Month: May 2018
Peace picks, May 7 – May 13
- War by Other Means: Russian Disinformation Undermining Democracy, Spurring Conflict | Monday, May 7 | 2:00pm – 3:00pm | U.S. Institute for Peace | Register here |
Russia’s concerted disinformation campaign against the West is sowing confusion and distrust and undermining democratic institutions from Ukraine to the United States. Anne Applebaum—a Pulitzer Prize-winning author, thought leader and commentator on politics and foreign policy—and U.S. Institute of Peace Executive Vice President William Taylor will discuss the challenges to the West from Russian aggression and the weapons of disinformation and disruption, and what the United States and its allies need to do to respond. Join USIP for an engaging and timely discussion about Russia’s influence on democratic processes in both Ukraine and the United States. Featuring Anne Applebaum (Washington Post columnist, Pulitzer-Prize winning author and Professor of Practice, Institute of Global Affairs, London School of Economics) and William Taylor (Executive Vice President, USIP).
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- The Future of War and Challenges for Humanitarians – Featuring the President of the ICRC | Monday, May 7 | 2:00pm – 3:30pm | Wilson Center | Register here |
Will tomorrow’s wars be fought on the same terms as today’s? How will humanitarians need to adapt? Digitalization, artificial intelligence, and big data are transforming our world – and new technologies, such as autonomous weapons and the tools of cyber warfare, are new cause for humanitarian concern. Featuring Peter Maurer (President, International Committee of the Red Cross), Ambassador Martin Dahinden (Ambassador of Switzerland to the United States), Amb. Andreas Kellerhals (Director, Europa Institute, University of Zurich), and Robert S. Litwak (Senior Vice President and Director of International Security Studies, Wilson Center), as moderator. With introductory remarks by Jane Harman (Director, President, and CEO, Wilson Center).
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- Governance and Security in North Africa and the Sahel | Tuesday, May 8 | 9:00am – 3:30 pm | Carnegie Endowment | Register here |
This conference brings together leading scholars, policy analysts, and practitioners from around the world to address the changing political, socioeconomic, and security dynamics within the Maghreb-Sahel region. Panelists will examine the expanding horizons of insecurity and the challenges of uneven development, political contestation, and socio-religious change. They will also discuss the wider implications of the trends for development, peace, and security in both regions.
Panel 1: Contestation and Adaptation in the Maghreb (9:00am – 10:30am) featuring Anouar Boukhars (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Azzedine Layachi (St. John’s University), Sarah Yerkes (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), and Michele Dunne (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) as moderator.
Panel 2: The Challenges of Governance and Security in the Sahel (10:45am – 12:15pm) featuring Boubacar N’Diaye (Wooster College), Ibrahim Yahya Ibrahim (University of Florida), Ousseina Alidou (Rutgers University), Azeez Olaniyan (Ekiti State University, Nigeria), and Cyril Obi (African Peacebuilding Network, Social Science Research Council) as moderator.
Panel 3: Cross-Border Security Challenges (12:45pm – 2:00pm) featuring Jacques Roussellier (American Military University, South Africa), Mohamed Gain (Ibn Tofail University, Morocco), Rawia Tawfik (Cairo University), and Anouar Boukhars (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) as moderator.
Panel 4: Libya’s Impact on Sahel-Maghreb Security (2:15pm – 3:30pm) featuring Lydia Sizer (Independent Consultant), Karim Mezran (Atlantic Council), Manal Taha (USIP), and Frederic Wehrey (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) as moderator.
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- The Rise of China’s Private Security Companies | Tuesday, May 8| 10:00am –11:30am | Carnegie Endowment | Register here |
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative includes many state-owned enterprises that are operating in foreign countries for the first time and face unprecedented security issues. Instead of relying on the People’s Liberation Army or People’s Armed Police, hundreds of newly formed private security companies (PSCs) have been created to provide security services for these new ventures. Aside from the competence of these PSCs, questions remain regarding their effectiveness as a stand-in for the Chinese military and ability to work in harmony with China’s state interests. Featuring Alessandro Arduino (Co-Director, Security and Crisis Management Program, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences) and Michael D. Swaine (Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).
