Month: April 2018
The US, the EU and Macedonia
Here are the notes I used speaking in the Macedonian Parliament yesterday with Prime Minister Zaev, EU Ambassador Zbogar, and representatives of the governing and opposition political parties, under the chairmanship Artan Grubi:
- It’s great to be back in Skopje, and an enormous privilege to talk with you here at the Parliament.
- My thanks especially to Artan Grubi for suggesting this occasion, to Samuel Zbogar for tolerating an American’s comments on Europe’s business, and to all of you for being here.
- I’d like to discuss with you the triangle that has so often driven progress in the Balkans in general and in Macedonia in particular: the US, the EU and of course you.
- When those three are in sync, nothing stops us. When they are out of sync, little progress is made on big issues, including those that can threaten peace and stability. The Ohrid agreement is Exhibit 1, but this was also true at Dayton, in the leadup to the fall of Milosevic, and in Montenegro’s successful bid for NATO membership.
- Both the US and the EU have been through a difficult decade. But despite many difficulties, they have maintained their policies on the Balkans
- Career officials in the US State and Defense Departments have kept their previous course, while Vice President Pence and National Security Adviser McMaster have intervened clearly and constructively.
- Washington wants the Balkans peaceful and secure. The best way to ensure that is membership in NATO for those who want it as well as in the EU.
- The situation in Europe is analogous. The Europeans were for years preoccupied with their own financial crisis, the Greek debt debacle, and their consequences for the euro and for growth.
- Europe was also deeply scarred by the refugee influx from the Middle East and Africa and its implications for terrorism.
- Some Europeans have turned to demagogic leaders who promise to protect nativist groups from foreigners, while the British made the enormous mistake of voting narrowly to withdraw from the EU, in large part due to xenophobia.
- But Europe’s economy is now slowly recovering, and the Europeans have become much more alert to Putin’s trouble-making since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the attempted coup in Montenegro in 2016, and this year’s attempted murder of defectors in Britain.
- To my delight, the Europeans, alarmed by Russia, seized an opportunity in February to reopen the political window for EU accession in 2025, saying essentially that those who qualify by 2023 will be welcomed in two years later. They did not say when the window would close.
- For good reasons, many doubt the sincerity and even the feasibility, of this promise to enlarge once again. It is explicitly conditional on internal reforms to strengthen the Union, and it will require ratifications by current members that may prove difficult to elicit, including referenda in France and the Netherlands.
- This is nevertheless an extraordinary opportunity. It is my hope that as many Balkan countries as possible will take advantage of it.
- A process that has been frozen pretty much since Croatia acceded to the EU in 2013 has been restarted. Opportunities like this one don’t come often.
- That brings me to the Commission’s Progress Report on Macedonia and its implications for your government and parliament.
- The Progress Report is positive for Macedonia, which has clearly overcome a difficult and prolonged political crisis and is now pointed in the right direction.
- But I won’t worry too much about the Commission’s compliments. I’ll focus instead on the missing pieces of the Macedonian part of the puzzle.
- First and foremost is rule of law. Many of you will know the details of what the Europeans want better than I do, so I won’t bore you with those.
- I prefer to underline how truly fundamental an independent judiciary is to good governance. The essence of liberal democracy is individual rights.
- If I am unable to rely on the justice system to protect my rights as an individual, I’ll look elsewhere for security: to my family, my clan, my neighborhood, my language group, my ethnicity, my race, my religion, or my political party. We all have those identities, but when threatened with insecurity one or the other of them becomes dominant, or even exclusive.
- The result is a political struggle for power among different groups that all consider themselves victims. That struggle has degenerated in post-Communist Yugoslavia into war at least five times. You were witnesses to how bad that is when it happens.
- But what may not be so apparent is the role of an independent judiciary in making sure that it doesn’t.
- If I can expect to be treated fairly and objectively by the courts and hence also by the police and the rest of the public administration, I’ve got precious little to fight about, or grievances with which to rally others.
- There is nothing more important to Macedonia’s future as a state than establishing a judicial system that treats, and is perceived to treat, Albanians and Macedonians, women and men, members of SDSM and VMRO-DPMNE as well as DUI and DPA, equally and fairly.
