Month: April 2018
“Wicked” globalism
“Wicked” is the word wonks use to describe problems that are difficult to solve because they are so complex it is difficult to predict the impact of anything you do, which may cause consequences different from those you intend. That’s what is happening today: the US is facing nuclear issues with both North Korea and Iran that defy resolution in part because they may interact in both predictable and unpredictable ways.
This was not necessary. President Trump has chosen to schedule a decision for withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal for May 12, the date on which Congress requires him to certify whether continuing it is in the US interest. He refused to do that three months ago, without consequences. This time around he says he’ll withdraw if the deal isn’t “fixed” to include ballistic missile and eliminate the expiration clauses. There is no indication that can be done in the time frame available, though the Europeans are trying to back him down by committing to a follow-on agreement. The Iranians, however, show no sign of being interested in that.
Meanwhile, things are moving in the other direction with North Korea, which has expressed some interest in “denuclearization,” though what that means to Kim Jong-un is not yet clear. It almost surely doesn’t mean “complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization” that the Americans want. The North Koreans have a long history of reneging on agreements with the international community, but the Trump Administration seems determined to ignore that and instead seek still another one. Trump has already given Kim a big prize: the promise of a meeting that will legitimize Kim’s regime, something he would have criticized ferociously had his predecessor done it. Any agreement will have to involve some concessions from the US, likely on the American military presence in South Korea and maybe elsewhere in Asia.
Israeli President Netanyahu today went on TV to demonstrate that Iran was lying when it claimed not to have a nuclear weapons program prior to 2004. That was already well known. How that is supposed to undermine the agreement concluded in 2015 known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is not clear. The JCPOA committed Iran to international inspections that have so far confirmed there is no longer a nuclear weapons program, as well as dismantling of most of Iran’s centrifuges and one of its reactors. The JCPOA looks to many like a good antidote to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Netanyahu’s TV appearance confirmed that.
Trump has nevertheless indicated he will withdraw from it and reimpose unilateral sanctions. That will give Iran the option of sustaining the agreement with the Europeans (thus splitting them from the US and weakening the impact of sanctions) or withdrawing and going hell bent for nuclear weapons. Neither outcome would benefit the US. Withdrawal would also give North Korea good reason to doubt that any agreement with the US concerning its nuclear program will be maintained, though admittedly it already has ample reason for doubts. Iran racing for nuclear weapons would certainly give North Korea more than enough reason to hold on to its own.
This trifecta of likely bad outcomes has not been enough to convince Trump that he should override whatever promises he made during his election campaign. Most Americans support the JCPOA. But Trump isn’t interested in what most Americans think, only what his deep-pocketed donors like Sheldon Adelson think. That’s what Trump meant when he told French President Macron he would withdraw from the JCPOA due to domestic political pressure.
Netanyahu has also ordered airstrikes on Iranian facilities in Syria that reportedly store missiles for use against Israel. Tehran, including the Iranian Supreme Leader, has promised a response, while denying any Iranians were killed. Escalation of the tit-for-tat in Syria could well get out of hand, leading to a still wider war and even the Israeli ground invasion Syrians often warn of. The Americans have shown no interest in joining such an enterprise to drive the Iranians back from the Israeli border, but they likely aren’t saying a loud “no” to it either.
We are at one of those tipping points, like the eve of the Iraq war. The US can barge ahead on its current path, with some predictable negative consequences and likely many other unpredictable ones, though it is hard to think of positive outcomes. Or it can pause, rethink, and try to unravel the global interconnections that make its current course so likely to produce bad results. Globalism has its virtues, but it also has its exceedingly complicated, “wicked,” side. Clarifying problems so they can be solved is a lot better than muddying them, as Trump and Netanyahu both prefer to do.
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Stay the course
I spent last week visiting two allegedly dysfunctional states in the Balkans: Macedonia and Kosovo. Rumors of their incapacity or even demise are exaggerated. I visited with government officials, parliamentarians, NGOers, journalists, and old friends. I saw their presidents and prime ministers, but not their foreign ministers, as both were traveling. Despite their real problems, both states are functional and have made enormous progress over the past twenty years.