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- Trump and the JCPOA: It’s the End of the World As We Know It? | Wednesday, May 9 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |
The Trump Administration is expected to announce plans later this month for U.S. participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), better known as the Iran Deal. With John Bolton directing the National Security Council, Mike Pompeo confirmed as the new Secretary of State, and Secretary James Mattis at the helm of the Defense Department, the President’s foreign policy team is in place. But while all the President’s men have successfully established their ability to influence the administration’s policy, their recommendations for U.S. participation in the JCPOA have been contradictory to date. Secretary Mattis has signaled that he supports the U.S. remaining in the Iran Deal, while Secretary Pompeo and Bolton seem to support withdrawal. Panelists include Michael Doran (Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute), Michael Pregent (Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute), Richard Goldberg (Senior Advisor, Foundation for Defense of Democracies), and Behnam Ben Taleblu (Research Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies).
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- Forty Years of U.S.-China Relations | Friday, May 11 | 8:30pm – 1:30pm | CSIS | Register here |
The United States and China are approaching the 40th anniversary of the establishment of formal diplomatic relations. To commemorate this historic milestone, CSIS is hosting a half-day event on the morning of May 11, 2018, to discuss the twists and turns in the relationship over the last four decades and the challenges that lay ahead. The conference will feature key policy figures and experts from both the United States and China. It will begin with a keynote address from a current member of Congress, then have two star-studded panels discussing “The First 40 Years” and “The Next 40 Years,” and then wrap up with a luncheon armchair discussion.
Panel 1: The First Forty (9:25 am – 10:40 am) featuring Mr. James Mann (Scholar-in-Residence, Johns Hopkins SAIS), Amb. Charlene Barshefsky (Partner, WilmerHale), Dr. Suisheng (Sam) Zhao (Director, Center for China-U.S. Cooperation, University of Denver), Dr. Wang (Henry) Huiyao (President, Center for China and Globalization) and Dr. Scott Kennedy (Deputy Director, Freeman Chair in China Studies, CSIS) as moderator.
Panel 2: The Next Forty (10:50am – 12:00pm) featuring Mr. Daniel H. Rosen (Partner, The Rhodium Group), Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro (Assistant Professor, Georgetown University), Dr. Chen Dongxiao (President, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies), Mr. Wang Wen (Executive Dean, Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China), and Bonnie S. Glaser (Senior Adviser for Asia & Director, China Power Project, CSIS) as moderator.
Luncheon & Armchair Discussion: US-China Relations at a Crossroad (12:00pm – 1:30pm) featuring Sec. William S. Cohen (Chairman & Chief Executive Officer, The Cohen Group), Amb. Cui Tiankai (Chinese Ambassador to the United States), and Mr. Christopher K. Johnson (Senior Adviser and Freeman Chair in China Studies, CSIS) as moderator.
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The faster the better
The Trump Administration is well into the process of self-destruction. The evidence:
- It can’t decide whether the President himself paid hush money to a porn star or his enforcer/fixer did it without his knowledge.
- The Trump real estate empire disposed of large quantities of cash of uncertain origin in the decade prior to the 2016 election.
- Efforts to negotiate more favorable trade deals with China, Canada and Mexico are bellying up.
- Economic and job growth are slowing and the stock market has stalled.
- Trump has created a lose-lose situation for himself on the Iran nuclear deal and is headed in that direction with North Korea.
Any one of these items would be devastating to most American administrations, but Trump has managed to lower the bar for presidential performance so dramatically it hardly matters at this point.
With regard to items 1 and 2, I’m confident the Special Counsel will find the answers. He has the computers, cell phones and other records of Trump’s personal lawyer. He no doubt also has ample financial records for the Trump enterprises. Let’s wait for his investigation to discover the truth, which I doubt will be pretty.