- This is especially important when it comes to high-level corruption and abuse of power. It isn’t easy. You are watching in real time as the American judiciary tries to establish whether there were abuses during our last election. We’ll get through it, but not without a lot of problems.
- You’ll get through it too, again not without lots of problems.
- One further point: the kind of liberal democracy I am talking about requires a viable, constitutional opposition with a real possibility of alternating in power. That possibility should never evaporate, because it keeps politicians honest and alert to the needs of their constituents.
- VMRO-DPMNE fell from power in a terrible scandal, but it or some other party that represents its constituency has to have the real possibility of returning to power, as does DPA or some other group now in opposition.
- Balkan politics need to adjust to the notion that opposition is a vital part of democracy. Being out of power is hard, but just as important as being in it.
- Someone will say, what about the external factor? Even if we get an independent judiciary, even if alternation in power is a real possibility, even if our opposition is a viable one, Greece is blocking our path not only to the EU but also to NATO. Even if we meet all the EU accession requirements, won’t Athens still be a problem?
- Yes, is the short answer. You have a choice.
- There are two directions: a downward spiral of resentment that rejects EU and NATO conditionality and makes Macedonia vulnerable to Russian inducements, leading eventually to violence and partition, as the Russians will of course back the Greeks and those Macedonians who aren’t committed to a real democracy with equal rights.
- That is the direction you were headed in just a year ago.
- The other direction is a virtuous spiral that accepts tough NATO and EU conditions and keeps the country intact, leading eventually to a much higher standard of living and elimination of hard borders with Greece and Kosovo.
- I know of course what I would choose. But what does it mean to accept NATO and EU conditionality?
- With respect to NATO, I think it was a mistake for the US to say that Greece and Macedonia would have to come to an agreement before membership could be considered. That essentially delegated the US veto to Greece, which has not hesitated to use it, albeit informally.
- But that deed is done. Now the only way to sync up effectively with the Americans is to reach an agreement with Greece.
- I know that is painful, but the moment has come. You need to meet Athens somewhere in the middle, with a solution that emphasizes civic and not ethnic identity. Only then can NATO and EU become realities.
- Let me underline one other point: no matter what formal solution to the “name” issue you decide on, now or in the future, guys like me will continue calling you citizens of Macedonia and your language Macedonian until you ask us to stop, even if the formal agreement is ergo omnes.
- A Balkan friend whom I asked for advice on this talk wrote back: “The question is how we maintain the EU path with all these problems [throughout the Balkans and in the geostrategic environment]. How do we keep it as a value system and not just as a quick carrot? Can we hold with our institutions and economy until things will get more stable in the EU?”
- Those are the right questions. It is up to you to answer.
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Keeping our bases covered
The Persian Gulf region has seen a buildup in American military power in recent decades. With major bases in various countries – Kuwait (Ali Al Salem Air Base), Bahrain (headquarters of the Fifth Fleet), Qatar (Al Udeid Air Base), and the UAE (Al Dhafra Air Base) among them – the US has grown its military footprint across many of the Gulf.
Today, the operation of American bases has been complicated by the ongoing feud between Qatar and rival Arab Gulf states, most notable Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have cut diplomatic and trade relations since June of 2017. With the crisis showing no sign of resolution, the US is caught in the struggle between its Gulf allies, with America’s military bases put increasingly into question. Will the US follow the demands of its Gulf allies and cut its alliance with Qatar, as some in the White House have indicated?
On April 5, the American Security Project held an event to discuss US military bases in the Persian Gulf region, and their role in furthering American strategic interests in the wake of this crisis. The event featured the Inspector General of the Qatari Armed Forces, Staff Major General Nasser AbdulAziz Al-Attiyah. Joining him were USMP (Ret.) David Des Roches, Associate Professor at the Near East South Asia Center for Security Studies, and Brigadier General (Ret.) Stephen Cheney, CEO of the American Security Project, along with Asha Castleberry, Professor at Fordham University, who served as moderator in the discussion. Watch a full video recording of the event here:
Takeaways:
The Qatari government is very eager for U.S. bases to remain open. As Asha Castleberry and Stephen Cheney opened the event, they noted that it was put together rather quickly, predicated upon the participation of their Qatari guest. Nasser Al-Attiyah, for his part, repeated that the government of Qatar has been a friend and steadfast ally to the US for over 20 years, as exemplified by readiness to accept American air forces after pressure from Saudi Arabia forced them to move in 2003. Al-Attiyah emphasized Qatar’s value to the United States in both economic terms (as the 2nd-largest global buyer of American weapons) and strategic (as Qatar plans to expand Al Udeid Air Base and construct a new US naval base in coming years). His government sees its relationship with the US “as one of our top priorities,” echoing the views of the Qatari palace.