I started in Macedonia, which is saddled with two current issues: a law on language that the President refuses to sign and a dispute concerning its name with Greece.
The former raises constitutional questions, as the parliament has passed the law twice, after which the President is obliged to sign. He claims however that the law, which increases the required use of Albanian by state institutions, contradicts the constitution, which he is sworn to uphold. People get really worked up over this, but I just don’t see how it compares even remotely to the political crisis that enveloped the country in 2016 and 2017, when the opposition was publicizing wiretaps that demonstrated abuse of power. I’m betting Macedonia’s citizens and politicians will figure out how to get the constitutional court to decide who is right. That would be an institutional solution appropriate to the challenge. Not so bad.
The second problem is a congenital one. From the moment of independence, Athens challenged Skopje’s right to use “Macedonia” and has refused to accept Macedonia into NATO either as the Republic of Macedonia (its constitutional name) or as The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (The FYROM), the appellation Greece agreed in 1995 would apply to membership in international organizations.
This is the moral equivalent of the United States objecting to Mexico’s official name (Estados Unidos Mexicanos), or the Mexicans objecting to “New Mexico.” As in the rest of the Balkans, the real issues are territory and identity, not the name. Here too there are lots of solutions and an ongoing negotiation that appears to be making progress. Current betting is on “Republic of Upper Macedonia,” but precisely when and where that would be used is still uncertain. Any solution will have to pass muster in parliament and get approved in a referendum: again, institutional solutions.
Kosovo has also been through a rough patch, with two issues that created disorder in both the streets and parliament: demarcation of the border with Montenegro and creation of an Association of Serb Municipalities (ASM).
The former verged on silly, since only a few hundred hectares were involved and the agreement had already been concluded as well as ratified in Montenegro before it became controversial in Kosovo. It is now solved and the waters have calmed.
The ASM is still a problem, as it is part of the plan that got Kosovo its independence 10 years ago but risks making Kosovo like Bosnia, which is to say so ethnically divided as to be dysfunctional. The constitutional court has made clear within what parameters the issue should be solved, but some think it will be necessary to go further. That is going to be difficult, especially as the situation in Bosnia is worsening because the leader of its Serb 49% “entity” is using its power-sharing arrangements to block effective governance at the state level. Kosovo Albanians are right to want to avoid that kind of trouble.
Another recent incident has also roiled Kosovo’s waters: Turkish security officials were allowed to seize some of President Erdogan’s political opponents on Kosovo territory and deport them to Turkey, where they face a court system that is doing the President’s bidding. The proper court proceedings were not followed in Kosovo. A parliamentary committee has been commissioned to investigate.
The distinguishing characteristic of all these issues is that they touch on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states that are not yet consolidated, or self-confident (I’m grateful to Veton Surroi, a tough critic of Kosovo’s state-building process so far, for this realization). The result is a level of political (and occasionally physical) conflict that challenges weak institutions.
America’s own early republic had quite a few such challenges to sovereignty (look up Whiskey Rebellion and Marbury v Madison) that had to be decided in the courts, and we are still capable of creating new ones. It would be a mistake to conclude from their existence that the state-building process in the Balkans is a failure. The citizens’ preference for institutional solutions in both Macedonia and Kosovo is clear, even if the politicians don’t always abide by it.
Sovereignty is not yet complete, and territorial integrity not yet ensured. Reassurance on those scores is critical. In the 21st century Balkans, the US and EU need to continue to play their vital roles in ensuring that borders are not moved, minorities are treated in ways that make loyalty to the states in which they live appealing, and governance is not only fair but also functional and effective in producing services and prosperity.
I would guess Kosovo and Macedonia are a lot more than midway between independence and EU membership. Completing that trajectory is the shortest distance to regional peace and stability. We and they should stay the course.
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Crunch time
Pantelis Ikonomou, a retired IAEA inspector, writes:
For 25 years the international community with its competent institutions led by the world super powers failed to block the nuclear military program of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and to impose adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Geostrategic miscalculations or leaders’ inability were probably the cause of the persistent failure. The US has done well to unblock the situation, but major obstacles lie ahead.