Trump’s aggressive approach to trade is producing an equally aggressive reaction. The Chinese booted his proposals last week. Mexico and Canada are stiffening their resistance. Trump could end up imposing tariffs that will spark retaliation against American food and other exports, shredding the rural and manufacturing support that was vital to his election. Meanwhile, the trade deficit is up since his election, but no one notices because he makes so much noise.
The same is true for the economy more generally. While the press for some reason continues to laud economic and job growth figures that are no better (and recently worse) than the Obama performance they categorized as “lackluster,” the business cycle is aging and Trump’s initiatives are all inflationary. His tariffs, tax cuts, and overblown budget deficit are generating inflation and will soon cause a rise in interest rates, precipitating a slowdown and likely a recession. This could happen well before the 2020 election, if not before this year’s Congressional contests.
On the nuclear deal with Iran, Trump will either stay in despite his often expressed preference or get out, causing either a major rift with Europe or triggering an Iranian push to get nuclear weapons. That’s a lose-lose. Likewise with North Korea: either he buys what Kim Jong-un is selling, which won’t be the US goal of complete, irreversible or verifiable denuclearization, or he walks away without a Plan B. That too is a lose-lose.
You can’t sell flim flam forever. Sooner or later it all catches with you. That’s what’s happening. The faster the better.
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More on Bosnia’s election law
Slaven Kovačević writes:
Still another meeting about possible changes of the Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina has ended without agreement, which some will consider bad. I think this is the best solution at the moment, because it is not true that without agreement implementation of the future electoral results will be impossible.
That claim is based on the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) incorrect interpretation of the Constitutional Court’s Ljubić decision. The intention is to create pressure for changes to the BiH Election Law that advantage the HDZ, diminishing the basic human rights of a significant number of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina who live in environments beyond the HDZ’s direct political control.
In addition, the HDZ demands that the Election Law be amended to include election of members of the BiH Presidency, whereas the Constitutional Court of BiH rejected that part of the Ljubić appeal. The HDZ also abuses the Venice Commission, which at the end of its opinion made it clear that the current system for choosing members of the Federation House of Peoples is in line with the European electoral principles and standards.
The HDZ arguments are political in nature and not legal. The basic question is this: is the Federation formed from cantons or peoples, as HDZ claims? Under the Washington Agreement, the Federation of BiH is composed of federal units, later established in the Constitution as cantons. Here is an extract from the original Washington Agreement:
Bosniacs and Croats, as constituent peoples (along with others) and citizens of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, transform the internal structure of the territories with a majority of Bosniac and Croat population in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina into a Federation, which is composed of federal units with equal rights and responsibilities.
The choice of delegates to the House of Peoples is based on the implementation of Annex VII of the Dayton Peace Agreement (return of all expelled citizens to their pre-war homes). As long as this process is not completed, the 1991 census is to be applied, in order to avoid legalizing the results of genocide and ethnic cleansing. This is a constitutional provision that cannot be put out of force unless someone, like the High Representative (HR) or a competent state body, declares the return of expelled citizens ended. As this has not happened, this current legal norm remains in force. The current system under the FBiH Constitution is in line with the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The BiH Constitutional Court cannot contradict the European Court.
All citizens of the Federation of BiH must fully enjoy their civil and political rights, more precisely to elect and be elected to all legislative organs. The HDZ wants a consociational democracy, but one not based on the proportion of Croats throughout the country but rather one based only on four cantons that the HDZ controls. The HDZ’s efforts to change the BiH Election Law were motivated by their wish to legally mark part of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory as a “third entity.” Croatia and Russia support these efforts, in contradiction to the Dayton Peace Agreement, jeopardizing the entire political system.
The idea of blocking implementation of the election results is political, not legal. The earlier, 2011 HDZ effort to block implementation of electoral results led to the intervention of the High Representative. Annex 10 of the Framework Dayton Peace Agreement would still require the High Representative to intervene again to secure fair and democratic elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which means that he would then be obliged to intervene again.