Qatar has been a particularly comfortable host of American troops in the Middle East. Both Stephen Cheney and David Des Roches noted the tricky nature of hosting military bases in the Middle East. The US government insists on legal immunity for American soldiers, despite the Mideast’s distaste for “capitulations” to foreign powers. Bilateral relations can easily become strained. Qatar has given the US few headaches. American soldiers face fewer restrictions based on cultural taboos than other bases in the region (in contrast to Saudi, in particular). The air base at Al Udeid has been notably comfortable for American troops, with ample creature comforts and enough capacity to handle America’s largest aircraft.
The gains of keeping military bases abroad outweigh the liabilities. The speakers listed the benefits of having military bases distributed around the world: ability to respond to situations quickly, maintaining readiness for larger operations, training with allied nations, and allowing public diplomacy to the host country. But there are drawbacks too. Host countries can gain a certain amount of leverage over the United States by threatening to deny troops’ freedoms, but this is only possible when base residents were highly dependent on local infrastructure (as in Panama).
US strategy in the Persian Gulf benefits from keeping an array of regional allies. Building on Stephen Cheney’s comment that withdrawal from the Persian Gulf would be “inherently foolish” given US interests, Des Roches argued that keeping a “constellation of bases” in the region is an asset in case access to any one is suddenly rescinded. While Al-Attiyah assured that Qatar had agreed to lease its base at Al Udeid to the US until 2023, his promise was couched with the caveat that “in our region everything can be changed overnight.”
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The Rocket Man/Dotard Summit
North Korea’s suspension of nuclear and missile tests in anticipation of Kim Jung-un’s meeting with Donald Trump should surprise no one. Had the tests continued, there would have been no meeting. Kim doesn’t want that: the meeting is a big win for him, as it puts him on equal ground with the President of the United States, bolstering his legitimacy at home and abroad. In fact, there have been no tests since November, so the announcement is simply an acknowledgement of the status quo. The alleged abandonment of the nuclear test site may have been caused by geological problems there and is in any event easily reversed. Kim has given up little and gotten a lot.
Far less clear is what the US can get from this meeting. What it has sought in the past is complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization (CVID), which John Bolton in 2004 declared difficult to get. It is certainly going to be harder now, since North Korea now has the missiles and nukes it could only dream of in 2004.
Pyongyang will give up nukes if and only it believes it is getting a better guarantee of regime survival than they provide. That’s not easy to imagine, but it’s what people mean when they start talking about a formal end to the Korean war, which ceased hostilities with an armistice in 1953 but no peace treaty. A treaty ending the war would need somehow to obligate the US and its allies in South Korea and Japan not to seek an end to the extraordinarily brutal dictatorship in Pyongyang.
That would be a giant diplomatic leap from where we are now and is unlikely to be achieved in a first meeting between Presidents Trump and Kim. More likely is initiation of a new negotiating process and a continuation of some “confidence-building measures”: perhaps a pledge not to tighten sanctions, or some loosening of them on humanitarian grounds, an extension of the suspension of testing, return of some IAEA inspectors to North Korea, release of the three Americans imprisoned in the North, future talks and increased economic cooperation between North and South, release of Japanese and South Koreans that the North has abducted.
In negotiations of that sort, the devil is in the details. No one should expect Trump to handle those. The US is going to have to deploy a serious negotiating team with real experts and far more coordination than the Trump Administration usually displays. It’s amazing and reprehensible that CIA Director Pompeo’s secret visit to Pyongyang to talk with Kim over Easter weekend did not lead to the release of the imprisoned Americans, though I suppose Washington may have wanted to hold off on that in order to have a Summit deliverable. President Trump doesn’t want anyone stealing his thunder.
With a decision on the Iran nuclear deal pending before the Rocket Man/Dotard Summit, there is a real possibility Trump will wreck the prospects for any progress before the Summit convenes. Kim isn’t likely to take even modest steps toward de-nuclearization if he sees the US reneging on the painstakingly negotiated Iran deal. Why would he if Washington can’t be relied upon to keep its end of a nuclear bargain guaranteed by Europe and Russia?
