No formula for success

The downsides of withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal are all too obvious. But it behooves any conflict management type like me to consider the other side: what does the Administration think it will accomplish, and why do some allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia support withdrawal?

The Administration is saying that its main reason for withdrawing was the sunset clause, that is the expiration of parts of the agreement seven years from now. That sounds silly: why not wait until just before the agreement expires to threaten re-imposition of sanctions in order to negotiate a follow-on agreement? The answer is that Washington is trying to prevent Iran from gaining the economic benefits that will accrue during those seven years.

The Administration’s goal is to squeeze Iran through not only re-imposition of US sanctions but also through secondary sanctions that will dis-incentivize European, Russian, Chinese, and other companies from doing business with Tehran. Proponents of withdrawal believe this will at least limit Iranian capabilities–non-nuclear as well as nuclear–and make Iran less of a threat in the future. Some Americans seem to hope it will even bring the Islamic Republic to its knees, precipitating regime change.

These effects would depend on virtually universal adherence to the re-imposed sanctions. Why would the Europeans, Russians, and Chinese play ball? A well-informed Israeli put it this way, with respect to the Europeans: they fear war with Iran more than they fear re-imposition of sanctions. They will, in other words, go along in order to avoid an American attack on Iran. Even if you believe that–and I doubt it–it leaves Russia and China unconstrained. They are unlikely to be as easily cowed as the Europeans. They and many other countries will gladly do business with Iran, surreptitiously if not openly.

There is thus no reason to believe that sanctions can be made nearly as tight as they were in 2015 when the UN Security Council was unanimous and the nuclear deal was negotiated. Nor do I think the Europeans will buckle easily to American will. They are far more likely to try to sustain the agreement, which is what Iranian President Rouhani is saying he wants to do as well, so long as Tehran sees the consequent economic benefits.

If the Europeans withdraw, I suspect the Iranians will ramp up their enrichment activity and weapons research so as to reduce their breakout time to well under the one year the nuclear deal was designed to maintain. But Tehran will also want enough transparency through international inspections to ensure that the Israelis and Americans can be reasonably confident they are not actually producing nuclear weapons. It is not in Tehran’s interest for there to be any doubt on that score, since Israel can be expected to react or even pre-empt in kind if it perceives that it might be subject to a nuclear attack.

As for the hope that Iran may be constrained or even fatally weakened by re-imposed sanctions, that day is far off. It suits the Islamic Republic, especially its hardliners, well to have a foreign enemy it can blame for its own economic failures. The public demonstrations of the last year or so occurred precisely because the regime could no longer blame only the foreigners. Nor do I know of any regime that has wanted nuclear weapons that couldn’t find the financial resources to fund the program. North Korea has demonstrated how even a very poor country can do it. Iran will do likewise, no matter what sanctions are re-imposed.

As in many things, Trump has over-estimated his own power and underestimated his enemy. That is not a formula for success.