The elections last until the moment of implementation of the electoral results, which are an integral part of the electoral process. It is important to relieve the public of unnecessary fears about changes to the Election Law of BiH and devote efforts instead to announcing, holding and implementing elections. This would enable other, more important issues to be discussed, such as the motives of tens of thousands of young citizens of Bosnia Herzegovina who leave Bosnia every year and seek for their better life abroad.
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Croatian Assembly of Bosnia says I’m wrong
Josip Merdžo, Secretary General of the Croatian National Assembly BiH, writes:
In your article ‘Bosnia’s teapot tempest’ released at peacefare.net, May, 2nd, 2018, several inaccurate facts were made regarding the decision of the Constitutional Court of BiH U-23/14 related to the request made by Mr. Ljubic for reviewing the constitutionality of the Election Law. Obviously, you did not read this request because in your article you said that „… Ljubić asked the Court to forbid the Croats from Sarajevo, Tuzla and Bihać from becoming members of the House of Peoples of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina“, which is not true, and you can check it by reviewing the Constitutional Court’s decision U-23/14.
You also claim „He argued that Croat candidates should be elected only out of the majority Croat cantons, thus ensuring that only Croats vote for Croat delegates“,obviously not knowing the provisions of the Constitution FBiH and Election Law which precisely foresee that each constituent people within their own club in cantonal assemblies elect delegates for The House of Peoples.
Mr. Serwer, this is not about politics, it is just about legal arguments. The elections are conducted in accordance with the Election Law. Currently, the Election Law lacks a part that the Constitutional Court has abolished and there is no possibility to form the House of Peoples of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the House of Peoples at the state level.
Yes, this provision remains in the Entity Constitution of FBiH, but if I am not mistaken, the Constitution of BiH and the decision of the BiH Constitutional Court are above the Entity Constitution. So there is no legal ability to carry out what you are writing about.
You mention the situation after the 2010 elections when the OHR suspended the CEC decision when the session of the House of Peoples was annulled because the President of the Federation was elected in an improper manner. If you had tried to be better informed, you would never use this shameful move by the OHR and international community as a positive example.
According to the Election Law, the mandate of the legislative bodies lasts four years. It is unclear how you make the conclusion that this mandate can be extended after the expiry of this deadline. An example is found in the OHR standpoint on the City Council of Mostar. After the end of the mandate, the City Council no longer exists although the elections were not held for reasons because no amendment to the Election Law was made.
How little do you know about the things you are writing about is demonstrated once again in the fact that you are looking for the OHR and the international institutions not to apply the 2013 census but 1991 census! The BiH Constitution does not mention any census regarding electoral issues at all. The Entity Constitution of the FBiH in Amendment 52 Article 11a, states that the public institutions apply a 1991 census, namely: “Ministries in the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Cantonal Governments, Municipal Authorities, Cantonal and Municipal Courts in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina . “, So the 1991 census does not apply to the legislative bodies.
If you look at the valid provisions of the Election Law of BiH, you could also find that the “last census” is mentioned as a benchmark on a number of occasions, and the latest census is 2013. Also, Constitutional Court decisions U-23/14 and U-3/17 refer exclusively to the application of the 2013 census.
Dear Mr. Serwer, I do not intend to comment on your dealing with the HDZ, third entity, separatist tendencies, etc., which are commonly found in the performances of extreme Bosniak elements. That just proves that you are dominantly trying to enforce political interpretations instead of legal ones, and here we are talking about the implementation of the Constitutional Court’s decision.
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Bosnia’s teapot tempest
In December 2016, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) ruled partially in favor of a complaint lodged by former Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ) politician Božo Ljubić. At issue was the state election law provision dictating that cantons delegate at least one representative from each of the country’s three main ethnic groups to the Federation BiH House of Peoples. Ljubić argued that the Croat influence in cantons with majority Bosniak populations was unfairly diminished in the selection of delegates. He argued that Croat candidates therefore should be elected only out of majority Croat cantons, thereby ensuring that only Croats vote for Croat delegates. In effect, Ljubić asked the Court to forbid the Croats from Sarajevo, Tuzla and Bihać from becoming members of the House of Peoples of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Court partially agreed with Ljubić. The ruling struck down a portion of the country’s election law, stating that it must be amended within six months, without specifying changes. In previous, unrelated cases, the Court prescribed temporary solutions that enabled a ruling implementation; however, it declined to do so in this instance.