Here is a short but characteristic history of facts:
- In 1992, IAEA inspectors found inconsistencies in DPRK’s nuclear declarations. The year after, DPRK announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT. Just one day before the withdrawal was due, the US persuaded DPRK to suspend its decision.
- In December 1993, the IAEA announced that it could no longer provide “any meaningful assurances” that DPRK was not producing nuclear weapons. A US initiative saved the situation again. An Agreed Framework was signed between the US and DPRK in Geneva and the IAEA had to monitor its implementation.
- In December 2002, DPRK tampered with IAEA surveillance equipment. A few days later DPRK requested the immediate removal of IAEA inspectors from the country and announced its withdrawal from the NPT.
- In April 2003, DPRK declared it had nuclear weapons. A renewed US initiative led to the six-party talks (USA, China, Russia, South Korea, Japan and DPRK) on solving the nuclear crisis.
- In the following years, DPRK was repeatedly accused of violating the Agreed Framework and other international agreements. Several UNSC and IAEA resolutions were triggered with strong US leadership.
The upcoming May summit of Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un presents a unique opportunity to overcome a long-lasting failure. The political determination of both leaders is certainly the prerequisite for a decisive agreement on the “denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.”
Hence, the US will have to deploy a serious negotiating team with technical experts. The successful implementation of a complex final deal will depend on the completeness and clarity of the comprehensive Plan of Action to be compiled. It should cover all issues related to nuclear, missile and sanctions, linked to relevant UNSC and IAEA resolutions, as well as mutual commitments on military presence in the area. Notably, all these agreed actions ought to be verifiable and irreversible.
The partly analogous P5+1 Iran deal (JCPOA), although lacking the DPRK’s nuclear military dimension, offers a carefully elaborated model. Yet, at the same time it represents a time bomb: US withdrawal on May 12, as the President has presaged, would be just before the Trump/Kim summit. If that happens, why should Kim Jong-un trust his negotiating partner?
I would add this:
It makes no sense for the US to withdraw from the Iran deal, since that will trigger either renewal of Tehran’s nuclear weapons program (without IAEA inspectors present) or a dramatic breach with America’s European allies (and possibly both). Trump’s loud criticism of the deal has limited the economic benefits to Iran and gotten the Europeans to start talking about an expanded, follow-on version that would limit Iran’s missile program and extend the timeframe. Trump gains nothing more, and loses a lot, if he withdraws.
If, as this suggests, he stays in the Iran deal, that still does not guarantee Trump success with Kim, who has already gotten the audiences with Presidents Xi, Moon, and soon Trump that give him the legitimacy he craves. Kim’s promise of denuclearization is not new. He promised the same in 2005 and never delivered. The decommissioning of the DPRK’s nuclear test site will grab headlines in the next week or so, but keen observers believe the geology there is now so precarious due to underground nuclear tests that it is already unusable.
Meanwhile the US is reported to be talking with Asian allies about the future of its military presence in South Korea. It is precarious, since it is far too small and vulnerable to do much against a DPRK invasion, but serves as a tripwire for broader US intervention if it comes under fire. Kim will aim to eliminate it entirely once a peace treaty formally ending the Korean War is signed, something Trump may even welcome as he made it clear long ago he doesn’t want to be responsible for the security of our Asian allies and suggested they might want to get nuclear weapons of their own.
May is crunch time for the Iran deal and the Rocket Man/Dotard Summit. Hold on tight. It may be a wild ride.
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Peace picks, April 29 – May 6
- Venezuela’s Humanitarian Crisis: Searching for Relief | Monday, April 30 | 9:00am – 10:30am | Atlantic Council | Register here |
Please join the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center for a critical discussion on the multiple dimensions of the humanitarian crisis, how it has evolved through time, and what can be done to alleviate the suffering. Featuring speakers Diego Beltrand, Regional Director for South America at the International Organization for Migration; Chiara Cardoletti, Deputy Regional Representative to the United States of America and the Caribbean with the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR); Julio Castro, Professor in the Infectious Diseases Unit at the Universidad Central de Venezuela; Michael Fitzpatrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary with the United States State Department; José Manuel Olivares, Representative from the National Assembly of Venezuela; and Susana Raffalli, Venezuelanh humanitarian expert. Moderated by , U.S. News Director for NTN24 Gustau Alegret, with remarks by Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center Director Jason Marczak.
