Month: April 2018
Syrian chessboard
Entering its eighth year, the civil war in Syria has developed into a serious regional conflict. What started as a popular uprising by the Syrian public against Bashar al-Assad’s authoritarian regime has become a struggle for power between external actors, including both regional heavyweights such as Turkey and major global powers like Russia. Today, the Syrian theater is a battlefield for the mostly opposing interests of these actors. This competition has obstructed any progress towards a peace settlement for Syria. Rather, the conflict of interest is perpetuating the Syrian ‘civil war,’ with dire consequences for the country and its population.
On April 2, the Wilson Center hosted a panel addressing the issue of outside powers and the future of Syria. Moderated by Aaron David Miller, Vice President for New Initiatives and Middle East Program Director at the Wilson Center, the discussion sought to break down the array of interests present in the Syrian conflict and the different roles that Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Israel have assumed. Paul du Quenoy, Associate Professor of History at American University of Beirut, Amy Austin Holmes, Associate Professor of Sociology at American University in Cairo, David Pollock, Kaufman Fellow at the Washington Institute and Director of Project Fikra, and Robin Wright, USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow, offered their perspectives as long-time analysts of Syria and the Middle East.
Paul du Quenoy argues that Russia’s primary interest is to maintain a presence in the Middle East through preserving the Moscow-friendly Assad regime. Following the Arab Spring in 2011, Russia felt marginalized and humiliated. The political changes in countries such as Libya sidelined Moscow in regional affairs and sparked fears that the wave of public protests and regime instability could even reach Russia. To protect its influence in the Middle East, Moscow thus intervened in the civil war in 2015.
Although Russia has achieved its core goal, the overall track record of its intervention has been meager, highlights du Quenoy. Moscow succeeded in stabilizing the Assad regime. However, it is now bogged down in a costly conflict requiring continuous military activities. Russian hopes for becoming the core facilitator of a lasting peace solution for Syria and a central actor in the profitable business of rebuilding the country have not materialized. Instead, Moscow has had to recognize its limited leverage. Since Russia’s strategic interests are tied to the survival the Assad regime, the despot can exert influence on Moscow’s agenda and even obstruct unfavorable Russian policies.
In contrast to Russia, Iran has been more successful at promoting its interests, says Robin Wright. Tehran’s Middle East policy is driven by a feeling of vulnerability. Against the backdrop of its Shia religious orientation, Iran “feels strategically lonely,” that is, it considers itself surrounded by a hostile Sunni camp. To cope with this adverse environment, Tehran seeks to project power beyond its borders. This undertaking of expanding Iranian influence in the Middle East has been mostly implemented through establishing a strategic corridor linking Tehran in the East with Beirut in the West. Syria is an integral part of this land bridge. Although its intervention in the Syrian conflict has been costly, Tehran considers its efforts to sustain the Assad regime a long-term strategic investment essential to Iranian national security.
According to Austin Holmes, Turkey likewise sees its national security at stake in the Syrian conflict. Ankara’s primary interest is to keep the Syrian Kurds—who maintain close relations with their Turkish brethren—at bay. Faced with an ongoing domestic Kurdish insurgency promoted by the PKK, Turkey wants to avoid the establishment of a Kurdish autonomous zone in northern Syria stretching all along the Syrian-Turkish border. In 2016, Ankara launched its first intervention in Syria dubbed ‘Euphrates Shield’ to prevent a connection of the Kurdish cantons of Afrin and Kobane. In January 2018, Turkey stepped up its military activities to further weaken the Kurds, launching operation ‘Olive Branch’ aimed at occupying Afrin. While Ankara succeed at taking over the Kurdish stronghold, the repercussions have been inimical. Holmes stresses that the Turkish attacks on the Syrian Kurds undermine the fight against ISIS and jeopardize the Kurdish governance project of ‘Rojava,’ which she views as seeking to establish democratic principles in northern Syria.