This has led some, especially HDZ leadership, to argue that a legal vacuum now exists, claiming that the failure to amend the law could render the October general elections invalid or, alternatively, prevent government formation at the Federation entity level, ultimately leading to a total political paralysis and the collapse of the social security system.
This argument is not legal, but political.
The Constitution of the Federation BiH clearly regulates the election of delegates to the entity and state-level House of Peoples, as based on Annex VII of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). Annex VII provides that all citizens can live and exercise their civil and political rights – including the right to vote and be elected – in their pre-war residence, as well as throughout the country. Furthermore, the Federation entity Constitution states that the 1991 Census has to be used in determining the number of delegates in the Federation House of Peoples. Disregarding this requirement amounts to rewarding the results of ethnic cleansing and genocide.
The said provisions of the Federation Constitution remain fully valid. Moreover, they are in line with the European Court of Human Rights rulings. Consequently, some of the members of the Central Election Commission (CEC) have publicly stated that the CEC can and will use the Federation BiH Constitution and the valid provisions of the state election law to elect delegates to the Federation entity House of Peoples.
The HDZ appears to be misreading the Court’s decision in order to justify its planned prevention of the election of delegates from four cantons controlled by the HDZ (West Herzegovina, Posavina, Livno, and Herzegovina-Neretva) to the Federation entity’s House of Peoples. The ruse of electoral illegitimacy and the resulting crisis is simply another effort toward the HDZ’s territorial ambitions of creating a so-called “third entity.” In this, the HDZ leaders are publicly backed by the Government of Croatia and the Russian Federation.
The HDZ staged a similar production following the 2010 election, when it tried to block government formation by refusing to elect delegates from the four aforementioned cantons. Their abstention from political participation failed – despite support afforded by Milorad Dodik’s SNSD – when the Office of the High Representative (OHR) intervened to enable the formation of the Federation BiH government.
The DPA envisages the OHR as the final arbiter precisely because no other final adjudicating authority exists within the legal order established by the DPA, of which Constitution of BiH is an integral part. Should the HDZ employ the same tactic following the October 2018 elections, the OHR can end the impasse by intervening in the same manner as in 2011 or, alternatively, by simply imposing the Federation BiH 2019 budget before the December 31, 2018 deadline. Marinko Čavara, the HDZ-appointed Federation BiH president, can dissolve the Federation BiH parliament only if the legislative body fails to adopt the entity budget before the end of calendar year.
Furthermore, the HDZ cannot prevent formation of the BiH Council of Ministers, which is elected solely by the state-level House of Representatives. In its 2011 decision, the Constitutional Court recognized the legal status of Sulejman Tihić as a standing member of the BiH House of Peoples despite the HDZ’s and SNSD’s claims that the delegates’ previous mandates expired after new elections had been held. The Court ruled in favor of the continuity of government in principle, meaning that officials must continue performing their tasks until new ones are sworn in. Thus, the state-level legislature continued to function despite HDZ and SNSD belligerence.
Under this precedent, similar attempts at disruption by HDZ (or other) delegates will not lead to the disruption of the BiH legal order, as the HDZ and others falsely claim, nor will it be the end of BiH as an internationally recognized state, as both the HDZ and SNSD hope. The Ljubić ruling will not render invalid the results of the 2018 general election or deny government formation as long as the international community stands by the letter and the spirit of the DPA. The OHR should continue to fulfill the legal obligation thrust upon it by the international guarantors of the DPA, of which the US – the architect of the Bosnian peace – is of supreme importance.
