Alexandros Mallias, former ambassador of the Hellenic Republic to the US and now a special adviser to Eliamep, writes (based on his presentation to the 5th Hellenic High Strategy Conference, March 29 -30:
A process that runs from Tehran to Helsinki via Jerusalem? Madness, or surrealism? Call it utopia, but tomorrow it may become necessity. Allow me to identify six major problems and offer six proposals:
Mismatch between threats, military interventions and their consequences
The so-called “Arab Spring” is not simply a lost opportunity for the Arabs but also a great occasion missed by Europe and the United States as well. For the first time since the rise of “Arab nationalism” in the 1950s, the origin of the revolts did not target Europe, the United States, and Israel. What happened next was due also to our action, miscalculations or inertia and affects our own security and stability.
The unprecedented flow of refugees and migrants to Europe is the unavoidable “collateral damage.” The refugee and migration flows undermined the European integration process and pushed xenophobia and nationalism into mainstream politics. The refugee issue was the catalyst for the Brexit referendum. The European Union is losing a global politico-military partner and capabilities. I earnestly hope this trend will be reversed.
The EU was inadequate, divided and slow to assess the threat, to react, and to act. The lack of a common and integrated foreign policy as a functional common denominator is at the heart of the problem.
Proposal: prevention of population movements should be at the center of political decision-making
The following conditions need to be fulfilled before giving the “green light” for military power:
Conflicts of interest of the Middle East actors
The vital interests of regional players diverge. They are part of the problem as well as of the solution.
Proposal: a new regional security system covering the Middle East and the Mediterranean
The proposed arrangement might include all MENA States, Iran included, the five Permanent Members of the UNSC and the EU. This idea was floating in the UN Security Council Resolutions (Iran-Iraq cease fire) in the late 80’s.
Without a minimum understanding between the Islamic Republic and Saudi Arabia, there is no possibility of establishing balanced, interest-based security in the wider region of the Middle East and North Africa.
Saudi Arabia is changing. The modernization policies are essential for the Kingdom’s stability and security. Potentially aggressive behavior by Iran during the implementation of Saudi Arabia’s welcome reforms must be prevented. But the stabilization process of the wider Middle East is not achievable without Iran.
Logic dictates that long-term balance of power and interests should allow establishing the terms for the inclusion of Iran, Saudi Arabia and at a later stage Israel in a regional security arrangement, no matter how impossible this perspective looks today. However, logic rarely becomes a mainstream practice in international relations.
We should remember that the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 cemented the era of détente and cooperation, before the end of the Cold War. It included recognition that: “The participating states are convinced that security in Europe is to be considered in the broader context of world security and is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a whole…”
We need to launch a process including the OSCE member-states and the MENA states. The participating states should undertake commitments similar to those adopted within the Helsinki Process. China should also participate.
Nuclear proliferation
The risk of nuclear weapons proliferation in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East is real. It will become unavoidable if Iran gets nuclear capabilities. Already, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and possibly Egypt are contemplating their own nuclear ambitions.
Egypt’s well-known proposal for the creation of a Nuclear-Free Zone in the Middle East sounds good. However, Israel has its own reasons not to back the Egyptian plan.
Proposal: a phased multilateral treaty
First : The elaboration and adoption of a binding multilateral treaty for the non-use of nuclear weapons in the greater Middle East (including Iran).
Second: the Treaty could include a clause that bans, within a defined time schedule (for example 20 years), nuclear weapons in the wider Middle East, establishing a nuclear-free zone. The Permanent Members (P5) of the UN Security Council and the European Union could also be contracting parties.
Ballistic missiles and conventional forces
Iranian ballistic missiles are a threat to Israel’s security. The anticipated improvements in their accuracy and delivery capacity will further increase Israel’s and others’ concern and need for security, deterrence and retaliation.
Proposal: a “Middle East Conventional Forces Control and Reduction Treaty”
This would require the proportional and simultaneous reduction of ballistic and other conventional armaments. It could take the shape of a legally binding instrument similar to the November 1990 Paris “Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.”
We could foresee an intermediate set of Confidence Building Measures, including international inspections and observation of military exercises.
Anachronism and dysfunction of the global collective security system
The UN is unable to discharge its duties as the global collective security system. Unilateral actions by the P5 without foresight actions are well illustrated through their involvement in the Syrian chaos.
Often acting at the margins of their mandate (mainly the UN Charter’s Articles 23 and 24 ) their acts are justified by self-interest. Their motivations are geopolitical; about prevailing and expanding or containing influence.
Proposal: The UN Charter to be revised and the Security Council updated
Τhe post-war composition and the abuse of veto power do not match the present global risks, balance of power and capabilities.
Conclusion
We need to dare to dream. Today’s impossible is tomorrow’s achievement. Peace in the Middle East is not beyond our reach.
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