For Israel, the Syrian civil war has become an existence-threatening challenge, says David Pollock. In essence, the Israeli leadership has been preoccupied with its immediate, narrow interest of keeping the border with Syria secure, and has tried to stay out of the broader Syrian conflict. This approach translated into a threefold strategy: (i) securing the Golan Heights as a buffer zone, (ii) reducing the presence of and threats from hostile actors—including Hezbollah, the IRGC, other Iranian militias, and jihadists—near Israeli territory, and (iii) obstructing the transfer of advanced weapons to any of these actors. To achieve these goals, the Israeli air force has in the past conducted targeted air strikes. Israel has also engaged in intensive talks with Russia and has provided humanitarian assistance to populations in southeastern Syria to build strategic goodwill.
However, Pollock points out that Israel’s interests are eroding. Air strikes have merely achieved tactical successes and were unable to prevent Iran and its proxies from expanding their presence in Syria. Perception of a strategic threat is growing. Moreover, the United States remains disinterested in Syria and is unwilling to counteract Iranian encroachment. Israel therefore sees a need to intensify its involvement in the Syrian conflict to protect itself, and will most likely expand its military interventions in the foreseeable future.
Syria’s future looks bleak. The civil war has evolved into an open-ended confrontation among regional and international actors, which will continue to add fuel to the fire. Destruction and killing of innocent civilians will drag on. Unwilling to force an end to the conflict, the West should at least alleviate the human suffering that millions of Syrians both inside and outside the country endure.
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Dare to dream
Alexandros Mallias, former ambassador of the Hellenic Republic to the US and now a special adviser to Eliamep, writes (based on his presentation to the 5th Hellenic High Strategy Conference, March 29 -30:
A process that runs from Tehran to Helsinki via Jerusalem? Madness, or surrealism? Call it utopia, but tomorrow it may become necessity. Allow me to identify six major problems and offer six proposals:
Mismatch between threats, military interventions and their consequences
The so-called “Arab Spring” is not simply a lost opportunity for the Arabs but also a great occasion missed by Europe and the United States as well. For the first time since the rise of “Arab nationalism” in the 1950s, the origin of the revolts did not target Europe, the United States, and Israel. What happened next was due also to our action, miscalculations or inertia and affects our own security and stability.
The unprecedented flow of refugees and migrants to Europe is the unavoidable “collateral damage.” The refugee and migration flows undermined the European integration process and pushed xenophobia and nationalism into mainstream politics. The refugee issue was the catalyst for the Brexit referendum. The European Union is losing a global politico-military partner and capabilities. I earnestly hope this trend will be reversed.
The EU was inadequate, divided and slow to assess the threat, to react, and to act. The lack of a common and integrated foreign policy as a functional common denominator is at the heart of the problem.
Proposal: prevention of population movements should be at the center of political decision-making
The following conditions need to be fulfilled before giving the “green light” for military power:
- Defining the problem: what threat was Libya’ s dictator Muammar Gaddafi to Europe’s security? Is today’s Libya a security provider for Europe?
- A clear political goal: what do we want to achieve? What does success consist of?
- A clear line between wishful thinking and what is possible: no early “mission accomplished” fireworks.
- Political objectives matched by appropriate economic, political, and military means.
Conflicts of interest of the Middle East actors
The vital interests of regional players diverge. They are part of the problem as well as of the solution.
Proposal: a new regional security system covering the Middle East and the Mediterranean
The proposed arrangement might include all MENA States, Iran included, the five Permanent Members of the UNSC and the EU. This idea was floating in the UN Security Council Resolutions (Iran-Iraq cease fire) in the late 80’s.
Without a minimum understanding between the Islamic Republic and Saudi Arabia, there is no possibility of establishing balanced, interest-based security in the wider region of the Middle East and North Africa.
Saudi Arabia is changing. The modernization policies are essential for the Kingdom’s stability and security. Potentially aggressive behavior by Iran during the implementation of Saudi Arabia’s welcome reforms must be prevented. But the stabilization process of the wider Middle East is not achievable without Iran.
Logic dictates that long-term balance of power and interests should allow establishing the terms for the inclusion of Iran, Saudi Arabia and at a later stage Israel in a regional security arrangement, no matter how impossible this perspective looks today. However, logic rarely becomes a mainstream practice in international relations.
