Crunch time

Pantelis Ikonomou, a retired IAEA inspector, writes:

For 25 years the international community with its competent institutions led by the world super powers failed to block the nuclear military program of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and to impose adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Geostrategic miscalculations or leaders’ inability were probably the cause of the persistent failure. The US has done well to unblock the situation, but major obstacles lie ahead.

Here is a short but characteristic history of facts:

• In 1992, IAEA inspectors found inconsistencies in DPRK’s nuclear declarations. The year after, DPRK announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT. Just one day before the withdrawal was due, the US persuaded DPRK to suspend its decision.
• In December 1993, the IAEA announced that it could no longer provide “any meaningful assurances” that DPRK was not producing nuclear weapons. A US initiative saved the situation again. An Agreed Framework was signed between the US and DPRK in Geneva and the IAEA had to monitor its implementation.
• In December 2002, DPRK tampered with IAEA surveillance equipment. A few days later DPRK requested the immediate removal of IAEA inspectors from the country and announced its withdrawal from the NPT.
• In April 2003, DPRK declared it had nuclear weapons. A renewed US initiative led to the six-party talks (USA, China, Russia, South Korea, Japan and DPRK) on solving the nuclear crisis.
• In the following years, DPRK was repeatedly accused of violating the Agreed Framework and other international agreements. Several UNSC and IAEA resolutions were triggered with strong US leadership.

The upcoming May summit of Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un presents a unique opportunity to overcome a long-lasting failure. The political determination of both leaders is certainly the prerequisite for a decisive agreement on the “denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.”

Hence, the US will have to deploy a serious negotiating team with technical experts. The successful implementation of a complex final deal will depend on the completeness and clarity of the comprehensive Plan of Action to be compiled. It should cover all issues related to nuclear, missile and sanctions, linked to relevant UNSC and IAEA resolutions, as well as mutual commitments on military presence in the area.  Notably, all these agreed actions ought to be verifiable and irreversible.

The partly analogous P5+1 Iran deal (JCPOA), although lacking the DPRK’s nuclear military dimension, offers a carefully elaborated model. Yet, at the same time it represents a time bomb: US withdrawal on May 12, as the President has presaged, would be just before the Trump/Kim summit. If that happens, why should Kim Jong-un trust his negotiating partner?

I would add this:

It makes no sense for the US to withdraw from the Iran deal, since that will trigger either renewal of Tehran’s nuclear weapons program (without IAEA inspectors present) or a dramatic breach with America’s European allies (and possibly both). Trump’s loud criticism of the deal has limited the economic benefits to Iran and gotten the Europeans to start talking about an expanded, follow-on version that would limit Iran’s missile program and extend the timeframe. Trump gains nothing more, and loses a lot, if he withdraws.

If, as this suggests, he stays in the Iran deal, that still does not guarantee Trump success with Kim, who has already gotten the audiences with Presidents Xi, Moon, and soon Trump that give him the legitimacy he craves. Kim’s promise of denuclearization is not new. He promised the same in 2005 and never delivered. The decommissioning of the DPRK’s nuclear test site will grab headlines in the next week or so, but keen observers believe the geology there is now so precarious due to underground nuclear tests that it is already unusable.

Meanwhile the US is reported to be talking with Asian allies about the future of its military presence in South Korea. It is precarious, since it is far too small and vulnerable to do much against a DPRK invasion, but serves as a tripwire for broader US intervention if it comes under fire. Kim will aim to eliminate it entirely once a peace treaty formally ending the Korean War is signed, something Trump may even welcome as he made it clear long ago he doesn’t want to be responsible for the security of our Asian allies and suggested they might want to get nuclear weapons of their own.

May is crunch time for the Iran deal and the Rocket Man/Dotard Summit. Hold on tight. It may be a wild ride.