It took years to negotiate the Iran deal. It will take just as long to negotiate a serious stand down from North Korea’s nuclear status, if it is even possible. The US will need to be thinking of intermediate steps, as well as pondering how far it wants to go in giving the Kim regime the guarantees of regime survival it will want. Who knew North Korea could be so complicated?
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Peace picks, April 23 – 29
- Washington’s Shifting Syria Policy: Implications for U.S.-Turkey Relations | Monday, April 23 | 11:00am – 12:30pm | Turkish Heritage Foundation | Register here |
As the Syrian civil war enters its eighth year, political dynamics are beginning to shift. On April 4, a tripartite summit to further discussions on the resolution of the conflict was held in Ankara between Turkey, Russia, and Iran – critical countries that once had deeply conflicting priorities in Syria. Notably absent from this high-level diplomacy is the U.S., whose priority in Syria remains fixated on defeating ISIS. On the same day that the presidents of Turkey, Russia, and Iran were meeting in Ankara, President Trump stated his intention to withdraw U.S. troops after the defeat of ISIS, raising questions and concerns about Washington’s long-term role in Syria. The Syrian civil war has heavily strained U.S.-Turkey relations, with Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch in Afrin against the YPG being the most recent example of the troubling rift between the NATO allies. The impact of the shift in Washington’s Syria policy and post-ISIS long-term role will determine the next phase of the relations between the U.S. and Turkey. Featuring Mariam Jalabi (Representative, Syrian National Coalition’s office at the UN), Bradley A. Blakeman (Former White House Senior Staff under President George W. Bush; Commentator, Fox News), Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Peter B. Zwack (Senior Research Fellow, Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies), Dr. Mesut Hakki Casin (Academic, Ozyegin University, Air Force and Turkish Military Academies), and Dr. Sahar Khan (Research Fellow, CATO Institute).
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- ISIS in North Africa: Past and Future Trajectories | Monday, April 23 | 12:15pm – 1:45pm | New America | Register here |
From 2013 through 2014 ISIS recruited thousands of fighters from North Africa to fight in Syria and established a fallback position in Libya. Today, ISIS has lost much of its territory both in Syria and in North Africa. How did ISIS emerge in North Africa and what is its future in the region? Featuring Sarah Yerkes (Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Aaron Y. Zelin (Richard Borow Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy), and David Sterman (Senior Policy Analyst, New America; Co-author, All Jihad is Local: ISIS in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula).
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- The Future of Political Islam: Trends and Prospects | Tuesday, April 24 | 9:30am – 11:00am | Brookings Institution | Register here |
Since the 2011 Arab uprisings, the progression of events in the Middle East has provoked new questions on the role of political Islam in the region. The Arab Spring offered Islamist parties the opportunity and challenge of governance, and the widely varying results led many observers to reconsider basic assumptions on political Islam. Lines drawn between ideology and politics have become blurred. Common conceptions of Islam and the nation-state as incompatible have come under review. As scholars and Islamists alike imagine the future of political Islam, these considerations and others will play a central role. Featuring Shadi Hamid (Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution), Peter Mandaville (Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution), and Jocelyne Cesari (Professor of Religion and Politics, University of Birmingham; Senior Fellow, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs, Georgetown University).