We should remember that the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 cemented the era of détente and cooperation, before the end of the Cold War. It included recognition that: “The participating states are convinced that security in Europe is to be considered in the broader context of world security and is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a whole…”
We need to launch a process including the OSCE member-states and the MENA states. The participating states should undertake commitments similar to those adopted within the Helsinki Process. China should also participate.
Nuclear proliferation
The risk of nuclear weapons proliferation in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East is real. It will become unavoidable if Iran gets nuclear capabilities. Already, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and possibly Egypt are contemplating their own nuclear ambitions.
Egypt’s well-known proposal for the creation of a Nuclear-Free Zone in the Middle East sounds good. However, Israel has its own reasons not to back the Egyptian plan.
Proposal: a phased multilateral treaty
First : The elaboration and adoption of a binding multilateral treaty for the non-use of nuclear weapons in the greater Middle East (including Iran).
Second: the Treaty could include a clause that bans, within a defined time schedule (for example 20 years), nuclear weapons in the wider Middle East, establishing a nuclear-free zone. The Permanent Members (P5) of the UN Security Council and the European Union could also be contracting parties.
Ballistic missiles and conventional forces
Iranian ballistic missiles are a threat to Israel’s security. The anticipated improvements in their accuracy and delivery capacity will further increase Israel’s and others’ concern and need for security, deterrence and retaliation.
Proposal: a “Middle East Conventional Forces Control and Reduction Treaty”
This would require the proportional and simultaneous reduction of ballistic and other conventional armaments. It could take the shape of a legally binding instrument similar to the November 1990 Paris “Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.”
We could foresee an intermediate set of Confidence Building Measures, including international inspections and observation of military exercises.
Anachronism and dysfunction of the global collective security system
The UN is unable to discharge its duties as the global collective security system. Unilateral actions by the P5 without foresight actions are well illustrated through their involvement in the Syrian chaos.
Often acting at the margins of their mandate (mainly the UN Charter’s Articles 23 and 24 ) their acts are justified by self-interest. Their motivations are geopolitical; about prevailing and expanding or containing influence.
Proposal: The UN Charter to be revised and the Security Council updated
Τhe post-war composition and the abuse of veto power do not match the present global risks, balance of power and capabilities.
Conclusion
We need to dare to dream. Today’s impossible is tomorrow’s achievement. Peace in the Middle East is not beyond our reach.
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Stay, but not for long
March 29 President Trump declared:
We’re coming out of Syria, like, very soon. Let the other people take care of it now. Very soon—very soon we’re coming out.
He reiterated that sentiment Tuesday. Yesterday the White House confirmed that the troops will stay, at least for now. Apart from the question of who is really commander-in-chief, and whether President Trump has any idea what he is talking about, this ambiguity (or is it vacillation?) leaves us with important questions: should the troops stay or go? What should their goals be?
The only valid purposes for staying should be US national interests, in particular vital ones. Staying only if Saudi Arabia agrees to pay–a proposition the President has floated–violates this first principle. Foreign governments do sometimes pay part of the costs of deployed American forces, but only when the deployment (to Japan, South Korea, Germany, Italy, or Qatar for example) meets the criterion of being in the US national interest. American troops should not be for sale.
What American interests can be served by extending the US presence in Syria, now that the Islamic State has lost almost all of the territory under its control? I think there are three possibilities:
- Prevent resurgence of ISIS, which will continue its insurgency despite its loss of territory.
- Counter Iran’s presence and influence.
- Prevent allied Syrian Kurdish forces from aiding the insurgency inside Turkey.*
A continuing American presence in eastern Syria is not going to bring down President Assad or otherwise hinder his depredation of the Syrian people. It will not expel the Iranians or the Russians. The US hasn’t even been willing to counter Assad’s use of chemical weapons against civilians, never mind the extensive bombing of civilian targets and abuse of those who surrender to “reconciliation” agreements.
