Josh Marshall gets it right in this morning’s tweet:
The reality is already pretty clear, though it’ll take a few days for people to admit it. The President accepted a non invitation to a summit with Kim Jong un on an clueless impulse. White House now trying to make it unhappen.
Specifically, the National Security Council, where the adult in charge is General McMaster. He managed to get the White House spokesperson to say “”concrete and verifiable action” is required from Pyongyang before the meeting.
That condition has been nowhere evident in the President’s utterances. Nor is it clear that Pyongyang ever issued an invitation, though a meeting with the US president has been a priority goal for the North Koreans for decades. It is certainly reasonable to try to get them to pay something for it.
Unfortunately the clumsy way the non invitation has been accepted and conditions imposed only afterwards undermines US standing in the matter. Of course we can just fail to schedule the meeting if the North Koreans don’t comply with the conditions, but that will make the US look responsible for the failure. It might be better than the alternative: a meeting without substantive accomplishments that gives the North Koreans what they want and the US nothing but an ego-moment for Trump. But if I had to guess, Donald Trump will want to go ahead anyway, convinced that he can by force of personality bring Kim Jong-un around.
The odds of North Korea abandoning its nuclear weapons and missiles are vanishingly small. Unlike Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qaddafi, Kim really does have weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. It is difficult to imagine what diplomatic assurances could equal the guarantee they provide that the US will not attack or seek to overthrow the regime. Nuclear weapons are Kim’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement, a pretty good one. He is not going to abandon them completely.
Our best alternative to a negotiated agreement is tightening sanctions. Certainly they have started to bite. But the history of sanctions is clear: their effectiveness decays with time (because the target country learns how to maneuver around them), and you get what you want from them mainly when you negotiate relief, not when you impose them. So they are not a very good alternative to negotiated agreement, but rather an interim means to getting to the negotiation table.
There is another issue with sanctions: they are only effective so long as others join in imposing them. If the US is perceived as responsible for nixing the presidential meeting, China and others won’t necessarily join the tightening. That would make the sanctions ineffective and strain US relations with whoever doesn’t want to play along with us.
Trump has once again botched a diplomatic move. That’s not surprising: his Secretary of State knew nothing of the President’s intentions and the State Department is a wreck. McMaster is trying to impose some discipline and rescue the President from his own bad and irresistible impulses. This is not the way the US government should be operating.
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