Month: May 2018
Stop griping
Marija Jovicevic at the Montenegrin daily Pobjeda asked some questions. I answered:
- New elected president of Montenegro Mr. Đukanović said that he will work on better relations with Moscow. Can we expect improvement of relations because Mr. Putin congratulated victory to Mr. Đukanović for presidential elections and said that relations between two countries should be better? How do You read this messages? Does anything at all depend on Montenegro?
A: There is no harm in principle for a NATO member to seek good relations with Moscow, but it depends on what terms. I think President Djukanovic has demonstrated his fortitude in resisting Moscow’s worst behavior, which included a murder/coup attempt. If he can now improve relations with Moscow while remaining faithful to EU and NATO concerns, all to the better. I might doubt it can be done, but it is worth a try.
2. Representatives of non-governmental organizations wrote letter to European commission that Brussels should stop negotiations with Montenegro because we not do enough in the fields of judicial reforms .Do You think that it is a work of non-governmental organizations or they should help government in the process of European integrations?
A: Insisting on judicial reform will help with the process of European integration, and civil society should be free to do as it sees fit, within legal limits. Writing a letter to Brussels is certainly within those limits. Civil society may also want to help, but it is not the government’s handmaiden.
- EU and western Balkans will host a big summit in Sofia on 17 May. Do you expect any big steps in this partnership? Do You think that big summits are not enough that EU needs to do more for Western Balkans?
A: I think the Western Balkan countries need to do more for themselves. They’ve been offered a date for new accessions to the EU, which is also prepared to help them meet the requirements of the acquis. It’s time to stop griping and start performing.
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America alone is weak
Here’s how I see the US in the Middle East today:
- Move of its embassy to Jerusalem will mark the end of a role for Washington as mediator in negotiations between Israel and Palestine.
- Support for the Kurds in northern Syria is pushing Turkey further from the NATO alliance and into the arms of the Russians.
- Withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and the threat of sanctions will push the Europeans into the arms of the Iranians.
- Encouragement of Saudi and Emirati belligerence towards Qatar has split the Gulf Cooperation Council and pushed Qatar towards Iran.
Abandoning the Washington consensus, the Trump Administration is proving why that consensus existed: it ensured that the United States maintained alliances and could act with multilateral approval on a wide range of issues. America First is indeed proving to be America Alone.
There are few benefits to the US from this break with the past. The move of the embassy to Jerusalem will please Trump’s evangelical Christian and conservative Jewish supporters, but most American Jews are liberal and understand why it would have been better to await a final status settlement and creation of a Palestinian state before moving the embassy. US support for the Kurds has enabled a victory over the Islamic State but now threatens to further undermine relations with Ankara and Alliance solidarity. No one even pretends that withdrawing from the Iran deal will do any good, since Russia and China will not rejoin sanctions (and the Europeans will fight them). The split in the GCC benefits Iran and Turkey, not the US.
The countries pleased with what Trump is doing are Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. This is the new alliance Washington hopes to array against Iran. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are struggling to hold their own militarily and politically in Yemen, one of the world’s poorest countries. Can they be relied on for more than sword dance extravaganzas? Trump’s unconditional support for Israel has given a whole lot more than it has gotten. The Israelis continue to expand settlements on the West Bank and to kill Gaza demonstrators. Trump apparently expects no more more restraint on the part of others than he demonstrates himself.
America is losing ground in the Middle East even faster than under President Obama, who notoriously thought we were spending too much treasure and effort there. Trump used to think so too, but now National Security Adviser Bolton is pushing him towards confrontation with Iran, in an apparent attempt to precipitate regime change. That would be much more likely if the Iran deal had been maintained. Withdrawal from it gives Iranian hardliners more political support and the regime a good excuse for why economic performance is so bad.
Oddly, Trump has done virtually nothing to respond to Iranian behavior in the region, which is unquestionably nefarious. Particular in Syria but also in Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, and Iraq Trump has done nothing beyond what his predecessor already was doing to push back against Iran. America Alone is a weak America, not a strong one.