Weighing against the continued US presence are many factors: the risks to the small numbers of Americans (2000 or so) spread out over the large territory east of the Euphrates, the dubious legality and legitimacy of the operation (especially once ISIS has been pulverized), the likelihood that our presence will lead to mission creep in either military or civilian directions, and the costs and domestic political sustainability of the operation. The US troops have shown they are capable of defending themselves, having fended off a Russian mercenary attack weeks ago. But sooner or later, dozens or maybe hundreds will be killed or wounded. How long will an impatient president who promised to bring American troops home from the Middle East persist in keeping them there once that happens?
The troops will at some point be withdrawn. The question is what conditions can be created to allow that to happen without imperiling vital US interests.
First and foremost is some minimal stabilization before withdrawal, so that local people will have the means and the will to resist any ISIS resurgence. That is what is going on now. The key is not physical reconstruction, which will take years, but rather clearing mines and rubble as well as establishing a modicum of legitimate governance by and for local people. Here is a lengthy discussion of the issues involved in stabilization of both Iraq and Syria Monday at USIP:
If President Trump, as some have suggested, was talking about Saudi money for the stabilization process, that would make a whole lot more sense than selling our troop presence.
Countering Iran’s presence and influence is not going to be easy. They are on the winning side in this war. They don’t really have to come through the part of Syria US and allied forces control to be present and influential there. It seems to me the best we can do is try to negotiate withdrawal of the Shia militia forces Iran has deployed inside Syria, in exchange for US withdrawal of its ground forces. It might not work of course, especially as the President has already tipped them off as to what he wants. I thought he said he wasn’t going to do stupid things like that. But it might be worth a try.
It will be difficult, to say the least, to sever the tie between the Syrian Kurdish forces (PYD) with which the US has collaborated to defeat ISIS and the Kurds rebelling inside Turkey (PKK). The two organizations are closely tied ideologically and loyal to the same leader. But if the US wants to restore its relations with NATO ally Turkey, that is what it needs to try to do. The first step should be getting the PYD out of Manbij, a mostly Arab town west of the Euphrates, as Vice President Biden promised in the summer of 2016. The US Central Command is dead set against fulfilling that commitment, as it doesn’t want to abandon its Kurdish allies. But that’s why we have civilian control of the military.
The Turks should be able to live with PYD, or at least Kurdish, dominance of the area east of the Euphrates, but the Kurds as well as their Arab allies south will need at least continuation of US air support to prevent the area east of the Euphrates from falling to a revived extremist group, the Syrian armed forces, or Shia militias. As a former colleague pointed out to me yesterday, that is precisely what the US did in Iraq for more than a decade: it enforced a no-fly zone that effectively protected Iraqi Kurdistan from Saddam Hussein. During that time, Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds found a modus vivendi, at least until the Kurdistan referendum last year. The air support would most effectively be provided from Turkey, as it is today. Turkey would expect to receive from the PYD at the very least a verifiable pledge of non-assistance to the PKK, as well as assurances about allowing pluralism in their part of Syria.
The good options in Syria evaporated long ago. The best the US can do now is use its position there to meet limited but important national interests that will endure past the troops withdrawal. That will mean staying, but not for long.
*For those keeping score, here are Secretary of State Tillerson’s deadletter objectives:
1) ISIS and al-Qaeda must suffer an “enduring defeat” and Syria must never again become a platform for transnational terror organization that targets U.S. citizens;
2) Syria’s seven year-long civil war must draw to a close through a brokered diplomatic settlement;
3) Iran’s influence in Syria must be “diminished” and its “dreams of a northern arch…denied;”
4) The conditions should be created to allow Syrian refugees and internally displaced people to return to their homes;
5) Syria must be “free” of weapons of mass destruction.
I’ve watered down 1), eliminated 2), kept much of 3), eliminated 4) eliminated 5), and added Turkey and the Kurds.