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- Oman’s Role in a Turbulent Region | Monday, April 30 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |
In the midst of a series of diplomatic crises in the Gulf region, Oman stands out as a widely-respected regional mediator and has also led working groups in China and India on bilateral economic ties as well as maintained cordial relations with Iran. What is Oman’s role in promoting diplomacy, security and stability in the Gulf, and the prospects for Oman’s growing economic ties in the region and around the world? The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host Sayyid Badr bin Hamad al-Busaidi, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Oman, to address these pressing questions about Oman’s future. Amb. (ret.) Gerald Feierstein, MEI’s director for Gulf affairs and government relations, will moderate the discussion.
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- Behind the Scenes of Russian Opposition Campaigns | Monday, April 30 | 3:30pm – 5:00pm | Wilson Center | Register here |
How do you run an election campaign when you know that your candidate will not win? What lessons do the latest campaigns offer for the future? The managers of Alexei Navalny’s and Ksenia Sobchak’s 2018 Russian presidential campaigns will discuss their experience and the future of opposition campaigning in Russia. Featuring Leonid Volkov, Chief of Staff for Alexey Navalny, and Vitali Shkliarov, Senior Adviser to Ksenia Sobchak.
There will be a webcast of this event.
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- Denuclearizing North Korea: Practicalities and Politics | Tuesday, May 1 | 9:00am – 12:00pm | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register here |
In the aftermath of the inter-Korean summit on April 27, and ahead of planned U.S.-North Korea talks, please join Carnegie for a deep dive on the practicalities and politics of denuclearizing North Korea. With two sessions: Denuclearization Roadmaps at 9:10am – 10:30am, featuring Corey Hinderstein (vice president of international fuel cycle strategies at the Nuclear Threat Initiative), Eli Levite (nonresident senior fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment), Li Bin (senior fellow working jointly with the Nucelar Policy Program and the Carnegie Endowment), and Toby Dalton (co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment); and Regional, Political, and Diplomatic Dimensions from 10:45am – 12:00pm, featuring Choi Kang (vice president for research and director of the Center for Foreign Policy and National Security at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies), Douglas H. Paal (vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment), Jung H. Pak (senior fellow and the SK-Korea Foundation chair in Korea studies at Brookings Institution’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies), and James L. Schoff (senior fellow in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment). Opening remarks by George Perkovich (vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment).
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- Iraq After ISIS: What to Do Now | Tuesday, May 1 | 12:15pm – 1:45pm | New America | Register here |
In 2017, the United States dealt ISIS a devastating blow eliminating its territorial holdings in Iraq and Syria. Iraq, which will hold national elections on May 12th, emerged out of the war against ISIS strong and in an increasingly positive mood. Yet as Iraq looks ahead to a post-ISIS future, numerous challenges lie ahead. In a new policy report, Iraq After ISIS: What to Do Now, Bartle Bull, author and founder of Northern Gulf Partners, an Iraq-focused merchant banking firm, and Douglas Ollivant, (ASU Senior Future of War Fellow with New America and former Director for Iraq on the National Security Council, propose the contours of a positive, forward-looking U.S.-Iraqi relationship. In discussion moderated by Peter Bergen, Vice President and Director of the International Security Program at New America.
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- Eurasia and Afghanistan – A New Era of Regional Cooperation | Wednesday, May 2 | 10:00am – 12:00pm | Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies (Johns Hopkins University) | Register here |
Despite present challenges to global security and the international liberal order, the South/Central Asian region remains a dynamic and fast-changing region and over the past couple of decades and has shown that increased regional cooperation is indispensable to achieving development goals and stability in the region. Four experts on the region – Afghanistan Ambassador to the United States Hamdullah Mohib, former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs Earl Anthony Wayne, former U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and Ambassador to Pakistan Richard Olson, and former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Robin Raphel – will analyze the recent progress in regional cooperation, peace process, and the economic integration in broader Eurasian context impacting Afghanistan and Central Asian countries. The discussion will be moderated by Dr. Kent Calder, with introductions by Rohullah Osmani, Visiting Scholar of the Reischauer Center.