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Peace picks, May 14 – May 20
- The Fallout from Trump’s Decision on the Iran Deal | Monday, May 14 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
May 12 is the deadline for President Trump to renew sanctions waivers under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In January, he vowed to pull out of the JCPOA unless European nations met his demands for new pressure on Iran’s ballistic missile program, more stringent inspections of Iran’s military installations and a commitment to extend curbs on the Iranian nuclear program beyond the terms of the nuclear deal. The Future of Iran Initiative, the Global Business and Economics Program, and the Middle East Security Initiative invite you to a discussion of the ramifications of Trump’s decision on the likely responses of Iran and US European allies as well as the consequences for non-proliferation and conflict in the Middle East. A conversation with Axel Hellman (Policy Fellow; European Leadership Network), Elizabeth Rosenberg (Director, Energy, Economics and Security Program; Center for a New American Security), Ali Vaez (Iran Project Director; International Crisis Group), and David Mortlock (Nonresident Senior Fellow, Global Energy Center; Atlantic Council). Moderated by Barbara Slavin (Director, Future of Iran Initiative; Atlantic Council), with keynote remarks by David O’Sullivan (Ambassador and Head, European Union Delegation to the United States).
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- How to Talk to North Korea | Monday, May 14 | 10:00 am – 11:00 am | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here |
As a possible Trump-Kim summit draws closer, join Carnegie for a conversation about what negotiating with North Korea is really like. Previous U.S. negotiators and experts will talk about what lessons have been learned in previous rounds of talks, and what the United States should know going forward. The New York Times’ Mark Landler will moderate. Panel includes Suzanne DiMaggio (Director and Senior Fellow, New America), Robert L. Gallucci (Professor, Georgetown University), Christopher Hill (Professor, University of Denver), and Daniel Russel (VP for International Security and Diplomacy, Asia Society Policy Institute)
- US Policy Towards Iran: Strategic Options | Monday, May 14 | 10:00 am – 11:30 am | Bipartisan Policy Center | Register Here |
The president’s decision on the future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has dominated the discussion in Washington. But recent events also reinforce the need for an American strategy for the broader challenge posed by Iran. Returning some measure of stability to the increasingly fractured Middle East—a vital and enduring U.S. national security interest—requires confronting the spread of Iranian influence.
Join us on May 14 for a discussion on Iran’s influence in Syria and Iraq, and the release of a report from the Task Force on Managing Disorder in the Middle East on U.S. Policy Toward Iran: Strategic Options. Fireside chat includes Amb. Eric Edelman (Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey) and Jake Sullivan (Former Director of Policy Planning, U.S. State Department and Former National Security Advisor to the Vice President). Panel includes Amb. James Jeffrey (Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and Iraq), Mary Beth Long (Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs), Denise Natali (Director, Center for Strategic Research at the Institute for National Strategic Studies) and Blaise Misztal (Director of National Security, Bipartisan Policy Center). Moderated by Arshad Mohammed (Diplomatic Correspondent, Reuters).
A Tale of Two Elections: Recapping the Polls in Lebanon and Iraq | Tuesday, May 15 | 12:00pm – 2:00pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |
As Lebanon holds its first parliamentary elections in nine years and Iraq paves a way forward in the aftermath of the war against ISIS, many questions remain as to what the political future holds for both countries. The parliamentary elections in Lebanon on May 6, and in Iraq on May 12, serve as a barometer for transparency, inclusion, and the political realities in both countries. The polls have raised pressing political and governance issues such as how to overcome sectarianism, corruption, and economic stagnation in order to encourage further openness and plurality. The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a panel discussion to examine these issues. MEI’s Bilal Y. Saab and Paul Salem will be joined by Abbas Kadhim (SAIS), Omar al-Nidawi (Gryphon Partners), and Bilal Wahab (WINEP) for a two-hour panel event moderated by MEI’s director for conflict resolution and the Track II Dialogues initiative, Randa Slim.
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5. Cuba: Post-Castro Transition | Wednesday, May 16 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |
In April, Miguel Díaz-Canel became the 19th President of Cuba and the first in over 40 years who was not a member of the Castro family. This appointment — not election — of a new Cuban president raises a number of important questions about the future and stability of the regime. In a post-Castro era, Cuban politics will likely change, though the direction and magnitude of those changes remains to be seen. On May 16, Hudson Institute will host a panel to explore these issues and discuss the possibility of a democratic transition on the island. Panelists will include Eduardo Ulibarri, a Costa Rican journalist, diplomat, university professor, and international consultant; Hector E. Schamis, a teacher at Georgetown University’s Center for Latin American Studies and Democracy & Governance Program; and Ambassador Jaime Daremblum, senior fellow and director of Hudson Institute’s Center for Latin American Studies.