The OHR and the international community cannot allow the 2013 Census results to be used as the basis for determining the formula for allocation of House of People delegates because that would directly violate the Federation BiH Constitution, annul the Annex VII of DPA, and amount to accepting the results of ethnic cleansing.
The implementation of the Ljubić decision in the spirit of HDZ’s interpretation would be equivalent to a contemporary “Three-Fifths Compromise.” The United States has a moral obligation not to allow such “solutions” to be implemented under its watch.
Furthermore, the implementation of the Ljubić decision in the spirit of HDZ’s interpretation would only embolden HDZ’s and SNSD’s ever-growing separatist ambitions, spelling instability and a likely return to conflict in the not too distant future – a security nightmare in the heart of Europe that would be more than welcomed by the Kremlin.
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Backfire
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu yesterday obliterated his own argument against the Iran nuclear deal. Let’s leave aside whether it is appropriate for a country that has clandestinely produced nuclear weapons to criticize others for attempting to do the same thing. Netanyahu presented evidence that before 2004 Iran had such a clandestine nuclear weapons program. This is well known and confirmed at the time by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It is a major reason the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is needed: to stop and to some extent reverse Iran’s progress toward nuclear weapons.
Netanyahu doesn’t like the JCPOA because some of its provisions expire in the 2020s and none of its provisions deal with ballistic missiles. What he has failed to explain is how the US withdrawing from the deal now would fix that or in any other way make Israel and the US better off. The Europeans have made it plain they will stick with the deal if the Iranians do. The Iranians are divided: some want to keep to it while others want to withdraw. If they continue the deal with the Europeans, US re-imposition of sanctions is unlikely to get Tehran to negotiate a follow-on agreement. The sanctions worked in 2015 because everyone was supporting them. If the Iranians withdraw, they can go hell bent for nuclear weapons immediately.
If US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal doesn’t benefit Israel, what then might Netanyahu be trying to achieve? One possibility is a crisis that would result in a US attack on Iran’s remaining nuclear facilities. Another is the worsening of Iran’s economic situation to encourage demonstrations and eventual regime change.
Both of these are dicey propositions. While the US certainly now has an excellent idea of precisely where the nuclear facilities are located (credit to the IAEA), any attack on them would precipitate Iranian retaliation against US forces and civilians in the Gulf, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere, in addition attacks on Israel from Gaza, Lebanon and Syria as well as from Iran. Trying to prompt regime change is always iffy, but especially so in an Islamic Republic that has weathered several episodes of mass demonstrations that might have brought down a less entrenched or less brutal regime.
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Netanyahu is pushing for a withdrawal from the JCPOA without any clear notion of what the benefits might be. That however isn’t likely to phase Donald Trump, whose ability to reason things through is limited. He likes acting on impulse, especially when flattered by someone he thinks well of like Netanyahu. Sheldon Adelson’s campaign contributions are no doubt another factor in favor of withdrawal.
Fortunately, there will be some in the Administration who will argue against, noting that the US has already gotten most of the benefits withdrawal might produce: the Europeans are open to discussing a follow-on agreement that could encompass ballistic missiles and banks have hesitated to provide financing to Iran and those who want to do business there. The US, by contrast, continues to benefit from the IAEA inspections and the delay in Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Secretary of Defense Mattis has made it plain that Iran is complying with the JCPOA, which has ample provision for verification. He no doubt also understands that the prospects for a nuclear deal with North Korea, already dim, would evaporate entirely if the US walks away from the JCPOA.
So Netanyahu’s showy non-TED talk yesterday was unconvincing. I’d would say it even backfired. The US (and Israel) will be far better off if the US stays in the nuclear deal.
PS: A chat April 30 with someone well-informed about Israel suggested Netanyahu’s aim is to get the Europeans to re-impose sanctions, so that the Iran of the 2020s is far less resource-rich than it would be otherwise. Asked why the Europeans would do that, I was told they are more afraid of war with Iran than they are of reimposing sanctions. That game is called chicken and often ends in catastrophe.
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