Backfire
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu yesterday obliterated his own argument against the Iran nuclear deal. Let’s leave aside whether it is appropriate for a country that has clandestinely produced nuclear weapons to criticize others for attempting to do the same thing. Netanyahu presented evidence that before 2004 Iran had such a clandestine nuclear weapons program. This is well known and confirmed at the time by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It is a major reason the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is needed: to stop and to some extent reverse Iran’s progress toward nuclear weapons.
Netanyahu doesn’t like the JCPOA because some of its provisions expire in the 2020s and none of its provisions deal with ballistic missiles. What he has failed to explain is how the US withdrawing from the deal now would fix that or in any other way make Israel and the US better off. The Europeans have made it plain they will stick with the deal if the Iranians do. The Iranians are divided: some want to keep to it while others want to withdraw. If they continue the deal with the Europeans, US re-imposition of sanctions is unlikely to get Tehran to negotiate a follow-on agreement. The sanctions worked in 2015 because everyone was supporting them. If the Iranians withdraw, they can go hell bent for nuclear weapons immediately.
If US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal doesn’t benefit Israel, what then might Netanyahu be trying to achieve? One possibility is a crisis that would result in a US attack on Iran’s remaining nuclear facilities. Another is the worsening of Iran’s economic situation to encourage demonstrations and eventual regime change.
Both of these are dicey propositions. While the US certainly now has an excellent idea of precisely where the nuclear facilities are located (credit to the IAEA), any attack on them would precipitate Iranian retaliation against US forces and civilians in the Gulf, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere, in addition attacks on Israel from Gaza, Lebanon and Syria as well as from Iran. Trying to prompt regime change is always iffy, but especially so in an Islamic Republic that has weathered several episodes of mass demonstrations that might have brought down a less entrenched or less brutal regime.
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Netanyahu is pushing for a withdrawal from the JCPOA without any clear notion of what the benefits might be. That however isn’t likely to phase Donald Trump, whose ability to reason things through is limited. He likes acting on impulse, especially when flattered by someone he thinks well of like Netanyahu. Sheldon Adelson’s campaign contributions are no doubt another factor in favor of withdrawal.
Fortunately, there will be some in the Administration who will argue against, noting that the US has already gotten most of the benefits withdrawal might produce: the Europeans are open to discussing a follow-on agreement that could encompass ballistic missiles and banks have hesitated to provide financing to Iran and those who want to do business there. The US, by contrast, continues to benefit from the IAEA inspections and the delay in Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Secretary of Defense Mattis has made it plain that Iran is complying with the JCPOA, which has ample provision for verification. He no doubt also understands that the prospects for a nuclear deal with North Korea, already dim, would evaporate entirely if the US walks away from the JCPOA.
So Netanyahu’s showy non-TED talk yesterday was unconvincing. I’d would say it even backfired. The US (and Israel) will be far better off if the US stays in the nuclear deal.
PS: A chat April 30 with someone well-informed about Israel suggested Netanyahu’s aim is to get the Europeans to re-impose sanctions, so that the Iran of the 2020s is far less resource-rich than it would be otherwise. Asked why the Europeans would do that, I was told they are more afraid of war with Iran than they are of reimposing sanctions. That game is called chicken and often ends in catastrophe.
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