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- Public Protests and Prospects for Reform in Iran | Tuesday, April 24 | 1:30pm – 3:00pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |
Over the last few months, Iran has experienced a series of street protests in rural areas and social arenas once seen as the key support base for the Islamic Republic. Politically active youth are voicing their frustrations with the country’s political, social, and economic prospects. Many of these protests as well as online activism have been met with pushback from conservatives and crackdown from the government. What are the prospects for change in Iran’s existing political system? Is there a dynamic that might foster greater openness, pluralism and democratization? Who are the rising political figures who may lead such a change? How can the international community support a political shift in Iran that benefits its own society? The Middle East Institute is pleased to host Daniel Brumberg (Co-editor (with Farideh Farhi) of Power and Political Change in Iran), Azadeh Pourzand (Co-founder and executive director, Siamak Pourzand Foundation), and Shadi Mokhtari (Professor, American University) to examine the unfolding political struggles in Iran and their potential implications for the Islamic Republic. Alex Vatanka (Senior Fellow, Middle East Institute) will moderate the discussion. ___________________________________________________________
- The Battle for the New Libya | Tuesday, April 24 | 5:30pm – 7:00pm | Carnegie Endowment | Register here |
The death of Muammar Qadhafi in 2011 freed Libya from forty-two years of despotic rule, raising hopes for a new era. But in the aftermath of the uprising, the country descended into bitter rivalries and civil war, paving the way for the Islamic State and a catastrophic migrant crisis. What went wrong? Based on years of field reporting in Libya, Carnegie’s Frederic Wehrey will discuss his new book, The Burning Shores: Inside the Battle for the New Libya, which tells the stories of Libyan lives upended by the turmoil, sheds new light on the country’s afflictions, and provides valuable lessons for the future. Longtime Libyan activist and medical doctor Laila Bugaighis will serve as a discussant and journalist Robert F. Worth will moderate. The discussion will be followed by a short reception, and copies of the book will be available for purchase. Featuring Frederic Wehrey (Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Laila Bugaighis (former deputy director general and CEO, Benghazi Medical Center), and Robert F. Worth (contributing writer, New York Times Magazine; author, A Rage for Order: The Middle East in Turmoil, from Tahrir Square to ISIS).
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- Iraq’s Upcoming Elections: Likely Outcomes and Impact on US-Iraqi Relations | Wednesday, April 25 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
Please join the Atlantic Council for a conversation with a panel of experts to discuss Iraq’s upcoming parliamentary election, post-election dynamics, alliances to form a new government we may see emerge, what political and constitutional reforms the next government needs to adopt, and how the election may impact US-Iraq relations. Featuring Ambassador Feisal al-Istrabadi (Founding Director, Center for the Study of the Middle East, Indiana University, Bloomington), Ambassador Rend al-Rahim (Co-Founder and President, Iraq Foundation), Dr. Harith Hasan Al-Qarawee (Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council), Ambassador Ryan Crocker (Visiting Lecturer and Diplomat-in-Residence, Princeton University), and Ms. Vivian Salama (Political Reporter, NBC News) as moderator. With introductory remarks by Frederick Kempe (President and CEO, Atlantic Council).
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- New Year, New Strategy: Shifting Policies on North Korea in 2018 | Wednesday, April 25 | 1:30pm – 3:00pm | Wilson Center | Register here |
After more than a year of escalating tensions over North Korea’s nuclear provocations and a war of words between Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump, we have seen an abrupt shift in strategy on the Korean Peninsula. Declaring himself content with North Korea’s nuclear weapons arsenal in late 2017, Kim Jong Un began 2018 with a new approach: diplomatic outreach. A summit between Kim and ROK President Moon Jae-in inside the Demilitarized Zone will be held later this month, the first inter-Korean summit in more than a decade. On the eve of the summit between the leaders of the Koreas, several leading scholars will discuss this shift in strategy, including lessons from history, prospects for peace and reconciliation, and implications for the United States as President Trump prepares for his summit with Kim. Join the Wilson Center for a discussion that will provide background and context as a season of summits between the North Koreans and its Korean War foes unfolds. Featuring Abraham Denmark (Director, Asia Program, Wilson Center), Jean H. Lee (Director, Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy), Jung H. Pak (Senior Fellow, SK-Korean Foundation Chair in Korea Studies, Brookings Institution), and Jake Sullivan (Martin R. Flug Visiting Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School). With introductory remarks by Joonho Cheon (Minister, Embassy of the Republic of Korea).
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- Afghanistan in 2020: Is Peace Possible? | Wednesday, April 25 | 2:30pm – 4:30pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
The search for peace has become a central focus of Afghanistan policy in Washington and for Kabul. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani offered the Taliban constitutional reform and status as a legitimate political party in late February on the condition that the group makes peace. In recent months, the Taliban have also publicly offered talks with the United States and prominent Afghan powerbrokers, and high-profile peace demonstrations in conflict-torn Helmand province have spread across much of the country. Featuring Ambassador Timothy Carney (Former U.S. Ambassador to Sudan and Haiti), John Wood (Associate Professor, National Defense University; former U.S. National Security Council Senior Director for Afghanistan), Johnny Walsh (Senior Expert, Afghanistan, USIP; former DOS lead for Afghan reconciliation), Courtney Cooper (International Affairs Fellow, CFR; former U.S. National Security Council Director for Afghanistan), Ahmad Mohibi (Founder and President, Rise to Peace), and Michael Sherwin (Assistant United States Attorney, DOS; former U.S. Navy Intelligence Officer) as moderator.