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The R word in practice
Natasa Kandic yesterday sent around a policy brief on How the European Union Can Contribute to Reconciliation of Post-Yugoslav Countries. It starts with a review of judicial proceedings in the region and continues on to this account of RECOM, an indigenous effort at non-judicial reconciliation that merits more attention than it has gotten. So I have taken the liberty of publishing that part of the policy brief here:
An Extrajudicial Fact-Finding and Truth-Telling
Body (RECOM)
The regional intergovernmental commission for the establishment of the facts about victims and the circumstances of their death (RECOM), should by its seal prevent the political manipulations and interpretations that jeopardize connectivity and cooperation. This would reduce room for lies, denial, and the production of nationalist narratives about the wars, and contribute to the humanization of the other, the stability and security of the region and the sustainability of economic cooperation, and at the same time enable reforms of educational programs in those parts concerning recent history.
In 2008, non-governmental organizations from the former Yugoslavia established the Coalition for RECOM, which today includes more than 2,100 organizations and individuals and advocates the establishment of a Regional Commission for the Establishment of the Facts on War Crimes and Other Serious Violations of Human Rights Committed in the Territory the Former Yugoslavia (RECOM). The initiative for the establishment of the Commission has been supported by the signatures of over 580,000 citizens from the entire region, and, following a broadly inclusive, four-year consultation process (during which 128 debates were held with 6,700 representatives of civil society), the goals, tasks, competence, duration and procedures of the future intergovernmental commission have been formulated. Starting from this foundation, the final version of the Draft Statute of RECOM was agreed in 2014 by the Special Envoys of the Presidents of Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia, and the Bosniak and Croat members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In the meantime, two new members of the Presidency (2014) were elected in BiH, with which the Coalition for RECOM has not yet managed to hold a meeting, while the Bosniak Presidency member has continued to support the establishment of RECOM. A new President was elected in Croatia in 2015 who believes that support for the establishment of RECOM is outside the scope of the competence of the President. In this situation, in which some newly elected politicians have ceased to support civil initiatives that enjoyed the support of their predecessors, the Coalition for RECOM has created a new strategy, which starts from the affirmation of the Berlin Process as being an appropriate platform for the agreement of post-Yugoslav leaders to launch an intergovernmental project for reconciliation. The first step is to be the signing of the Agreement on the Establishment of RECOM at the Berlin Process Summit in London in July 2018, by which the post-Yugoslav countries’ Prime Ministers, whose support would remain unchangeable (independent of elections), would demonstrate the willingness of their states to initiate procedures for the establishment of RECOM, in accordance with Article 48 of the Draft Statute. An equally important step is to re-engage Croatia in the RECOM process, in which it played a leading role until the beginning of 2015.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The progress in the reconciliation of post-Yugoslav countries requires the following:
1. Strengthening of the domestic judiciaries and their cooperation in the prosecution of war crimes:
– Support for the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT) becoming the engine of regional cooperation in the prosecution of war crimes – to assist in the creation of a regional prosecutorial strategy, to provide easier access to evidence and facts established before the ICTY, and to provide expert support in investigations and in the preparation of indictments against individuals who participated in the planning of mass crimes but today hold positions that protect them from criminal responsibility.
– Resolving bilateral disputes between Serbia and Croatia by signing a bilateral agreement on the prosecution of war crimes, according to which the trials would be held on the basis of the defendant’s domicile, thus in practice eliminating the possible harmful consequences of the application of the universal jurisdiction principle contained in the law of the Republic of Serbia and the Croatian Law on the invalidity of legal acts produced in Serbia.
– The relinquishment by the BiH Presidency of the principle of territorial jurisdiction and acceptance of the standard whereby each state holds trials of its citizens, since this approach contributes the most to critical re-examination within the society and facing its own responsibility towards others.
2. Signing a political agreement by which the post-Yugoslav countries will undertake to create the conditions for the establishment of RECOM within a reasonable time frame:
– Signing of the agreement under the auspices of the Berlin Process at the London Summit in July 2018. The agreement should include the possibility of later accession, as well as an invitation to the other countries in this regard.
– Increasing the visibility of the objectives and tasks of the future Commission, especially the importance of the list of war victims in the context of the humanization of the victims and the public recognition of all 130,000 victims.