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- Japan’s Security Strategy: A Political Update from Nagatacho | Thursday, May 3 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register here |
Please join CSIS for an exchange with Japanese thought leaders on the security policy debate in Nagatacho (a district in central Tokyo where the national parliament, or Diet, is located) and priorities for the U.S.-Japan alliance. Featuring Gen Nakatani (Liberal Democratic Party; Former Minister of Defense), Akihisa Nagashima (Party of Hope; Former Vice Minister of Defense), and Satoshi Morimoto (Takushoku University; Former Minister of Defense), with Sheila Smith (Senior Fellow for Japan Studies, Council on Foreign Relations) and Michael J. Green (Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair, CSIS).
This event will be webcast live from this page. No registration necessary.
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- Cyber Risk Thursday: Building a Defensible Cyberspace | Thursday, May 3 | 4:00pm – 5:30pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
This Cyber Risk Thursday, join the Cyber Statecraft Initiative as we engage key experts and stakeholders for a progressive and solutions-oriented discussion on the defensive innovations and methodologies that can helps secure cyberspace and its underlying infrastructure. A conversation with panelists Gus Hunt (Managing Director and Cyber Lead, Accenture Federal Services) and Jason Healey (Senior Fellow, Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Atlantic Council). With welcoming remarks by Frederick Kempe (President and CEO, Atlantic Council), opening remarks by John Goodman (CEO, Accenture Federal Services), and introductory remarks by Dr. Joseph Nye (University Distinguished Service Professor, Harvard University Kennedy School of Government).
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- Time for Action in the Western Balkans: Policy Prescriptions for American Diplomacy | Friday, May 4 | 2:00pm – 3:30pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
The Western Balkans — Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Albania, and Serbia — are re-emerging as a region of stagnation and instability due to poor governance, the influence of outside forces and tense relations between ethnic groups and neighboring states. A forthcoming report by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy and the EastWest Institute highlights the need for immediate, decisive action by the U.S. and the European Union to head off instability and possible violent strife. Please join the U.S. Institute of Peace to hear from the authors of the report — Amb. Frank G. Wisner (International Affairs Advisor, Squire Patton Boggs and former U.S. ambassador to Zambia, Egypt, the Philippines and India), Jonathan Levitsky (Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton, and former Counselor to Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations), Amb. Cameron Munter (CEO and President, the EastWest Institute and former U.S. Ambassador to Serbia and Pakistan), and Tom Graham (Senior Fellow and Managing Director, Kissinger Associates, Inc.) — as they present a strategy for the United States and Europe, working in a revitalized partnership, to forestall a downward spiral in the Western Balkans, which could potentially lead to fractured states and widespread instability on Europe’s borders. In conversation with moderator Amb. Sarah Mendelson (Distinguished Service Professor of Public Policy and Head of Heinz College, Carnegie Mellon University, and former U.S. Representative to the Economic and Social Council at the United Nations).
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Cautious optimism
Iraq is in transition. With the territorial defeat of ISIS having been completed in late 2017, the reconstruction and political renewal of the country is in full swing. In February, the Kuwait International Conference for Reconstruction of Iraq mobilized almost $30 billion of international support. On Thursday, the Iraqi government held a major oil and gas bidding round aimed at further revitalizing the sector, particularly in areas previously controlled by Islamist insurgents. Moreover, on May 12, Iraq is scheduled to hold its next parliamentary elections, which will act as a stress test for a democracy trying to recover from the ISIS surge. Notwithstanding the positive developments in recent months, Iraq faces a long and stony road ahead in terms of rebuilding and recovery.
On April 26, the Atlantic Council organized a panel addressing the country’s multiple challenges and opportunities, including the role the energy sector can play in enabling recovery. The discussion featured Iraqi Ambassador to the US Fareed Yasseen, Hafez Ghanem, Vice President for Middle East and North Africa at the World Bank, Majid Jafar, CEO of Crescent Petroleum, Ben Van Heuvelen, Editor in Chief of the Iraq Oil Report, and Ellen Scholl, Director of the Global Energy Center at the Atlantic Council, as the moderator. Atlantic Council’s President and CEO Frederick Kempe gave an introductory statement.