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- Iran: As Anti-Government Protests Continue, Can the U.S. Help Maintain Momentum? | Thursday, April 26 | 3:30pm – 4:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |
In January, the Iranian regime announced that the anti-government protests that unexpectedly swept through the country had successfully been suppressed. In truth, this struggle continues–if not in the streets, then on social media, on city walls, and in the private lives of citizens. In the eyes of the younger generation of the Shiite majority, who are the backbone of the protests, the mullahs are losing legitimacy. This discontent is not limited to economic grievances and has taken aim at the political and social leadership as a whole. Many of these protests have begun to target laws like mandatory headscarves. Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, the mandatory headscarf for women has been the enduring symbol of the mullahs’ political control and of women’s restricted status. Foregoing the hijab in public is to risk arrest, job loss, lashing, reeducation classes or other punishments, so these protesters have resorted to posting photos and videos of themselves on social media. Featuring Masih Alinejad (Founder, My Stealthy Freedom), Mehrangiz Kar (Iranian feminist scholar), Mariam Memarsadeghi (Co-founder and Co-director, Tavaana), Nina Shea (Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Religious Freedom, Hudson Institute).
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- Investing in Iraq: Reconstruction and the Role of the Energy Sector | Thursday, April 26 | 5:00pm – 6:00pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
On the heels of the Kuwait conference in February, and with an oil and gas bidding round and elections on the horizon, this wide-ranging conversation will focus on the state of investment in Iraq, including the role the energy sector can play in enabling recovery, and the challenges ahead in terms of rebuilding and recovery. Featuring H.E. Dr. Fareed Yasseen (Iraqi Ambassador to the United States), Majid Jafar (CEO, Crescent Petroleum), Ben Van Heuvelen (Editor in Chief, Iraq Oil Report), Ellen Scholl (Deputy Director, Global Energy Center, Atlantic Council) as moderator. With introductory remarks by Frederick Kempe (President and CEO, Atlantic Council).
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Not enough to make a difference
My piece on the US/French/British attack on Syria’s chemical weapons plants is up on The National Interest, three days after I submitted it and without significant changes, but authors aren’t supposed to complain about such things. My only regret is that I didn’t get a chance to insert a few words about ways in which the attack could conceivably shift the political terrain, both internationally and within the US. I am grateful to an unnamed Syrian friend for inspiring this post.
Internationally, the attack in principle could send a strong signal to the Russians that they no longer have completely free reign in Syria. Three permanent members of the UN Security Council are prepared to act without its authorization. The Americans, Brits and French also managed either to evade Russian countermeasures or to convince the Russians not to use them. Of course President Trump undermined the strong signal when he backed off the Russia sanctions his Administration was recommending.
The attack also suggested that those within the Administration who want US troops to stay are gaining ground. There is no real connection between the troop presence in eastern Syria and the attack, but if we care enough to send 105 missiles against Assad presumably we also care enough not to withdraw the troops without something in return. Trump is also the joker in that pack, since he could of course just summarily withdraw, apparently hoping that some Arab force will materialize to do the hard work of stabilization and reconstruction. Fat chance of that.
So I’m afraid even with these political shifts, if in fact they have occurred, the likelihood of any further intervention in Syria is small. The Russians will continue their air assault on Syrian opposition-controlled areas. Assad will either abstain from chemical use for a while or test us by starting small and building up to larger attacks. He has gotten away with it for years–it is even possible the Douma attack was not supposed to kill so many people. I don’t see any sign Trump is ready to attack again unless something big happens.
The Russians meanwhile are delaying the arrival of the inspectors from the Organisation for the Prevention of Chemical Warfare (OPCW) at the attack site, hoping to clean it up thoroughly so that there will forever be some doubt in some people’s minds that a chemical attack even took place. The OPCW in any event doesn’t determine who was responsible for the attack, only whether the chemicals were used. So Assad and Putin can continue to claim that the rebels did it. Why they always use the chemicals against themselves and never against their Syrian, Iranian or Russian enemies doesn’t bother those who are pleased to hear the Russian denials.