3. The action plan of the European Commission’s Western Balkans Strategy for a credible enlargement perspective should provide for explicit measures:
– To support the establishment and operation of the Regional Commission for the establishment of facts on war crimes and other serious human rights violations in the territory of the former SFRY in the period from 1 January 1991 to 31 December 2001 (RECOM), and to define the establishment and commencement of the work of this commission by the end of 2019 as an indicator of progress in the process of reconciliation;
– To support the cooperation of the domestic prosecutors’ offices with the MICT in the creation and implementation of the regional prosecutorial strategy, and define the development of the strategy by mid-2019 as an indicator of progress in establishing the rule of law and contribution to the reconciliation process.
4. The European Parliament should provide strong support to reconciliation in the region
through a resolution that would support the establishment and operation of the
regional intergovernmental commission – RECOM.
5. The European Commission and the European Parliament should organize a donor conference and the establishment of the Post-Yugoslav Reconciliation Fund, which would finance regional projects focusing on peace-building and common issues and include all post-Yugoslav countries.
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An artful Saudi charm offensive
Quite a bit has been written recently about the efforts of the Saudi state – and its de facto leader Mohammed bin Salman, in particular – to win influence in the White House. Little has been said, however, about the parallel track of Saudi public diplomacy aimed at shifting the opinion of the common American.
This charm offensive has ratcheted up in recent days since the announcement of Mohammed bin Salman’s multicity tour of the U.S., which began last Monday. Since then we’ve seen a rash of public-facing events featuring the ambitious Crown Prince: he’s meeting with Oprah; he’s getting a latte at Starbucks; his magazine is on sale at Rite-Aid.
One of the more illuminating events put on during bin Salman’s visit involved the Crown Prince only tangentially. On the night of March 21, the Saudi embassy in Washington teamed up with the Middle East Institute to organize a one-night-only exhibition of Saudi art at Foggy Bottom’s Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts. The event was sponsored by MBS’ personal philanthropic venture the Misk Foundation, with art curated by the associated Misk Art Institute. Despite that morning’s snow, the event saw hundreds of attendees until late into the evening.
Great turnout out @miskartinst exhibition of #Saudi contemporary art. Tonight only at the Kennedy Center. pic.twitter.com/zS3ErYIhxX
— Middle East Institute (@MiddleEastInst) March 21, 2018
Unless you’re among a select sliver of the world’s population, you probably have little familiarity with the world of contemporary Saudi art. Let me assure you, this is exactly what the event’s organizers expect of you. A newly-published overview of Saudi art summarizes the conversation they want you to have:
For the Kennedy Center, Misk chose to feature a variety of pieces from Saudi artists, ranging from modernist installations to more traditional paintings. There were quasi-political works such as Ahmad Angawi’s installation Street Pulse, whose microphones reflect a thirst for free expression, and Nugamshi’s video Mirage, in which the artist uses crude oil to write out the title. Both Amr Alnagmah’s photography piece Digital Spirituality and Ahmed Mater’s Magnetism to frame the Kaaba in a new light, while Angawi’s Wijha 2:148 (see below) depicts the massive development taking place in Mecca since the 1980s. Not everything is new, however – the event also featured a number of massive murals, painted by a team led by husband and wife Ali Moghawi and Fatimah Hassan in a style known as Al-Qatt Al-Asiri, recognized in 2017 on UNESCO’s list of Intangible Cultural Heritage.
Ahmad Angawi – "Wijha 2:148 – And everyone has a direction to which they should turn" (2013) | One of the contemporary Saudi art works on display tonight only at the Kennedy Center | Information: https://t.co/mKFovRYELr pic.twitter.com/qHuE3LKq0v
— Middle East Institute (@MiddleEastInst) March 21, 2018
As if to certify the importance of the event, the exhibit was visited by a number of Saudi dignitaries, including Minister of Culture and Information Awwad al-Awwad and royal family member (and noted art enthusiast) Prince Badr bin Abdullah. If the intent behind visits from these big names was to draw in more attendees, I can vouch for its success – many people I spoke confessed they had no knowledge the event was happening until they spotted the Saudi delegation moving through the Kennedy Center. The extra publicity attracted some unfriendly attention as well, with protesters from Code Pink arriving early to demonstrate against the Saudi war in Yemen.