The Kuwait Conference was a major success for Iraq. Yasseen stresses its huge symbolic value, both due to its location and turnout. The Kuwaiti leadership showed enormous goodwill to host the event, which has opened a new chapter in relations between the Gulf country and Iraq. Participation exceeded all expectations. Instead of an estimated 500 participants, more than 2000 people showed up. Hafez Ghanem likewise emphasizes that the massive participation, especially of private sector actors, was a huge accomplishment. This demonstrates that there is trust in Iraq.
Hope is justified. Yasseen points out that there is true willingness on the side of Iraqi decision makers to move forward, despite its problems. Iraq has a plan and commitment to implement reforms. The upcoming elections—which are much less sectarian and polarized than previous political contests—will not derail this process; rather, everyone in Iraq is committed to reforming the country. Jafar confirms the ambassador’s assessment. Considering where Iraq used to stand two years ago, we have already seen much progress. The outlook for the country is positive.
Iraq has to pursue wide-scale reforms. Ghanem argues that the country has to adopt a two-fold economic transformation. First, it has to reduce its dependency on oil, both in terms of revenues and mentality. Iraq needs to drop it rentier state attitude and move toward a more productive economy. Second, the country has to scale down its overblown public sector and become more private-sector friendly. Reconstruction will only be successful if this step is made, as most of the $80 billion needed has to come from private investors. Jafar also calls for a downsizing of the public sector. He stresses that the climate for investment has to be improved substantially. Most investors are not deterred by security concerns or political instability, but complain about administrative banalities such as problems with visas, complex administrative processes, and the complex customs system. Corruption compounds theses issues.
Ben van Heuvelen calls for caution. Despite positive signs, Iraq’s situation remains tense. The bidding round on Thursday was a success, but problems stand out. In particular, experienced global oil companies shied away from the auction. Firms that have already had real exposure to the costs of doing business in Iraq are still skeptical. Moreover, the country’s overall security situation continues to be problematic. ISIS has been defeated, but the Islamist insurgency is still ongoing. Iraqi security forces do not posses the capabilities required to establish a deterrent presence throughout all the liberated areas. Although there is no major ISIS threat to the oil sector, instability puts a drain on the budget and inhibits investment. For example, planned pipeline projects to Turkey and Jordan cannot be implemented in the current security climate.
Iraqis and international investors have regained confidence in the country. There is legitimate reason to assume that Iraq will recover from the ISIS nightmare and move towards stability. However, this process will be tedious and arduous, and setbacks will certainly occur.
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The US, EU and Kosovo: can they sync up?
Here are the speaking notes for the talk I gave this morning under the auspices of KIPRED in Pristina, Ambassador Lulzim Peci presiding:
- It’s great to be back in Pristina, and an enormous privilege to talk with you here at the Swiss Diamond, though I hope next time to have a Marriott at our disposal as well. Don’t tell your foreign minister I said that!
- I’d like to discuss with you the triangle that has so often driven progress in the Balkans in general and in Kosovo in particular: the US, the EU and of course you.
- When those three are in sync, nothing stops us. When they are out of sync, little progress is made on big issues, including those that can threaten peace and stability.
- Let me start with the US. Its circumstances have changed dramatically since the 1990s and early 2000s, when relatively small American interventions—military and diplomatic—ended and prevented wars in the Balkans, including the 2001 conflict in Macedonia.
- That was the unipolar moment, when Yeltsin’s Russia was on the ropes and China had not yet started to show its financial muscle.
- In the 1990s, the US was not yet tired of playing the role of global policeman and it was confident of its own strong democratic tradition.
- The 17 years since 9/11 have changed that. The attack on the World Trade Center prompted a justified US invasion of Afghanistan and an unjustified US invasion of Iraq, both of which seemed to go well at first but bogged down into quagmires that sapped American finances, strength and confidence.
- Now we live in a multi-polar world, one in which President Putin is trying to reassert Moscow’s claim to great power status and President Xi doesn’t even have to try.
- The financial crisis of 2008 sent the world’s economy into a tailspin. Though the American recovery was relatively steady and even fast compared to Europe’s, a large portion of the relatively uneducated, white, male working population still hasn’t recovered.