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6. Decision Point: Iran, the Nuclear Deal, and Regional Stability | Wednesday, May 16 | 1:00pm – 2:30pm | Wilson Center | Register here |
President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear agreement will have far reaching implications for U.S. policy; the trans-Atlantic alliance; non-proliferation efforts; and even on regional stability – particularly in the Israeli-Lebanese-Iranian-Syrian arena. Indeed, those implications may go far in defining the U.S. posture in the region for years to come. Join us as four veteran analysts and policy advisers on the Middle East assess the implications of the president’s decision, including on U.S. foreign policy in the region at large. Featuring speakers Robert S. Litwak (Senior Vice President and Director of International Security Studies, Wilson Center), Michael Singh (Managing Director and Senior Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy), Ray Takeyh (Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations), and Tamara Cofman Wittes (Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution). Moderated by Aaron David Miller (Vice President for New Initiatives and Middle East Program Director, Wilson Center), with introductory remarks by Jane Harman (Director, President, and CEO, Wilson Center).
There will be a live webcast of this event.
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7. Turkey’s Early Elections | Wednesday, May 16 | 2:00pm – 3:30pm | SETA Foundation | Register here |
On June 24, Turkey will hold its first presidential and parliamentary elections under the new presidential system that was adopted in the 2017 constitutional referendum. In the presidential race, several political parties have nominated their own candidates, while in the parliamentary elections, several parties have formed alliances to gain the majority in the legislature. The winner of the presidential election will form the first Turkish government under the new presidential system for the next five years. The parliamentary makeup will be of critical importance in the transition to the new system. Please join the SETA Foundation at Washington DC for a timely discussion on Turkey’s upcoming June elections, current coalitions, political party dynamics, and the future of Turkish politics. With speakers Ihsan Aktas, President, GENAR Research and Polling; Nebi Mis, Director, Domestic Policy, SETA Foundation; and Murat Yesiltas, Director, Security Policy, SETA Foundation; with moderator Kilic Bugra Kanat, Research Director, SETA Foundation.
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8. The Risk of Interstate War(s) in the Middle East | Thursday, May 17 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Middle East Institute | Register here |
While armed nonstate actors and proxy militias have been grabbing most headlines in recent years, the risk of interstate war in the Middle East is rising at an alarming rate. Tensions between Israel and Iran have boiled over several times in recent weeks in Syria, risking a serious escalation between the two countries. Iranian-supplied missiles have been launched from Houthi-held areas in Yemen targeting Riyadh and other Saudi towns and cities, risking an escalation between the two regional powers. Tension also persists between the United States and Iran as the Trump administration moves away from the JCPOA. In Syria, U.S. and Russian forces are flying missions in a crowded air and military space; the risk of escalation there between the two superpowers also cannot be discounted. How high is the risk of interstate war in the Middle East? What are the dynamics of these various tension axes? How could the United States and other regional and international powers help avert such potential outbreaks? The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a panel featuring Martin Indyk of the Brookings Institution, Kenneth Pollack of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), MEI’s Bilal Y. Saab, Julianne Smith of the Center for New American Security (CNAS) to discuss these mounting tensions and how best to address them. MEI’s senior vice president for policy research and programs, Paul Salem, will moderate the discussion.
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9. Decentralization in Tunisia — Empowering Towns, Engaging People | Thursday, May 17 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register here |
Tunisia’s first ever democratic local elections in May are a crucial step in the country’s efforts to devolve power from the national to the local level. In their latest paper, Decentralization in Tunisia: Empowering Towns, Engaging People, Carnegie Fellow Sarah Yerkes and Vice President for Studies Marwan Muasher argue that if done right, decentralization will both empower local actors and introduce a new political class outside of the country’s traditionally dominant political parties. Successful decentralization requires strong political will from central government officials, who must demonstrate their commitment to participatory local governance both on paper and in practice, and from local officials who must build trust with their constituents, provide opportunities for citizen engagement, and prevent the recreation of ineffective institutions at the local level. With the participation of Carnegie Senior Vice President for Studies Thomas Carothers and PBS NewsHour’s P.J. Tobia in the first session (10:05 – 10:45); Director of the Tunisian Institute of Elected Officials Elyès Ghanmi, independent consultant on local and international governance Laura J. Hogg, and programmes director at the Jasmine Foundation and researcher at Sciences Po Paris Intissar Kherigi with Sarah Yerkes and Marwan Muasher in the second session (10:50 – 12:15).
