Delay can be good

Yesterday’s bravado has given way to today’s hesitation. President Trump tweeted this morning:

Never said when an attack on Syria would take place. Could be very soon or not so soon at all!

This kind of inconsistency creates confusion and uncertainty that can undermine US standing in the world and even contribute to crisis escalation. Flip-flops are no better in diplomacy than they are in domestic politics. In addition, the delay has given the Syrian government time to park its aircraft and other assets close by the Russians, whom the Americans will not want to hit.

But this particular delay could still be a good thing, if it gives Washington time to do three things:

• Assemble unequivocal evidence that Syrian President Assad was responsible for the chemical attack last week on Douma;
• Plan a serious combined military and diplomatic campaign to end at least the use of chemical weapons in Syria, if not the war itself;
• Rally domestic as well as international support for that combined campaign.

I don’t see much sign that the US is working on any of these things, but it should.* This post is about what Washington should be doing now, before any military action.

First is to gather the evidence. Intelligence doesn’t flow instantaneously. Materials often have to be translated and analyzed, not the least for veracity. Many countries may have collected against Syrian targets. To put together an unclassified version of the evidence against the Syrian government, cleared by all those agencies and governments that have contributed something, takes time and concentration.

That material should then be presented publicly, first and foremost to the Congress. Members on both sides of the aisle are nervous about allowing the President to act without at least Congressional consultation, if not approval. They fear another exclusively presidential decision, like last year’s cruise missile attack on the Syrian base that had launched a sarin attack, would set an undesirable precedent for military action against North Korea and Iran. Some in Congress are also loathe to do anything that will get the US more involved in Syria, as the President has also been. Americans are not keen on taking on more responsibility for that devastated country.

Evidence against Bashar al Assad also needs to be presented internationally, both in classified and unclassified formats. France and the UK are thought to be considering participation in military action. Others, like Germany and Saudi Arabia, have good reason to be sympathetic with the US even if they are reluctant to participate. Russia de facto controls Syrian air defenses, which have mostly stood idly by while the US and especially Israel flies at will over and near Syria. If Moscow can be convinced to continue to hold its fire, Assad will be more chastened. It is not only cruise missiles that send a message.

A one-off strike, tightly targeted on those who launched the chemical attack on Douma, will do no more this year than last year. Assad is fighting not only to hold on to power, but also for his life. Only the prospect of a broad, sustained military campaign against his capabilities will affect his calculations about using chemical weapons, which are important to him because he is short of manpower after 7 years of war. The Administration needs to be asking whether targeting the presidential palace (with or without a warning) or the Syrian Air Force intelligence facilities that plan chemical attacks would send a stronger message than targeting just runways and aircraft.

The Administration also needs to consider what happens if Russians or Iranians or their proxies are killed, intentionally or unintentionally. Does the US have the capability to respond to escalation? Would it want to do so? Is it prepared for what Russia might do in Ukraine, the Baltics or the Balkans? Does it have the capability to respond to what Iran and its proxies might do in Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, or even inside the US?

The Syrian conflict has widened from non-violent protests against autocracy to a civil war and now to a geopolitical contest between some of the most powerful states on earth. It behooves the US to think carefully about the many diplomatic, political, and military consequences that may follow from military action. Once it has carefully chosen a course of action, it needs to assemble as much support as possible and move decisively, not only in Syria but also defensively worldwide.

*Curt Mills at The National Interest attributes the hesitation to domestic, rightwing pressure. I suspect he is correct.