- It was their discontent, especially in the Midwest, that led to President Trump’s election in 2016. He lacked a majority of the popular vote but gained a modest margin in the electoral college, which gives less populous states greater weight in determining who wins the presidency.
- The Trump Administration is not a conservative one: it has abandoned a central conservative tenet—concern about the budget deficit—in favor of a massive tax cut for the wealthy and an unprecedented boost in military spending as well as sharply increased military activities focused on Islamic extremism, especially in the Middle East and Africa.
- It has also been sometimes belligerent towards North Korea and always towards, while abandoning both the Trans-Pacific and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnerships and throwing down the gauntlet on trade and investment as a challenge, especially to China.
- The Administration’s initial hostility towards NATO has been corrected, but the President has little use for the EU, whose sharing of responsibilities is anathema to an America First attitude.
- I need only mention briefly that the Administration is also preoccupied with a series of dramatic scandals that involve Russian tampering in the US election, the President’s many sexual affairs, and his financial and other legal improprieties. This is a confused White House under siege.
- As a consequence, Trump focuses on keeping his big money donors and his white working-class base happy. He explicitly states that he has no interest in how others govern themselves and has warmed to autocrats like Presidents Duterte, Putin, Xi, and Sisi.
- The kind of liberal democracy “of the people, by the people and for the people” that many in Kosovo aspire to is under threat in America and out of fashion in much of the rest of the world, as ethnic nationalists and kleptocratic elites feel unconstrained by Trump.
- So you shouldn’t be surprised when I say that the Balkans and their governance failures are one of the last things on minds in Washington. Even if he is married to a Slovene, President Trump hasn’t spent more than a few minutes on the Balkans since taking office.
- Instead, career officials in the State and Defense Departments have thankfully kept US Balkans policy on their previous course, and Vice President Pence as well as former National Security Adviser McMaster have intervened constructively.
- But it is going to be difficult to match even the low Obama-level interest in Balkans democracy with President Trump in the White House.
- The situation in Europe is better. The Europeans were for years preoccupied with their own financial crisis, the Greek debt debacle, and their consequences for the euro and for growth.
- Europe was also deeply scarred by the refugee influx from the Middle East and Africa and its implications for terrorism. More than 100,000 illegal border crossings occurred here in the Balkan, putting economic, logistical and political strain on the region.
- Some Europeans even within the EU have turned to demagogic leaders who promise to protect nativist groups from foreigners, while the British made the enormous mistake of voting narrowly to withdraw from the EU, in large part due to xenophobia.
- But Europe’s economy is now slowly recovering, and the Europeans have become much more alert to Putin’s trouble-making since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the attempted coup in Montenegro in 2016, and this year’s attempted murder of defectors in Britain.
- To my delight, the European Commission, alarmed by Putin, seized an opportunity in February to reopen the political window for EU accession in 2025, saying that those who qualify by 2023 will be welcomed in two years later. They did not say when the window would close.
- For good reasons, many doubt the sincerity, and even the feasibility, of this promise to enlarge once again. It is explicitly conditional on internal reforms to strengthen the Union, and it will require ratifications by current members that may prove difficult to elicit, including referenda in France and maybe the Netherlands.
- This is nevertheless an extraordinary opportunity. It is my hope that as many Balkan countries as possible will take advantage of it. Most of the benefits of EU membership come in preparing for accession.
- Montenegro and Serbia lead the regatta, as they have achieved candidacy status and are making their way as quickly as they can through the chapters of the acquis.
- But others are not so far behind: the Commission has recommended candidacy status for Albania as well as Macedonia, and Kosovo has approved border demarcation with Montenegro and will now I hope get the visa waiver. That will be an important milestone in synching up with the US and the EU.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina, although it has applied for candidacy, is in many respects the laggard, as its governing system is based on the awkward constitution Americans wrote at Dayton.
- Nevertheless, a process that has been frozen pretty much since Croatia acceded to the EU in 2013 has restarted. Opportunities like this one don’t come often.
- That brings me to the Commission’s Progress Report on Kosovo and its implications for your government, parliament, and civil society.
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