Syrian chessboard

Entering its eighth year, the civil war in Syria has developed into a serious regional conflict. What started as a popular uprising by the Syrian public against Bashar al-Assad’s authoritarian regime has become a struggle for power between external actors, including both regional heavyweights such as Turkey and major global powers like Russia. Today, the Syrian theater is a battlefield for the mostly opposing interests of these actors. This competition has obstructed any progress towards a peace settlement for Syria. Rather, the conflict of interest is perpetuating the Syrian ‘civil war,’ with dire consequences for the country and its population.

On April 2, the Wilson Center hosted a panel addressing the issue of outside powers and the future of Syria. Moderated by Aaron David Miller, Vice President for New Initiatives and Middle East Program Director at the Wilson Center, the discussion sought to break down the array of interests present in the Syrian conflict and the different roles that Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Israel have assumed. Paul du Quenoy, Associate Professor of History at American University of Beirut, Amy Austin Holmes, Associate Professor of Sociology at American University in Cairo, David Pollock, Kaufman Fellow at the Washington Institute and Director of Project Fikra, and Robin Wright, USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow, offered their perspectives as long-time analysts of Syria and the Middle East.

Paul du Quenoy argues that Russia’s primary interest is to maintain a presence in the Middle East through preserving the Moscow-friendly Assad regime. Following the Arab Spring in 2011, Russia felt marginalized and humiliated. The political changes in countries such as Libya sidelined Moscow in regional affairs and sparked fears that the wave of public protests and regime instability could even reach Russia. To protect its influence in the Middle East, Moscow thus intervened in the civil war in 2015.

Although Russia has achieved its core goal, the overall track record of its intervention has been meager, highlights du Quenoy. Moscow succeeded in stabilizing the Assad regime. However, it is now bogged down in a costly conflict requiring continuous military activities. Russian hopes for becoming the core facilitator of a lasting peace solution for Syria and a central actor in the profitable business of rebuilding the country have not materialized. Instead, Moscow has had to recognize its limited leverage. Since Russia’s strategic interests are tied to the survival the Assad regime, the despot can exert influence on Moscow’s agenda and even obstruct unfavorable Russian policies.

In contrast to Russia, Iran has been more successful at promoting its interests, says Robin Wright. Tehran’s Middle East policy is driven by a feeling of vulnerability. Against the backdrop of its Shia religious orientation, Iran “feels strategically lonely,” that is, it considers itself surrounded by a hostile Sunni camp. To cope with this adverse environment, Tehran seeks to project power beyond its borders. This undertaking of expanding Iranian influence in the Middle East has been mostly implemented through establishing a strategic corridor linking Tehran in the East with Beirut in the West. Syria is an integral part of this land bridge. Although its intervention in the Syrian conflict has been costly, Tehran considers its efforts to sustain the Assad regime a long-term strategic investment essential to Iranian national security.

According to Austin Holmes, Turkey likewise sees its national security at stake in the Syrian conflict. Ankara’s primary interest is to keep the Syrian Kurds—who maintain close relations with their Turkish brethren—at bay. Faced with an ongoing domestic Kurdish insurgency promoted by the PKK, Turkey wants to avoid the establishment of a Kurdish autonomous zone in northern Syria stretching all along the Syrian-Turkish border. In 2016, Ankara launched its first intervention in Syria dubbed ‘Euphrates Shield’ to prevent a connection of the Kurdish cantons of Afrin and Kobane. In January 2018, Turkey stepped up its military activities to further weaken the Kurds, launching operation ‘Olive Branch’ aimed at occupying Afrin. While Ankara succeed at taking over the Kurdish stronghold, the repercussions have been inimical. Holmes stresses that the Turkish attacks on the Syrian Kurds undermine the fight against ISIS and jeopardize the Kurdish governance project of ‘Rojava,’ which she views as seeking to establish democratic principles in northern Syria.

For Israel, the Syrian civil war has become an existence-threatening challenge, says David Pollock. In essence, the Israeli leadership has been preoccupied with its immediate, narrow interest of keeping the border with Syria secure, and has tried to stay out of the broader Syrian conflict. This approach translated into a threefold strategy: (i) securing the Golan Heights as a buffer zone, (ii) reducing the presence of and threats from hostile actors—including Hezbollah, the IRGC, other Iranian militias, and jihadists—near Israeli territory, and (iii) obstructing the transfer of advanced weapons to any of these actors. To achieve these goals, the Israeli air force has in the past conducted targeted air strikes. Israel has also engaged in intensive talks with Russia and has provided humanitarian assistance to populations in southeastern Syria to build strategic goodwill.

However, Pollock points out that Israel’s interests are eroding. Air strikes have merely achieved tactical successes and were unable to prevent Iran and its proxies from expanding their presence in Syria. Perception of a strategic threat is growing. Moreover, the United States remains disinterested in Syria and is unwilling to counteract Iranian encroachment. Israel therefore sees a need to intensify its involvement in the Syrian conflict to protect itself, and will most likely expand its military interventions in the foreseeable future.

Syria’s future looks bleak. The civil war has evolved into an open-ended confrontation among regional and international actors, which will continue to add fuel to the fire. Destruction and killing of innocent civilians will drag on. Unwilling to force an end to the conflict, the West should at least alleviate the human suffering that millions of Syrians both inside and outside the country endure.