What to do about the Balkans

The European Union at the Thessaloniki Summit of 2003 affirmed its most powerful tool of democratization: enlargement. The Balkans had often been viewed until then as a ‘dark hole’ of Europe. The EU hoped that conditionality would pull the war-ravaged landscapes of the Western Balkans closer to the liberal democracies of its members states and ensure regional stability.

Fifteen years later and $20 billion from the European Union and $4 billion from the United States (excluding military aid), the post-Yugoslav countries of the Balkans have arguably created legal frameworks that resemble the liberal democracies, and there has been no war.  Yet the region remains a space where endemic corruption and stagnation rule.

May 17 another EU-Western Balkans Summit took place in Sofia, Bulgaria, bringing together heads of state or government from EU member states and leaders from the 6 Western Balkans partners: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. President of the European Council Donald Tusk announced that

the European Union is and will remain the most reliable partner of the entire Western Balkans. And in very concrete terms we discussed how to improve connections with and within the Western Balkans region.

Tusk underlined the EU’s “connectivity agenda” for the region and clarified that this is “

neither an alternative, nor substitute for enlargement. It is a way to use the time between today and tomorrow more effectively than before, so that our citizens and businesses are not waiting for the benefits of EU integration. Because I don’t see any other future for the Western Balkans other than the EU. There is no other alternative, there is no Plan B.

This reiteration calmed fears among local population and politicians that the EU was backtracking on its enlargement commitment.

On the same day, the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies hosted a discussion titled “The Transatlantic Alliance and the Western Balkans: Regional Challenges and Options for a Common EU-US Response.” The panel included:

1. Lord Paddy Ashdown, Member of the House of Lord and former High Representative and EU Special Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina
2. Marsaili Fraser, Former Head of the Political Department of the EU Special Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina
3. James O’Brien, Vice Chair of Albright Stronebridge Group (ASG) and Former Special Presidential Envoy for the Balkans
4. Majda Ruge, Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins SAIS 

The panelists discussed the current state of play in the Western Balkans and offered recommendations for a common EU and US response.

Ruge reiterated the challenges currently haunting the region arising from the tension between the EU agenda and political realities on the ground. The socio-political landscape in the Balkans 15 years after the Thessaloniki summit includes unresolved conflicts and bilateral issues, complex and muddled jurisdictions (as seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Northern Kosovo), irredentism (recent flirtations with the idea of changing borders and secession in Bosnia), and backsliding on crucial democratic institutions and norms.

Ruge stressed as well the effects of Middle East instability on the Balkans and the EU. In 2015, the flow of refugees reached unprecedented levels since WWII, with 764,038 border crossings through the Balkans route into the EU.

There are also successes in the region. Ruge cited the new government in Macedonia as building bridges rather than relying on divisive rhetoric, as well as Albania’s commitment to enhance the rule of law in line with EU standards by setting up internationally-supervised vetting procedures for the appointment of judges and prosecutors.

Ashdown stated that despite the transatlantic engagement in the region manifested through billions of dollars in aid and expertise, the Western Balkan states cannot operate at a level of functionality that would make them welcome EU members. Nor can they deliver to their citizens the benefits that justify loyalty to the state. The EU and the US have failed. Corruption remains endemic in the region, “as deeply embedded as when I went there in 2002 and not much has changed.”

Among the few successes, Ashdown listed the absence of war, and in some cases states that have shuffled a bit closer to the standards that would allow them to be members of EU. But overall, the Balkans pretend to reform, and the international community pretends to believe them.

Ashdown reminded his audience that you cannot save the maiden if you are not prepared to kill the dragon. The dragon we keep on failing to identify and slay is the dysfunctionality of the states. Brussels and Washington should sync their efforts and always act in a united fashion and employ muscular conditionality. The EU and the US should have a regional policy (and not different enlargement packages for each country) as a way to exploit regional linkages.

O’Brien spoke on US engagement in the region, emphasizing that Washington has a short-term focus on bigger wins, for example over the last year the Macedonia name issue and the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. These are efforts to put out fires and achieve outcomes within the 1-2 year lifespan of a deputy assistant secretary. O’Brien would prefer the US focus on institutions that allow for political competition and rotation of power as well as reach out to parts of society that do not feel represented.

Fraser believes that the prospect of membership is still necessary (although it may not be sufficient) to stabilize the region. Enlargement remains the EU’s most effective foreign policy tool. However, the enlargement process that happened in the countries of Eastern Europe should not be copy-pasted to the Balkans. The EU should be mindful that political elites were crucial to the process and were conforming to EU standards before being asked to do so.

In the Balkans, the most glaring problem is lack of political will. Political elites are reluctant to undertake difficult reforms that undermine their own interests. Nonetheless, enlargement can still drive progress in the region. The EU should get better at selling the benefits of membership not only to political elites but also to the general population of the Balkans.  Furthermore, the EU should get better at naming-and-shaming politicians who are not implementing EU reform policies.