A light lunch will follow.
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10. The Transatlantic Alliance and the Western Balkans | Thursday, May 17 | 10:30am – 12:30pm | Johns Hopkins SAIS | Register here |
Amid a growing number of foreign policy rifts between the United States and the European Union, the Western Balkans remains one region where the new US administration has identified an opportunity for close cooperation with Brussels. As European political leaders convene in Sofia for the Western Balkan Summit, we will talk about the past and present challenges to transatlantic cooperation in the Western Balkans and how these might be overcome. As European political leaders convene in Sofia for the Western Balkan Summit, we will talk about the past and present challenges to transatlantic cooperation in the Western Balkans and how these might be overcome. The timing for such a discussion is critical, given the renewed secessionist threats in the region and the need for a joint US and EU response to grapple with this challenge. A conversation with Lord Paddy Ashdown, Member of the House of Lords and former High Representative and EU Special Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina; Ms. Marsaili Fraser; former Head of the Political Department of the EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and Mr. James O’Brien, Vice Chair of Albright Stonebridge Group and former Special Presidential Envoy for the Balkans; moderated by Dr. Majda Ruge, Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins SAIS.
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11. Politics and Economics in Putin’s Fourth Term | Friday, May 18 | 9:45am – 11:00am | Atlantic Council | Register here |
As Vladimir Putin begins an unprecedented fourth term as president of Russia, his country stands at a critical crossroads. With a volatile economy and an increasingly authoritarian government, the country is facing high levels of political and economic uncertainty. At this event, Vladimir Milov, Russian opposition politician and economist, will join a panel of US-based experts to discuss the political and economic future of Putin’s Russia. Featuring Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center Dr. Anders Åslund and David M. Rubenstein Fellow at the Brookings Institution Dr. Alina Polyakova, with moderation by Director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center Ambassador John Herbst.
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12. Can Inclusive Peace Processes Work? Strategies for Meeting Resistance to Inclusion | Friday, May 18 | 10:00am – 11:30am | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
Too often, peace processes only include dueling parties — leaving women; religious, indigenous, and ethnic groups; youth; and survivors of violence excluded from critical discussions that shape the future landscape of a country. Yet, sidelining their voices often results in a resurgence of conflict and fails to achieve comprehensive or sustainable peace. Join the U.S. Institute of Peace and Conciliation Resources for a discussion on overcoming challenges to inclusive peace processes and negotiated settlements. The research draws on case studies and local perspectives with local partners from Colombia, Bougainville and Nepal, exploring how inclusion is negotiated in war to peace transitions, common barriers to and trade-offs between inclusion and stability, and types of external and internal support that have been effective. In three segments: Presentation of Findings with Zahbia Yousuf (Senior Advisor, Peace and Transition Process, Conciliation Resources) and Sophia Close (Senior Advisor, Gender and Peacebuilding, Conciliation Resources); Application and Experiences on the Ground with Deepak Thapa (Director, Social Science Baha; Kathmandu, Nepal) and Rosa Emilia Salamanca (Director, Institute for Social and Economic Research and Action; Bogota, Colombia); and Policy Implications with Esra Cuhadar (JR Senior Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace) and Jennifer Marron (Peace Process Advisor, Bureau of Conflict Stabilization and Operations, Department of State). With moderator Rosarie Tucci (Director, Inclusive Societies, U.S. Institute of Peace) and introduction by Nancy Lindborg (President, U.S. Institute of Peace).
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Winds of change in Baghdad?
- Will Abadi win a majority?
With the Dawa Party split and no clear allies at his side, Haider al-Abadi’s future as Prime Minster is in doubt without a strong showing by his Victory Alliance at the ballot box. While an electoral win doesn’t necessarily mean taking the premiership (as happened to Ayad Allawi in 2010), the knives will be out for Abadi without a clear victory. - Will Maliki be eclipsed by Ameri?
