The US, the EU and Macedonia

Here are the notes I used speaking in the Macedonian Parliament yesterday with Prime Minister Zaev, EU Ambassador Zbogar, and representatives of the governing and opposition political parties, under the chairmanship Artan Grubi: 

1. It’s great to be back in Skopje, and an enormous privilege to talk with you here at the Parliament.
2. My thanks especially to Artan Grubi for suggesting this occasion, to Samuel Zbogar for tolerating an American’s comments on Europe’s business, and to all of you for being here.
3. I’d like to discuss with you the triangle that has so often driven progress in the Balkans in general and in Macedonia in particular: the US, the EU and of course you.
4. When those three are in sync, nothing stops us. When they are out of sync, little progress is made on big issues, including those that can threaten peace and stability. The Ohrid agreement is Exhibit 1, but this was also true at Dayton, in the leadup to the fall of Milosevic, and in Montenegro’s successful bid for NATO membership.
5. Both the US and the EU have been through a difficult decade. But despite many difficulties, they have maintained their policies on the Balkans
6. Career officials in the US State and Defense Departments have kept their previous course, while Vice President Pence and National Security Adviser McMaster have intervened clearly and constructively.
7. Washington wants the Balkans peaceful and secure. The best way to ensure that is membership in NATO for those who want it as well as in the EU.
8. The situation in Europe is analogous. The Europeans were for years preoccupied with their own financial crisis, the Greek debt debacle, and their consequences for the euro and for growth.
9. Europe was also deeply scarred by the refugee influx from the Middle East and Africa and its implications for terrorism.
10. Some Europeans have turned to demagogic leaders who promise to protect nativist groups from foreigners, while the British made the enormous mistake of voting narrowly to withdraw from the EU, in large part due to xenophobia.
11. But Europe’s economy is now slowly recovering, and the Europeans have become much more alert to Putin’s trouble-making since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the attempted coup in Montenegro in 2016, and this year’s attempted murder of defectors in Britain.
12. To my delight, the Europeans, alarmed by Russia, seized an opportunity in February to reopen the political window for EU accession in 2025, saying essentially that those who qualify by 2023 will be welcomed in two years later. They did not say when the window would close.
13. For good reasons, many doubt the sincerity and even the feasibility, of this promise to enlarge once again. It is explicitly conditional on internal reforms to strengthen the Union, and it will require ratifications by current members that may prove difficult to elicit, including referenda in France and the Netherlands.
14. This is nevertheless an extraordinary opportunity. It is my hope that as many Balkan countries as possible will take advantage of it.
15. A process that has been frozen pretty much since Croatia acceded to the EU in 2013 has been restarted. Opportunities like this one don’t come often.
16. That brings me to the Commission’s Progress Report on Macedonia and its implications for your government and parliament.
17. The Progress Report is positive for Macedonia, which has clearly overcome a difficult and prolonged political crisis and is now pointed in the right direction.
18. But I won’t worry too much about the Commission’s compliments. I’ll focus instead on the missing pieces of the Macedonian part of the puzzle.
19. First and foremost is rule of law. Many of you will know the details of what the Europeans want better than I do, so I won’t bore you with those.
20. I prefer to underline how truly fundamental an independent judiciary is to good governance. The essence of liberal democracy is individual rights.
21. If I am unable to rely on the justice system to protect my rights as an individual, I’ll look elsewhere for security: to my family, my clan, my neighborhood, my language group, my ethnicity, my race, my religion, or my political party. We all have those identities, but when threatened with insecurity one or the other of them becomes dominant, or even exclusive.
22. The result is a political struggle for power among different groups that all consider themselves victims. That struggle has degenerated in post-Communist Yugoslavia into war at least five times. You were witnesses to how bad that is when it happens.
23. But what may not be so apparent is the role of an independent judiciary in making sure that it doesn’t.
24. If I can expect to be treated fairly and objectively by the courts and hence also by the police and the rest of the public administration, I’ve got precious little to fight about, or grievances with which to rally others.
25. There is nothing more important to Macedonia’s future as a state than establishing a judicial system that treats, and is perceived to treat, Albanians and Macedonians, women and men, members of SDSM and VMRO-DPMNE as well as DUI and DPA, equally and fairly.
26. This is especially important when it comes to high-level corruption and abuse of power. It isn’t easy. You are watching in real time as the American judiciary tries to establish whether there were abuses during our last election. We’ll get through it, but not without a lot of problems.
27. You’ll get through it too, again not without lots of problems.
28. One further point: the kind of liberal democracy I am talking about requires a viable, constitutional opposition with a real possibility of alternating in power. That possibility should never evaporate, because it keeps politicians honest and alert to the needs of their constituents.
29. VMRO-DPMNE fell from power in a terrible scandal, but it or some other party that represents its constituency has to have the real possibility of returning to power, as does DPA or some other group now in opposition.
30. Balkan politics need to adjust to the notion that opposition is a vital part of democracy. Being out of power is hard, but just as important as being in it.
31. Someone will say, what about the external factor? Even if we get an independent judiciary, even if alternation in power is a real possibility, even if our opposition is a viable one, Greece is blocking our path not only to the EU but also to NATO. Even if we meet all the EU accession requirements, won’t Athens still be a problem?
32. Yes, is the short answer. You have a choice.
33. There are two directions: a downward spiral of resentment that rejects EU and NATO conditionality and makes Macedonia vulnerable to Russian inducements, leading eventually to violence and partition, as the Russians will of course back the Greeks and those Macedonians who aren’t committed to a real democracy with equal rights.
34. That is the direction you were headed in just a year ago.
35. The other direction is a virtuous spiral that accepts tough NATO and EU conditions and keeps the country intact, leading eventually to a much higher standard of living and elimination of hard borders with Greece and Kosovo.
36. I know of course what I would choose. But what does it mean to accept NATO and EU conditionality?
37. With respect to NATO, I think it was a mistake for the US to say that Greece and Macedonia would have to come to an agreement before membership could be considered. That essentially delegated the US veto to Greece, which has not hesitated to use it, albeit informally.
38. But that deed is done. Now the only way to sync up effectively with the Americans is to reach an agreement with Greece.
39. I know that is painful, but the moment has come. You need to meet Athens somewhere in the middle, with a solution that emphasizes civic and not ethnic identity. Only then can NATO and EU become realities.
40. Let me underline one other point: no matter what formal solution to the “name” issue you decide on, now or in the future, guys like me will continue calling you citizens of Macedonia and your language Macedonian until you ask us to stop, even if the formal agreement is ergo omnes.
41. A Balkan friend whom I asked for advice on this talk wrote back: “The question is how we maintain the EU path with all these problems [throughout the Balkans and in the geostrategic environment]. How do we keep it as a value system and not just as a quick carrot? Can we hold with our institutions and economy until things will get more stable in the EU?”
42. Those are the right questions. It is up to you to answer.