weapons and missiles are vanishingly small. Unlike Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qaddafi, Kim really does have weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. It is difficult to imagine what diplomatic assurances could equal the guarantee they provide that the US will not attack or seek to overthrow the regime. Nuclear weapons are Kim’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement, a pretty good one. He is not going to abandon them completely.
Our best alternative to a negotiated agreement is tightening sanctions. Certainly they have started to bite. But the history of sanctions is clear: their effectiveness decays with time (because the target country learns how to maneuver around them), and you get what you want from them mainly when you negotiate relief, not when you impose them. So they are not a very good alternative to negotiated agreement, but rather an interim means to getting to the negotiation table.
There is another issue with sanctions: they are only effective so long as others join in imposing them. If the US is perceived as responsible for nixing the presidential meeting, China and others won’t necessarily join the tightening. That would make the sanctions ineffective and strain US relations with whoever doesn’t want to play along with us.
Trump has once again botched a diplomatic move. That’s not surprising: his Secretary of State knew nothing of the President’s intentions and the State Department is a wreck. McMaster is trying to impose some discipline and rescue the President from his own bad and irresistible impulses. This is not the way the US government should be operating.
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