Even if Abadi’s coalition wins a plurality as polling predicts, there is a second contest for leadership in Shiite politics. Nouri al-Maliki, once “Saddam of the Shiites,” has seen his position sharply decline since his ouster in 2014. Maliki is attempting his comeback at the head of a diminished State of Law Coalition, but his rise is challenged by the entry of militia leader Hadi al-Ameri into politics, who is contesting the position as Iran’s most stringent ally in Iraq. While the Ameri and his alliance of Shiite militias are certain to be a force to be reckoned with no matter the results, a poor showing for Maliki would complete his fall into irrelevance. - Will Hakim and Sadr’s rebranding pay dividends?
One of the more surprising developments in Iraqi politics has been attempts by Shiite leaders to break away from the sectarian narrative toward a reformist angle – a trend evident in ISCI head Ammar al-Hakim abandoning his former party (Iran’s old favorite) and Moqtada al-Sadr’s shock alliance with the (questionably relevant) Iraqi Communist Party. Expect this populist trend to continue if Hakim and Sadr prove it can sway voters. - Is this the debut of a Kurdish opposition?
The disastrous results of last year’s independence referendum, adding to dissatisfaction with runaway corruption in the Kurdistan Regional Government, have greatly damaged the reputation of Iraq’s top Kurdish parties. Tomorrow’s parliamentary elections feature the first test for the newly-formed Nishtiman (Homeland) List, a coalition of Kurdish parties seeking to challenge the traditional KDP-PUK duopoly in regional elections this September. Whether or not Nishtiman emerges with more seats over their rivals, a good performance might enable Baghdad to shut out the traditional Kurdish powers in forming a government. - Is the PUK done for?
Compounding their existing problems, the PUK is weakened by a lingering succession crisis in the wake of Jalal Talabani’s death last October, which led to PUK majordomo Barham Salih’s defection to form his own party. More so than the KDP, the PUK has been on a decline since 2014 – if their voters don’t show up tomorrow the PUK’s influence in Baghdad may be at an end. - Will small parties earn enough to gain influence?
With no existing coalition predicted to win an absolute majority, small parties – the kind that have never tasted political power in Baghdad – could play an outsized role in forming a government. With the prospects of a 2010-style grand Shiite coalition unlikely, small parties could emerge as kingmakers with the latitude to push government in novel directions. - Will turnout be down?
While Iraq is at peace since the defeat of ISIS, the devastation brought by the conflict remains. While Baghdad has designed a system to allow displaced persons to vote in their home elections at any polling station across the country, with an estimated two million people still displaced across Iraq it is unlikely that voter turnout will reach the 62% of previous elections. A reasonable turnout in formerly ISIS-held areas will show if Iraq’s Sunnis have faith in the system to deliver results. - Will violence be down?
With ISIS defeated as a military force, Baghdad’s stage-managing of elections without violence will show the extent of their victory over terrorism. Iraq has never seen parliamentary elections entirely free of terrorist attacks, so even low levels will be a telling sign. - Will there be accusations of fraud?
Since 2014, Baghdad adopted a system of electronic voting equipped with biometric detectors as a means to deter low-level voter fraud. While this may succeed in deterring simple forms of fraud, we will see if it lessens accusations thereof. The existence of vote-buying by prominent parties is widely understood, a fact which a losing party could use as an excuse to delegitimize results.
Ultimately, however, what we learn from the electoral results will be only half of the story – the real test will be in the government formation negotiations to follow. But tomorrow’s elections will set the stage for a new order in Baghdad, and potentially major developments for Iraqi democracy.
PS: For more context, here is the half-hour VoA Encounter show Dr. Daniel Serwer did with Bilal Wahab and Carol Castiel Thursday, before the election:
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No formula for success
The downsides of withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal are all too obvious. But it behooves any conflict management type like me to consider the other side: what does the Administration think it will accomplish, and why do some allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia support withdrawal?
The Administration is saying that its main reason for withdrawing was the sunset clause, that is the expiration of parts of the agreement seven years from now. That sounds silly: why not wait until just before the agreement expires to threaten re-imposition of sanctions in order to negotiate a follow-on agreement? The answer is that Washington is trying to prevent Iran from gaining the economic benefits that will accrue during those seven years.