Beyond the quality of the art, what does all this effort say about the Saudi state? The ruling clique in Riyadh is trying to sell themselves as ambitious reformers of their aging system. So far, the Saudi soft power initiative has been focused on personal outreach. This event, however, confirms Mohammed bin Salman’s ambitions for advancing not just his own image to a US audience, but also the image of a new Saudi nation that he intends to debut. If the Misk Foundation’s art initiative is any indication of a trend, MBS aims to convince even the average American that a dynamic, cultured Saudi Arabia is on the rise. So yes, art from Saudi Arabia. And undoubtedly a whole lot more to come.
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Next year in Jerusalem
Israel’s use of deadly force against mostly nonviolent Gaza demonstrators on Friday raises lots of questions: as none of the Palestinians succeeded in crossing the border fence, why did the IDF use live ammunition? They claim to have fired only on those using violence or trying to cross into Israel, but on the Gaza side there are lots of videos and eye witnesses contradicting that claim. Was the Israeli government focused on violent militants, or was it really trying to frighten masses of nonviolent Palestinians away from the demonstrations? “Violence” in this instance seems to refer to throwing of stones, but the Israelis present seem to have been well out of range. Burning tires and approaching the border fence are definitely not violent or terrorist acts. Why are they being referred to as such?
I suppose we’ll never know the answers to these questions, as the Israelis will not allow an independent investigation. They appear to me genuinely frightening by the prospect of thousands of Palestinian refugees walking peacefully into Israel and claiming their rights to land their grandparents left, or were compelled to leave, in 1948. The Israelis are determined not only to stop that kind of popular protest, even if peaceful, but also to scare Palestinians into submission. Doing so redounds to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s benefit in domestic politics: his supporters are unconcerned with the deaths of Palestinians and devoted to an expansive vision of Israel’s security needs.
During my visits to both Israel and Palestine in January, I was unable to visit Gaza, but talked with a nonviolent activist who lives there. Gaza is desperate. Even the White House recognizes that the conditions in which its two million people are living–without adequate clean water, little electricity, limited medical care, and few jobs–are unacceptable. Who would not want to demonstrate? The Israelis and the Palestinian Authority would like the refugees to blame Hamas, which has controlled Gaza since 2006. Hamas is supporting the demonstrations, trying to deflect criticism for its governance failures. It seems to be succeeding, not least because it too uses violence and brooks little opposition.
Of course Palestinian lives matter to the friends, families, and communities from which they come. The fifteen or more reported killed Friday will have hundreds if not thousands of relatives and personal acquaintances who will mourn them, in addition to a far wider circle who feel they are martyrs to the Palestinian cause. Will future protests attract more than the 30,000 or so who attended the first demonstration? The plan has been to repeat them until May 15, the day Israelis celebrate the country’s 1948 independence while Palestinians mark the nakba (catastrophe).
But Palestinian lives matter in other respects too. Israel may be an electoral democracy, but it is not a liberal democracy that treats everyone as having equal rights. This matters because its friends in Europe and the US shouldn’t settle for less. Either Israel needs to treat the Palestinians whose Gaza and West Bank territory it embargoes as equal to its own citizens, or it has to let them establish their own state and allow them to govern it as they see fit, so long as it doesn’t threaten Israel. For most American Jews, there is no acceptable in-between, as Ron Lauder recently pointed out. Most of us will not support an increasingly theocratic Israel in which Palestinian lives don’t matter.
It is ironic that the Jewish and Palestinian historical narratives are mirror images of each other. The Jews were exiled almost two thousand years ago and now feel it is time to reclaim their ancient lands. The Palestinians were exiled 70 years ago, from lands they had occupied for most of those two thousand years. “Next year in Jerusalem,” the cry with which Jews finished the Passover Seder Friday evening, could just as well be uttered by Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza, most of whom do not have the permit required to reach the Haram al Sharif. It is time for all of us to acknowledge the others’ aspirations. Palestinian lives do matter.
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