So I stick with my main point: Trump did just enough not to be accused of failing to defend his red line, but not enough to make any real difference in Syria’s wars.
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Pragmatism, not ideals
The United States and France look back on a steadfast relationship. Providing support during the American War of Independence, France became the first ally of the nascent United States in 1778. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the Franco-American relationship was strong, despite minor tensions during World War II and the presidency of Charles de Gaulle. In the early 2000s, disagreements over the Iraq War cooled down relations, but cooperation between both states has flourished again in the last decade. However, Donald Trump’s election victory in 2016 and the President’s confrontational rhetoric towards Europe raises questions whether this positive trend will continue.
On April 12, the Atlantic Council hosted a panel discussing the implications of the upcoming state visit of French President Emmanuel Macron to Washington in mid-April. H.E. Gérard Araud, Ambassador of France in the United States, and Pierre-Andre Imbert, Social Policy Advisor to President Macron, offered their perspective along with Frances Burwell, Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council, and Atlantic Council Senior Fellow Jeff Lightfoot, whose recent publication “The French-American Alliance in an America-First Era” provides a broad overview of the current state of US-French relations. Damon Wilson, Executive Vice President at the Atlantic Council, delivered an introductory statement and Susan Glasser, staff writer at the The New Yorker, moderated the discussion.
President Macron has been able to establish a fruitful working relationship with President Trump, according to Ambassador Gérard Araud. As the other European heavyweights Great Britain and Germany have been preoccupied with internal problems during the past year, Macron was able to position France as the primary European interlocutor for the United States after coming to office in May 2017.
Both Washington and Paris are pragmatic. President Macron has decided that France needs to maintain a good working relationship with whoever is in power in Washington. The US administration respects Frances’s international engagement, particularly in combating terrorism in the Sahel and the Levant. Disagreements exist—for instance on the nuclear deal with Iran and trade policies—but are not fundamental. Both Presidents acknowledge each other’s position and remain invested in addressing common challenges with joint forces. The United States and France share similar interests and values and must thus solve global problems together, stresses Araud. The Franco-American relationship will remain strong in spite of Trump’s aggressive foreign policy rhetoric.
Jeff Lightfoot highlights that the French public opinion of Trump is very low and Macron could easily define himself in opposition to the US president. If Trump decides to snub Europe, for instance by revoking the Iran nuclear agreement or imposing tariffs, Macron’s popularity might suffer. Yet Araud argues that the French are able to differentiate between Trump’s personality and the need to maintain a good working relationship with any US president. The ongoing positive dialogue indicates that there exist no fundamental disagreement The problem is rather the US press, which is using Macon against Trump. We should not expect any spectacular outcomes from the state visit.
Whether Macron will be able to maintain his role as Europe’s spokesman largely depends on the outcome of his domestic agenda. Pierre-Andre Imbert underlines that Macron is pursuing fundamental reforms in France. His successes in both the presidential and parliamentary elections have transformed the country’s political landscape. Now the president seeks to utilize his standing to deliver on his promises to prepare France for the future. The overall goal is sustainable, inclusive growth. To achieve this, fundamental reforms—for instance of the labor market— are needed.
Frances Burwell also stresses that the French president needs to maintain his strong domestic standing to be able to both shape the European Union and maintain his role as the primary European interlocutor for the United States. So far, Macron has pushed through his economic reforms with relentless effort. Even though domestic opposition is currently mounting, he still has time to reap the fruits of his policies ahead of the next elections schedule for 2022.
In the meantime, France will continue play a central role in global affairs, says Araud. On the micro level, Paris will in particular seek to revive the international dialogue on Syria to initiate a political transition in the country. Only by doing so, can Syrian be stabilized and vital threats like terrorism and mass migration tackled. On the macro level, Macron will address the crumbling of the Western-dominated world order and seek to reform the current system. The United States remain a crucial partner in taking up this challenge.
In a period of global turmoil, the United States and France depend on strong bilateral relations. Both Presidents are aware of the need for cooperation. In spite of Trump’s antagonistic rhetoric and other gloomy signs, we can expect this bilateral transatlantic relationship to remain strong.
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