The Administration’s goal is to squeeze Iran through not only re-imposition of US sanctions but also through secondary sanctions that will dis-incentivize European, Russian, Chinese, and other companies from doing business with Tehran. Proponents of withdrawal believe this will at least limit Iranian capabilities–non-nuclear as well as nuclear–and make Iran less of a threat in the future. Some Americans seem to hope it will even bring the Islamic Republic to its knees, precipitating regime change.
These effects would depend on virtually universal adherence to the re-imposed sanctions. Why would the Europeans, Russians, and Chinese play ball? A well-informed Israeli put it this way, with respect to the Europeans: they fear war with Iran more than they fear re-imposition of sanctions. They will, in other words, go along in order to avoid an American attack on Iran. Even if you believe that–and I doubt it–it leaves Russia and China unconstrained. They are unlikely to be as easily cowed as the Europeans. They and many other countries will gladly do business with Iran, surreptitiously if not openly.
There is thus no reason to believe that sanctions can be made nearly as tight as they were in 2015 when the UN Security Council was unanimous and the nuclear deal was negotiated. Nor do I think the Europeans will buckle easily to American will. They are far more likely to try to sustain the agreement, which is what Iranian President Rouhani is saying he wants to do as well, so long as Tehran sees the consequent economic benefits.
If the Europeans withdraw, I suspect the Iranians will ramp up their enrichment activity and weapons research so as to reduce their breakout time to well under the one year the nuclear deal was designed to maintain. But Tehran will also want enough transparency through international inspections to ensure that the Israelis and Americans can be reasonably confident they are not actually producing nuclear weapons. It is not in Tehran’s interest for there to be any doubt on that score, since Israel can be expected to react or even pre-empt in kind if it perceives that it might be subject to a nuclear attack.
As for the hope that Iran may be constrained or even fatally weakened by re-imposed sanctions, that day is far off. It suits the Islamic Republic, especially its hardliners, well to have a foreign enemy it can blame for its own economic failures. The public demonstrations of the last year or so occurred precisely because the regime could no longer blame only the foreigners. Nor do I know of any regime that has wanted nuclear weapons that couldn’t find the financial resources to fund the program. North Korea has demonstrated how even a very poor country can do it. Iran will do likewise, no matter what sanctions are re-imposed.
As in many things, Trump has over-estimated his own power and underestimated his enemy. That is not a formula for success.
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BIG mistake
As expected, Donald Trump today announced American withdrawal from the nuclear deal, re-imposition of sanctions, and a threat of sanctions against any country that helps Iran’s economy. He justifies these moves on the basis of Iran’s missile program, support for terrorists and regional behavior, none of which are covered under the agreement.
It is uncertain what will happen next, but it is Tehran’s move. Its main options are
- Maintain the nuclear agreement, along with Europe, China and Russia. That will create an enormous split in the West and discourage allies in Asia from joining with the US in a nuclear agreement with North Korea. It will also provide Iran with the lion’s share of the economic benefits it was promised, at least until the US levies secondary sanctions on European, Russian and Chinese banks and companies that do business with Iran. When the US does that, it will drive the Europeans into the arms of the Iranians, Chinese and Russians.
- Withdraw itself and re-embark on its nuclear weapons program. It is likely not much more than a year from having nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. We won’t know as much as we do today about Iran’s nuclear capability, because the Iranians will likely kick out the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. Tehran may try to maintain some level of nuclear transparency, not least because of the risks associated with misunderstanding of its intentions. No one in Iran should want Israel to conclude that a nuclear weapon is being mounted on a missile. We all know how the Israelis would deal with that eventuality.
I’d bet on Tehran choosing Option 1, which provides economic and diplomatic benefit not available in Option 2.
In both options, the US and Israel are losers. Trump has done precisely what the hardliners in Iran have wanted. His pitch at the end of his TV appearance to the Iranian people will fall on deaf ears, crowded out by the chorus of denunciation of the US and its unreliability. Some of the hardliners will want to retaliate against the US in Iraq, Syria, or even in the US.
This is the worst US foreign policy decision since the invasion of Iraq, but with one important difference: the entire intelligence community and a good part of the cabinet believes Iran has been fulfilling the terms of the nuclear agreement and the US is wrong to withdraw. President Bush at least had the lame excuse that the intelligence community told him Saddam Hussein was developing nuclear weapons. This president has no one else to blame for a blatantly BIG mistake.
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